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Abstract
This work focuses on the history of the Fang people of Equatorial Guinea 
between 1927 and 1979 in an effort to shed some light on the so-called process of 
retraditionalization that African societies have been undergoing for the last three 
decades. Contrary to those views that expected that independence would consolidate 
the process of modernization initiated by colonialism, many African countries, 
including Equatorial Guinea, have seen how traditional structures have gained ground 
ever since. This process is often explained as a result of the so-called crisis of 
modernity. It is argued that, due to the instability provoked by rapid modernization 
and the failure of modern structures, Africans are recovering their old ways in search 
for solutions. This explanation, however, stands against those views that considered 
that colonial conquest put an end to African traditional systems. This thesis argues 
that, although traditions are certainly back, this is, in fact, a new phenomenon, which 
started with the advent of colonial conquest.
This work shows how colonial structures and the changes that followed resulted 
in the collapse of the traditional social model. In response to such situation, a new 
socio-cultural tradition, rooted in the old one, took fomi -  being the development of 
modem Fang identity its most salient element. Research specifically focuses on 
transformations in authority, religious beliefs and identity, as well as their 
relationship. Much emphasis is put on the historicity of the process, covering three 
main historical stages such as the second half of the nineteenth century, the period of 
colonial conquest and domination between the 1910s and 1968, and the aftermath of 
independence between 1968 and 1979.
This work does not only examine a peculiar colonial model, the Spanish, on 
which very little has been written, but also an African society that the English 
language literature has largely ignored. In so doing, research has relied on both oral 
sources and documents. Interviews were conducted in Equatorial Guinea. Archival 
sources were examined both in Alacala de Henares (Madrid), where Spain’s public 
records are based, and Rome, where part of the documents of the Claretian missionary 
order can be found.
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Note on Spelling
Fang or Beti languages are spoken, in multiple variations and dialects, across most of 
southern Cameroon, northern and Central Gabon, Rio Muni and the northwestern 
corner of the Republic of Congo. Although mutually understandable, the languages 
both lack a standardized and written version, and it is always difficult to decide how 
to best transcribe Fang-Beti vocabulary. In addition to the difficulties posed by the 
existence of numerous dialects, the languages have traditionally been transcribed 
according to the phonetic rules of the language of the colonizer; namely French, 
German and Spanish. For the puipose of this work, I have followed, the transcription 
model used by Julian Bibang Oyee in his book Curso de lengua fang. For reasons of 
clarity, however, I have replaced the sign -rj, representing the characteristic nasal 
Fang-Beti phoneme, for -ng. Furthermore, I have maintained the accepted spelling of 
public figures, such as Macias Nguema, whose name should actually be transcribed 
Ngema.
Glossary
Abaa: palaver house
Administrador territorial: District officer 
Afri Kara: Fang-Beti mythical ancestor 
Ayong: Clan
Benga: Coastal people of Rio Muni 
Beyele: Pigmy people of Rio Muni 
Beti: Name of the Cameroonian Fang 
Biere: Ancestor statue
Bisio / Bujeba / Osyeba: People of Rio Muni and Gabon 
Bubi: Indigenous people of Bioko 
Bulu: Fang-Beti dialectal group of Cameroon 
Bwiti: Religious movement of Gabon and Rio Muni 
Demarcacion: District
Direccion General de Marruecos y Colonias (DGMC): Head Office for Morocco 
and the Colonies
Direccion General de Plazas y Provincias Africanas (DGPPA): Head Office for 
African Towns and Provinces 
Dzaa: Village
Ekwele (pi. bikwele): Sanaga-Ogowe currency
Emancipado: African with full citizen rights
No-emancipado: African without citizen rights
E’Lat-Ayong: Fang-Beti affirmative movement
Evu: Living being responsible for witchcraft powers
Ewondo: Fang-Beti dialectal group of Cameroon
Fang-Fang: Fang-Beti dialectal group of Gabon and Rio Muni
Fernandino: Creole people of Bioko
Fernando Po: Present-day Bioko
Claretian: Catholic missionary order
Indigena: Native African (no-emancipado)
Jefe: Chief
Kombe: Coastal people of Rio Muni
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Mbwo: Witchcraft, sorcery
Mebe’e: One of the Sanaga-Ogowe names for God 
Melan: Sanaga-Ogowe ancestor cult 
Mlnnama / midzaa: Sanaga-Ogowe community leader 
Mvok: Village
Mvok-e’bot: Extended family with a commoon polygamous grandfather 
great-grandfather 
Nda-e’bot: Smallest family structure
Ndowe / Playero: Modem name of Rio Muni’s coastal peoples
NMkuma (pi. mikukuma): Administrative chief
Nnem (pi. beyem): Sorcerer, witch
Nswa: Bridewealth
Ntangan (pi. Mitangan): European
Ntangan-ngongoo (pi, mitangan-mingongoo): Missionary 
Ntem: River at the border between Cameroon and Rio Muni 
Ntoo (pi. botoo): Elder
Ntumu: Fang-Beti dialectal group of Cameroon and Rio Mimi
Nzama: One of the Sanaga-Ogowe names for God
Nyaamboro (pi. benyaamboro): Elder
Oban: Period of raids
Ogowe: Gabonese river
Okak: Fang-Beti dialect group of Rio Muni
Pahouin / Pamue / Pangwe: Colonial name referring to the Fang-Beti
Patronato de Indigen as: Guardian institution for no-emancipados
Prestacion personal: Compulsory communal work for Africans
Reduccion: Missionary sub-station
Rio Muni: Mainland Equatorial Guinea
So: Sanaga-Ogowe initiation rite
Tribunal de raza: Colonial native court
Wele: River of central Rio Muni
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Introduction
Six years ago I had the opportunity to attend a lecture at King’s College, London, 
in which Patrick Chabal outlined the main ideas of his and J.P. Daloz’s book, Africa 
Works. Chabal explained that we should analyse present political conditions in Africa 
from an outlook in which African political actors have been able to elaborate an 
effective political system through the 4instrumentalization of disorder’. In other 
words, by internalizing the climate of apparent chaos, Africans have found local tools 
to deal with disorder and obtain the maximum benefit from it.1 Indeed, I could lay 
numerous parallels between Chabal and Daloz’s analysis and the political situation in 
Equatorial Guinea, from where I had returned only a few months before. Nonetheless, 
Chabal’s presentation left me with a few unanswered questions and an undeniable 
sense of discomfort. For some time, I wondered if indeed Africa works and I had been 
mistaken all along. Yet, whenever I tried to answer this question, the same image 
always came up in my mind, an expensive vehicle on the unpaved tracks that 
crisscross Equatorial Guinea. This vehicle is sometimes broken-down and sometimes 
stuck in the mud, but it always carries a bunch of politicians and top government 
officials, who see through the windows how they are moving, thinking that the car 
works just fine. At the rear, however, a group of villagers laboriously push the vehicle 
forward and silently wonder why these powerful men cannot find another way to 
make the car move.
Equatorial Guinea does not work: it is a dysfunctional society that struggles to 
deal with daily challenges and often fails in finding solutions to pressing difficulties. 
Like many other countries across the continent, Equatorial Guinea suffers from a so- 
called crisis of modernity. This term seems to refer to the difficulties that
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fundamentally traditional societies experience as a result of modem transformations, 
such as those deriving from the establishment of the nation-state model or the 
capitalist economy. The most obvious consequence of this crisis is the process of 
retraditionalization or Africanization that the continent has been experiencing since 
independence and which has attracted the attention of political scientists and 
anthropologists for nearly two decades. This process does not only involve the revival 
of ‘traditional’ institutions such as kinship ideology, clientelism and most notoriously 
witchcraft beliefs, but it has also affected ‘modem’ institutions inherited from the 
colonial era, which have been re-appropriated or Africanized, as Bayart pointed out in 
his pioneering study at the end of the 1980s.
Scholars were generally caught by surprise by a phenomenon that very few could 
foresee in the immediate aftermath of the independence process. Certainly, some 
authors, such as Fernandez, were aware of the existence of lingering institutions of 
precolonial origin, yet most views interpreted this as remains of a transitional period 
that modernization, now boosted by sovereign governments, would eventually 
eliminate.3 Since the 1980s, inspired by the emergence of so-called authenticity or 
Mobutu-style regimes across Africa in the previous decade, historians turned their 
attention to traditions, which had been almost exclusively studied by anthropologists 
until then. In 1983, Ranger’s seminal study focused on the historical development of 
traditions in the last century, questioning the historicity of modem African traditions, 
which he considered to be the outcome of a process of ‘invention’ or manipulation 
that followed colonial conquest.4 Ranger’s analysis was influenced by the dominant 
historiographic view that portrayed the colonial conquest as a watershed in the history 
of Africa. The pervasiveness of traditions across most of the continent, however, led 
scholars to question this approach, as the growing influence of traditions in Africa
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suggested a pattern of continuity between precolonial and postcolonial African 
societies.
Today, very few have doubts about the retraditionalization of African societies. In 
Equatorial Guinea, the influence of so-called traditional institutions and ideas is rather 
obvious, to the point of shocking Equatorial Guineans who return home after having 
lived abroad for the last few decades. At a theoretical level, I had been inclined to 
think that African societies needed to re-appropriate European institutions so they 
could better suit local needs. Nonetheless, the reality on the ground appeared to 
contradict the theory. Despite the absence of active dissatisfaction, one can perceive 
Equatorial Guineans’ discontent with the current social, political and economic 
conditions -  and the recent oil boom has barely changed the situation. Amongst the 
Fang majority, whenever someone expresses his frustration with Equatorial Guinea’s 
condition, it is not uncommon to hear expressions such as wd kobo abe, wd kobo 
politik (literally, ‘you are talking bad, so you are talking politics’). The mere 
complaint about the lack of running water or electricity is interpreted as a political 
comment or criticism against the government and it is likely to be punished. For those 
who argue about the continuity between precolonial and postcolonial societies, 
problems in Africa are to a large extent explained by the presence of precolonial 
values that are at odds with the hegemonic institutions inherited from colonialism.5
Although I believe that cultural issues play an important role in the problems of 
African societies today, it is hard to accept the continuation of precolonial elements as 
a major factor. In fact, my experience in Equatorial Guinea reveals that there is not a 
clear-cut comiection between precolonial and postcolonial traditions. Although it is 
not commonly admitted, Equatorial Guineans of a certain age are able to identify clear 
changes in traditional institutions and beliefs over the course of their lifetime. To Jan
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Vansina, the colonial conquest was a turning point in the history of Equatorial Africa, 
as the ‘tradition’ that ruled these societies for almost a millennium came to an end due 
to the loss of sovereignty.6 In Paths in the Rainforests, Vansina describes Equatorial 
African societies as complex realities in which social, political and economic 
institutions maintain an intimate relationship thanks to the interplay of people’s ideas 
and actions. To claim that certain areas of precolonial societies remained untouched 
by colonialism, as Feierman and Gray do, amounts to ignoring the effect that, on the 
one hand, material transformations have on ‘discourse’, and, on the other, the 
relationship that authority structures maintain with the ‘invisible realm’.7
If indeed colonial conquest put an end to the system of traditional institutions and 
ideas that dominated Equatorial African societies, the question that remains to be 
answered is how is it possible that the process of retraditionalization is taking place. I 
shall show how the revival of traditions is, in fact, part of a process that followed 
colonial conquest and that resulted in the development of new yet ‘traditional’ 
institutions and ideas -  what I call the new tradition. For this purpose, I shall focus on 
the Fang of Equatorial Guinea between 1927 and 1979. Although I agree with 
Vansina that the loss of sovereignty of Equatorial Africans resulted in the collapse of 
the existing tradition, I shall argue that local communities managed to retain enough 
autonomy to transform traditional institutions and ideas, so they could adapt to the 
conditions imposed by colonial domination. In this respect, the new tradition is an 
example of continuity, despite the fact that the colonial state first and the postcolonial 
state later imposed a series of limitations that have strongly influenced this ongoing 
process.
To question the impact of the imposition of the colonial state upon decentralized 
societies like those of Rio Muni (the mainland of Equatorial Guinea) is only
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reasonable insofar as it helps us to qualify previous statements that characterized this 
event as a sharp historical break. The Spanish conquest of Rio Muni in the 1920s 
triggered off a series of transformations that resulted in the formation of the modem 
Fang society. As Vansina argues, in the past, local communities in this region enjoyed 
a large degree of autonomy that very much shaped their social and cultural structures. 
From the beginning of the twentieth century, these communities became, for the first 
time, subjects of a centralized political structure, the state, as the Spanish moved 
further into the interior. As subjects of an authoritarian regime, these communities lost 
a large part of their autonomy. The end of colonial domination in 1968 did not bring 
this situation to an end. If anything, it made matters worse because the postcolonial 
state became much more invasive than its predecessor. Both in the colony and the 
postcolony, Equatorial Guineans have been characterized for being more reactive than 
proactive; that is, their decisions are mostly dictated by the actions and obstacles of an 
illegitimate political power. As Ranger points out, in understanding Africa today, we 
need to look at colonial Africa because ‘its dynamics have continued to shape 
postcolonial society’. For this reason, this work continues into the first decade after 
independence (1968-1979) in order to explore social and cultural transformations 
during the infamous regime of Macias Nguerna.
One of the driving forces behind colonial domination was the economic 
exploitation of African societies. For this purpose, social and economic 
transformation -  the modernizing project -  became the main priority of colonial 
administrations. Young, in his comparative study of the colonial state, stresses the 
hegemonic nature of colonial administration, which, under the dominant notion of 
‘progress’, portrayed Africans as ‘malleable clay’ that needed to be reshaped.9 The so- 
called modernising project consisted of the establishment of a series of administrative,
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educational, economic and infrastructural measures that sought to assimilate the 
African to the European. In Africa, modernity became the conceptual paradigm of the 
modernization process; a notion, as J. and J.L. Comaroff argue, ‘toward which non- 
westem peoples constantly edge -  without arriving.’10 Modernization in Equatorial 
Guinea, like in the rest of colonial Africa, was always a partial project, since it mostly 
sought to benefit the interest of a small sector of the colonial society, the European 
colonizers. The final outcome of ambitious modernization was clearly at odds with 
foreign domination. Consequently, Africans came to know a different modernity -  as 
the mental image of what a modem society is like -  than its metropolitan version. 
Throughout this work, we should understand modernity as the socio-cultural 
paradigm constructed during the colonial period and which, in many respects, 
Africans still pursue today.
Colonial Africa was characterized by the antagonistic relationship between rulers 
-  Europeans -  and subjects -  Africans, In fact, colonial modernity was bom out of the 
opposition between the so-called modem or civilized European and the so-called 
traditional or savage African.11 Tradition, therefore, became synonymous with 
African culture, whereas modernity became synonymous with European civilization. 
These two sectors formed what we know as colonial society and their parallel 
coexistence determined what Balandier refers to as ‘the colonial situation’.12 By using 
this term, Balandier seeks to emphasize the abnormal conditions of life in colonial 
Africa and which resulted in the series of dysfunctions that we observe today across 
most of the continent. Indeed, we should wonder if the present process of 
retraditionalization is, in fact, a different type of modernity. Geschiere, who has 
studied the emergence of witchcraft beliefs in eastern and southern Cameroon for the 
last few decades, shares this opinion and considers that witchcraft, far from being a
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lingering phenomenon, has experienced deep changes, being mostly a response to the 
transformations that modernization has brought about.13 Jean and John Comaroff also 
argue that there are many ‘modernities’, and ‘witches are modernity’s prototypical 
malcontents’, since they ‘embody all the contradictions of the experience of 
modernity itse lf.14
From this point of view, the development of new Fang traditional structures 
should be considered as Fang modernity instead of a new tradition. This might well be 
the case had it not been for the lack of integration that has characterized Fang society 
for the last century, and which has led to a division of social and cultural structures 
into two realms -  the modem European and the traditional Fang. Although colonial 
domination imposed a set of new institutions and ideas as part of the modernizing 
project, this incomplete system required the maintenance of traditional structures. In 
Equatorial Guinea, the main symbol of the hybrid and dividing character of 
colonialism was the development of two legal systems, one for Europeans and 
emancipados (Africans with full legal rights) and another for ‘indigenas’ (natives), 
who were deprived of full legal rights due to their ‘primitivism’. Colonial policies set 
Africans and Europeans -  along with their respective cultures -  on parallel levels, 
contributing to the development of a sort of dualism that I shall refer to as the ‘double 
realm’. As has been noted, the nature of colonialism in Africa resulted in confusion 
between skin colour and culture.15 To the Fang, therefore, witchcraft and science do 
exist but they are not incompatible, since one takes place within the traditional realm 
and the other within the modem realm.
In order to show the development of a new tradition, I shall focus on Fang 
authority, identity and religious beliefs and the transformations they experienced over 
the last century. Chapter 1 will examine a series of theoretical issues that will be
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relevant throughout this work as well as the different character of traditional 
organizations in Rio Muni previous to colonial domination. In chapter 2, I shall 
examine the Spanish conquest of Rio Muni during the first quarter of the twentieth 
century and its impact on traditional structures across the entire region. This was a 
turning point in the history of Fang society, since it gave way to a series of rapid 
transformations that changed social and cultural structures drastically. Chapter 3 will 
look at some of the most significant characteristics of the Spanish colonial 
organization and how they often hampered Africans’ initiatives. Throughout chapter 
4, we shall see how, during the 1930s and 1940s, the numerous clans of Rio Muni that 
today form the Fang developed a common identity on the basis of their old socio­
cultural tradition, while trying in vain to maintain their authority and religious 
structures. Chapter 5 will examine how during the 1950s and 1960s the Fang began to 
accept modernity as the goal they should aim at, and in so doing the minority of 
acculturated individuals realized that only the country’s independence would bring 
about this goal. Far from it, as we shall see in chapter 6, Equatorial Guinea’s 
independence in 1968 did not consolidate the so-called modernization project. 
Colonial modernity immediately proved ineffective before the challenges that 
independence posed and modem structures rapidly collapsed, giving way, throughout 
the 1970s, to the process of retraditionalization that the country is still undergoing 
today.
Equatorial Guinea, being the only Spanish-speaking country in Africa, has usually 
been ignored by modem Africanists. With the exception of the colonial period, it is 
not common to find abundant information written about this country. During this 
period, colonial officials, settlers and a few academics produced most of the material 
on the former Spanish colony. Very often these works are more revealing in tenns of
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the mentality of the Spanish colonizers than academically rigorous -  Panyela and 
Sabater being the main exception. Nonetheless, one can find abundant interesting 
material in the journal of the Instituto de Estudios Africanos (IDEA), which was the 
official institution for the study of African issues in Spain. After independence, Spain 
lost all interest in its former possession and this resulted in a significant reduction in 
the number of works published on Equatorial Guinea. For this reason, I have been 
forced to rely on material written on neighbouring countries, especially on Gabon and 
Cameroon as cultural similarities made extrapolations more reliable. Since Fang 
identity stretches beyond the borders of Rio Muni into these two countries, and the 
Fang have traditionally attracted the interests of academics, I was able to find many 
valuable sources. During the course of my research, I was fortunate that two key 
works on the Fang were published in Spanish. The first was Tessmann’s ethnographic 
monograph, Die Pangwe, first published in German in 1913 and the result of intensive 
research in the interior of Rio Muni during the 1900s. The translation to Spanish was 
initially an individual initiative of Erika Reuss Galindo, a Spaniard of German origin 
who lived in Equatorial Guinea during the late colonial period. The second work is 
the translation of Dula Bon be Afri Kara (The Journey of the Children of Afri Kara), 
which is a modem historical account of the history of the Fang, written in 1948 by 
Ondo Enguru. This work, first published in Bulu -  a dialect variety of Fang -  at the 
American Presbyterian Mission of Ebolowa (southern Cameroon), was part of the 
E'Lat-Ayong protest movement, which was key in the construction of modern Fang 
identity, hi Equatorial Guinea, many claim to have read or owned this book, but I 
never came across it, therefore I was especially happy to leam that Julian Bibang had 
published a Spanish version of Dulu Bon be Afri Kara - 1 still long for a reprint of the 
original version, nevertheless.
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Due to the nature of the topic, this research has relied heavily on oral sources. 
During the course of seven months, I conducted some eighty interviews throughout 
Equatorial Guinea. Research in this country is not simple, since political conditions 
make this kind of work particularly suspicious. However, once they had overcome 
their initial apprehension, people were by and large extremely cooperative. Although 
the interviews did not cover topics that might be considered politically sensitive, in 
order to overcome people’s fears and to ensure their cooperation, I promised that their 
identity would be kept anonymous. I have made an exception, however, only in those 
cases where I had certainty that the informant had passed away. Fieldwork was 
carried out in two geographic areas, north of the river Wele in the districts of Ebibeyin 
and Mikomeseng and south of this river in the districts of Akurenam and Evinayong. 
This choice was not arbitrary, as I tried to cover the two dialect and cultural areas in 
which the Fang of Rio Muni are divided. Later I learnt that such rigid division is, in 
fact, rather modem and deceptive, due to the extremely fluid character of identities in 
the region. Throughout the research I chose to interview people born before 1960 so 
as to see the differences between younger and older individuals as well as the pattern 
of change between the 1920s and the 1970s. Although I intended to talk to men and 
women alike, I must admit that the number of women I interviewed was significantly 
smaller because they were somewhat reluctant to talk about a subject, ‘history’, about 
which they believed they knew little.
Oral sources are balanced with an array of documents, which have been 
especially valuable in contextualizing the information that I gathered on the ground. 
For the colonial period most sources on Equatorial Guinea are based at the Archivo 
General de la Administracion (AGA, Public Record Office) in Alcala de Henares 
(Madrid), where it is also possible to find a few documents on the immediate post­
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independence period. Unfortunately, access to numerous records, especially for the 
period between 1955 and 1979, continues to be restricted. The study of the period 
after independence is particularly difficult due to the lack of documentation. In 
addition to the restrictions imposed by the current political situation in Equatorial 
Guinea, documents are carelessly piled on shelves, if not misplaced, and rapidly 
destroyed by the humidity and woodworm. Regarding missionary sources, I had the 
opportunity to visit the central archives of the Hijos del Inmaculado Corazon de Maria 
(Claretians) in Rome only to learn that, I had been misled in Equatorial Guinea and 
that the bulk of the documentation is in fact in Malabo. Fortunately, the Biblioteca 
Nacional in Madrid keeps all the issues of La Guinea Espanola, the fortnightly 
magazine that the Catholic order published in Equatorial Guinea between 1904 and 
1969, which has been a valuable source.
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Chapter 1 
The Sanaga-Ogowe Tradition
In his study of Equatorial African societies, Vansina points out that traditions 
‘have no beginning, although they do come to an end. It is the observer who 
determines when a tradition begins, that is, when its basic principles have become 
sufficiently different from the tradition out of which it grew’.1 This chapter will 
examine the society from which the Fang of Rio Muni developed a new tradition 
following the Spanish conquest of this territory in the late 1920s. The analysis will 
reveal a tradition -  which I shall refer to as Sanaga-Ogowe -  which in its 
fundamental elements was not only different from the modem Fang tradition, but 
more importantly, could not survive as a whole after the colonial conquest. By 
carefully examining Vansina’s complex notion of tradition, in which change and 
continuity, autonomy and the connection between past and present are fundamental 
concepts, we shall be able to comprehend why the loss of sovereignty had such a big 
impact on the Sanaga-Ogowe tradition. All these theoretical concepts will be more 
easily understandable by looking at different aspects of the Sanaga-Ogowe tradition, 
such as migration, family-based communities and ancestor-based beliefs, which 
contributed to the shape of Sanaga-Ogowe societies over the centuries.
Although this long-lasting tradition covered a wide geographical area, this chapter 
will focus mainly on those sections of Sanaga-Ogowe society living south of the river 
Ntem -  the natural border between present-day Cameroon and Rio Muni and Gabon. 
The southern Sanaga-Ogowe, in addition to being more relevant for the study of the 
modem Fang of Rio Muni, also shared a greater socio-cultural cohesion. Nonetheless,
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I shall refer to other geographic areas when necessary. Given that most of the 
information -  European observations and local accounts -  on the Sanaga-Ogowe was 
gathered in the second half of the nineteenth century, the following reconstruction of 
their history will be mainly valid for the period immediately prior to the European 
occupation.
Bya tsia’a: “our tradition”
Tradition, past, change and continuity and autonomy are some of the important 
concepts that Vansina uses in his seminal study of Equatorial African societies, Paths 
in the Rainforests, and which have proven to be extremely useful in framing an 
analysis of the history of the Fang people of Equatorial Guinea. Vansina applies the 
term tradition to describe the societies of Equatorial Africa prior to the European 
conquest. The people of this region developed a unique social model, the ‘equatorial 
tradition’, the key features of which were shared across the entire region.2 The 
equatorial tradition was the outcome of the historical processes that followed the 
migration of these Bantu-speaking people from the northern savannah habitat in 
which they shared what Vansina calls a ‘common ancestral tradition’.3 As a result of 
the major transformations that these people went through, the interaction with a new 
environment -  the rainforest -  and the encounter of different societies, the old socio­
cultural model had to readapt in order to face new challenges, giving way to the 
equatorial tradition. Despite these changes, the equatorial tradition still kept features 
of its predecessor.
It is somewhat surprising that Vansina does not provide a clear definition of the 
term tradition. Rather, the reader is left to interpret what the concept means in the 
context of his work. This is even more surprising if we consider the problematic use
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of such a word in the last century and a half by historians and anthropologists alike.
The constant reference to the ‘cognitive’ and ‘physical realm’ in Paths in the
Rainforests offers us a clue as to what tradition means in Vansina’s analysis. To him,
a tradition is made up of its material culture as well as its mental construction. It is
suggested that these two realities maintain a somewhat symbiotic relationship, though,
in his view, the cognitive reality has a greater importance because it provides the
intellectual tools which allow the community to either adopt, transform or reject
material innovations,4 The reader has to wait until almost the end of the book to find
the closest thing to a definition of tradition:
[TJraditions are self-regulating processes. They consist of a changing, inherited, 
collective body of cognitive and physical representations shared by their members. The 
cognitive representations are the core. They inform the understanding of the physical 
world and develop innovations to give meaning to changing circumstances in their 
physical realm, and do so in terms of the guiding principles of the tradition.5
Indeed, such an open definition leaves plenty of room for interpretation as well as 
misunderstanding, a risk that Vansina perhaps consciously takes. However, it is 
possible to track similarities between his view and those of Equatorial Guineans for 
whom such term has become the order of the day. Like Vansina, Equatorial Guineans 
have no clear definition for the term tradition. It is simply a term that has developed a 
common understanding through usage. Interestingly enough, people only use it in its 
Spanish version -  tradicion -  even when they are speaking in any of the vernacular 
languages of the country. When asked about this word, people refer to the ancestors; 
that is, the tradition is what their forefathers used to do or the society they built. 
Nowadays, very few people are aware whether there exists a Fang tenn for tradition. 
Soon after starting my fieldwork, I leamt that there is a similar term in Fang that can 
be translated as tradition: tsia’a. Although this word is not used by the younger
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generation or urban dwellers, village elders still know it. Tsia ’a, unlike tradition, is 
not really a noun and very often it is used as a kind of adjective that implies a sense of 
both past and prestige. However the term can also be used as a noun, as in the form 
byd tsia ’a (our tradition).
In Fang, as in English, tradition primarily denotes a relationship with the past, and 
this is the key when applying this term to define the peoples that I shall deal with in 
this work. Vansina’s ‘tradition’ could otherwise be translated as ‘culture’ in its 
anthropological sense -  the sum of activities and ideas of a group of people with a 
common history -  and it would certainly be much less controversial. By applying the 
term tradition, I seek to stress the paramount role of the past in present-day Equatorial 
African societies. Any culture -  or tradition -  develops a mental representation of 
itself, which is an artificial and volitive creation. This is what Zahan calls ‘the 
experience of the human grouping’, which in his own words would represent ‘the 
totality of the acquisitions which the successive generations have accumulated’.6 In 
the case of the tradition, its mental representation relies on the past and the ancestors 
as the main -  though not only -  source of legitimacy and validation.
The past is not only central in Equatorial African societies but in most societies 
across the continent, and, indeed, in all so-called traditional societies. Within these 
cultures there exists a conscious effort to establish and maintain a link between past 
and present; this is what to be traditional amounts to. According to Booth, time is not 
an abstract concept but a tangible one since it is made up of events, which, once they 
happen, move into the past.8 Nonetheless, events do not constitute the past by 
themselves, it is ultimately up to human actors to decide which events are relevant -  
thus worth storing -  and which are not. The connection between present and past is 
established through the ancestors, whose family character not only bridges the gap but
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also puts a known face to the events of the past, hence making it real.9 Amongst the 
inhabitants of Rio Muni, the ancestors acquired a central role that was reinforced by 
religion. The ancestors, and the tradition which they created, became sacred. In so 
doing, it regulated and sanctioned almost every aspect of people’s lives. Traditional 
life had to be earned out in accordance with tradition and not doing so would risk 
breaking the bond between present and past. Legitimacy, therefore, came from the 
past or its human manifestation, the ancestors. Not surprisingly, these principles 
suited the interest of the elders whose proximity to the ancestors made them the ideal 
agents between the forefathers and the rest of their kinsfolk.10
In order to maintain the order imposed by the ancestors, the elders needed to deny 
the notion of change within their society. Nowadays historians and anthropologists 
know how misleading this idea has been. In their encoimter with African societies, 
especially those of the equatorial region, European observers and scholars earned 
with them a long array of prejudice bom out of the Enlightenment era regarding the 
relationship between material underdevelopment and lack of change. These ideas 
seemed to be confirmed by an ideology which, as in the case of the inhabitants of Rio 
Muni, maintained that their society had preserved the same structure and ways as that 
of the their ancestors; in other words, the ‘tradition’ had remained the same since time 
immemorial.
The realization that change is in fact part of any human society drove scholars to 
remove terms such as ‘tradition’ or ‘traditional’ from their respective fields. Despite 
the connotations attached to this term, it is important to emphasize that, in no sense, 
does modem scholarly reject change within traditional cultures. Both Vansina and 
Booth in their study of traditional societies pay special attention to change. Booth 
explains the nature of change amongst traditional peoples, whereas Vansina
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introduces an interesting idea by making ‘change’ and ‘continuity’ part of the same 
concept. According to Vansina, a tradition, as any culture, must have a self- 
reproducing nature, and change and continuity -  though apparently contradictory -  is 
the instrument that allows the tradition to survive. The emergence of an innovation 
creates a contradiction between the physical and cognitive realms. Vansina and Booth 
agree that change takes place whenever an innovation is accepted and integrated as 
part of the broad culture. The cognitive realm provides the mechanisms creating the 
appearance that the innovation has always been part of the tradition. The adoption of 
innovations -  ‘change’ -  makes it possible for the tradition to adjust to changing 
circumstances and hence survive -  ‘continuity’. A specific group of elders with the 
necessary expertise -  Feierman’s peasant intellectuals -  usually carries out this 
complicated process.11
There are serious doubts concerning the ability and pace of so-called egalitarian 
societies such as those of Equatorial Africa to implement change. Several European 
observers describe the Fang before the colonial conquest as a people willing to accept 
those innovations the Europeans brought with them. Dynamism as well as pragmatism 
seemed to have been rather common in a society where there was no institution strong 
enough to impose standardized views. The same ‘circularity’ that, according to 
Geschiere, allows witchcraft discourses to replace old and exhausted rituals by new 
and fresh ones without undermining the underlying principles of witchcraft beliefs, 
makes it possible to adopt new ways without questioning basic cultural principles.12 
This made the tradition relatively permeable to innovations of all kinds. The small 
size of political communities, in which authority rarely went beyond village limits, 
provided the necessary ‘autonomy’ to deal with changing circumstances. To Vansina,
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autonomy was vital to keep a traditional culture alive, as the earners of the tradition
13must be free enough to decide what does and does not become part of their culture.
Such a high level of autonomy makes one wonder whether it was possible to 
develop something similar to a common tradition. Such was the case of the peoples 
sharing a common language who lived in southern Cameroon, northern and central 
Gabon and Rio Muni before colonial conquest. Most scholars -  such as Alexandre, 
Fernandez, Laburthe-Tolra and Mbana -  agree that these peoples constituted a 
homogeneous entity in spite of internal differences. The sections living south of the 
river Ntem, for example, had a lesser degree of social centralization and political 
hierarchy than those north of the Ntem. It is difficult to know how long some of the 
features observed in this period by Europeans had been around. Joaquin Mbana 
argues that numerous and deep changes took place as a result of European trade in the 
late nineteenth century.14 In spite of these transformations, the principles of the 
tradition, which I shall describe, mvok, minnama and Melon, were still recognizable at 
the time of the Spanish conquest.
Mitok or the great migrations
Pahouin, Pangwe, Pamue, Fang or Beti are just a few of the long array of names 
that have been applied to the groups that share a common language and culture and 
live in the wide area covering southern Cameroon, northern and central Gabon and 
most of mainland Equatorial Guinea. This confusing situation is common to many 
places across the African continent.15 The study of ethnographic material, especially 
that written before the mid twentieth century, still puzzles the reader due to the 
multiplicity of names that a single group could receive. Very often this confusion was 
the outcome of the colonial state’s enthusiasm for imposing its ideological order on a
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reality that it barely understood. At times, as Samarin shows, this trend could escalate 
into inventing ethnic groups that were simply a product of European imagination and 
their image of Africans.16
Pahouin, Pamue or Pangwe are simply European variations of the same word, 
that the French, Spanish, and German applied, from the second half of the nineteenth 
century, to what they considered to be the same social entity. Scholars agree that 
nineteenth-century European traders leamt this term from their African commercial 
partners on the coastal region -  the Mpongwe in Gabon or the Benga in Rio Muni 
amongst others.17 There are several interpretations regarding the origin of this name, 
although it is commonly understood that it derives from the term Fang. Being spread 
across such a large area, the Sanaga-Ogowe were divided into several sections or 
subgroups speaking different dialects; the Fang were only one of them. It was the 
Fang with whom coastal groups established contact for the first time and, depending 
on their language, the name was pronounced in different ways such as Pango, Pangu, 
Pamu, Pamo, Panwe, etc.18 hi addition to the transformation of the name, the term 
was also applied to the entire Sanaga-Ogowe population.19
Some thought that using the native name that the Sanaga-Ogowe applied to 
themselves could easily solve the discussion about their actual name, hi 1863 and 
again in 1904, two European observers, Burton and Roche, claimed that this people 
called themselves Fang, hence this is the name that should be used.20 More recently 
Equatorial Guinean intellectuals have argued in favour of using the tenn Fang 
claiming that it was always this culture’s name.21 Unfortunately, the solution is not so 
simple because neither the whole group called themselves Fang nor was there such a 
unique teim. On the contrary, it appears that there were multiple names across the 
different regions in which this people lived before the European conquest.
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Mbana is perfectly aware that the Fang were only one of many subgroups, and yet 
he supports the use of the term Fang when he classifies ‘the Fang group as the name 
adopted by the people with a common culture sharing the same geographic 
territory.’22 He acknowledges that the naming of a group is an artificial choice and, as 
such, it is up to the people who form this group to decide what name should be 
applied to them.23 Whereas in present-day Equatorial Guinea and Gabon the members 
of this group call themselves Fang, this is not the case of Cameroon, where the 
accepted term is Beti, which, to Mbana, is equivalent to Fang. Beti is the plural for 
nti, that can be translated as noble or civilized man. Fang has a double origin; on the 
one hand, fdm\ man or male; and, on the other, mfang: genuine or completed man.24 
Tessmann’s approach to this problem was very similar, though his solution was a 
different one. During the course of his work as trader and researcher in the 1900s, he 
realized the difficulties of labelling this culture. Thus Tessmann opted for applying a 
foreign name, such as the German tenn Pangwe.25 Fernandez also applies the French 
version of the term -  Pahouin -  for the whole group, while using Fang only to refer to 
the southern sections.26
Other attempts to solve this problem vary from conciliatory to neutral approaches. 
Alexandre, for example, sought an inteimediate solution, which recognized realities 
on the ground while reducing the multiplicity of internal social divisions: the Beti- 
Bulu-Fang group. According to him, dialect and cultural differences amounted to 
three main subgroups: Beti, Bulu and Fang.27 This classification added another 
unresolved problem. As I shall show later, the reduction of all internal differences to 
only three subgroups is debatable. Vansina, however, prefers to use the term Sanaga- 
Ntem group, which refers to the two main rivers in the area.28
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Regardless of what choice we make, the decision is always questionable. Using a 
term such as Fang appears to be ‘ahistorical’, in the same way that nobody would 
refer to the peoples living in central Europe two thousand years ago as Swiss or 
Austrians. A term like Pamue -  in any of its European versions -  does not seem 
appropriate because many Equatorial Guineans and Gabonese consider it derogative, 
given that it was used by the colonizers and Africans never identified themselves with 
this foreign name. The Sanaga-Ntem group, though not ideal, is a good solution that 
needs to be slightly revised. The tradition we are dealing with covered a larger area, 
going as far south as the river Ogowe. Therefore the term ‘Sanaga-Ogowe’ group 
seems more suitable. I shall only refer to this group as ‘Fang’ after the Spanish 
controlled Rio Muni in the late 1920s, for this is the identity they began to develop 
ever since.
Both Alexandre and Panyela claim that the Sanaga-Ogowe shared some kind of 
‘national’ consciousness, yet this view was clearly based on mid-twentieth century 
observations.29 The name confusion reflects a reality on the ground; that is, the 
Sanaga-Ogowe group did not constitute a single political entity. In fact, we can 
interpret the absence of local terms referring to any social entity beyond the ayong or 
clan level as a sign of how insignificant the subgroup and ethnic division, terms for 
which there is no local equivalent, was in their daily lives.30
Who then are the Sanaga-Ogowe? By the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, to the Europeans, the answer appeared to be quite simple. The Pamue or 
Pahouin, often represented as cannibal and extremely warlike, embodied the
• o 1stereotypical image of the African of the interior migrating like ‘hordes’ to the coast. 
Although they appeared to be easily identifiable, a close look at the material and 
reports written in this period shows a very different reality. On the ground, Europeans
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did not always find it easy to determine who was and was not part of this group. As a 
result, small groups of the interior, whose identity was uncertain, were normally 
integrated into the larger Pamue people. One of the most remarkable examples is the 
Bisio -  also known as the Osyeba, Bichiwa, Bujeba, Makina or Mokuk -  a group 
whose actual identity and name are yet to be clarified by scholars. Whereas Tessmann 
and Raponda Walker argue that the Bisio were part of the Pamue, Spanish colonialists 
preferred to consider them as a different group pushed to the coast by the latter in the 
second half of the nineteenth century.32 Weinstein indicates that, nowadays, the 
Gabonese census includes the Bisio or Osyeba amongst the Fang, yet in Equatorial 
Guinea they are still a distinctive people.
Over several centuries, the Sanaga-Ogowe people developed a tradition that 
shared a common worldview and religious rites as well as social and political 
institutions. This was the result of a dynamic process in which they not only 
acculturated the peoples they encountered during the course of the series of 
migrations that fundamentally shaped the Sanaga-Ogowe tradition but were also 
acculturated themselves.
Historical accounts collected by Avelot, Largeau and Trilles in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries show that ‘migration’ was a central element of the 
Sanaga-Ogowe culture.34 This view was reinforced by the late arrival of sections of 
this group to the coast, which was witnessed by European observers. Historians and 
anthropologists acknowledge the importance of this phenomenon and have tried to 
uncover the numerous enigmas surrounding the Sanaga-Ogowe migration. Mbana5s 
PhD thesis claims that the dynamic nature of this culture can only be understood in 
the light of this long migratory movement.
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The geographical origin of the migration is still unknown. Local accounts dating 
from the early twentieth century did little to clarify the possible origin of the 
migration. Like most old narratives, they acquired a mythological character over time, 
making it difficult to separate fact from fiction. The few names mentioned as the 
migration’s point of origin camiot be realistically located on a map. Tessmann, for 
example, was told that Mvokeji was the original country, whereas Largeau alludes to 
Mooketanga.35 These accounts, however, provided some information that scholars 
have used in order to locate the possible origin. Many of them relate to a mountainous 
area outside the rainforests, which was probably located close to a large river or lake. 
They also indicate that the migration generally followed a westward path. Thanks to 
this information, scholars have traditionally argued that, at some point, the Sanaga- 
Ogowe lived in a savannah habitat northeast of their present location.
Early studies of the Sanaga-Ogowe group claimed that this area was probably 
located in the Egypt-Sudan area. Trilles specifically points at the Bahr-al-Ghazal 
plateau as their original country.36 This was part of what Mbana calls the ‘romantic 
interpretation’, which either sought to deny the Bantu origin of the Sanaga-Ogowe or 
link them to so-called superior people. Such was the case that some authors even
* TOwanted to see in this African people the descendents of an old Germanic tribe. 
Europeans dealing with this group in the early stages of contact were certainly 
amazed by the long genealogies that they were able to recite. According to Alexandre, 
this was the underlying reason for a supposed historical link between the Sanaga- 
Ogowe and the ancient Egyptians. Furthermore, Europeans were interested in 
portraying the Sanaga-Ogowe as an invading group, who, coming from a distant 
place, had recently arrived in modern-day Rio Muni and Gabon displacing weaker 
peoples in their march. In an effort to legitimize colonial conquest, this type of
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approach was commonly used by Europeans -  the Afrikaner being the most notorious 
example -  trying to represent Africa as a continent in which, until recently, large areas 
remained uninhabited.
The Egyptian-Sudanese theory has not survived the passage of time.39 Only 
within Fang mythological accounts created in the twentieth century one can still find 
references to the Egyptian origin of the Sanaga-Ogowe. Tessmann, Balandier and 
Alexandre argue in favour of southward migration, which would situate the origin of 
the migration in a savannah area bordering present-day Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria. 
As early as 1913, Tessmann supported this view based on the environment described 
by historical accounts as well as the direction that elders pointed at when asked about 
their forefathers’ country.40 Further, the existence of terms related to a savannah 
environment in the Sanaga-Ogowe language would help to support a theory for which 
evidence is rather scanty. Mbana, for example, disagrees with this view and argues in 
favour of a more specifically Central African origin. According to the information 
that he collected in Fang villages of Rio Muni, Southern Cameroon and northern 
Gabon, most old settlements could be found within the rainforest, being the most 
northern villages in a region around the rivers Sanaga and Nyong.41 This information 
along with the cultural similarities between the Fang and coastal groups of Rio Muni 
lead him to state that Sanaga-Ogowe presence in their present-day habitat is much 
older than initially thought.42
Mbana’s thesis is somehow denied by an overwhelming consensus amongst 
scholars, which claims that Sanaga-Ogowe presence in the Rio Muni and Gabon area 
is quite recent.43 It is suggested that this group probably crossed the river Ntem 
sometime between the late eighteenth and mid-nineteenth century. According to 
Mbana, however, such ideas are based on the misconception that the Sanaga-Ogowe
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migration was a continuous phenomenon. Furthermore, Vansina argues that 
conventional hypotheses about Sanaga-Ogowe migration were misled by the 
migratory movement to the coast of sections of the Sanaga-Ogowe from the 1830s.44 
Local historical accounts as well as early European observations suggested that this 
was a unique, long and massive migration. Depending on the source, such movement 
would have been triggered off by the attack of military superior people -  the Mvele -  
a desire to acquire European goods, or the search for the creator-god on the coast. 
Therefore, it was assumed that the migration must have started in a fairly distant 
place.
Like Mbana, Vansina also argues that Sanaga-Ogowe presence in their present- 
day territory is much older than it has been assumed, as shown by the presence of 
iron-smelting sites, probably of Fang or Ntumu origin, in the upper Ntem area dating 
back to about 1600 45 Tessmann says that the Ewondo, from the Yaounde region, 
imported raffia, which was a key construction material for the Sanaga-Ogowe.46 
Raffia mostly grows in the rainforest and it is scarce on the outskirts of the equatorial 
forest where the Ewondo live. The heavy dependence of the northern Sanaga-Ogowe 
sections on this material appears to indicate that their presence around present-day 
Yaounde dates back to the days when the landscape was dominated by rainforest 
vegetation, which was gradually destroyed as a result of human activities. Vansina 
rightly argues that it is not possible to pinpoint a moment in time in which the Sanaga- 
Ogowe lived in a savannah-like environment, due to the lack of evidence. He, 
however, claims that, based on population density and linguistic data, the core of the 
Sanaga-Ogowe culture must have been developed in the Sanaga Valley area no later 
than the thirteenth or fourteenth century.47 The geographical expansion of the Sanaga- 
Ogowe and subsequent ‘linguistic diversification’ was likely to have taken place in
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the fourteenth or fifteenth century, according to glottochronological dating.48 Mbana 
and Vansina’s view is, so far, the most convincing one with regards to Sanaga-Ogowe 
migration, nonetheless, neither Mbana nor Vansina explain why the ‘piercing of the 
adzap’ (Tigemella Africana P.) -  the big tree that symbolizes the passage into the 
rainforest -  is such a recurrent theme in those historical accounts collected by early 
European observers.
Therefore, to Mbana, the migration time span was long not because it started in a 
distant place, but rather because we are dealing with a series of successive migrations 
by which the Sanaga-Ogowe moved back and forth within their present-day habitat. 
This view is also shared by Fernandez, who argues that ‘the notion that there was a 
steady migration southwestward is countered by evidence of reflux and return.’49 
Certainly, the Fang of Equatorial Guinea refer to this period using the term mitok, a 
plural form, which can be translated as migrations.50 Furthermore, scholars have 
drawn attention to the cultural similarities between coastal groups of Rio Muni and 
the Sanaga-Ogowe -  even a neophyte like myself can notice clear language
c t
connections between Kombe and Fang of Rio Mum.
Mbana’s conclusions, though not conclusive, are certainly interesting. By taking 
into account the ‘discontinuous interpretation’, that is, the idea that migration was not 
a continuous process but a series of intermittent phenomena that went back and forth 
over a large territory, the long debate as to the causes of the exodus becomes more 
comprehensible. We should not look for ‘the cause’ but rather for a series of causes 
behind the numerous migratory movements. Therefore, at times this phenomenon was 
said to have been triggered by warfare, natural disasters, trade or even myths. 
Alexandre points out that amongst northern sections military invasion is often
39
mentioned as the reason for migration, whereas in the south similar accounts are much
• i 52more vague, emphasizing commercial reasons instead.
fCHAD _
L-M ' S,
jun,n ~ \ - ^  r  ’w'
{ i  ; *' | v
„ * * CENTRAL AFRICAN* mh*— —
J .U *  ' S '  ~">J ' REPUBLI C
' r am^ROON J ■’—k‘-
.• .is . .
Ctl ^K ■ sr ..‘ *. -V'.V*- -Ry •“““ » * « -  AAH.AR*.
4 " :  ' 1
•,k"  F T H I f
^  ,w.
E I C
' r . y#
■' -pV J / l
« / . f t ,
------------    iZ E T  " r  . r  •—
w £  '■)■ lx A  ^I ,  ,fuClA'«OA k  } ^
~  1 ,  REPUBLIC O P  1
■ -stssr . ■ 1•>. r     or B A  s
r ‘ I V f-r -  -  — .
- r  %  N  ... 1 1  - !  * &  f f e  -  ■KtfUA * “ *■„' ■»      • TANZANIA, • ,  { — - v t r  -  “7 \4 , • -
—  -  ......
A' iOI.
O 14 t M
the Sanaga-O gowe migration
'  1 ■ •?!.?• \ •'Hr d®5
been suggested as origin of l 
MAP 2
• 1 ,'IMR* i A M -
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There were periods of greater stability in which settlements only moved every 15 
or 20 years to find suitable land for farming, followed by periods of turmoil in which 
settlements moved rapidly over longer distances, as the Europeans witnessed in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Though apparently massive to the eyes of 
coastal groups and Europeans, this drive to the coast was not organized; rather it 
followed the same pattern of previous migration movements. That is, a single village 
or a few individuals decided to leave their old site and found a new settlement a few 
kilometres away.53 As Fernandez points out ‘villages moved forward in a leapfrog 
fashion’ and only very rarely did movements involve long distances/4 Although this 
pattern became more frequent in times of greater turmoil, it did not differ greatly from 
those periods of calm and stability in which villages regularly changed their location.
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The Sanaga-Ogowe has often been characterized as a semi-nomadic group, for their 
settlements never remained in the same location for more than 15 or 20 years. As 
Chamberlin explains, this was due, amongst other reasons, to shifting cultivation and 
poor soils, which forced people to search for untouched lands.55 Sanaga-Ogowe 
expansion throughout such large area must have followed this model, allowing the 
gradual acculturation of those groups they encountered in the process. Constant 
village resettlement was key in shaping the social structure. A fission-fusion model 
contributed to the endless creation and disappearance of different family groups.56
For a long time, scholars have tried to understand the formation and the structure 
of the series of subgroups amongst the Sanaga-Ogowe. Panyela and Sabater refer to
e"i
these subgroups as ‘dialectal cultural sections’. Fang historical accounts seemed to 
indicate that they were the outcome of the original group’s first division. The 
migration would have started with a single cohesive group and, at some point, it split 
up into different sections that followed different routes. Each of these initial sections 
would be the embryo of the subgroups that we know today. This approach assumed 
that the formation of subgroups predated that of clans. That is, successive divisions 
within each section gave birth to numerous clans. Each clan would be ascribed to one 
particular subgroup, because they shared the same origin.
It is not clear how many subgroups would have originated from the initial 
division. The lists vary depending on the author, yet it was understood that the 
number of original subgroups was limited at first, and more subgroups grew out of the 
original ones. Tessmann names the Eton, Muele, Yaunde [Ewondo], Ntum [Ntumu], 
Bene, Bulu, Mwai, Fang and Mokuk [Bisio] as the main ‘subtribes’ of the Sanaga- 
Ogowe.58 To Alexandre, however, the list should be limited to three main subgroups: 
Beti, Bulu, and Fang; each of them divided into several ‘tribes’.59 Regardless of the
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number of subgroups all these authors, except Tessmann, agree that the development 
of clans followed that of subgroups. Undoubtedly, historical accounts like Dulu Bon 
be Afri Kara, written by Ondo Engura in 1948, influenced the views of scholars 
working on the area by the mid twentieth century.
James Fernandez also pays attention to historical accounts and believes that 
certain clans can be clearly ascribed to a particular subgroup. Yet he is aware of the 
obstacles that this interpretation faces on the ground, as many clans can be found 
through several sections of the Sanaga-Ogowe.60 A close look at any genealogy 
reveals that clans, which are usually ascribed to different subgroups, shared the same 
origin at some point. European observers soon learnt of this phenomenon called e lat- 
ayong (literally, the ‘sewing’ of a clan). This concept was used to remember the 
common origin of those families that split up in the past and formed different clans, hi 
Rio Muni, one of the best-known cases is that of the Nzomo and Amvom clans, 
whose genealogies tell us of the historical link between both of them. To Mbana, this 
clearly proves, first, that the ayong or clan predates the subgroup and, second, that the 
nucleus of the Sanaga-Ogowe group was unique, for, in 110 other way, the presence of 
a given clan within several sections can be explained.61 In an interview conducted by 
a Spanish missionary in 1919, an elder explains that Murenzama or God created the 
Sanaga-Ogowe and their clans simultaneously.62
The formation of a series of subgroups amongst the Sanaga-Ogowe was a result 
of migration. On a tentative level, I shall explain how this process took place. A 
limited group of families moved into a new area of the rainforest where they founded 
several settlements. The area could be previously inhabited by non-Sanaga-Ogowe 
people or not. The initial settlements soon multiplied as a result of natural growth and 
the arrival of new families. Living in closer relation and perhaps in contact with other
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linguistic groups, they would develop a distinctive dialect and certain cultural 
peculiarities. Families living in the area, though known by the names of their original 
clans, would probably develop new identities amongst the dwellers of the area.63 The 
origin of a clan or subgroup name is not clear, but it seems likely that they were 
usually given names by outsiders on the basis of a distinctive peculiarity or unusual 
custom.64 While conducting research in Rio Muni, I heard completely opposite 
versions about names of clans and villages -  sometimes derogatory and others 
complimentary.
We can see from this description that, often, the ‘birth1 of new clans and 
subgroups may have been an overlapping experience. In fact, we should consider it as 
a process rather than an event. Certain clans would be ascribed to specific subgroups, 
for their existence has long been associated with a given dialectal section. Newcomers 
could initially maintain their original identity, but as time went by their identity would 
dilute within the subgroup. Amongst all the social divisions that we find within the 
Sanaga-Ogowe, the subgroup identity was, and still is, the most fluid. Due to 
migration, subgroups and clans appeared and disappeared constantly; this is why we 
find so many distinct cultural sections.65 Unlike clans or lineages, belonging to a 
subgroup was not determined by biology. Families arrived and left continuously, so 
anybody could eventually be considered part of a given subgroup. Therefore it is not 
possible to state accurately how many or which clans constituted a subgroup. The 
truth is that any interpretation of this phenomenon is highly speculative and confirms 
how little we know and how difficult it is to grasp these concepts.
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Mvok-e’bot or the village of people
The Sanaga-Ogowe has been classified as a patrilineal society. The central role of 
the paternal figure was also reflected in migration accounts, in which he was often 
described as a sort of foundation hero in charge of leading the series of migrations. As 
family head, his duty was to found a dzad, village or settlement, which, in due time, 
would become mvok, community village or home village. The dzad is simply the 
physical representation of the village, whereas the mvok is the social concept of the 
village as home of the family. The Sanaga-Ogowe social organization was almost 
exclusively consanguineous; that is, people grouped together in villages according to 
blood ties. The mvok was exclusively the home for botoo (plural for ntoo, eldest) or 
family heads, their wives, descendents, and, in some cases, male dependents who 
were not biological members of the family.66
Sanaga-Ogowe life revolved around the mvok, where people’s daily activities 
took place. Every important decision in the life of an individual was taken in relation 
to her or his mvok. During the course of Spanish occupation, the Governor-General 
Angel Barrera acknowledged the abdd or ‘palaver house’ as the central space of 
village life.67 Upon founding a new settlement, each ntoo had to build the family’s 
abdd, a place where adult men gathered and developed many of their social and work 
activities outside of the forest. It was in the abdd where important decisions for the 
community were taken. Immediately after founding the village, one of the most 
important issues was to allocate fanning land amongst the botoo, who subsequently 
distributed it amongst their wives. Adulthood was not necessarily associated with age 
but, more importantly, with being manied and having children. Each season elders 
decided which section of the forest should be cleared for cultivation and allocated 
each parcel; the first wife of the family head played a fundamental role in this
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decision, since women knew what are the best lands to cultivate.68 In this respect, it 
appears that, while he was alive, the village founder had a prominent role in these 
decisions.69 Once sons got married, they also became part of the land distribution 
process, for only married men were entitled to land. The reason for this was that 
women were in charge of growing food for their husbands and children. Land 
distribution had to be made in the most equitable way possible in order to avoid 
conflict and disruption in the community.
In case of conflict, medzo (‘matters’ or ‘questions’) were publicly discussed in the 
village forum, where elders tried to restore peace.70 One of the most important issues 
addressed in this space was marriage. The arrival of a new member was a matter that 
concerned the whole village community. Legal marriage required the payment of 
nswa (bridewealth) a subject that, very often, involved long negotiations conducted at 
village level between the two families. When quarrels between wife and husband 
turned serious, the issue was also taken to this public space. By discussing matters 
openly in the abdd, it was guaranteed that an important part of the community was 
involved in the decision-making process -  namely male elders, though exceptionally 
women and youngsters could also participate.71 At the same time, they avoid raising 
suspicions, since in this society secrecy and mystery often fell in the realm of 
witchcraft. Whenever elders considered that a certain problem required a solution 
which could not be treated openly, this often involved the celebration of cult rituals.
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In his recent study of southern Gabon, Gray claims that colonialism brought a 
purely territorial definition of space, which amongst equatorial peoples had been 
defined purely on the basis of social relations between its dwellers.72 This is the 
underlying concept behind the Sanaga-Ogowe mvok, which was not so much a 
physical space but a place for human relations -  primarily of the family group. The 
settlement could be abandoned, but people’s attachment to the members of mvok was 
kept for generations through the recollection of genealogies and celebration of Melan 
-  the ancestor cult.
However vague and empty concepts such as ethnic group or subgroup may be, 
consanguinity involved much more meaningful relations with clearly defined borders. 
The importance of family ties is revealed by the existence of numerous terms 
indicating several degrees of proximity between family members: ndd-e ’bot, mvok- 
e 'bot, ayom-bot, etunga-bot, and ayong-bot or ayong. When I asked Joaquin Mbana 
about the meaning of these terms, he replied that all of them reflect aspects of the 
same concept: familia -  a term widely used today by the Fang of Rio Muni. This
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answer is true and false at the same time. It is true in the sense that all its members 
recognized a common ancestor, from which originates some sort of solidarity amongst 
them. Yet, it is also false because it does not reflect that solidarity degrees vary with 
the level of proximity. That is, the closer the biological relation, the stronger the 
solidarity is. There have been several attempts to define what type of relationship each 
of these terms entail, yet none of them is entirely convincing. Ndongo and Panyela 
translate them, respectively, as nuclear family, large family, lineage, stock or 
ancestry, and clan.73 It is difficult to know whether there were ever any clear-cut 
definitions, especially nowadays after the introduction of new cultural concepts and 
lack of use -  only ndd-e’bot, ayong, and, to a lesser extent, mvok-e’bot are still 
regularly used.
The ndd-e’bot is to the Sanaga-Ogowe tradition what the ‘house5 is to the 
equatorial tradition described by Vansina; that is, the basic social organization.74 In 
search for fertile land or autonomy, a settlement could originally be formed by single 
nda-e’boty which comprised wives and children under the authority of the ntoo. 
Whereas the family head’s control over his daughters ended once they got married 
and moved out of the village, sons remained under his authority for as long as he was 
alive. Alternatively, sons could emancipate themselves from paternal authority by 
moving out and founding their own settlement. Although not uncommon, it appears 
that that only happened in those cases in which father and son could not reconcile 
their differences.75
The ntoo’s control over family matters, labour, or land distribution made him a 
central figure within this culture. Yet, all this could be temporary or relative; as we 
shall see later, very often he found it very hard to keep a tight grip on his so-called 
dependents. It was patrilineality that made his role essential, since the father
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determined family and clan ascription. Fatherhood was not a biological concept but a 
legal one, which required the payment of bridewealth. It is relatively common to hear 
a woman’s name be recited amongst the long array of male ancestors that formed 
genealogies. Whenever fatherhood was not sanctioned by nswa, the child was 
ascribed to the mother’s line imder the control of the mvam, grandfather, or the nycici- 
ndom, maternal uncle. In his essay about nswa, Nze Abuy recalls a Fang saying that 
highlights the triviality of biological concepts: ''mon a s’e mon mbie, ane mon nsoa’ 
(the child is not of the one who gave birth to him, but of the nswa).76
Despite its essentially patrilineal character, women seemed to have played an 
important role with regards to descent, especially in cases of significant polygamy. 
After the death of a polygamous father, the original ndd-e’bot would split up in 
several mendd-me’bot (plural for ndd-e’bot) depending on the number of mothers. 
Each mendd-me ’bot would be led by one of the sons, though the mother would keep a 
special position as originator of that particular nda-e ’bot, as revealed in Melon where 
female and male ancestors were worshiped together.77 Understandably, this process 
did not take place each generation because polygamy, as we shall see later, was not 
always widespread. A few generations later, that polygamous ancestor would be 
considered as the founder of a mvok-e ’bot or group of mendd-me ’bot. Thus, in order 
to know which family in a clan one belongs to, the Sanaga-Ogowe ask: o ne mvok e 
za? (literally, you are of the village of whom?) After some generations and successive 
divisions, the descendents of that polygamous ancestor would consider themselves as 
belonging to the same ayom-bot, etungd-bot, and eventually the ayong or clan.
It has been suggested that northern sections were less fragmented in terms of 
social structures than those south of the Ntem, where migratory movement was more 
intense.78 This would, somehow, explain why lesser entities like the nda-e ’bot and
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mvok-e’bot were especially prominent in the south.79 Tessmann points out that in the 
north of the Sanaga-Ogowe territory there were fewer villages but they were bigger. A 
similar phenomenon could be observed in Rio Muni, where, according to Captain 
Roche, who explored this area in the 1900s, the biggest villages were located in the 
northern section, close to the river Ntem.80 Most descriptions indicate that villages 
were usually made up of several settlements.81 During an expedition across Rio 
Muni’s interior in 1911, Governor Barrera mentioned that they passed through several 
villages next to each other which had the same name.82
Although Sanaga-Ogowe ideology indicates that villages were founded by a 
single man, in reality this effort was usually carried out by several brothers. One man, 
the ntoo, was recognized as the single founder. If there was a good relationship 
between the brothers, they would live in the same settlement or dzaci -  this was more 
likely amongst uterine brothers -  otherwise they would build adjacent settlements. 
This group of settlements formed a nnam (extended village), known by a single name 
attached to that of its founder. Should the population increase due to natural causes or 
the arrival of relatives and friends, they would stay in one of the existing settlements 
or, more likely, they would construct a new one. Tessmann claims that villages were 
rarely extended, even if it was required for the children of the ntoo, the preference 
being to build a new settlement nearby.83 Several nuclear families could inhabit the 
same extended village, but they were usually of the same mvok-e 'bot or, at least, clan. 
In the rare case that families from different clans lived in the same village, there was 
probably some sort of matrilineal connection.
The threat of superior military enemies favoured stronger and more cohesive 
settlements in the north, yet this was not the only factor. The south also suffered 
invasions such as the oban and yet large settlements were not developed. The obdn is
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known as the period of warfare in which northern sections of the Sanaga-Ogowe -  
some sources mention the Bulu -  raided and displaced southern groups.84 It is 
described as a unique period, which, according to Mbana, took place between 1880 
and 18 90.85 Yet it is probable that this was only the last of several periods of warfare. 
Oral accounts claim that Mbo Ba, an elder of the Nzomo clan, was the person who 
‘stopped’ the obdn after defeating Bulu raiders.86 The Nzomo’s genealogies suggest 
that this person was probably bom in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. Thus 
the famous obdn should have taken place in the second half of the eighteenth 
century.87 We know through European accounts that the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century witnessed a period of warfare, probably associated with coastal migration,
commerce and German occupation of southern Cameroon, which one of my
88informants referred to as the time of ldang.
The importance of autonomy amongst the Sanaga-Ogowe was based on two 
interconnected notions. On the one hand, the rejection of strong leadership was behind 
strong egalitarian tendencies in this society. On the other, practical experience taught 
that communal life involved a great deal of tensions, hi order to avoid disrupting 
conflicts intensified by permanent contact inside a small setting, families preferred to 
live in separate settlements. Part of Sanaga-Ogowe ideology aimed at having big 
settlements in which large families lived together, yet in reality this was not often the 
case. In discussing this issue, Fernandez says: ‘one of the principal precepts of the 
social order is... that each man should remain in his own house with his own family 
tending to his own affairs and making use of that which clearly belongs to him.’89 
Commitment to this idea would avoid conflict and ultimately guarantee the unity of 
the family. Should problems persist, a few would leave the village and found a new 
settlement in a distant location.
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We should not infer from this that social dislocation was exclusively due to the
desire for autonomy. Family divisions might be triggered by natural causes, such as
famine or epidemic outbreaks, which forced people to find more prosperous
settlements. The state of disarray described by many late nineteenth-and early
twentieth-century European accounts might also split up entire families. An informant
described one of those moments:
We left Aseng because a group came and attacked us; this group was called kiang. 
Whenever this band arrived, people had to run away through the forest. This is why 
eventually my family left that place and came to this region. People escaped in such a 
frantic state that not even wife and husband knew where each other were. Everyone 
fought for their own survival... My father came out first around this area, and my mother 
came out through another village canying a baby with her... Then my father was warned 
that should go to pick up my mother who was alive in another village. This is how we 
arrived in this region.90
The ayong or clan was the social organization which grouped together different 
movdk-me ’hot under a common identity. Somehow, the ayong counteracted Sanaga- 
Ogowe inclination for autonomy because, along with a desire for independence, there 
existed a need to establish and maintain family union beyond time and space. Social 
segmentation was overcome through consanguinity. After a series of migrations and 
successive divisions, all those families that recognized a common distant ancestor 
were considered to belong to the same clan.91 It was the ayong that determined 
people’s identity, not language, territory, or religion. Identity was humanized, for it 
was only through people that it was passed down. Thus, in order to know someone’s 
clan, the Sanaga-Ogowe ask: o ne za ayong? (literally, of whose clan are you?).
Although consanguinity provided some sort of stability to communities, Copet-
02Rougier explains that social units based on blood ties could be rather fluid. 
Genealogies were usually readapted in order to suit realities on the ground. It is well
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known that an individual 01* family could change their clan affiliation, but, as Vansina 
puts it, ‘ideology was and still is so strong that this continues to be denied by most 
people.’93 We know that, right before European domination, a war captive, despite 
being integrated within the family group as dependent, was regarded as oloo (slave) 
amongst the northern Sanaga-Ogowe.94 The descendents would later become part of 
the family, though maintaining a different status, which reminded members of their 
foreign origin.95 No data suggest that this kind of phenomenon developed in the south; 
at least, not on a large scale.
Being the largest social unit, the ayong has also been seen by many as the most 
important political entity within the Sanaga-Ogowe tradition. Legal ruling did not 
extend beyond the boundaries of the clan, except in certain cases that we shall see 
later. However, it is not all that clear whether we should consider it as the most 
important political unit. In spite of all the series of obligations between clan members, 
it lacked a recognized leader or ruling institution. Decisions were usually taken at the 
level of the nda-e’bot or the mvok, thus, these institutions, though not the largest, 
should be considered as the most important political bodies. Bot Ba Njok maintains 
that, as a result of migration and social dislocation, the ndd-e *bot surpassed the ayong 
in importance.96 It seems quite likely that, at some point, clan members lived next to 
each other, which made it easier to maintain some sort of political cohesion. Amongst 
the northern clans cited by Tessmann, we find that many clans have the word mvok 
attached to their name, which suggest that clans still shared the same space.97
It is not all that clear to what extent ayong solidarity was effective. Referring to 
the Mkako, another decentralized society of south-eastern Cameroon, Copet-Rougier
ORpoints out that clan solidarity could be rather weak. Amongst the Sanaga-Ogowe, 
there were also cases in which clan solidarity appeared to be a faint concept.
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Governor Barrera, referring to a military expedition against a Sanaga-Ogowe leader in 
1915, said: ‘of course not all the Samangones [i.e. Esamongon, a clan from Rio Muni] 
support Domakoa [Ndongo Mange], for some of them have volunteered to join the 
forces to punish Domakoa’.99 This is somewhat surprising, if we consider that use of 
force against clan members was strongly prohibited. However, rather than being the 
rule, this example seems to suggest that in situations of extreme social upheaval, like 
colonial conquest, clan solidarity could become quite fragile. Generally, the ayong's 
greatest success was the strong solidarity it generated, reminding all its members of 
their family ties and mutual obligations, which compelled them to help each other. 
Tessmann highlighted how clan families kept ‘extremely active’ contact thanks to 
mutual hospitality; this situation was also extended to allied families.100 In fact, many 
inter-clan conflicts were the result of such solidarity. A report in La Guinea Espanola 
describes a skirmish that started after a man of the Yenvi clan killed a man who was 
beating a Yenvi woman.101
Nzamd-Dulu was the incest transgression that all members of the clan universally 
avoided. This term -  ‘Nzama’s walk’ or ‘do like Nzama’ -  reflects the principle of 
exogamy that tied together the whole clan.102 Regardless of the genealogical distance, 
this law called attention to the fact that clan members were all part of the same family, 
and should be regarded as brother and sister. The principle was so strong, that the 
Sanaga-Ogowe actually practiced double exogamy; that is, a man could not marry a 
woman of the clan of his father or mother. There was certain flexibility with regards 
to the second case, and sometimes unions between a man and a woman of his 
maternal clan was allowed, provided that genealogies reveal a considerable gap. 
Incest was so strongly despised, that it was also extended to all those clans that were 
seen to have split up in the past -  e ’lat-ayong -  even if they were non-Sanaga-Ogowe
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clans.103 It is not clear how it happened, but certain clans can trace their counterpart 
amongst Bilobolobo -  a term applied to non-Sanaga-Ogowe speakers.
Exogamy guaranteed the creation of a large social network, which made possible 
all sorts of exchanges between allied families. Such ties were indispensable within a 
climate of constant insecurity and mistrust as that of the second half of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Mbana drew my attention to the fact that most marital 
unions were earned out between couples living in the vicinity, and, often, numerous 
marriages took place between the same two clans, like the case of the Nzomo and 
Esen of Rio Muni.104 By doing so, it was not only possible to integrate different 
people, but also to know if they have good habits -  bumba fulu.105 Marital alliances 
and socio-economic relations between neighbouring families helped to create a sense 
of district, which, though not recognized in the figure of a leader or institution, was 
acknowledged by its dwellers.
Mmnama or the eyes of the village
The history of the Sanaga-Ogowe appears to have been characterized by the 
constant struggle between the desire to consolidate strong leadership and rejection of 
centralized power. The latter was so intense that strong leaders rarely succeeded in 
extending their power to the next generation. Leadership was rarely acknowledged at 
clan or lineage level within this segmentary society. The mvok and the ndci-e ’bot were 
the only recognizable political units, but leadership was permanently challenged, in 
such a way that most scholars have described the Sanaga-Ogowe as an egalitarian 
acephalous society.
European accounts are full of examples describing the weak nature of leadership 
amongst the Sanaga-Ogowe. Nonetheless, this was not an anarchic society, as some
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early European observers described it.106 It did manage to develop a series of 
mechanisms which made it possible for decisions to be taken and implemented within 
village communities. Whereas in the south strong leadership was almost nonexistent, 
amongst northern sections more centralized power structures were developing by the 
late nineteenth century. The nature of power, however, remained the same throughout 
the whole Sanaga-Ogowe territory; that is, power was only effective at a family level. 
Only sporadically, authority and legal ruling could be extended beyond family 
borders, such as the case of the anti-witchcraft cult Ngii.
Like so many aspects of Sanaga-Ogowe society, political structure was highly 
flexible, and it is possible to find multiple interpretations regarding authority and 
leadership. Bot Ba Njok claims that this society had a pyramidal structure based on
4 • • 107three types of prominence: biological, intellectual and religious, and political. 
Mbana, based on the legends of the Mvet or troubadours, argues that there existed a 
triple division of power:108 Minnama or village representative, Ndzwee or village 
judge, and the Akamayong or military chief.109 hi fact, there was no clear 
conceptualisation or strict division of power. Although these concepts may have 
existed as part of Sanaga-Ogowe ideology, they were vaguely defined and often could 
not be matched by tangible institutions.
The mvok was usually made up of mendd-me ’bot, meaning that each village had 
more than one family head. This group of elders, called botoo or benydamboro (plural 
for nyaamboro), acted as principals.110 Nonetheless each village generally 
acknowledged a single representative known as minnama. This figure received 
different names depending on the region, such as ntoo or midzaa. All these terms 
reflect the same sense: the representative or principal of the village. In Rio Muni 
during the colonial period, midzaa and minnama were often translated as the owner of
56
the village, yet it literally means the ‘eyes of the village’, from mis (eyes) and chad
(village). 111 This translation is much more faithful to what the village leader was
supposed to be amongst the southern Sanaga-Ogowe. The minnama was simply a
primus inter pares, chosen by the elders for his qualities to represent his village.
Referring to the role of the community head, Tessmanm said: ‘A chief... does not
represent a sole individual, but the whole senior members of the families, and the
* • 112corresponding family head will only represent them outside the village.’ To 
represent the village involved speaking 011 behalf of his mvok-e’bot, village 
community, in case of external conflict or during the burdensome negotiations which 
preceded marriage. Tessmann claims that the principal’s role was broader, for he 
acted as a sort of leading judge in the village tribunal and moderator during elders’
* 113discussions 111 the abda.
No doubt, minnama'’& executive power was very limited. Numerous sources 
referred to village leaders’ inability to carry out their commands. In fact, Europeans 
were often asked to intervene in the solution of conflicts, since the minnama was not 
always capable of achieving consensus amongst the elders.114 Even after solving a 
dispute, according to Tessmann, chiefs had little or no power to make their rulings 
effective.115 The village leader was not necessarily the wealthiest person. Mbana 
argues that in Sanaga-Ogowe ideology, a rich man could not be considered as 
minnama, because his condition would make him primarily look after his own 
interests and not those of his community. Furthermore, wealthy men usually had 
numerous enemies and conflicts, which would not serve the benefit of the mvok- 
e ’bot.U6 The minnama based his position on his personal qualities, which, somehow,
• 117made his position temporary. He was supposed to look after his fellow villagers, 
solving conflicts and restoring peace whenever it was broken. Informants described
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him as a fair, unselfish person who had to have the ‘gift of word’ or eloquence in
order to make everybody listen. The term mi-nnama was applied to this figure
because he had to have eyes ‘to see beyond’ or ‘to know’. Whenever there was a
person with such outstanding qualities, he was often respected and regarded as an
arbitrator by different clans within a region. Barrera explains how in the case of a
serious dispute between two villages it was necessary to ‘resort to the decision of
arbitrators designated by both sides, usually chiefs from other villages who are known
118amongst the natives for properly solving these matters’.
A deep-rooted rejection of both central power and individual success has led 
many scholars to describe the Sanaga-Ogowe as a strongly egalitarian society. Elders’ 
council and witchcraft beliefs are often viewed as two examples of this egalitarian 
ideology. In the last few decades, however, scholars have leamt that reality as well as 
ideology was rather more complex. Egalitarian tendencies were also counteracted by 
an opposing ideology, which, as we can see in mvet legends, praised the idea of strong 
rulers capable of keeping their people together.119
Many believe that the strong emphasis on egalitarianism is a result of the 
subsistence economy. For several centuries, before the rise of European coastal trade 
in the mid-nineteenth century, individuals found it quite difficult to accumulate wealth 
and excel over the rest of the community. Rowlands and Wamier explain that, under 
these circumstances, material success was seen to happen at the expense of the 
community: ‘social life is perceived as a zero sum game: what someone possesses 
must be appropriated at the expense of someone else.’120 Along with these economic 
notions, the Sanaga-Ogowe developed an ideology in which excessive individual 
success and accumulation of power was considered to be evil. This belief was based 
on the idea of a ‘natural order’ created by God. Economic equality was part of the
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natural order. Therefore, those excelling over the rest of the community were thought 
to go against it. Mbwo (witchcraft) was the explanation for human success, and 
possession of evu — seen as a living being inside people — made it possible to control
191hidden forces.
The Sanaga-Ogowe, however, did not believe in total equality. In reality, what we 
find is the existence of some sort of hierarchical order. European missionaries and 
officers became almost obsessed with the denunciation of women’s inequality and 
elders’ rule. Women were very often described as slaves, whereas elders were 
portrayed as tyrants who oppressed their people through all kinds of pagan beliefs.122 
Although such desciiptions were exaggerated, age and gender were undoubtedly the 
two main factors in determining social hierarchy. To a lesser extent, we could also 
add wisdom, for, as we shall see later, it played an important role in the Sanaga- 
Ogowe political order. Male elders, especially the most knowledgeable ones, 
occupied the top position within the flat pyramid of the Sanaga-Ogowe social order. 
Women and youngsters had a secondary role, being subject to elders’ control, hi this 
respect, we could argue that absolute egalitarianism was only real amongst elders.123 
Nonetheless, Fisiy and Geschiere wisely point out that hierarchies were somewhat 
flexible because of the lack of central institutions.124 The subordinate position of 
young men was only temporary, since they would eventually achieve the same status 
as their fathers. Until then, it was not uncommon for yomigsters to challenge elders’ 
authority.125 As regards women, they kept control over their production, which made 
their role not as secondary as missionaries insisted on describing. Referring to chiefs’ 
control over women, Tessmann said:
The worst part is when he [the chief] appears even subjected to his wives... he has to
stoop to ask for permission to his wives to kill a chicken and offer it to a visitor; he
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becomes then a caricature of the masculine gender, and, especially, of what a leader is 
supposed to be like.126
The notion of separation of powers, though vague, seemed to have existed 
amongst the Sanaga-Ogowe. What we could consider as positions of authority 
required completely different personal characteristics. Thus, the qualities of the 
persons in charge of keeping the ancestors skulls’ for Melan, the village 
representative, or the rich man, were generally contradictory, making it not viable for 
an individual to accumulate several positions. Within a society where power was 
based on individuals, not institutions, such an accumulation would be interpreted as 
the concentration of power in the hands of a sole individual. Ultimately this figure 
would be able to impose his view upon the rest of the community, becoming a sort of 
uncontested tyrant.
Constant competition between elders prevented the over-concentration of power. 
Instead, what we find is the government of benydamboro or elders. The term did not 
refer as much to biological age, as to experience and wisdom. This concept derived 
from Sanaga-Ogowe beliefs, in which the bongus (initiated men) are given access to 
secret or hidden knowledge. The bebin (non-initiated), are also called bedzimi mam -  
those who ignore things -  because they remain ignorant of the secrets. The initiated 
man, because of his access to secret things and age is considered to be a ‘real person’
1 77-  nyaa-mot -  who knows what is best for the community. Such a notion was not so
far from reality, because elders’ authority was, in fact, the rule of those who knew
128most -  beyem -  and with enough strength of character to make their views heard.
Knowledge of the tradition was crucial within a context of competition between 
elders. Generally, the decision-making process involved long discussions. Therefore, 
the most knowledgeable had greater chances to put across their views and convince
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their audience. During discussions, speakers had to try to reach consensus, for there 
was no other way to decide. In a 1910 article, Father Nicolas Gonzalez explained how 
this process worked: ‘When an important matter has to be dealt with, neighbouring 
chiefs [family heads] gathered, and, in common agreement, determine whatever is 
appropriate on each case.’129 Probably, these kinds of scenes led Captain Roche to 
describe the Sanaga-Ogowe political process as democratic.130 However, this system 
had to face numerous problems. The need to convince the majority of the elders, made 
the decision-making slow. Furthermore, as a result of rivalry between elders, it was 
very difficult to impose long-lasting views. Moreover, they often failed to reach an 
agreement, which, if serious, could cause the splitting up of the village community.
Age and intellectual prominence were not by themselves enough to guarantee 
elders authority. Any political system must be able to have some capacity of coercion 
in order to defend itself as well as to impose its decisions. Copet-Rougier, in her essay 
about violence in acephalous societies, distinguishes between ‘legitimate’ and 
‘illegitimate violence’. The former seeks to support the social order, whereas the latter 
aims at destroying it. Amongst the Sanaga-Ogowe, legitimate violence rests on the 
benydamboro. Any use of force by an individual against a fellow villager or 
manipulation of hidden forces for his or her sole benefit would be considered as 
illegitimate violence. Elders’ power depended on their capacity to exercise two forms 
of indirect force: ‘open’ and ‘symbolic violence’.131 Their control over land and the 
series of economic obligations derived from it are clearly a form of open violence. 
Through their control over religion, they exercised a form of symbolic violence, as 
they subtly imposed a series of moral obligations on the rest of the community 
through a combination of impenetrable ceremonies and discourse. Within Sanaga- 
Ogowe culture, religious beliefs were used to perpetuate the existing social order. As
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we shall see in the next section, Sanaga-Ogowe religious beliefs maintain that the 
ancestors created the existing social order, thus, if the community wants to keep their 
protection and avoid their anger, they had to follow the ancestors’ ways. The elders, 
being closer to the ancestors, became their legitimate spokespersons, and religious 
cults were a mechanism to facilitate their social control.
Nonetheless, we should not interpret that economic and religious control were 
enough to guarantee elders’ power. Migration, for instance, could clearly limit elders’ 
economic preponderance. Although the village elders shared some common interests, 
they were not a cohesive group, for they had to compromise between the interest of 
the entire village and those of their own families or themselves. Disagreement was, 
therefore, a factor in weakening benydamboro'’s moral authority, especially when they 
lacked the sorts of qualities that their moral leadership required. Unlike north of the 
Ntem, in the south leadership was not broadly recognized by the entire village 
community, and, very often, it depended on the personal character of the head. Only 
at nda-e ’bot level were leaders almost universally recognized. Each nda-e ’bot had its 
family head who was in charge of solving its problems as well as representing it. The 
limits to authority amongst the Sanaga-Ogowe were not so much due to lack of 
leadership qualities, as Tessmann suggested, but as to the difficulty in finding the 
balance between strong authority and egalitarian ideology.132
The rise of European coastal trade from the mid-nineteenth century brought about 
new instruments to strengthen leadership. Along with commercial wealth, the second 
half of the nineteenth century witnessed an increase in warfare and violence, which 
helped leaders to consolidate their power. These factors were behind the emergence of 
the nkukuma or ‘big man’ amongst the northern sections of the Sanaga-Ogowe and, 
sporadically, in the south. Nkukuma originally meant rich person. According to
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Mb ana, these were a new type of leaders who thanks to war and trade were capable of
1concentrating political, economic and military power. Although we have no 
definitive data, it appears reasonable to think that the impact of European trade 
contributed to an increase in violence throughout the Sanaga-Ogowe territory. 
Warfare did not only happen as a result of leaders’ competition for the new source of 
wealth, but also because of problems related to the payment of growing bridewealth 
prices. In a society where conflicts between families had been historically difficult to 
settle, the new situation appeared to escape the control of its leaders.
Early colonial reports draw attention to the large number of conflicts and wars 
originated by bridewealth disputes. Yet a careful examination of nswa payments 
reveals that these were not simply ‘matters over women’, as were often described. 
Along with high prices, such payments included a wide variety of goods such as: 
spear heads (bikwele, sing, ekwele), muskets, gunpowder, cattle, cloth, kitchenware, 
machetes, spears, tobacco and beads.134 This suggests that nswa was not only a 
mechanism to exchange people, but also facilitated commercial exchange between 
different families. It is well known that the payment was not limited to nswa. The 
future husband offered several gifts before the final arrangement and throughout his 
marriage. It is not surprising then, that nswa negotiations could degenerate into bitter 
and long-lasting disputes. Lacking formal markets and in a context of permanent 
mistrust and hazard, commerce amongst the Sanaga-Ogowe was based on personal 
relations. Tessmann also describes how friends used to pay visits to each other in 
which gifts were mutually exchanged.
The development of elcwele as a currency shows that trade activities were more 
developed before the arrival of the Europeans than has previously been thought. There
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existed several types of bikwele that were used both as ordinary payment and
bridewealth.136 Regarding these activities, an article in La Guinea Espanola noted:
One of the most surprising things for all those who penetrate into our continent [Rio 
Muni] for the first time and visit Pamue villages are the commercial transactions and 
arrangements, which after long discussions and no little ostentation they cany out... they 
walk around the place setting [abdd] in which they shelter, placing little piles of old iron
137pieces [bilcwele\ over here and little sticks or pieces of banana leaves over there.
Family heads were in control of most commercial activities, for they were in charge 
of nswa negotiations and organizing trade caravans. Furthermore, they were also 
behind the production of bilcwele. European observers indicate that forges were 
usually located in the abdd.13* Bikwele manufacture was somewhat limited because it 
involved a long and burdensome technical process as well as a severe ritual
139preparation for those taking part in the task.
Due to low production, local trade was never capable of generating the kind of 
economic growth necessary to strengthen leadership. European commerce, however, 
did not only offer a much larger quantity but also different types of products that local 
production could not match. Control over such products laid the foundations for the 
emergence of the nkukuma as a political leader. Although European commerce 
facilitated certain processes which already existed, it did not alter the socio-economic 
core of the Sanaga-Ogowe society, since people still remained as the main asset. 
‘Wealth in people’ was very much alive even after colonial conquest.140 People’s 
economic value was recognized through a series of compensation mechanisms which 
include the payment of a varying quantity of goods. Nswa, for example, was a way to 
compensate the woman’s family for the loss of one of its members as well as her 
potential offspring. Murder or accidental killing also had to be compensated, if 
subsequent revenge killings were to be avoided.141 Women’s high value was based on
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their role as food producers, but above all, as child bearers for the family group. A 
woman could be extremely hardworking in the field, but if she was not capable of 
conceiving, she was often returned to her family. The nkukuma was considered a rich 
man primarily due to his wealth in people. Such wealth and prestige could eventually 
lead to recognition as a leader.142 Late nineteenth-century mikukuma, however, did not 
succeed in extending their power to the next generation, because power had a personal 
rather than an institutional base. After his death, material wealth was divided between 
his dependents, weakening his accumulated power.143
Melan or “god below”
‘Nzam 'e yo, Fam a si; Nzame Nzame, Fam e Fam* (Nzama — God -  is above, 
man is below; Nzama is Nzama, man is a man) is an old saying, which wisely 
summarizes the role of religion in Sanaga-Ogowe society.144 Often characterized as 
not being a religious people by early European observers, especially missionaries, the 
Sanaga-Ogowe developed a worldview in which the earthly realm was symbiotically 
connected to the supernatural one. The latter held many of the answers to the 
occurrences of the former. Yet, such conceptions did not translate themselves into an 
extensive and profound religious life. If the natural order was not altered, the Sanaga- 
Ogowe did not see the need to celebrate their cults. Religious beliefs were, 
nonetheless, a central pillar of their tradition.
To the Sanaga-Ogowe, religion was not an identifiable category, but an 
indistinguishable part of their whole culture. This represented an obstacle for those 
observers who tried to study this people in the late nineteenth century. By then, 
Christianity was seen as separate entity of European cultures, thus their questions 
were often not understood or awkwardly answered by Africans. The most common
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error, as Tessmann points out referring to Father Trilles, was to mistake religious 
symbols for reality.145 Such a tendency created the somewhat grotesque image of this 
society, which, as we shall see in following chapters, greatly influenced colonial 
attitudes during the conquest stage and thereafter.
Scholar's studying twentieth-century religious movements have realized that, 
amongst Central African societies, ritual takes a priority over belief.146 The same 
phenomenon has been observed amongst the Sanaga-Ogowe people. In his extensive 
and detailed study, Tessmann describes those rituals that he personally witnessed. Yet 
he admits that local interpretations were often sketchy or even mistaken. Instead, 
Tessmann provides his own interpretations based on his observations, talks with 
locals, and readings. At times, it appears that Tessmann tries to make Sanaga-Ogowe 
beliefs fit into his preconception o f ‘primitive’ religions.147
Tessmann’s work, however, is important. His observations reveal a society with a 
rather sophisticated belief system, which was not evident to me during my fieldwork. 
Clearly, today’s generation barely keeps memories about the complexity of the 
numerous cults and beliefs of the past. Like Tessmann, I also found that only a few 
individuals master this sort of knowledge. In the past, villages used to have one or two 
elders with a special inclination for knowledge and reflection.148 These ‘intellectuals’ 
played a very important role not only as storekeepers of knowledge, but also as 
interpreters and creators of it. In a society where most people merely took part in 
rituals without fully understanding them, this granted them some sort of hegemony 
over the community. Cults and principles were very much the same throughout the 
Sanaga-Ogowe territory, yet European observers gathered numerous versions and 
views on common beliefs and rituals. Due to the lack of centralized institutions, 
orthodoxy was virtually nonexistent, and interpretations and views depended on
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multiple village intellectuals. They would also decide when rituals were needed as 
well as conduct them.
Such heterogeneity determined the difference in emphasis of cults from one 
region to another. Tessmann points out that what he called ‘benevolent cults’ were 
much more common in the south than in the north.149 Whereas some cults such as 
Meldn, So, or Ngu were widespread across the entire Sanaga-Ogowe country, some 
others, such as Eniko and Schib, were limited to a single subgroup.150 According to 
Tessmann, elders’ recollection of cults, which no longer existed in the 1900s, 
indicates that cults were more prolific in the past.151 The study of modem religious 
movements shows that they usually have a temporary character, remaining alive for
1 S9some twenty or thirty years, until they lose their vitality. hi the case of those well 
established throughout a large area, such as Meldn or So, it is reasonable to think that 
they survived for much longer. In spite of valuable comparisons with twentieth- 
century movements, we should not take for granted that these modem phenomena are 
an exact replica of old religious cults. For instance, social protest is usually linked to 
religious movements, yet such a connection is not so clear in the past, where 
centralized power was non-existent.
The Sanaga-Ogowe developed a non-theocentric religion. This led most early 
observers to think that the Sanaga-Ogowe did not believe in the idea of a supreme 
God. In the course of their evangelical work, missionaries soon learnt that, in fact, 
such an idea was not foreign.153 hi 1912, Trilles published one of the numerous 
legends of the creation, which he had been collecting since his arrival in the region in 
1892.154 The Creator receives different names depending on the source. The most 
common name is Nzama, which is today accepted as the name of God amongst the 
Fang of Gabon and Rio Muni. Fernandez, along other scholars, claims that Nzama
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was not the real name of God. According to him, missionaries erroneously translated 
Nzama for God, though this was actually the name of Mebe V s -  God’s -  first son.155 
The discussion about the term used for God amongst the Sanaga-Ogowe is a long and 
inconclusive one. Whether God receives numerous names in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, it would be logical to think that the Sanaga-Ogowe, an extremely 
decentralized society, also used multiple terms. Mebe’e, Nzama, Nkom-Bot, Nkwa, 
Elofek, Nti-Bise are just a few of the names mentioned to reflect the same concept.156
In Sanaga-Ogowe cosmogony, God is not really a creator but an ‘organizer’. 
Tessmann explains how God organized the ‘inert chaotic matter’. In doing so, He 
provided this substance with life and shaped it into the visible and invisible reality as 
the Sanaga-Ogowe knew it.157 Although this is not the place to deal with such myths 
in detail, it is worth considering a few aspects of these beliefs. Sanaga-Ogowe 
religious conceptions were based on the concept of a ‘natural order’ established by 
God at the moment of the ‘organization’. Such a concept was a product of the 
observation of nature and society. To the Sanaga-Ogowe, the natural order was no 
other thing than the regular working of nature and society -  the seasonal rains, the day 
after the night, the village as home of people, elders ruling over youngsters, etc. 
Anything which did not follow the regular run of events falls into the ‘unnatural’ 
order. Consequently, the natural order was associated with Good, whereas the 
disruption of it was considered as Evil.
The natural order exists and recreates itself thanks to the action of God. When 
organizing the chaotic matter, Tessmann explains, God gave to every element a 
‘special force’, which made each of them to be exactly what they are and transmit 
these exact characteristics to its kind.158 Narrowly comiected to this idea is what 
Tessmann calls ‘sensitive’ and ‘visible radiation’.159 It derives from the special force,
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and is capable of affecting other objects and beings in one way or another. This is the 
same principle that lies behind byang. This term is frequently translated as medicina 
in present-day Rio Muni, though remedy would be a more accurate translation, for the 
‘radiation’ of an object was used to have either a positive or negative impact on 
people. Contrary to missionaries’ belief, the influence of these objects -  fetishes in 
colonial jargon -  was not due to some form of ‘spirits’ living inside, but to the 
radiation of that special force bestowed by God.160
There are several mythological variations about the creation of the first man or 
human being. Some myths say that Nzama created the first man, Mot-Zama, along 
with several animals, usually the gorilla, Ngi-Zamd, and chimpanzee, Waa-Zamd.[(A 
Other myths also add three more human characters: Nlcwi-Zama, the Beyele; Akut- 
Zcimd, crazy or fool; and Ngomwenio.162 hi these myths we observe that God 
abandoned his children due to their disobedience. As a result, people had to face 
numerous difficulties without the help of their father. Most observers agreed that God 
was rather irrelevant in the daily lives of the Sanaga-Ogowe. In an article in La 
Guinea Espanola, a missionary complained about the role of God amongst locals in 
the following terms:
It is not that, generally speaking, they do not admit a Supreme Being and Creator of all 
things, but they err about its Providence, because they do not admit Him in ordinary 
events, though they do in exceptional cases.163
Local concepts saw in God a very distant being, so great that He did not worry about
human affairs. After being abandoned by God, Sanaga-Ogowe could only resort to the
ancestors for mediation and protection.
For the Sanaga-Ogowe, respect for ancestors was almost reverential. If they
worshiped anything it was the family ancestors through the celebration of Meldn -  or
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Biere as scholars generally know it. Trilles argued that biere, referring to the
ancestors statues, were a sort of national God.164 Europeans used to mistake the statue
for the real object of worship; the ancestors’ skulls. Most of my informants told me
that biere was simply a statue, which had 110 value in itself. It was used as a
distraction, in order to keep women and children attention away from the skulls.165 hi
1911, Father Nicolas Gonzalez said this about the ancestor cult:
Amongst the Pamue the idol, (or more appropriate, the principal fetish) is a skull of their 
forefathers, for they suppose the dead person’s soul dwells in it. The skulls are kept in a 
round box, longer than wider, of barrel shape, made up of tree bark; on top of it they 
usually put a figure, shaped, sometimes, as a man, and, at times, as a woman.166
As noted above, the Sanaga-Ogowe saw the disruption of the natural order as a 
threat to their survival. From the social point of view, communal life was considered 
to be the natural state in which humans live. That is how Nzama had established it in 
the beginning, and how ancestors continued ever since. Meldn sought to maintain this 
system by strengthening family links. The role of the ancestors was to reinforce the 
sense of belonging; all members of the village have the same origin, thus, are one sole 
thing. Regarding the name of the cult, Tessmann explains that it comes from the root - 
la, to be united.167 Whatever problem affected the community, it could only be solved 
by maintaining the unity of the village. The ancestors, also called betsira (fathers) or 
bot (people), did not look after individuals but the whole community.168
Generally only initiated men took part in Meldn rituals. It appears there was no 
established age to be initiated and it was up to the elders to determine when there 
were enough youngsters who could be initiated. Tessmann mentions that, 
exceptionally, women could also be initiated. This could happen either in those cases 
in which women had accidentally seen the skulls, or when there was no close male 
relative alive of one of the ancestors.169 During Meldn rituals, the skulls were
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introduced to the group of youngsters who had to be able to recognize them thanks to 
the previously learnt genealogies, which were an essential part of boys’ education. 
While reciting the names of the ancestors, the conductor of the ceremony also 
mentioned the extraordinary facts associated with that particular person. As Mbuy 
points out, in ancestor cults not everybody could qualify as an ancestor.170 This person 
had to be regarded as somebody of exceptional value for the community. In this 
respect, both men and women could reach this status and be worshiped in Meldn. The 
aspiration of most leaders was to achieve the sort of fame that would eventually 
qualify them as ngunmeldn (the ancestors honoured in Meldn)}11 During the initiation 
ceremony, neophytes consumed alan, a hallucinogen which allowed them to see 
beyond the visible world and enter into contact with the ancestors.172 The initiation 
ceremony eventually sought to strengthen the village community by joining together 
three different generations: ancestors, elders, and youngsters as past, present and 
future of the family.173
According to my informants, each village had a special person in charge of 
looking after the ancestors’ remains. This person was considered to be of an 
exceptionally good character, from whom no hurt was expected. Since the force of 
this cult rested in the family nature of the ancestors, those who were closest in time 
were especially worshiped. It was to them that most petitions were addressed, for they 
would listen more carefully to the needs of their children. Should the natural order be 
disrupted, elders would have to ask the ancestors for their mediation. They did not 
intervene unless they were asked to. The ancestors would only look after general 
problems affecting the community such as poor crops, child mortality or drought. The 
leading elders, thanks to their knowledge and experience, would assess when it was
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necessary to akom adzad or ctkom meldn (literally to prepare -  repair -  the village or 
Meldn) m
All Sanaga-Ogowe religious manifestations seek to oppose evil and to restore the 
natural order disrupted by it. Meldn, however, was not the only community rite. The 
Sanaga-Ogowe also developed other cults, in which the initiated tried to fight more 
specific problems and purify the community. So and Ngu were arguably the most 
popular ones, for they were widespread through most of the Sanaga-Ogowe territory. 
The former was a universal initiation rite, symbolizing the passage of boys into sexual 
maturity.175 This was considered to be the first step of adulthood. From then on, 
youngsters were no longer children. Tessmann argues that, amongst the Sanaga- 
Ogowe, sex, somehow, had negative connotations, because, according to legends that 
he gathered, God abandoned humans when they started to practice sex.176 Amongst 
the southern Sanaga-Ogowe, such connotations were reinforced through the combined 
celebration of the So and Ndong-Mba rituals, in which the latter was designed to 
combat incest, the main sexual taboo amongst clan members, that could eventually 
destroy the community.
Ngu has long attracted the attention of scholars due to its social implications. It is 
considered to be an anti-witchcraft cult, which sought to eradicate activities that 
endangered the community. For this reason, Alexandre regarded Ngu as a sort of
* • * » 177police and judicial body. Members of this cult were supposed to find and punish 
those violating the peace of the community. The Sanaga-Ogowe realized that certain 
problems did not only affect isolated communities, but also different family villages 
alike. Therefore, the celebration of Ngu was often carried out by people of different 
clans together. They shared similar problems and joined forces in fighting against 
them. NgiVs power was limited nevertheless. Tessmann points out that its effect only
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reached close villages within a few hours.178 Unlike Meldn or So, Ngu was not a 
compulsory rite that all male Sanaga-Ogowe had to be initiated into.179 Due to its 
special character, it appears that access to this cult was restricted to a few individuals 
who had the leadership and knowledgeable qualities required. Alexandre argues that, 
in spite of being ruled by a council, hierarchical structures inside Ngu were more 
distinguishable than in any other aspect of this culture.180
Tessmann argues that people only resorted to Ngu for crimes such as theft, sexual 
offences, and especially murder. It appears from his descriptions that, when such 
cases took place within a village, an initiated elder took the case before the Ngu’s 
council, where the matter was discussed and resolved. The murderer of a relative 
could be executed, though this had to be done without spilling his blood, for such a 
thing was not tolerated amongst family members.181 We do not know to what extent 
Ngu was successful in preventing these kinds of crimes. Although Tessmann 
maintains that many people believed in the frightening power of Ngu, we need to 
keep in mind that it was mainly a deterring tool.182 By the time Tessmann conducted 
his research, Ngu appeared to be quite active amongst the Sanaga-Ogowe. Mbana 
claims that this cult became prominent in the late nineteenth century.183 It is possible 
that the constant internal violence of the period favoured the expansion of this semi-
184judicial cult amongst southern Sanaga-Ogowe.
There existed a large array of cults that were practiced on a much smaller scale in
• 18^fewer regions. The south was more prolific regarding these minor cults. They had a 
much more specific character, and usually sought to address a particular type of 
problem. Tessmann mentions several cults such as Schok, Bokung, and Elong that 
were practiced in more than one region, whereas some others were limited to one
1 o/:
subgroup such as Eniko of the Ntumu, and Schib and Odschoe of the Fang.
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Tessmann describes in great detail the rituals and interprets the symbols associated 
with them. Unfortunately, he does not pay as much attention to the reasons which led 
to the celebration of religious ceremonies on each occasion. He does say, however, 
that most individuals were only initiated into one cult, which means that many of 
them had an extremely minor character even within the regions where they were more 
popular.187
Although many of the cults were generally restricted to men, women were not 
totally excluded from religious life. As noted above, at times women could be 
initiated into Meldn. Tessmann also mentions that in some regions women took part in 
Ngu rituals.188 One obstacle for adult women’s greater involvement in male cults was 
their family character. Women usually lived in their husbands’ villages and were not 
considered part of the mvok-e ’bot. Those who for some reason remained in their own 
family village found it easier to participate in these rituals, especially if there were no 
old members alive of their ndd-e’bot. Amongst the Sanaga-Ogowe there were also 
exclusively female cults in which only initiated women could take part. As late as 
1922, they were still present, as we can see in an article in the Claretian magazine that 
referred to them as secret societies.189 Sadly we do not have much data on them, 
because women kept such information away from predominantly male European 
observers. The latter had to rely on male informants who, very rarely, had first hand 
accounts on these rites. Female cults, like their male counterparts, were covered by a 
layer of secrecy whose details were hidden especially from men.
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Photograph 3: Ngu mask
Photograph 2: Melan or Biere statue
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Mewungo is the best-known female cult and it appeared to have been the most 
important, though Tessmann also mentions several others, such as Mekong, 
Endaluma, Ewud, and Akang.190 According to Alexandre, Mewungo was very useful 
in reinforcing women’s cohesion within a setting where most married women came 
from different clans.191 Female cults also sought to deal with specific problems that 
affected women such as infertility, infant mortality, or neglectful husbands. Berger
argues that female cults were a perfect example of how before colonialism cults could
192also play a resistance role, providing some form of counterbalance to male power.
During the celebration of Mewungo, Tessmann explains how women walked around
* 193the village hurling all kinds of insults and jokes on men, who stayed indoors. 
Female cults could also offer valuable protection against male abuse, for they were 
feared by many men who ignored the inside nature of these cults. Like in the case of 
male rituals, we do not know on which occasions they were celebrated, though it 
seems that they were not as frequent.194
Somehow, all cults sought to boost good fortune while protecting the community 
and its members from evil and mbwo. Part of the problems that affected the Sanaga- 
Ogowe was blamed on the ancestors’ neglect, but generally it was attributed to mbwo 
or individuals’ use of magic for their own benefit. Witchcraft was often thought to be 
behind someone’s recurring misfortune. The price that someone had to pay for 
benefiting from witchcraft was usually the death of a close relative. People deeply 
believed in such practices to the point that, except in the case of old people, death was 
not considered to be natural, as Father Gonzalez explained in 1911.195 From the point 
of view of this work, the most interesting aspect of such belief is that witchcraft, 
defined as individual’s ambition, was considered to be the greatest enemy of the 
community. Witchcraft was not only an instrument to prevent excessive accumulation
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of power or material wealth in the hands of a few people, but also a way to protect the 
cohesion of the group. The Sanaga-Ogowe learnt that individuals’ excessive 
ambitions tended to cause jealousy and tensions, which eventually ended in the 
splitting of the family village. In this respect, we can see how the use of magic per se 
was not necessarily evil. Great leaders were believed to owe their position to magic. 
Communal cults also resorted to magic in order to achieve their goals. The difference 
in both cases is that magic was openly used for the benefit of the community. As we 
shall see in the following chapters, increasing individualistic beliefs as well as forced 
secrecy made certain rituals fall into the realm of witchcraft, which by then met no 
opposition from vanished or declining religious cults.
Conclusion
Autonomy, the ability of human groups to make fundamental decisions regarding 
their societies, was a vital principle in the configuration of the Sanaga-Ogowe 
tradition. In this respect, the mvok-e'bot played a major role because it retained
decision-making within the limited boundaries of the community. A strongly
egalitarian culture, represented in the figure of the minnama as a primus inter pares, 
made it possible to keep personal ambitions under control, preventing communities 
from loosing their political autonomy at the hands of authoritarian characters. Limited 
economic development also contributed to maintaining the status quo, because
individuals were unable to accumulate enough wealth to institutionalize their
authority. When families found personal leadership too pervasive, they could always 
recover their autonomy by migrating and founding a new mvok-e ’bot. hi so doing, the 
Sanaga-Ogowe tradition expanded over a large area, and was enriched through 
contact with different cultural groups and natural environments. Since migration was
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a back-and-forth phenomenon, innovations could be transmitted to other sections of 
the Sanaga-Ogowe. Change was, subsequently, legitimized through the semi-sacred 
past or its humanized representation, the ancestors, whose commitment was ensured 
through the participation of the male members of the tnvok-e ’hot in Melan rituals. By 
bridging the gap between past and present, Melon guaranteed the existing social order 
and strengthened family ties.
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Chapter 2
The “Death” of the Old Tradition
During the first quarter of the twentieth century, the Sanaga-Ogowe of Rio Muni 
witnessed how growing European penetration into their territory culminated in the 
loss of their sovereignty at the hands of the Spanish. From 1910, under the leadership 
of Governor-General Barrera, Spain launched a series of military campaigns against 
Sanaga-Ogowe clans, and, by 1927, Rio Muni had been completely pacified. More 
importantly, colonial conquest resulted in an offensive against key pillars of the 
Sanaga-Ogowe tradition. Colonial impact on minnamci authority, mvok-e’bot 
organization and Meldn rituals undermined Sanaga-Ogowe capacity to integrate and 
legitimize the changes taking place between 1901 and 1927. One must not assume 
that the Sanaga-Ogowe socio-cultural organization disappeared completely as a result 
of colonial conquest. We must understand this as a process in which elements of the 
Sanaga-Ogowe tradition were able to survive through a process of re-adaptation that 
gave birth to the new tradition. This chapter intends to show how the deep 
transformations of this period altered the basic structure of Sanaga-Ogowe society to 
the point of changing the core of the old tradition and laying the basis of the new. 
1927 is simply a symbolic landmark of a process that in northern and coastal Rio 
Muni was well underway before this date.1
The transformations of this period predated the Spanish conquest, as Sanaga- 
Ogowe clans increasingly got involved in the European trade from the late nineteenth 
century. Behind the final migration to the coast during this period was Sanaga-Ogowe 
desire to trade with Europeans. This did not, however, include the handover of their
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sovereignty. As a result, the Spanish were forced to make greater use of violence to 
conquer the territory than is commonly admitted. Colonial violence had an exemplary 
character, being often disproportionate and arbitrary. One of the first symbols of 
Sanaga-Ogowe submission was the appointment of the nkukuma or administrative 
chief, which was intended to replace the traditional minnama. Even in those cases 
where traditional leaders were appointed, the Spanish acknowledgement undermined 
the existing authority structure, which, from then on, relied on the Colonial Guard as 
the coercive instrument to enhance chiefs’ authority. During this process, the mvok 
lost its sovereignty as decision-making was removed by the state. After colonial 
conquest, decisions would no longer respond to the needs of the mvok-e'bot but those 
of the government. As we shall see, all this was possible thanks to existence of 
disaffected sectors within Sanaga-Ogowe society. This, along with the instability that 
characterized this period, was skilfully exploited by the Claretian missionaries, whose 
role would be key for the colonial enterprise in eroding the unity of the mvok-e ’bot 
and undermining the existing social order.
The last migration
Migration to the coast was accelerated in the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
as a result of increasing Sanaga-Ogowe interest in European goods. Chamberlin 
quotes information that indicates that at least from the 1840s, southern sections of the 
Sanaga-Ogowe were trading ivory in exchange for European goods through semi­
coastal intermediaries.2 When they found out that they received much less than 
Europeans paid for ivory, some groups decided to get rid of intermediaries. Growing 
European presence on the coast and, especially, the rise in wild rubber demand 
brought about a greater Sanaga-Ogowe involvement in so-called legitimate trade.
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Commercial caravans were increasingly replaced by a will to establish permanent
settlements close to the source of wealth. Governor Barrera described this population
movement in the following terms:
Through the north-eastern section of our territory, [Sanaga-Ogowe] hordes were entering 
after being pushed away by stronger ones. These hordes were crossing a river called Kero 
[probably Kie] and, according to the reports that I obtained during my expedition, they 
descended towards the south up to the Benito’s [Wele] basin, encamping between the 
river and Bata’s mountains, Crystal Mountains... after surveying the area, they started to 
advance towards the sea using the rivers as guides, especially the Benito. These hordes, 
being stronger than the tribes that they encountered, displaced others out of their way... 
both the Esamongon and Amvom Pamue were forced to move forward after being pushed 
out by others.3
Whereas ivory was not abundant and was dangerous to obtain, wild rubber along 
with other forest products such as palm oil, ebony and other valuable woods made it 
possible for the Sanaga-Ogowe to participate in expanding legitimate trade. European 
trade brought about a series of changes, but, for the most part, the Sanaga-Ogowe way 
of life was completely independent from foreign powers. In spite of the partition of 
the territory between Spain, France, and Germany, the Sanaga-Ogowe kept moving 
relatively freely across the area, as they had always done. Only local social relations, 
such as clan rivalries and alliances, limited freedom of movement. In 1901, a Spanish 
report pointed out that most trade activities were carried out at the mouths of the 
rivers Ntem, Benito or Wele, and Muni, as well as in Bata. The bulk of products from 
the interior, however, were diverted to German factories in the interior due to the lack 
of communications from the Spanish coastal stations.4 The Germans penetrated into 
the interior of southern Cameroon in the mid 1880s, founding the Yaounde station in 
1888. Up until the 1910s, they maintained small commercial stations in the interior of 
Rio Muni from where they conducted commercial and policing activities.5 The French
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carried out similar activities on the Rio Muni coast, where they had been present from 
the 1890s. In fact, coastal trade declined in this region after the French handed over 
sovereignty to the Spanish in 1901.6
Photograph 4: Spanish trader buying ebony
The impact of European trade was soon recorded within Sanaga-Ogowe culture 
through a series of mythological accounts that established a fraternal relation between 
the Sanaga-Ogowe and the Mitangan (plural for Ntangan, term generally applied to 
Europeans). Often, these legends explained that the Sanaga-Ogowe was the brother of 
the European, who thanks to his obedient character was given knowledge by Nzama.7 
This was the secret behind Europeans’ wealth. The Sanaga-Ogowe remember this 
period through the celebration of Ngon-Ntangan, a ritual which, although often 
translated as ‘the white young woman’, can also be translated as ‘the time of the 
white’, since ngon literally means moon and subsequently lunar month. The same
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term is also applied to adolescent women because of the link between the lunar month 
and female menstruation.
Photograph 5: Ngon-Ntangan mask
During the 1900s, Spanish activities were limited to the Rio Muni’s coastal strip. 
In addition to Spain’s lack of resources, Spanish occupation of the interior of Rio 
Muni was also hampered by the belief in the fierce character of the Sanaga-Ogowe, 
who, in the colonial imagery came to symbolize Europeans’ deepest fears regarding 
Africans. Thus the Pamue were depicted as the savage cannibal, whose cultural and 
moral depravation justified European colonialism. This stereotype, along with that of 
the recent Sanaga-Ogowe invasion, was not only held by the Spanish but also by the
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German and French in the neighbouring territories. Although much has been said 
about the mental images of European coining into contact with Africans in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this question still continues to fascinate 
scholars, as they try to assess the extent to which such images were true. Part of this 
fascination has to do with the endurance of such stereotypes. As we shall see in 
following chapters, the association between the Fang and anthropophagy continued 
throughout the entire colonial period and beyond independence.
As far as the European is concerned, the origin of the myth of Fang cannibalism 
dates back to the late 1850s and the writings of the explorer Paul du Chaillu. Although 
du Chaillu was not the inventor of a myth, which predated his arrival in Gabon in 
1855, it was through the publication of his book, Explorations and Adventures in 
Equatorial Africa, in 1861 that the so-called cannibalistic nature of the Pamue became 
popular amongst Western explorers and missionaries. It appears that Sanaga-Ogowe 
reputation as an anthropophagous people was originally spread by coastal Africans, 
such as the Benga and Mpongwe, who sought to scare Europeans, so as to stop them 
from trading with the Sanaga-Ogowe directly.8 Such an interest was rooted in their 
role as middlemen in the growing trade between European and forest goods. During 
his expedition to the interior of Rio Muni in 1884, the Spanish explorer Manuel de 
Iradier was told that the ‘Pamue were unhappy with the whites, because they do not 
want to give them directly the goods they bring from Europe’, and he wondered 
whether the frightening stories told by coastal Africans about the Pamue intended to 
stop his march to the interior.9 In understanding the development of the cannibalistic 
reputation of the Sanaga-Ogowe, we also have to keep in mind Central African 
conceptions regarding power and its relationship to witchcraft. That is, the power of a 
fearful rival, such as the Sanaga-Ogowe, rests on supernatural forces, which are
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associated with witchcraft and the symbolic eating of their victims.10 It is no surprise, 
then, that coastal Africans used this type of expression when referring to the Sanaga- 
Ogowe, especially after observing the effect that such images had on Europeans.
In 1863, Richard Burton toned down du Chaillu’s previous statements, stating that 
‘the cannibalism of the Fans is by no means remarkable, limited, as it is, to the 
consumption of slain enemies’.11 Tessmann was even more critical with du Chaillu, 
accusing him of exaggeration and inaccuracy in his reports about the Pamue.12 
Tessmann’s criticism was especially acute because he was aware that, six decades 
after the publication of Explorations and Adventures, du Chaillu’s sensationalist 
views on the Pamue still held sway amongst Europeans, for whom the ‘Pamue were 
considered the most savage and dangerous cannibal people of the western [African] 
coast.’13 According to Tessmann, cannibalism was nonexistent amongst the northern 
sections of the Sanaga-Ogowe, and only amongst the southern sections could one find 
traces of this habit, as they could ‘exceptionally’ eat their ‘fallen enemies’.14 There is 
110 indication that Tessmann witnessed such episodes firsthand. Most likely, he based 
this statement on reports from northern Sanaga-Ogowe clans and European traders, 
and, having a high concept of the Pamue, as he did, Tessmman explained the 
existence of cannibalism as a result of contact with ‘neighbouring tribes’.15
At the turn of the twentieth century, the Spanish described the Pamue as a 
camiibal and violent people, yet such descriptions were somewhat qualified in the 
light of the lack of evidence. In 1901, a Spanish officer, after referring to the Pamue 
as a ‘fighting, unruly and anthropophagous’ people, wrote: ‘although I have visited 
many Pamue villages, I have not seen any proof of this brutal habit’.16 hi 1902, 
Martinez de la Escalera went a step further, as he questioned the so-called ferocity of 
the Pamue and considered their ‘fondness for human flesh more than dubious’.17
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Nonetheless, efforts to qualify the so-called cannibal character of the Sanaga-Ogowe 
were overshadowed by a campaign in the opposite direction, which was mostly led by 
the Claretian missionaries through their magazine, La Guinea Espanola. In a series of 
articles written during the 1910s and 1920s, the Spanish missionaries described how 
anthropophagy and human sacrifices played an important role in the religious life of 
the Pamue.18
As Florence Bemault correctly points out, such misconceptions were partly rooted 
in Central African beliefs and practices with regards to the dead human body, which, 
in some instances, was considered to be a fetish, since ‘power could be achieved 
through the manipulation of sacred power sheltered by material bodies’.19 Perhaps, 
Europeans’ imagination of cannibal Africans partly took root, as Bemault also 
suggests, due to the existence of atavistic European beliefs regarding the supernatural 
nature of human remains -  the worship of relics of saints is common amongst 
European Catholics. Undoubtedly, this was reinforced by tangible images, such as the 
presence, in most Sanaga-Ogowe villages, of ancestors’ skulls and other remains that 
were used in religious ceremonies, and the exhumation of coipses in order to perform 
the ritual autopsy that sought to establish whether there was any link between 
someone’s death and witchcraft. Sanaga-Ogowe custom, consisting in filing their 
front teeth for beauty purposes, certainly contributed to the myth of Pamue 
cannibalism. Neither precolonial nor colonial testimonies show any conclusive 
evidence that anthropophagy was a common phenomenon amongst the Sanaga- 
Ogowe or the Fang. Whether or not symbolic anthropophagy ever gave way to 
isolated cases of actual ingestion of human flesh is almost impossible to say, yet, as 
we shall see in chapter 4, the nature of such rumours seems very farfetched. In 1927, 
for example, La Guinea Espanola attributed a so-called case of cannibalism to
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members of ‘certain secret societies, known as nvueti [Bwiti] or malan [Melan]\
when in reality neither of these cults had anything whatsoever to do with
20anthropophagy.
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Photograph 6: Press cutting referring to the anthropophagous Character of the Sanaga-Ogowe
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The appointment of Governor-General Angel Barrera was a significant step in the 
final occupation of Rio Muni by the Spanish, because, in contrast with his 
predecessors, he stayed in office for a long period, between 1910 and 1925. Barrera 
believed that the ‘ferocious childishness’ of the Pamue undermined Spanish interests, 
thus it was necessary to pacify and civilize the territory in order to bring about 
economic prosperity.21 His appointment boosted colonial ambitions in the area, 
especially Rom 1915 when the Spanish founded several military posts in the interior 
of Rio Muni, making it possible to impose Spanish rule over the whole Sanaga- 
Ogowe region by the end of the 1920s.
The consequences of similar processes across the African continent are still 
unclear, for historians disagree as to the extent to which colonialism reshaped African 
societies. Moving away from views that tend to describe colonialism as a strongly 
pervasive phenomenon, in the last two decades scholars have sought to give African 
agency a larger weight. According to this trend, it is not possible to understand the 
colonial period without recognizing people’s agency. We are now aware that Africans 
were not simple puppets whose behaviour was determined by colonial officers pulling 
the strings. However, it is yet to be determined to what degree agency was allowed 
under different forms of colonialism. This is a fundamental question because, if 
anything, colonialism was primarily about the control over agency. Colonized people 
generally tried to retain their autonomy, while colonial powers sought to remove it 
from them.
Spanish colonial conquest undermined Sanaga-Ogowe capacity to make 
fundamental decisions with regards to their society. To Vansina, this was a key 
episode, for it is autonomy which enables people to make decisions and changes 
ensuring the survival of their tradition.22 Although Gray is right in pointing out that
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there were areas, such as the occult realm, where Africans did not lose total control as 
a result of colonial conquest, every sphere of the Sanaga-Ogowe culture felt, to some 
degree, the effects of the new colonial order.23 We shall see later how the banning of 
certain religious practices and the spread of the Catholic faith deeply affected Sanaga- 
Ogowe religious views. Indeed, it is difficult to accept that transformations in vital 
elements of the Sanaga-Ogowe culture, such as invoke mmnama, or Meldn, remained 
isolated without affecting the whole tradition, especially within a context in which the 
Sanaga-Ogowe were no longer in command.
The “peaceful” penetration
Spain believed it had legitimate historical rights on the lands of the Gulf of Guinea 
as a result of the signature of the Treaty of San Ildefonso with Portugal in 1777. The 
Treaty awarded Spain a few islands in the Gulf of Guinea and rights over the 
mainland. These rights were weak, since Portugal controlled neither these islands nor 
the mainland. Spain’s claims remained nominal until the second half of the nineteenth 
century, when it began to assert its rights over the islands of Fernando Po and 
Amiobon. However, the mainland and the tiny islands in front of the River Muni’s 
estuary remained ignored until the 1890s. Deep political instability in Spain 
throughout the nineteenth century and the loss of its last important colonies in the 
1890s -  the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Cuba, in what came to be known as the 
‘1898 disaster’ -  prevented it from paying sufficient attention to a continent to which, 
in spite of its proximity, it had no historical tradition beyond Morocco. Perhaps 
pushed by the resentment caused by the loss of the colonies, some sectors in Spain 
turned their attention to Africa. A few Spanish economic lobbies and intellectuals 
became aware that Africa had turned into the new arena where colonial ambitions
96
were pursued. This movement was led by the Asociacion de Africanistas, which 
sought to encourage the Spanish government to make effective their rights over the 
territories in the Gulf of Guinea.24 By the late 1890s, however, the European powers 
had already partitioned most of the continent. The Berlin Conference stated quite 
clearly that any territorial claim on Africa had to be made effective through 
occupation. As a result, Spain was left without arguments to support its claims based 
on a dubious eighteenth-century treaty.
By the end of the century, Spain only occupied a short coastal strip in the south of 
present-day Rio Muni and the tiny islands of Corisco, Elobey Grande, and Elobey 
Chico. On these grounds, France agreed to negotiate with Spain its rights over a small 
portion of continental land. The outcome of these negotiations was the signature of 
the Treaty of Paris in 1900 by which France recognized Spain’s sovereignty over a 
territory bordering French Gabon and German Cameroon. A commission was set up 
to establish the exact limits of the Spanish colony. Spain’s initial claims over some 
180,000 square kilometres were finally reduced to about 26,000 square kilometres. 
This outcome did not satisfy many people in the metropolis, who considered that the 
nation’s interests had been severely harmed.25 This resulted in a sense of 
dissatisfaction with the colony that was hardly overcome throughout the whole 
colonial period.
By the 1900s, the Sanaga-Ogowe of the newly designated territory of Rio Muni 
were influenced by the three colonial powers depending on the area they inhabited. 
Until the First World War, the Sanaga-Ogowe living in the interior of Rio Muni north 
of the river Wele principally maintained relations with the Germans. This was a major 
concern for the Spanish officers, not only because the Germans did not respect the 
colony’s borders, but also because Sanaga-Ogowe products were diverted into
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German territory instead of being traded on the coast, as Governor Barrera 
complained in 1911:
The colony... can be said to be completely German, since it is the Germans who exploit 
it. They trade in the interior, and speak against us, depicting us as a weak nation, with no 
resources, and worthless. I insist, I have come back [from the expedition to the interior] 
believing that the German forces enter our territory, punishing and exercising 
sovereignty’.26
Barrera also complained that similar activities happened in the southern section of the 
colony, where the French carried out commercial exchanges with Sanaga-Ogowe 
groups.27 As a matter of fact, only those Sanaga-Ogowe based on the coast and its 
immediate hinterland traded with the Spanish. It was not until the late 1920s that the 
colony’s borders had a more effective character.
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As early as 1903, we have information that refers to the return to their villages of 
the first group of Sanaga-Ogowe and Bisio labourers recruited during the first official 
expedition to Bata’s hinterland.28 Yet, because of both instability in the area and lack 
of Spanish determination, similar expeditions were not repeated until the 1910s. The 
lack of recognition of Spanish sovereignty along with economic goals were the two 
main factors that drove forward Spain’s determination to make effective their control 
over the interior of Rio Muni in the 1910s. hi 1911, Governor-General Barrera carried 
out his first expedition deep into the interior seeking to exercise Spanish sovereignty 
as well as to open the interior to commerce by encouraging the Sanaga-Ogowe to stop 
violent disputes, clear forest paths, resume trade caravans, and take part in labour 
recruitment for Fernando Po’s plantations.29 This initial expedition was followed by 
several punitive missions to pacify semi-coastal Sanaga-Ogowe clans between 1911 
and 1913.
Sources show how the Spanish felt that the nation’s pride was being hurt by 
constant Geiman and French incursions into Rio Muni, fuelling the injuries caused by 
the 1900 treaty.30 When in 1914 the Europeans moved the battlefields of the First 
World War onto African soil, the number of incursions into the Spanish colony 
escalated significantly. Spain’s neutral position during the war was being clearly 
undermined by its lack of control over Rfo Muni, as was evident when the war spread 
into the Spanish territory and Sanaga-Ogowe clans took sides with opposing 
European forces. The situation became critical when a few clans began attacking 
Geiman refugees from Cameroon. Spanish officers learnt from local informants that 
the Allies were providing weapons and ammunition and encouraging attacks upon 
caravans of Geiman refugees.31 The British captain of the Allied forces not only 
denied this point, but also accused the Spanish of supporting Germany.32 Such
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developments deeply worried colonial officials, especially after an incident in which 
the members of the Esamongon clan led by Ndongo Mange reportedly murdered two 
German citizens. As a result, the Colonial Guard launched a punitive expedition 
against the Esamongon clan. This operation caused numerous deaths to Ndongo 
Mange’s group, driving him to ask for forgiveness. His position seemed to vary soon 
after, resulting in successive punitive operations by the Colonial Guard.
For the Spanish, the situation created by the war represented a double danger. On 
the one hand, it set a bad precedent because it would suggest to the Sanaga-Ogowe 
that it was possible to attack white people, as Barrera explained to the Minister of 
State:
All this will be one of the consequences that this war will leave behind: the loss of respect 
for the white man, the realization that he can be killed and that the very same white men 
encourage such deaths. This makes it necessary to become determined to occupy the 
territory [Rio Muni], which we should have long occupied. It is essential to do it as soon 
as possible, as I proposed to this Ministry on 8 April 1912, in order to avoid incidents and 
open this country to exploitation.34
More importantly, contrary to the Brussels Agreement of 1908, the Sanaga-Ogowe
were acquiring arms that could eventually be turned against the Spanish.35 Because of
the increasing instability in Rio Muni, Spanish officials were afraid that either France
or Britain might attempt to take over the colony on the grounds that Spain had not
made effective their rights, or that the continuous instability might jeopardize their
position in their own colonies. In response to these circumstances Governor Barrera
reported:
It was necessary, in order to guarantee our neutrality [and] defend those belligerents who 
asked for our protection... to establish, in May 1915, military posts in Yenge, Meloko, 
N ’Guamban, and Mikomesen... and one month later it was also necessary to create 
another in Ayameken, in the light of the attitude of the natives who contributed to the 
assassinations [of the two Germans].36
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The Mikomeseng post, some 130 kilometres from the coast, represented a significant 
step, because, for the first time, Spain could claim to have a real presence in the heart 
of the Sanaga-Ogowe territory.
Photograph 7: Group o f Sanaga-Ogowe of the Catholic Village of San Jose de Banapa
At the beginning of the century, it was very clear that Spanish interests were 
mainly focused on Fernando Po, where most Spanish settlers and the emerging cocoa 
plantations were based. For the Spanish, the mainland’s only appeal was as a source 
of labour for the island’s plantations, whose chronic lack of manpower was 
hampering further development.37 Colonial officers and plantation owners’ hopes 
rested on examples such as the Portuguese islands of Sao Tome and Principe and 
Angola. In 1894, the Claretian missionaries were already experimenting with migrant 
labour when they founded on the island the village of San Jose de Banapa with a few 
coastal Sanaga-Ogowe people.38 The missionaries aimed to create a model village to 
Christianize and civilize Africans, yet the scheme did not continue due to lack of 
economic means as well as internal rivalries amongst colonizers.39
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Initially, Spanish officers sought to control the existing coastal trade networks 
consisting of scattered European factories in which trade caravans exchanged their 
goods. The French had profited from this trade in the late nineteenth century. The 
Spanish were aware that the Sanaga-Ogowe were keen to barter their forest products 
with the Europeans, thus, they expected the trade volume to grow bigger over time. 
They held similar expectations regarding the recruitment of Sanaga-Ogowe workers. 
In this respect, Governor Barrera wrote: ‘the future of the island of Fernando Po... 
depends on the domination and control over the mainland territory, from where 
labourers will have to come to save the agriculture’.40 The 1911 expedition to the 
interior was followed by a steady flow of young men recruited as labourers. Colonial 
officers expected that it was only a matter of time before the number of labourers 
would increase after the Sanaga-Ogowe realized the economic benefits.41 The Spanish 
believed to have found in the Sanaga-Ogowe the perfect African partner who would 
provide them with forest products as well as cheap labour.
Spanish plans were blocked by the internal dynamics of Sanaga-Ogowe society, 
which, from the 1900s, prevented normal development of trade due to the re- 
emergence of internecine violence in Rio Muni. Local trade was rarely organized at 
clan level. Instead, caravans were usually formed by a few close families. The nature 
of this trade required a large number of people in order to carry the bulky goods, but, 
more importantly, to diminish the risk of being attacked during their journey. Sources 
suggest that the withdrawal of French troops from Rio Muni’s coast in 1900 was 
followed by a decline in commerce and a rise in violence, making coastal trade much 
more difficult and dangerous. In 1911 several coastal chiefs complained to Governor 
Barrera:
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In the old days, we used to go very far into the interior, very happily and without any 
problem. Since the Spanish arrived, one cannot walk fifteen minutes into the bush, and we 
cannot trade either for fear that the Pamue take away our stuff easily or by force.42
Strong Sanaga-Ogowe clans sought, first, to displace intermediary groups, and,
second, to prevent other clans from trading directly on the coast.43 Between 1900 and
1916, the Esamongon, Esambira, and Atamake clans became the principal middlemen
between coastal factories and the people of the interior 44 During this period, they
were behind much of the violence in the region. Those caravans that managed to
reach the coast were usually forced to pay some form of duty on their way back.
The Spanish knew that many Sanaga-Ogowe families were willing to trade on the
coast. Such a good disposition was, to a large extent, part of the problem because it
exacerbated competition between different clans and families for the control over
trade routes. This rivalry was hampering Spanish hopes to develop trade and labour
recruitment, for people were likely to lose either their lives or goods when marching
to and fro. Generally, small clans were left aside from coastal trade for fear of being
assaulted by larger groups like the Esamongon. Furtheimore, by the mid 1910s, some
elders began to refuse to allow youngsters to enrol as labourers for Fernando Po’s
plantations. Governor Barrera reports on an incident in which a ‘chief of the Esabeng
clan, Mange Makina, tried to prevent youngsters from going to the coast45 In a
separate incident, during the last Esamongon uprising in 1915, one of the rebel leaders
demanded other clans not to go to Bata or Fernando Po to work.46 Spanish sources do
not explain this change of position, but it might be possible that elders realized some
of the consequences of migrant labour. Elders’ social prominence partly rested on
their economic control, especially over those goods used as payment for bridewealth.
A youngster working for a limited period of time on the cocoa plantations could,
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somehow, escape his father’s control by saving enough to get married. Regardless of 
elders’ rejection, the main factor preventing people from enrolling as workers was 
insecurity. Sources refer to numerous incidents in which migrant workers were 
attacked and deprived of their goods on their way back to their villages. Between 
1912 and 1914, for example, the semi-coastal Sanaga-Ogowe clan Yenven earned out 
two attacks against migrant workers, driving the Claretians to express their concern 
about the effect that such attacks might have for future recruitment of manpower in 
Rio Muni.47 In response to such a situation, Governor-General Barrera ordered the 
Colonial Guard to escort returning Sanaga-Ogowe workers by the mid 1910s 48
Barrera understood that short-term solutions would not make Rio Muni profitable. 
The occupation and pacification of Rio Muni would facilitate the establishment of the 
effective colonial administration that was required to develop the commercial and 
labour scheme that he had in mind. The Spanish were aware of how precarious their 
situation was, for their authority did not usually extend beyond a one-hour walk from 
their military posts.49 The situation created by the First World War and the subsequent 
creation of military stations in the interior showed the way to effectively occupy the 
territory. In 1916, Barrera explained his strategy to the Minister of State, consisting of 
the creation of posts, which, after consolidating the control over the surrounding area, 
would be replaced by others further in the interior.50 Nonetheless, Spanish occupation 
proved to be an arduous task due to the Sanaga-Ogowe social structure, which forced 
them to impose their authority village by village.
Contrary to colonial rhetoric, which was created later in the century, Spanish 
conquest was far from being peaceful. Certainly, the Spanish did not usually confront 
major opposition in the form of large Sanaga-Ogowe alliances capable of presenting a 
substantial challenge to the Colonial Guard. The same social structure, which made
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conquest such a time-consuming process, hindered the formation of strong alliances. 
In fact, there was not a unique perception amongst the Sanaga-Ogowe as to who the 
enemy was. Such perceptions varied over time and from one clan to another. On the 
one hand, to small clans, whose access to the coast was denied by more powerful 
rivals, the Spanish penetration was an opportunity to change this situation. We also 
know from Spanish sources that many Sanaga-Ogowe welcomed the Spanish as an 
opportunity to end the continuous climate of violence and insecurity, which was 
taking such a large toll.51
On the other hand, some actively confronted Spanish authority, and even 
developed inter-clan alliances in order to fight them. The most notorious case was 
Ndongo Mange’s uprising, who along with other leaders of the Esamongon, 
Esambira, Esakunan, Esandon and Asok clans joined forces against Spain in 1915. 
This revolt was probably motivated by the Spanish policy which aimed at ending the 
privileges of intermediary clans and drawing a larger number of clans from the 
interior into the colonial economy. In addition, the Esamongon rebels demanded that 
nobody worked in Bata or Fernando Po for the Spanish.52 Allied Forces’ support, 
providing arms and ammunition, gave the rebel clans the opportunity to fight. It took 
the Spanish more than a year to put an end to the rebellion. A great part of the 
Colonial Guard’s success was due to the initial support of smaller clans and, 
ultimately, of sections of the rebel clans, which, after severe punishment, chose to join 
the Spanish.53 By the autumn of 1916, many rebel leaders had escaped to Cameroon 
because of the combined harassment of the Colonial Guard and their local allies.54 
Some could not cross the border, such as Mbo Nso’o (known by the Spanish as Bongo 
Roko), who was forced to surrender by members of his clan after a military operation
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that caused some 90 casualties.55 Although Spanish sources do not refer to this, Fang
informants, as we shall see, claim that he was eventually executed by the Spanish.
The rebellion led by Ndongo Mange, however, was unusual. Many Sanaga-
Ogowe families were initially passive towards the Spanish penetration, for they saw
more advantages than disadvantages. Generally, Sanaga-Ogowe opposition was
undertaken by isolated extended families that, intentionally or unintentionally, did not
comply with the orders of the government. During this period, most families kept
resolving their conflicts as they had in the past. Colonial archives contain numerous
documents about skirmishes between rival clans, and a few against Europeans, such
as the death of a Spanish trader in 1908, which was immediately punished by the
Colonial Guard. Referring to this incident, the Governor wrote:
Vela, fearlessly and despotically, dealt with a native, and, being abusive in his business 
with him, pointed a gun at the Pamue man and threatened to kill him. The latter shot at 
him and killed him... the killer was handed in to the authority... The Pamue tribe of the 
killer, Jessa, was severely punished by the Colonial Guard because the victim was a 
European’.56
Spanish officers were strongly opposed to Sanaga-Ogowe retaliation, because they 
understood that Spain was the only sovereign power to resolve existing conflicts, hi 
1913, Barrera advised the Sub-Governor of Elobey to ‘recommend the natives again 
to take their “palavers” to be resolved before the Authority, unless they wanted to face 
punishment*.57
Like the Germans in Cameroon and the French in Gabon, the Spanish had to 
confront multiple political entities in what would become Rio Muni. Much to their 
distress, the lack of centralized institutions made it necessary to conquer the Sanaga- 
Ogowe almost village-by-village. Spain’s conquest over a given mvok-e’bot was not 
automatically followed by the surrender of the remaining sections of the clan. Barrera
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soon learnt that only heavy human and material losses would convince the remaining 
sections to accept Spanish authority. As the Spanish realized, the segmentary structure 
of the Sanaga-Ogowe could also be played to the advantage of Spain, preventing the 
development of solid alliances. After the death of an Atamake individual at the hands 
of a sergeant of the Colonial Guard and, in order to avoid the alliance between the 
Atamake and the maternal clan of the victim, Barrera instructed the Sub-Governor of 
Elobey:
Try to exploit the differences between the Atamake and Esemvus [Esambus], making the 
former see the convenience of not allowing the latter to control and direct them. Let them 
see, without promising anything, that, since they are the weakest side, we shall protect 
them and help them with our forces against the Esemvus [Esambus] if necessary...
58Without making it evident, try to boost the differences between both tribes.
There were two contrasting perceptions as to what was going on in Rio Muni in 
this period. To the Spanish, treaties with local rulers meant recognition of Spain’s 
sovereignty on the part of the Sanaga-Ogowe. The latter, however, interpreted such 
treaties as personal agreements of a temporary character. It is not surprising that 
certain clans were willing to ally themselves with the Spanish, who had both the 
military capability as well as the manufactured goods that they were so keen to 
acquire. Should the conditions change, Sanaga-Ogowe clans would turn their backs 
against the Spanish and compete for the control of certain trade routes. This partly 
explains Spanish officials’ tendency to depict the Sanaga-Ogowe as traitors and 
people who could not be trusted. Whereas to the Sanaga-Ogowe, partnership could be 
purely economic, to the Spanish, cooperation meant that the Sanaga-Ogowe had 
freely given up sovereignty.
Although by the mid 1910s the Spanish were seriously committed to finalizing 
Rio Muni’s occupation, the lack of means and support from the metropolitan
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government lengthened this process for more than a decade. Whereas in the northern
and coastal areas the effects of Spanish domination were visible by the early 1920s, in
the southern and central-eastern section of Rio Muni, the Sanaga-Ogowe still retained
their independence.59 The northern border was the first inland region to be pacified,
partly, because of the developments of the First World War. Moreover, the present-
day districts of Ebibeyin, Mikomeseng and Niefang were not only the most densely
populated, but also where the bulk of trade activities took place. The central-eastern
border, however, was less developed in terms of trade, and so was ignored by the
Spanish, hi the south, pacification was mostly delayed due to the numerous swamps
and rivers, which made access extremely difficult.
Following the example of Fernando Po, Spanish authorities decided to use the so-
called politico, de atraccion (attraction policy) in order to pacify Rio Muni. During the
conquest period, colonial officers’ actions were determined by the so-called attraction
policy, which sought Sanaga-Ogowe cooperation in trade, clearing forest paths, and
labour recruitment within a non-confrontational climate.60 However, this strategy was
criticized throughout the 1900s from several colonial sectors, which did not see any
clear progress in the occupation:
This [pacification] will only be achieved with the army and expeditions to the interior, 
since those who, like me, have been there are convinced of the failure of the attraction 
policy, which has been interpreted as weakness of the government.61
The attraction policy was, somehow, bom out of necessity, for it was acknowledged
that Spain lacked the necessary means to conduct a more aggressive strategy. It was
also argued that direct confrontation had to be avoided, if they were to make the
Sanaga-Ogowe understand about the mutual benefits of economic cooperation.
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Violence could only deter the Sanaga-Ogowe, thus, colonial officers were advised to
use force only as a last resort.
By the late 1900s, Sanaga-Ogowe lack of recognition of Spanish sovereignty,
along with growing criticism as to the advance of colonization in Rio Muni led the
recently appointed Angel Barrera to pursue a more aggressive strategy. The attraction
policy remained as the official approach regarding natives, but it was now to be
complemented by a policy of carrot and stick. Barrera explained that it was necessary
to make ‘the natives understand that their real interest is on our side, because we
desire their good and progress. Because we are fair, we punish them when they
deserve it, while encouraging them when their behaviour is excellent’.62 Colonial
Guard officials had to severely punish those who challenged Spanish authority to
avoid the prolongation of uprisings or similar examples in the future. Punitive
operations did not only seek to cause human casualties but also material destruction in
order to create as much disarray as possible. Governor-General Barrera instructed
Colonial Guard officers in the following terms: ‘This part of the district [northern
border] will shortly be pacified if punishment does not exclusively concentrate on the
burning of villages, but we must also seek to be as forceful and hard as possible’.63
After an operation, in which fourteen villages were reportedly destroyed, the
Governor-General wrote:
This Governor-General regrets to say that is not satisfied, at all, either with the way in 
which the operation was conducted, or its outcome... You do not mention anything about 
the destruction of the Pamue's crops. You have only focused on destroying plantain 
trees... which were not the crops you had to destroy, but the fields of cassava, pumpkin, 
peanut, etc.64
Punishment operations were not considered to be successful until the so-called rebels 
asked for forgiveness and surrendered their weapons. It was probably in this period
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when the military came to be known under the term mon-bisimci, which was originally 
applied to Bulu raiders during the time of the obdn.65
If the objective was to create disarray, this policy was certainly effective. Minor 
offences were subsequently castigated with disproportional measures, and entire clans 
were pimished as a result of ‘offences’ committed by fellow clan members.66 
According to Colonial Guard reports the number of Sanaga-Ogowe casualties during 
punitive operations against a given village rarely exceeded ten, however, within a 
context of small social units, such losses had a deep impact. The Spanish approach 
was totally different because most of their casualties were not Spanish. In 1912, 
Governor Barrera threatened a Sanaga-Ogowe family, arguing that, unless they 
followed his orders, he ‘would punish them severely, regardless of the number of 
casualties, because, as deplorable as this can be, they represent nothing in a war, and 
will soon be replaced’.67 Throughout most of the conquest period most colonial 
guards were from West Africa, especially Senegal, and it was only from the mid 
1920s that the number of local guards increased.
The repressive measures of this period left a deep scar amongst the Sanaga- 
Ogowe. A Fang elder from Mikomeseng referred, in particular, to two brutal episodes 
in the interior of Rio Muni in the mid 1910’s and early 1920s. One had as a main 
character an elder called Mbo Nso’o, the above-mentioned Esamongon leader who 
fought against the Spanish conquest and for the control of trade routes. According to 
my informant, he was eventually beheaded in public in the district capital: ‘after this, 
everybody was overwhelmed with fear and they resigned themselves.’68 The second 
episode, though details are known by few, has become part of Fang collective 
memory, for it involved the elimination of almost an entire clan. According to the 
informant, the brutal repression was triggered by the murder of a Spanish soldier at
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the hands of members of the Osumu clan, leading Lieutenant Ayala to such drastic 
measures.69 The elimination is not confirmed by colonial sources, though a few 
documents refer to an incident that took place between 1921 and 1922 involving the 
same officer and clan, and which might have been whitewashed by the colonial 
officer, hi a letter to the Minister of State, Governor-General Barrera explains how he 
had to restrain Lieutenant Ayala from launching an immediate punitive campaign 
around present-day Mongomo district in response to the attack against two colonial 
guards.70 Ordered to wait for reinforcements, Ayala finally marched against the rebel 
clans in April 1922. Ayala’s report to the Governor enumerates the number of 
weapons and ammunition confiscated without mentioning any deaths, suggesting the 
possibility that he acted outside the Governor’s orders.71 According to collective 
memory, the Osumu clan eventually disappeared as survivors had to integrate into the 
Bekpwen and Esakora clans in order to escape from repression.72 This episode does 
not only show how flexible local identity could be, but also how it was possible to 
manipulate it in response to critical situations.
Between 1919 and 1923, the situation created by the military occupation was 
aggravated by famine, which affected large areas of Rio Muni. Several reports 
indicated that either insects or wild animals were behind the food shortages, yet it 
appears that military activities and the disruption they brought about could have 
played a major role.73 Subsequently, famine was complicated with an epidemic 
outbreak in central areas south of the river Wele by mid 1922.74 hi the face of these 
events, remaining resistance began to crumble.
During the 1910s and first half of the 1920s, Spain’s main priority was to disarm 
the Sanaga-Ogowe. This policy did not only seek to prevent further attacks against 
colonial forces, but also fights between Sanaga-Ogowe clans. This became the first
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indication that newly appointed chiefs’ authority was quite limited. Although many 
had accepted Spanish penetration into Sanaga-Ogowe territory, they proved to be 
much more reluctant when they were asked to hand over their muskets. Often, 
appointed chiefs looked for support from the Colonial Guard to disarm their fellow 
villagers as well as neighbouring communities.75 Eventually, the examples set by the 
Colonial Guard drove many to surrender their arms peacefully. To counteract 
dissatisfaction, the Colonial Guard started building schools next to their posts, and 
conducting vaccination campaigns against smallpox in the 1920s.76 Nevertheless, in 
the second half of the 1920s colonial decisions had a much deeper impact on the 
Sanaga-Ogowe, when the population was mobilized to construct a road network 
throughout Rio Muni. If there was any doubt as to whom the real ruler was, the road 
construction made it clear.
From mirmama to district officer
Initial contacts between Spain and mainland Africans in the Gulf of Guinea date 
back to 1858, when a Spanish expedition to the Muni Estuary got in touch with 
coastal groups and established a series of treaties with the chief of the Benga people, 
Bonkoro II. Although Spain did not resume its efforts in the area until later in the 
century, this set a precedent in its dealings with coastal Africans of Rio Muni. At the 
begimiing of the twentieth century, Spain’s main concern in Rio Muni was to identify 
Sanaga-Ogowe counterparts with whom to negotiate the terms of their relationship. 
Recognition of Spanish sovereignty was to be the first stage before resolving what 
eventually to do with the territory. Spain believed that by signing treaties with local 
chiefs, they would secure Africans’ acceptance of Spanish rule. Colonial officers were
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in charge of conducting a policy of nombramientos (appointments) amongst leaders
who accepted Spanish rule.
Experience with the numerous coastal and semi-coastal groups of Rio Muni taught
Spanish officers that the appointment of chiefs would not result an easy task. Unlike
the Benga, whose political authority was somewhat centralized, the social and
political structure of the so-called Ndowe and Bisio was clan based, having no
political institutions that ruled the whole community.77 As a result, Spanish officers
were forced to sign numerous treaties and appoint more chiefs than they had initially
expected; a necessary evil to secure the submission of the entire native population.
Initially, this was not a major obstacle for Spain, because coastal groups, accustomed
to the European presence, were keen to establish alliances with them in order to
maintain an economy, which relied on European commerce. Further, coastal groups,
being very inferior in number, were very much concerned about the growing arrival of
Sanaga-Ogowe clans from the interior, which had recently pushed groups, such as the
Bisio and Baseke, towards the coast. After a punitive expedition against the Esen, a
Sanaga-Ogowe clan, the Sub-Govemor of Bata wrote:
It has caused an immense joy amongst the coastal peoples... some [chiefs] have told me 
that they will no longer be afraid of trading in the interior. It is well known how much 
fear most of these dwellers feel towards the Pamue, after having been pushed away and 
forced by them several years ago to leave their villages and settle on the coast under the
78protection of our government.
By the turn of the century, many Sanaga-Ogowe families were well established 
on the coast and its hinterland, sharing, in some cases, the same space with the so- 
called Bilobolobo. Colonial documents of the 1900s often refer to Sanaga-Ogowe 
people who either lived on the coast or regularly came up to coastal commercial 
factories.79 The Spanish approach towards the Sanaga-Ogowe was not significantly
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different from the one used with other coastal groups. One of the main difficulties for 
the Spanish was that, by the early 1900s, they knew very little about Sanaga-Ogowe 
society. Their information relied mainly on coastal groups’ accounts, as well as 
European explorers and missionaries who had ventured into the interior from the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Colonial officers had little firsthand information 
that could give them a clearer idea about what to expect. They appeared to be 
somewhat sceptical about the veracity of existing reports. On the one hand, colonial 
officers did not hold coastal groups in high esteem, which prevented them from giving 
too much credit to their informants. On the other, they were also aware of the 
exaggerations that often surrounded European accounts.80 Colonial officers, therefore, 
opted for a much more empirical approach based on their direct dealings with the 
Sanaga-Ogowe.
It remains unclear whether Spanish officials respected existing local leaders 
during the occupation of Rio Muni, or whether they appointed other individuals as 
administrative chiefs. Spanish sources seem to suggest that existing Sanaga-Ogowe 
local authorities were maintained in most cases. Whenever local leaders accepted 
Spanish authority, they were officially acknowledged as village leader and appointed 
as representatives of the colonial government. To Spain, it was vital to avoid any 
major disruption or antagonism between them and Africans, especially during the 
initial stages of colonization, before carrying out more drastic changes, because its 
weak position did not allow it to challenge local structures directly. Consequently, 
numerous family heads were appointed as chiefs. According to Barrera, African 
coastal chiefs also shared this concern by 1911:
They [the Kombe] rightly complain about the excess of appointments of chiefs granted by
Sub-Governors to numerous people, who only deserved such distinction for being owners
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of a hut... instead of doing nothing other than granting appointments any old how, we
81could have accomplished much in these territories.
Some of my informants also shared the view that, generally, the Spanish respected 
local authorities. According to them, on arriving in a village, colonial officers asked to 
meet the local leader who, after agreeing on the terms indicated by the Spanish, was 
subsequently appointed. They recall how, in this period, chiefs appointment was 
symbolized by the handing over of bingom or badges, a hat, and, at times, a Spanish 
flag.82
However, not all Fang informants agree on the terms of the appointment of the 
first administrative chiefs. Accounts stating that precolonial leaders were respected 
were often contradicted by fellow villagers in subsequent conversations, hi order to 
reconcile contradictory views, we need to understand that this was not a clear-cut 
process. One immediate problem that arises is to examine what the Sanaga-Ogowe 
and the Spanish understood by the term ‘chief. On the one hand, the Spanish had 
problems in understanding the concept of primus inter pares with limited executive 
powers that required constant negotiation between the members of the mvok-e ’bot. 
The Fang, on the other hand, could not fully grasp the concept of a mediator chief 
whose authority lay outside the community and was primarily accountable to the 
Spanish. This is still problematic today, because, as I realized during my fieldwork, 
interpretations can be misleading if one is not aware that not only has this concept 
evolved within the Fang society in the last century, but elders also tend to manage 
precolonial and postcolonial concepts equally. Often, it was necessary to clarify 
whether informants were referring to the nkukuma (administrative chief) or the 
minnama (traditional leader) -  clearly different to them. Nowadays, the Spanish term 
jefe, chief, is translated in Fang as nkukuma (originally, that who has wealth or rich
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person). In translating a figure, which did not quite exist before, they resorted to an 
approximate term.
At the turn of the twentieth century, very few Sanaga-Ogowe individuals in 
present-day Rio Muni could be considered as nkukuma. Only amongst those clans 
close to the coast do we have clear information that suggests that a process of wealth 
accumulation was taking place in this period. After visiting various coastal Sanaga- 
Ogowe villages in 1909, a Claretian missionary explained: ‘I know more than one
Q-l
chief, well supported by Spain, who already owns more than twenty [wives].’ 
According to Governor Barrera, Nso’o Mbo, the Esamongon leader who offered stiff 
resistance to Spanish attempts to open trade routes for clans from the interior during 
the first half of the 1910s and father of Mbo Nso’o, had more than thirty wives.84 
Even though these figures might be somewhat exaggerated -  Barrera claimed that 
Nso’o Mbo was more than 100 years old — they indicate a growing connection 
between commercial wealth and political power.85 However, this process did not seem 
to be so developed in the interior, where neither polygamy nor trade had reached the 
same scale as in coastal and semi-coastal areas. Tessmann, who worked in the interior 
of Rio Muni in the 1900s, claims that polygamy was not widespread in the area, and 
most men could only afford one wife.86
In most areas of Rio Muni, the minnama continued to act as representative of the 
elders. Wherever the process of accumulation had not taken place, colonial officials 
chose to recognize as leaders those villagers who, somehow, stood out for their 
economic position, in spite of the presence of accepted community leaders. Many 
informants recall how, when arriving in a village, the Spanish appointed as chief to 
‘someone who moved much, who had the capacity to host foreign guests, and who 
could associate with them’; the person who proved to be most dynamic amongst the
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villagers.87 Colonial documents refer to Sanaga-Ogowe chiefs marching to the coast 
during the course of commercial expeditions or simply to report upsetting incidents in 
their area.88 These reports, however, contrast with those of many of my informants, 
who claimed that community leaders could barely leave their village, for their 
presence was required to resolve any important incoming issue. The minnama's 
position within the village very much depended on peoples’ respect, which came from 
his commitment towards the whole community above his personal interests.
Individuals who had been in touch with the Europeans on the coastal factories or 
the Fernando Po’s plantations were better prepared to deal with the Spanish, and knew 
what was expected from them. Nzang Okenve from the Mikomeseng district 
explained how his father, the brother of the existing minnama, was appointed as chief, 
because the Spanish officer considered him to be more appropriate due to his 
command of Pidgin English and economic position, obtained on the Fernando Po’s
• 89  i  »plantations. Whenever it suited their interests, Spain appointed administrative chiefs
without consulting local communities, as Barrera himself explained:
I knew that Mba Obama had the same father and mother as Obama... he has great 
prestige amongst his people. I told him that if he promised me to keep building the village 
in Congue and make the Atamake come down to form a large village, if he promised me 
to make his people obey him and obey the Sub-Governor, and if he promised me to 
resolve the ‘Palavers’ justly within his tribe, I would appoint him chief of his tribe. He 
promised me eveiything I told him, and I granted him the appointment... after assuring 
him that the same way I granted him the appointment.. ,90
hi some cases, elders chose to send decoys in order to protect the actual 
leadership. Around 1910, the Amvom of Akurenam, Evinayong district, were 
involved in a conflict with the Spanish after murdering the manager of a commercial 
factory who refused to return the goods that members of their clan brought back after 
working on Fernando Po. Following an intense retaliation campaign the Spanish
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decided to summon the Amvom leader to put an end to the conflict. Not trusting the 
intention of the Spanish, they send the minnama's youngest brother, who ‘had neither 
wife nor children’. The Spanish agreed to end the conflict and appoint him as chief on 
condition that all firearms were handed over, which the Amvom consented to.91
As we shall see, the appointment of chiefs often resulted in the coexistence of the 
administrative chief and minnama. Initially, the appointment of chiefs across Rio 
Muni did not necessarily undermine local authority structures, because such a figure 
was simply seen as a mediator between the Spanish and the actual village authority. 
Sources suggest that the chief, as such, was not endowed with any special recognition 
in the village; in fact, one informant referred to them as ‘secretaries’ or 
‘interpreters’.92 Nonetheless, this process was not the same in all villages since it 
depended very much on the circumstances of each particular community and its 
leaders. Whereas some be'minnama (plural for minnama) actually accepted their 
appointment by the Spanish, acting as mediators between the colonial government and 
their fellow villagers, others despised such a position and chose to assign that 
responsibility to someone else. Whenever the Spanish required it, administrative 
chiefs were summoned to attend meetings with colonial officers that involved long 
journeys by foot to the district headquarters. Understandably, this subordinate position 
was not attractive to Sanaga-Ogowe elders, who considered such treatment 
unacceptable for respected leaders.
Right from the beginning, colonial officers had to deal with the problem resulting 
from chiefs’ limited authority. To begin with, the authority of precolonial leaders was 
only acknowledged within the small community of his mvok. Even in the case that 
traditional leaders were actually appointed as chiefs, their authority was still rather 
limited because of the existing checks and balances that guaranteed that decisions
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were made amongst all family heads. This was especially so in cases that escaped the 
boundaries of traditional authority, such as labour mobilization or the handing over of 
firearms. The infamous African despot of European myth, capable of forcing his 
people to obey, did not exist in Rio Muni.
Barrera was aware of the fragile position of Sanaga-Ogowe chiefs, admitting: 
‘unless we empower them... we cannot count that, once gained their will, that of their 
conditional subjects will be also gained.’93 During the 1910s and 1920s, Barrera 
aimed at creating unified leadership for each clan, an institution which would be later 
known as Primer Jefe (First Chief).94 By doing so, he sought to ‘empower chiefs in 
order for them, as efficacious auxiliaries of the government, to support the 
administration in the task of civilization and progress’.95 These clan chiefs were 
supposed to solve the numerous ‘palavers’ and violence in Rio Mimi and, if unable to 
do so, to refer the case to the colonial officer, who would be the final arbiter. 
Paradoxically, by killing those Sanaga-Ogowe leaders who rejected Spanish rule, 
Spain eliminated the strong and prestigious rulers that they would long for during the 
early colonial period. Although Barrera was aware that colonial officers had created 
an administrative problem by appointing too many chiefs, this subject was not 
resolved during his time in office.96 Nonetheless, Barrera set the basis for the colonial 
chieftainship organization.97
Unfortunately, we do not have firsthand accounts that might shed some light on 
the stance of administrative chiefs during this period. From Spanish sources and 
people’s memories, we can gather that chiefs’ position was often ambivalent. As 
Sanaga-Ogowe men of their time, they understood how the role of leader was defined 
in their tradition. At the same time, they were aware that they owed their new status to 
the Spanish. Indeed, this caused a major crisis within Sanaga-Ogowe authority, which
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under colonialism came to mean two different things. On the one hand, they 
maintained the old concept of authority as protector of the welfare and interests of the 
mvok-e’bot. On the other, administrative chiefs had to enforce colonial government’s 
orders, which very often contradicted with the interests of the mvok-e ’bot, Faced with 
such a dilemma, chiefs tended to adopt three different positions.
First, some decided to become simple mediators between the colonial state and 
their village community, while respecting the authority of the minnama. This was not 
an easy task, since the responsibilities of the nkukuma and minnama often entailed 
overlapping functions that were hard to coordinate. In addition, district officers 
usually punished those chiefs who did not prove to have a strong grip on their 
community, as Barrera warned: T would remove it from him if he fail in his promises, 
and did not make his people obey him.’98 A Claretian missionary referred to this dual 
hierarchy in 1923, when he described an incident in which a village elder did not 
allow the appointed chief to baptize his daughter. Being reprimanded by the angry 
Father, the nkukuma explained:
Father, I wanted to baptize the little girl but I could not. I act like the chief, but I am not.
The actual chief is somebody else, whose orders I have to obey compulsorily. He is the
one who has not allowed me to baptize the little girl."
Second, there were those colonial chiefs who saw the new situation as an 
opportunity to fulfil their personal aspirations. In the past, strong egalitarian 
tendencies as well as elders’ competition prevented ambitious individuals from 
accumulating excessive power. In the light of Spanish occupation, some expected to 
bypass those check-and-balance mechanisms and become powerful chiefs. Nso’o 
Mbo, for example, was glad to accept Barrera’s offer to create a unified clan 
leadership, and ‘demanded’ that Barrera provided him with shotguns and gunpowder 
to overcome resistance amongst other Esamongon families.100 Unfortunately for him
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and other similar leaders, the Spanish had a different type of strong leader in mind. 
Nso’o Mbo’s attempt to control trade activities through the imposition of a 
commercial duty on all caravans marching through his area of influence, in the 
hinterland of Bata, was resisted by the Spanish, who, in 1913, launched a series of 
punitive expedition against his clan, causing numerous losses. As a result, other 
Esamongon leaders decided to hand him over to the Spanish authorities.101
Finally, there were those who tried to recreate the Sanaga-Ogowe leadership, as 
envisioned in Sanaga-Ogowe ideology, with the help of the Spanish. That is, serving 
the interest of the community, while being strong enough to protect his mvdk-e’bot 
and keep it together. Their personal ambitions were matched by a strong concept of 
the tradition. They believed that it was possible to look after their community, while 
satisfying the will of the colonial state. To them, it was feasible to preserve the 
autonomy of the village if orders were implemented, and matters were resolved within 
the village, without having to ask district officers to mediate. This approach could 
work, to some extent, in those cases where an individual with enough strength of 
character and charisma could persuade his fellow villagers. Nevertheless, the price to 
pay was high, because, as we shall see in chapter four, these individuals tended to rule 
on their own, overlooking the authority of their peers.
Governor Barrera’s communications to the district officers also insisted that it was 
important to show consideration for the chiefs when dealing with them, especially in 
front of other natives. This obviously put district officers, whose first priority was to 
develop the colonial infrastructure and economy, in a difficult position. To them, 
chiefs were in no sense different from the rest of the ‘backward’ Pamue. 
Consequently, chiefs were often ignored and overridden by district officers. Village 
chiefs had to be the first ones to follow orders, and, during the road construction, they
121
could be seen working hand in hand with the rest of their fellows. It was not only 
district officers who bore mixed feelings regarding native chiefs. Governor Barrera 
also had doubts as to the extent to which chiefs could be trusted, being afraid that 
strong chiefs could take advantage of the situation. The necessary balance to empower 
colonial chiefs while limiting their ambitions was difficult to achieve and, as in many 
other cases during the colonial domination, this attempt at social engineering never 
succeeded.
Although lack of massive dissent has been a constant feature since colonial 
pacification, the first stage of colonization was very different, as people, in general, 
had a very hard time trying to adjust to the new situation. Nowadays people seem to 
be relatively understanding about the position that early administrative chiefs were 
put in. When asked why people did not resist their orders, most informants tend to 
exonerate administrative chiefs who, in their eyes, had no other option but making 
people follow the government's orders. Understanding of the situation, however, did 
not go hand in hand with the strengthening of chiefs’ position. On the contrary, the 
situation deteriorated in a process stretching to the present day. Colonial officials’ 
multiple attempts to boost the authority of native chiefs mostly backfired. To the 
Spanish, the backing of chiefs’ authority, in essence, was reduced to the use of force -  
the Colonial Guard -  to impose their power. As early as 1911, the Spanish were aware 
that their policies had weakened chiefs’ authority in coastal areas: ‘With regards to 
the Kombe and other peoples who live on the coast, chiefs’ authority is very 
weakened and their people successfully resist any order that they dislike due to what 
we have done.’102 This policy was clearly unfortunate, because it increased the state’s 
difficulties in dealing with communities, and institutionalized the use of violence as a 
legitimate tool for state control. The colonial chief could be more authoritarian and,
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indeed, enjoyed a greater coercive backing than ever before in the history of the 
Sanaga-Ogowe, but this very support transformed him into a simple mediator between 
the state and the mvok.
Photograph 8: Sanaga-Ogowe nkukuma from Kogo along with his family
Photograph 9: Sanaga-Ogowe nkukuma from M isenge with his num erous wives
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From mvok to state
Sanaga-Ogowe responses to the Spanish conquest were largely determined by
internal contradictions, since some individuals were unhappy with the existing social
and political structures. Those willing to challenge the old system saw in the
Europeans an alternative to the existing situation. It would be too adventurous to
claim that they sought to challenge the whole tradition, but, at least, they tried to
overcome some of its limits. People understood these transformations within a social
context that made change possible through constant negotiation. They were not aware,
however, that the situation was much more critical because the Sanaga-Ogowe were
losing political control over the affairs of their own community. Change was no
longer a response from within the mvok-e *bot, but, above all, a result of state policies
that aimed at transforming Sanaga-Ogowe society.
Most resistance against some elements of the Sanaga-Ogowe culture came from
youngsters and women. When openly asked as to whether the relationship between
youngsters and elders was somewhat problematic, Fang informants firmly deny this.
Nevertheless, there are numerous anecdotes that show that such relationship was not
always smooth, especially -  though not exclusively -  regarding marriage issues. In
1912, Governor-General Barrera expressed his views on the situation:
I talked to them about how negative the fact of having numerous wives and demanding 
high prices for them was. As a result of this, only old men could marry and this was the 
reason why... they had very few children and many of them were weak. Due to this, they 
were vanishing little by little.103
The increase in the price of nswa resulted in a rise of violence between Sanaga- 
Ogowe families. To the Spanish, polygamy and bridewealth were the underlying 
reasons behind endemic violence in Rio Muni, hampering their goals of spreading 
trade activities across the region. Barrera did not wish direct confrontation with the
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Sanaga-Ogowe, therefore, instead of banning bridewealth practices, in 1911 he 
established a limit of 300 pesetas 011 it in the belief that this would end internecine 
violence.104 Tensions between fathers and sons over access to marriage are not 
exclusive of this period. Some Mvet legends, such as Moneblum, show that this was 
relatively common well before the arrival of the Europeans.105 Indeed, this sort of 
dispute could bring about the division of clan lineages into further sections. This is 
why elders normally disapproved of those fathers who were not able to restore peace 
and harmony within their own compound. Barrera’s policy, however, was not very 
effective in limiting bridewealth prices, and, throughout the whole colonial period, 
nswa negotiations were usually earned out on the fringe of the colonial 
administration. This limit on bridewealth did not encourage youngsters’ marriages 
either, especially if they were economically dependent on their fathers. An elder 
woman, married to Okenve Mituy, an important mikukuma of Mikomeseng district in 
the late 1920s, recalled how, despite having seventeen wives, he did not allow any of 
his sons to get married.106 As Balandier argues, the colonial order facilitated 
youngsters’ marriages by offering new economic alternatives to escape from elders’ 
control, but it also exacerbated tensions between generations.107 Barrera admitted that, 
since most adult Sanaga-Ogowe had their needs satisfied, marriage was the main 
incentive for young men to work for European businesses.108 This combined with 
access to education proved to be very valuable as young men were able to reach 
unprecedented positions of power. In 1910, La Guinea Espanola referred to Jose 
Mavena, a young man who had been ‘recently appointed chief of the Isen [Esen] 
tribe’ and how he ‘dressed up with all the authority insignias, and even a formidable 
revolver.’109
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A more silent discontent came from the ranks of women. Unfortunately, today it is 
difficult to know what their demands were at the time of European occupation of Rio 
Muni. Admitting that they had a limited scope to speak for themselves within the 
Sanaga-Ogowe society, the situation did not change greatly with the arrival of the 
Spanish, as colonial officers and, especially, Claretian missionaries proclaimed 
themselves women’s spokesmen. From the European point of view, there were three 
interconnected issues that mainly affected Sanaga-Ogowe women: labour
exploitation, polygamy, and adolescent marriage.110 Along with the opening of the 
interior to trade and the dealing of paths, ending polygamy became one of Governor 
Barrera’s principal demands when meeting Sanaga-Ogowe chiefs in his visits to the 
interior. Whether or not women shared these demands, we cannot know. Yet, there 
are data that suggests that they aimed at having a greater say, especially, on matters, 
such as marriage, that affected them directly. Marriage was often arranged between 
family heads. Generally, this procedure implied that the husband had sufficient capital 
to meet the other family’s demands. Due to inflationist tendencies in the value of 
nswa during this period, it was mostly mature men who could afford such prices.111 
As a result, increasingly younger women were getting married to older men. 
Arrangements could also be made at a very early stage to avoid potential rises in 
price, or to obtain needed incomes for a father to get another wife for himself or for 
one of his sons. Young girls, as early as nine years old, could be handed over for 
marriage. In such cases, they were kept under the care of their mothers-in-law, who 
acted as adoptive mothers until they were old enough. No matter how good the 
relationship between young wives and their mothers-in-law was, informants recall this 
experience as highly traumatic because they were taken away from their home and 
close relatives at a very early age.112 Under these circumstances, abom, an institution
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wrongly translated as kidnapping, appeared to become increasingly common as a 
mechanism for marriage in the early twentieth century. Referring to abom, an old 
couple, who got married following this procedure, explained:
A woman was, in no way, taken by force. Rather, she ran away with the young man she 
loved, hoping to later convince her father to consent such a union. If so, the father would
113agree on a reasonable brideprice, which would eventually sanction the marriage.
La Guinea Espanola and colonial records refer to numerous conflicts regarding 
bridewealth disagreements, which indicates that not only abom became common, but 
also that families rarely accepted any external imposition over brideprices. Women 
frequently found support from the colonial administration and, above all, from 
missionaries, who were keen to offer shelter for runaway wives,114
The imposition of the colonial state in Rio Muni was undoubtedly a turning point 
in the history of the Sanaga-Ogowe. But, who or what actually was the State? Up until 
today, the answer remains unclear to most Fang. Its real nature and meaning was 
never completely understood and the state, or government, came to mean an elusive 
concept where power resides and which was initially controlled by whites and later by 
blacks. As we can easily imagine, at the time of Spanish penetration the answer was 
much more vague. The state could be either mitangdn, the district officer, the Colonial 
Guard, mitdngdn-mingongoo (literally, merciful whites; i.e., missionaries), or Pana 
(i.e., Espana) -  whomever or whatever it was. From the beginning of colonial 
domination, the sate adopted a personal character rather than an institutional one. That 
is, the Sanaga-Ogowe learnt of the state through individuals who represented different 
spheres of the colonial apparatus, and who, in some cases, were narrowly linked to the 
administration, such as district officers and colonial guards, and, in some others, 
maintained an indirect relation with it, such as missionaries and traders. In the eyes of
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the Sanaga-Ogowe they were all the same and the same term was used for them: 
‘ colonialismo\n5
We do know from colonial documents that reality was more complex. Very often
colonial interests were rather diverse and disputes used to arise between all those
sectors that came to be labelled as ‘colonialism’. This is not to deny Fang perceptions,
as district officers, colonial guards, European traders and, to a lesser extent,
missionaries tried to present themselves as part of a monolithic block when dealing
with Africans. Equally the government’s political strategy also sought to show
unquestionable support for all Europeans living in the colony regardless of their
conduct towards Africans. Throughout the 1900s, the government was aware that
European traders tended to deceive Sanaga-Ogowe individuals when trading in their
factories and brutalize those who dared to complain, often with the support of the
colonial guard. In 1901 a colonial official described this situation:
Needless to say, the native is exploited in all transactions, and one peso in goods is not 
worth more than two pesetas... Considering the risks and privations that the European has 
to suffer in this country, it is understandable that profits be of such a magnitude.116
Whenever clans decided to retaliate, they were severely punished by the Colonial 
Guard that inflicted severe human and material losses, as we can see in the following 
example in 1912:
They [the Colonial Guard] inflicted four casualties on the enemy. Two of them were very 
prestigious chiefs amongst the Atamake... the largest village between Bata and Benito... 
lays in ruins, and its dwellers cry for their sensitive losses. This will make them 
understand that nobody attempts against Spain’s sovereignty and disobey its 
representatives freely. A small action like this, which was unusual due to the way it was
117carried out, has triggered off great effects for the Atamake.
The aim of the colonial state was to defend the Spanish interest the colony, as well as 
to avoid divisions in front of the natives. Throughout the whole colonial period there
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existed similar examples in which the state not only overlooked misconduct from 
European soldiers or missionaries but also publicly supported those actions. Not 
surprisingly, Africans came to identify all Europeans as part of the same entity.
Initial contact between the Spanish and the Sanaga-Ogowe was established at a 
personal level between colonial officers and Sanaga-Ogowe elders. Nonetheless, 
Spanish functionaries made clear that they were mere representatives of Spain in 
which name treaties were signed and policies carried out. The Sanaga-Ogowe 
understood that the Spanish came from a very distant place called Pand, and learnt of 
names such as Alfonso XIII or Primo de Rivera whose orders colonial officers 
followed. As Fernandez puts it, ‘the personal model of blood ties was replaced by a 
more abstract “natural” model of persons in structures.’118 Clearly the Sanaga-Ogowe 
had difficulties in adapting to such a system, because, in addition to losing 
sovereignty, political power became somewhat blmred and distant. Negotiation was 
impossible, as the people in charge presented themselves as simple intermediaries 
with no apparent capacity to decide, hi this context, the relationship between the 
Sanaga-Ogowe and Spanish officers became a dialogue of the deaf. Personal based 
relations, so important in the past, became almost meaningless. On the one hand, the 
Sanaga-Ogowe had been disenfranchised and, on the other, colonial officers 
represented institutions whose power was beyond Sanaga-Ogowe control.
It is hard to determine when the Sanaga-Ogowe realized they had lost their 
sovereignty at the hands of the Spanish. Outside the coast and its hinterland, their 
lives were not greatly altered as a result of the Spanish penetration until the late 
1910s. In the interior of Rio Muni, only those settled in the immediate surroundings of 
the Spanish camps could notice deeper changes and greater intervention of the 
colonial agents in their ordinary affairs. The resolution of ‘palavers’ by Colonial
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Guard officers was not extraordinary, since Sanaga-Ogowe families usually asked 
prestigious figures to mediate in difficult disputes. Nonetheless, the Spanish policy of 
disarmament of the African population in the late 1910s started to indicate that 
Spain’s presence was of a different nature, being much more intrusive than they had 
anticipated. This became clearer when the Colonial Guard intervened in this process, 
by punishing those who opposed this policy. To the Spanish, disarmament policy was 
the natural outcome of the series of occupation campaigns that sought to put an end to 
internecine violence in Rio Muni. Therefore, in those areas where the Spanish had 
consolidated their presence by the late 1910s, the coast and northern regions, 
appointed chiefs had to make sure that their fellow villagers surrender their firearms. 
As it was explained to them that aims were not necessary any more because Spain 
would mediate in all disputes and protect them in case of aggression.
The Sanaga-Ogowe did not only use muskets to fight against each other but also 
to hunt. The famine affecting many areas south of the Wele from the late 1910s was 
aggravated by an increase in wildlife that destroyed food crops. Sanaga-Ogowe chiefs 
demanded permission to use their old guns in order to get rid of animals, a petition 
supported by Claretian missionaries.119 The combined effects of famine, the casualties 
and destruction caused by the Colonial Guard’s punitive expeditions, and the growing 
intrusive Spanish policies gave Sanaga-Ogowe families a clear sense that they were 
losing their autonomy. People in the southern district of Akurenam still remember 
vividly the great sufferings of this period, which forced them to leave their villages 
and look for shelter somewhere else. Colonial documents also mention that, as a 
result of the chaos caused by disease and hunger, people from the Evinayong area 
moved towards Mikomeseng.121 The causes of the late 1910s and early 1920s crisis 
were never clarified by the colonial administration, which saw no direct link with the
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military occupation. Instead, some officers suggested a probable relation with the 
rising timber industry in which many young Sanaga-Ogowe men worked in central 
and southern Rio Muni. Amongst the series of measures announced by the colonial 
government to end the crisis, it was decided that ‘village chiefs will be encouraged to 
make broad plantations of cassava, yam, cocoyam, peanut, plantain [etc]. These Crops 
are totally neglected nowadays, due to the censurable and refined egoism of the 
timber trade’.122 Jeanne Henn refers to a similar problem in present-day southern 
Cameroon, because extensive rainforest cultivation requires ‘heavy forest clearing 
twice a year’ and ‘Beti men’, having ‘transformed their traditional food fields into 
cocoa plantations’, have ‘cut back their work on women’s food fields’.123 At the same 
time, ‘women were forced to produce more food in order to supply the colonial 
administration and new urban markets, to feed forced labourers, and to provision the 
large gangs of merchants’ porters who passed through the villages.’124
Whatever the causes of these series of food crises, it is clear that this was a period 
of major disruption for the southern Sanaga-Ogowe. Gray, for instance, claims that in 
Gabon ‘the first half of the 1920s appears to have been a peak of known leopard men 
activity, as ritual murders spread for the first time to the Fang-speaking clans of the 
Middle Ogooue [Ogowe] just when the effects of famine were being felt.’125 
Eventually, the Spanish authorities granted special gun permits to improve the 
situation. Nevertheless, these were exceptional cases, since one had to prove an 
‘excellent conduct and unconditional adhesion to the cause of Spain’.126 Generally the 
use of firearms remained very restricted throughout the whole colonial period.
If there is one event that finally convinced the Sanaga-Ogowe that they were no 
longer in control and had become subjects of the Spanish, this was the road 
construction scheme of the mid-1920s. As in many other parts of Africa, in Rio Muni
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the road construction period is associated with painful experiences and it is generally 
described as an extremely humiliating event. From the beginning of colonial 
occupation, the clearing of a communication network became one of the main 
priorities of the Spanish authorities, so as to open the whole territory to commercial 
activities. Once the region was pacified, Spain mobilized the local population in order 
to construct the road network. As colonial officials expected, this policy met general 
opposition amongst the Sanaga-Ogowe, yet, to the Spanish authorities, there was no 
way back and they carried on with the road scheme. Such a project was the first major 
decision of a broader plan that aimed at transforming and civilizing the entire Rio 
Muni. District officers had to make sure that the roads were built by any means. The 
Colonial Guard became crucial, as they were in charge of implementing the 
government orders and overseeing the construction of the roads.
Although Sanaga-Ogowe people had already experienced the brutality of the 
military during the conquest period, it is the memories of the violence and abuses of 
the 1920s road construction that have vividly survived until today. Colonial chiefs’ 
cooperation in this project was key, since they had to provide the labour force for the 
construction of the roads. Otherwise, they ran the risk of losing their position, being 
physically punished or imprisoned. Of course, labour was free, since the colonial 
treasury could not afford to pay for work that was seen to be for the benefit of the 
natives. Throughout the colonial period, this compulsory communal work was known 
as prestacion personal. Chiefs who succeeded in providing enough workers for the 
road construction received some sort of gratification. Road workers were not given 
any food, having to cany enough food to feed themselves for as long as their service 
lasted. Previous Spanish complaints about the heavy work and semi-slave conditions
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of Sanaga-Ogowe women did no longer matter, and men, women and adolescents 
alike took part in the road construction scheme.
News of the hardships soon spread across the Sanaga-Ogowe country. It was not 
only the difficulty of clearing the forest and building the roads without proper tools or 
carrying heavy loads throughout the hilly terrain, but above all the brutality of the 
Colonial Guard. Some informants still remember cases of people who died during this 
period after being brutalized by the mon-bisima. Some tried to run away and look for 
shelter in the forest, but their desperation was more intense knowing that they could 
not hide in the neighbouring French territories, since they already knew compulsory 
work could be much worse over there, hi fact, many had crossed the border from 
Gabon and Cameroon escaping from similar work schemes.127 The Colonial Guard 
hunted down all those who escaped in order to show the rest of the population that 
there was no refuge within the colony. As a result of the massive discontent caused by 
the road constructions, the colonial government remained hesitant to call on further 
compulsory work until the early 1930s when it was regulated:
Being subject... to the pure arbitrariness of local authorities and those in charge of use
it...abuses were inevitable, and in many cases, the native was cruelly humiliated... as a
result they developed an open opposition to this system... [and] we were forced to cancel
128all compulsory work...
Initially, only villages close to roads were affected by labour recruitment. Soon it was 
clear that it would be necessary to bring in more people to the road construction. Once 
more, the Colonial Guard received orders to go deep in the forest and force people 
from distant villages to provide workers, despite the fact that they did not benefit 
directly from those roads.
Following the construction of the road network, the Spanish conducted a policy of 
resettlement, between the late 1920s and early 1930s, that aimed at grouping the
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African population into larger villages in order to make local administration more
efficient. Such a measure sought to put an end to the traditional settlement pattern,
consisting of a myriad of small villages formed often by single extended families.
Villages, left aside from new roads, were also told to abandon their present location
and settle along the nearest road. This measure was not compulsory because the
government was seriously concerned about how people might react against it. To the
government satisfaction, however, many villages voluntarily moved towards the new
roads, especially in the case of villages in the vicinity of the road network. Governor-
General Nunez de Prado explained this process:
Near the finished roads, we are carrying out the concentration of neighbouring villages. 
The natives attend without resisting because... [they are] convinced about the facilities, 
advantages, and wealth offered to them. The same organization plan will be followed in 
all areas where communication ways are to be established, appointing, at the same time, 
prestigious chiefs to lead an important contingent, seeking to give them authority and 
support so they can directly rule in villages and facilitate the government’s task.129
Whereas some families refused to resettle along the new roads, many others appeared 
to do so freely due to the economic advantages that colonial roads offered.130 As far as 
they were concerned, this would offer them a possibility to sell their products without 
travelling for long distances as well as to purchase European goods more easily. 
Although moving a village was not a great change to the Sanaga-Ogowe, this measure 
now had two important changes: sedentarization of settlements and the sharing of the 
same space by several movok-me'bot.
Coexistence between different families within the same village under the authority 
of a single administrative chief was a partial success for the Spanish administration. It 
was partial, nonetheless, because the government could not overcome Sanaga-Ogowe 
reluctance to live with people from different clans. Only fellow clan families agreed
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to live together -  it would only be later in the 1960s when we can find different clans 
sharing the same settlement in some areas of Rio Muni. As for those villages located 
far from colonial roads, a few decided to move their settlements, but many remained 
in their old location waiting until a road was constructed nearer to them. Today it is 
still possible to find villages located along old paths, which never moved near the 
colonial road network. This apparent auto-marginalization helped them to retain more 
decision-making within their communities than the majority of the Fang living along 
the colonial road network. Between the Evinayong and Kogo districts, numerous 
villages remained isolated from the road that connected Evinayong to Niefang and 
Bata. It was not until the 1950s that a road was constructed in the vicinity. When 
asked why they never decided to resettle close to the road built in the early 1930s, 
villagers answered that they were better off than those living along the road. Although 
relatively isolated from the Europeans, they were still close enough to the coast and 
had easy access to their goods.131
Photograph 10: The road Bata-M ikomeseng was the first road opened
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Photograp 11: M ost villages have maintained the same location since they moved along the roads
Conclusion
The non-centralized political structure of the Sanaga-Ogowe was unable to meet 
needs of the colonial administration. As a result, the Spanish authorities increased 
their interventionism in Sanaga-Ogowe affairs, eroding the autonomy of the rnvok- 
e ’bot. This, combined with Sanaga-Ogowe individuals’ ambitions, resulted in the 
destruction of key traditional structures. In the process, the local authority rapidly lost 
his character as representative of the community to become a colonial instrument 
under the immediate supervision of the district officer and the constant backing of the 
Colonial Guard. By resorting to the use of coercive instruments to support local 
chiefs, Governor-General Barrera’s office established a precedent that has survived 
until today. The mvok-e’bot stopped being an active political community, as its 
members became subjects of a state that could now force them to carry out almost all 
kind of undesired tasks.
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Chapter 3
Spain's Last Crusade
If the Spanish conquest of Rio Muni was hampered by a lack of resources and 
support from the metropolis, the establishment of a colonial administration did not 
prove any easier. Madrid’s lack of interest in and commitment to its Central African 
territory continued throughout most of the colonial period, and it was only in the 
aftermath of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), that Franco’s regime became more 
actively involved in the development of Spanish Guinea. In this climate of 
metropolitan indifference, successive colonial governments had to create an 
administrative system which, very often, was the result of improvisation and the will 
of the current Governor-General. Broadly speaking, the colonial administration had 
two main objectives regarding Spanish Guinea: economic exploitation and the social 
transformation of Africans. Such general goals left plenty of room for the 
improvisation of policies. After the victory of Franco’s troops in 1939, Spain was 
able to develop a more consistent ideology and policy with regards to its African 
territories, hi the case of Spanish Guinea, the main lines of the colonial system were 
drafted and implemented between 1938 and 1959. By the end of 1936 Spanish 
Guinea was already under the control of Franco’s faction, and two years later his 
administration introduced a series of key legal reforms that shaped the political, 
social and economic structure of the colony until 1959 when Rio Muni and Fernando 
Po officially became Spanish provinces. During this period, Spanish Guinea was 
ruled under the umbrella of strong authoritarianism, Christian paternalism, and a 
close relationship between the Catholic Church and the colonial state. International 
pressure, as well as greater dissension within Francoist ranks, led to a gradual change
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of policies in the late 1950s. As a result, between 1959 and 1968, Spanish Guinea 
moved from a provincial status, which was granted in 1959, to an autonomous one in 
1964, and, finally, to independence in 1968.1
This chapter shifts focus from the colonized to the colonizers, as it seeks to 
delineate some of the main features of the system that the Spanish put in place. 
Although the Spanish colonial system in the Gulf of Guinea deserves greater 
attention, here I shall concentrate on those aspects particularly relevant for the African 
population. In understanding the colonial system as the environment in which the 
Fang had to carry out their everyday life, we can contextualize their actions and the 
development of new social and cultural structures -  the new tradition. We shall see 
how in developing a colonial system, the Spanish had to struggle between the desire 
for economic exploitation, which could attract much-needed metropolitan support, 
and the moral need for social transformation, which ultimately legitimized colonial 
domination. On the basis of misunderstood paternalism, the Spanish built up an 
antagonistic relationship between the ‘civilized’ European state and the ‘uncivilized’ 
African population. By looking at the colonial economy, we shall be able to 
understand why the so-called economic prosperity that the colony enjoyed in the 
1960s did not quite translate itself into Africans’ self-reliance, since economic 
decisions always prioritized Europeans over Africans. Eventually, I shall examine the 
enormous role of the Catholic Church as a fundamental pillar of colonial domination, 
which, although not always cooperative, contributed to maintain the social order.
The quest for a colonial policy
Numerous factors explain the lack of interest in Spain in its equatorial African 
colony. Most of them were related to the serious political and economic crisis that
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since the mid-nineteenth century affected Spain after the loss of most of its American 
empire. Reports from the tiny African colony were not very encouraging either. Long 
after occupying the colony, Spanish Guinea was still considered to be ‘a cemetery 
greedy for colonizers.’2 Although different colonial enthusiasts sought to dismiss this 
belief and change people’s opinion at home, in reality such a perception greatly 
influenced the policies of Spanish officers, especially with regards to labour. Until 
1968, the Spanish argued that Europeans were incapable of carrying out manual work 
in this region due to tropical diseases and the rigours of the climate.3 This key 
principle of the social and economic order in the colony laid the basis for racial 
segregation and African labour exploitation in plantations and through the prestacion 
personal. It is somewhat paradoxical that the same individuals, who tried to change 
the image of the Central African colony amongst Spaniards and convince the 
metropolitan government to increase investments, spread negative views about 
Spanish Guinea and its peoples. From the colonial government’s point of view, these 
opinions often served as an alibi to justify their failures, whereas for white settlers it 
appeared to serve as deterrence against potential competition from Spanish 
companies and settlers,
Spain’s expectations with regards to Africa were not different from other 
European countries, all of which saw the continent as a potential source of wealth to 
strengthen their economies in the light of late-nineteenth century competition 
between industrialized nations. If anything, Spain had a greater need to draw on these 
prospects because of its acute economic crisis and the consequences of the c 1898 
disaster’. The outcome of the Treaty of Paris buried Spanish hopes to find a new 
eldorado. In the metropolis, many saw Rio Muni as a burden, having very little hope 
that Spain could ever obtain any profit from it -  a view that barely changed until
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independence. Immediately after the final pacification of Rio Muni in 1927, the 
senior officer of the Direction General de Marruecos y  Colonias (DGMC, Head 
Office for Morocco and the Colonies) wrote to the Governor-General: ‘We are going 
to send you a mining engineer as part of a commission to study the colony’s geology 
and its mining regulations. I wish we could find something worthy! Since this would 
finally create some affection for [the colony]’.4 Yet, Spain was never able to find any 
significant mining wealth in Rio Muni, and hopes of the territory becoming a 
manpower source vanished by the late 1920s.
Although popularly known as Spanish Guinea, the official name of the colony 
was Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea after a Royal Decree reorganized its 
administrative structure in 1904 -  only one of many administrative reorganizations 
that followed.5 Indeed, the official terminology reflected more accurately the diverse 
nature of the colony. Spanish Guinea was not a single colony but two, made up of 
Fernando Po on the one hand and Rio Muni and the small islands of Corisco, Elobey 
Chico, Elobey Grande and Annobon on the other. Despite its smaller size, Fernando 
Po was home for numerous European settlers -  especially Spanish -  who rapidly 
flourished thanks to the successful cocoa plantations scattered throughout the island, 
making Fernando Po a classic white settler colony.6 Rio Muni, together with the 
smaller islands, had a minimum European presence and never attracted significant 
attention from the Spanish administration and businesses. Such disparities 
determined major differences in colonial policies with regards to the two 
administrative territories. Most economic resources were directed towards the 
development of infrastructure on the island, while the colonial government’s efforts 
aimed at guaranteeing the steady supply of manpower for the plantations. The 
remaining territories saw very little development prior to 1959.
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Since the beginning of the occupation of Rio Muni, Spain did not have a clear 
view of what to do with the territory. Such doubts generated an intense debate 
regarding the future of the colony. Some argued in favour of encouraging European 
migration through a series of incentives, or for establishing a penal colony in which 
rehabilitated prisoners could farm and start families.7 Others in the metropolis 
suggested the leasing of the colony to private companies for its administration and 
exploitation. The leasing alternative gathered considerable support amongst certain 
senior officers and politicians, who backed this view during the course of the series
o
of parliamentary debates about the colonization of the territory in 1904. Although no 
action was taken, the debate remained opened and seven years later Governor- 
General Barrera expressed his disagreement with the leasing of Rio Mimi to private 
companies:
[Companies] have become obsolete in other nations, which have got rid of chartered 
companies after falling into disuse, because, amongst many reasons, these companies 
cannot accomplish their mission without using force, which is one of the State’s 
attributes that can never be delegated to anybody.9
One of Barrera’s main concerns was to serve the interest of Fernando Po’s plantation
owners, hence it is not surprising that he was opposed to the leasing and exploitation
of Rio Muni by private companies. Clearly, this would not have allowed the
recruitment of Rio-Munian labourers for the island’s plantations.10 In 1911, Barrera
had already set the principal lines of Spanish policies regarding Rio Muni:
Concerning native property... we must look after it, not thinking of the present day but of 
the future of that race, which is the one that had to exploit the land and exchange its 
products for our manufactures.. .ll
The leasing never took place, yet it is not clear what eventually determined 
Madrid’s decision. Considering the crippled Spanish economy of the early twentieth 
century, it is difficult to see how private companies could have been interested in
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assuming the challenging task of exploiting Rio Muni. Furthermore, pressing 
problems in the metropolis took away any sort of interest in a colony where no 
foreseeable major benefits were expected. Between 1901 and 1938, Madrid took a 
passive stance with regards to Rio Muni which inadvertently left the colony to the 
sole administration of colonial officers on the ground, under the distant supervision of 
public servants in Madrid. The fact that the colonial administration kept a military 
character throughout most part of the period of Spanish domination illustrates the 
provisional nature of metropolitan policies in the Gulf of Guinea. The republican 
government’s attempt to move from a military administration to a civil one in 1934 
was eventually reversed by the series of decrees which in 1938 established the 
character of the colonial administration for the first two decades of Franco’s regime.12
Given the absence of a clear colonial project prior to 1938, colonial officers often
opted for a pragmatic approach to resolve most matters related to colonization.
Therefore, policies and legislation were often drawn a posteriori, in response to
arising problems. Lack of connection and discontinuity characterized many of the
policies of the different colonial administrators, as in the case of the Patronato de 
1 ^Indigenas. This institution, supposedly in charge of the administration and ‘welfare’ 
of those Africans considered as no-emancipcidos (non-emancipated or legally minors) 
from 1904, did not actually start functioning until 1928, when its statutes were finally 
approved.14
Until 1938, acute political rivalries in Spain that culminated in the civil war 
prevented the development of a clear colonial approach. Such inconsistency makes it 
difficult to provide a clear picture of what the Spanish colonial system was like, 
especially if we keep in mind the deep differences between the administration of Rfo 
Muni and Fernando Po. As Negrin points out, rather than talking of a colonial model
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for the Territories of the Gulf of Guinea, it would be more accurate to talk of models; 
one for Fernando Po and another for Rio Muni and the minor islands.15 This difficulty 
grows even bigger if we compare the policies followed in the Gulf of Guinea to those 
in the Spanish territories of Northwest Africa, the Moroccan Protectorate, Ifni and 
Sahara, where successive Spanish governments chose a less invasive approach 
towards native cultures.16 Indeed, this chaotic picture is not a unique case, and it is 
possible to trace numerous similarities with other colonial powers. Pragmatism and 
improvisation were the order of the day in most colonial administrations.
In spite of metropolitan rhetoric, European administrations in Africa had much 
more in common than it appears at first glance. District officers usually shared similar 
problems on the ground; hence their responses were likely to be similar. Often, 
variations in colonial policies were simply determined by physical conditions. The 
administration of a small territory with relatively homogeneous ethnic groups, such as 
Spanish Guinea, required less diverse policies than the administration of huge 
territories such as Nigeria or the Belgian Congo, for example. Similarities between 
different colonial administrations were not purely coincidental. In the case of Spanish 
Guinea, especially until the late 1930s, it was common that colonial officers looked at 
other colonies for effective solutions. As early as 1911, Barrera suggested that they 
‘should study the organization of the justice administration in the neighbouring 
colonies, especially that of Gabon or French Equatorial Africa, where racial
• • * 17similarities would make it more suitable to us’. This view was also shared by a top 
colonial officer during the republican period.18 The establishment of the Francoist 
administration did not stop this trend, for in 1940 the Sub-Govemor of Bata sent a 
report, based on a Belgian Congo manual, suggesting a series of norms for district 
officers.19 Governor-General Juan Fontan rejected this idea because he considered
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that Belgian colonization ‘was far more advanced’ and this model could not easily be
applied to Rio Muni.20 Ideological reasons became increasingly dominant after 1938
and foreign colonial models were then used mainly to legitimize Spanish
‘humanitarian’ colonialism. In 1959, Diaz de Villegas, head of the DGMC for most of
the Francoist period, compared the civilizing enterprise of Spain with the economic
exploitation practiced by other European nations.21 A few years earlier, Governor-
General Bonelli justified legal inequality in Spanish Guinea on the following grounds:
There are peoples forgotten by God... who, intoxicated by the corrosive venom of a- 
thousand-time-dammed ideas which are going to put an end to the unfortunate 
civilization in which we live nowadays, have fallen into stupidity and incoherence, giving 
natives in their colonies such a high degree of citizenship that they have the right to vote. 
That is, they have the right to exercise that stupid act that allows men to express an 
opinion about things they do not understand.. ,22
Internal contradictions within different colonial models were not only the result of 
lack of a clear colonial guiding principle and improvisation. As Murphy explains in 
his study of the colonial system in Kenya, contradictions often took place because the 
colonial state had to provide with the instruments for capitalist exploitation, while 
developing a tolerable level of legitimacy amongst Africans.23 In order to achieve 
legitimacy, the colonial state often presented itself as an agent for the protection of 
Africans. Thus, according to European rhetoric, colonialism was not exclusively a 
system of exploitation but, above all, a tool for the much needed civilization and 
improvement of Africans. The balance between exploitation and legitimacy varied 
according to the government in power in the metropolis and the interests of the 
different European sectors of the colony.
In the Spanish colony there existed a fragile equilibrium between white settlers 
and Claretian missionaries until late 1930s. In Rio Muni and, especially, on Fernando
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Po, settlers were in favour of greater economic exploitation and were usually backed
by the Governor-General. The Claretians, however, championed stronger protection
of Africans and often found support from Madrid thanks to the Catholic Church’s
influence. The Patronato de Indigenas was founded as the institution embodying the
paternalistic views of the Catholic missionaries and their followers. Yet the legal
vacuum between 1904 and 1928 allowed successive Governor-Generals to conscript
by force Africans from Rio Muni and Fernando Po for the island’s plantations, despite
protests from the Claretians. As a result of this conflict between the two sectors, by
1924 the relationship between Barrera and the Vicar-General Nicolas Gonzalez had
deteriorated so much that Gonzalez wrote:
His autocracy, to say the least, has reached the point that he is the law above all laws. 
Such is his malice, that he either secretly gives all those orders that might be 
compromising for him, or he despotically imposes them, even though they are contrary to 
all divine and human law.24
Eventually, in 1925, Barrera was removed from office by the conservative 
government of Primo de Rivera, clearly more sympathetic to the Catholic Church’s 
demands.25
Between 1925 and the end of Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship in 1930, there were 
no significant changes regarding Spain’s colonial approach. Perhaps the Claretian 
missionaries saw an increase in their support from Madrid, but most colonial policies 
continued to be shaped by the personality of the colony’s main authority. The 
metropolitan government continued to ignore the situation in Spanish Guinea, in spite 
of alarming signs of social, political and economic deterioration during the rule of 
Governor-General Nunez de Prado (1925-1930). In 1927, the Governor had to explain 
to the DGMC what happened in a corruption affair in the course of the 1926 labour 
recruitment campaign in Rio Muni, in which he claimed not to be involved.26 Neither
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Spanish settlers nor Claretian missionaries were happy with Nunez de Prado’s 
policies. In 1928, the Vicar-General Gonzalez wrote a report criticizing the use of 
forced labour as well as the deteriorating conditions amongst plantation workers.27 
After the fall of Primo de Rivera’s government in 1930, criticism against the 
Governor-General escalated and several newspaper articles portrayed Nunez de Prado 
as a tyrannical, corrupt and incompetent man.28 Similar complaints appeared in a 
letter written by the Comisidn de Agricultores de Fernando Poo (Commission of 
Fernando Po Farmers), which compared labour recruitment in Rio Muni with past 
slave trade practices.
One of the first decisions of the new metropolitan government with regards to 
Spanish Guinea was to dismiss Nunez de Prado in 1930. One year later, this step was 
followed by a decree to revise the legislation approved during the dictatorial period.30 
However, these decisions lacked the necessary resolution to modernize the archaic 
colonial administration. The most serious attempt took place in 1934 with the creation 
of the Cuerpo de Administradores Territoriales del Golfo de Guinea -  Territorial 
Administrator Corps of the Gulf of Guinea.31 This aimed to transform the military 
character of the colonial administration, which had hitherto been in the hands of 
military Governors and district officers, into a civil one. The republican government 
hoped that, by putting civil servants in charge of the colony, the administration would 
be more effective in looking after Spain’s ‘colonial interests’ as well as ‘organizing 
and protecting the native population against poverty and diseases’.32 Nonetheless, 
such a policy required funds, which the Spanish Public Treasury very much lacked, 
and will, which was seriously undermined by the political deterioration in Spain. 
Consequently, the formally civil administration remained in the hands of military 
officers until the end of Spanish domination.
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The republican government was aware of its lack of support within the military 
ranks, and this reform attempted to reaffirm its control over the colony. The 
establishment of the Republic in 1931 met general opposition in the colony from 
colonial officials, settlers and missionaries, leading the President of the Republic to 
warn against anti-republican feelings.33 Eventually, the acute antagonism between 
conservatives and the republican government spilled over to Spanish Guinea, where 
churches were ordered to close, like in the rest of Spain, by the Popular Front 
government. The electoral victory of the Popular Front in February 1936 was 
followed by the military uprising of General Franco five months later. During the last 
few months of the republican regime, the situation in the colony became confused, 
and even Governor-General Sanchez Guerra was accused of sympathising with the 
conservatives and was asked to resign. This development triggered the uprising of the 
conservative sector that with the aid of the Colonial Guard quickly took control of 
Fernando Po in September 1936.34 The supporters of the Popular Front government 
initially took shelter in Rio Muni, but by mid October, they were forced to leave the 
colony after a naval force sent by Franco easily overcame republican resistance.35
Throughout the period of Spanish rule in Guinea, the difficult equilibrium 
between the discourses of economic exploitation on the one hand and Christian 
paternalism on the other was achieved through the use of African migrant workers 
from outside the colony. Migrant work did not only have an economic value, but it 
was also important from the political point of view. The use of workers from outside 
Spanish Guinea allowed intense economic exploitation without eroding the so-called 
moral principles of Spanish colonialism. That is, Spain’s ‘Christian’ duty involved 
only those Africans legally under its ‘protection’, the native inhabitants of Spanish 
Guinea.
152
There existed a pattern of continuation with regards to the basic elements of
Spanish colonialism. Certainly the Francoist regime reinforced the existing colonial
policies by providing stronger political and economic support, as well as the
ideological blanketing of the nacioncil-catolidsmo (‘national Catholicism’). The
approval of the 1938 Estatuto deJusticia Indigena (Native Justice Statute) opened the
way to a series of administrative reforms, which, along with the economic
restructuring of the mid 1940s, shaped the social and economic bases of the colony
for the next two decades.
Indeed, colonial rhetoric escalated under Franco’s rule. The African colonies,
especially those considered to be more backwards, such as Spanish Guinea, became
part of the civilizing mission discourse, closely linked to the historic Spanish
enterprise in the Americas. Such views became dominant amongst those in the
metropolis who were in charge of the administration of the colony, as we can see in
the words of Diaz de Villegas:
None of these lands were obtained by force! If we keep them today, it is due to the 
colonizing genius of the race -  for Spain is the colonizing nation par excellence -  and 
because our foreign activity has been done under the divine sign of the Cross. The 
crucifix has been, indeed, our constant guide in the Americas, in Asia, in the Pacific, and 
in Africa.36
For the Francoist regime, Spanish Guinea was a continuation of Spain’s historical 
mission to spread Christianity amongst ‘infidels’. The 1938 justice reform, for 
example, was compared to the Leyes de Indias of Spanish America.37 The 
combination of old-fashioned Catholic values and extreme nationalism provided 
Spanish colonialism with a degree of paternalistic rhetoric so far unheard of, and only 
comparable to that of Portuguese Africa during Salazar’s dictatorship. More than ever 
during Franco’s regime, the native came to be seen as the central focus of
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colonization, whose inferiority justified Spain’s rule. Thus, Governor-General 
Bonelli, during the course of a lecture at the Institute of International and Colonial 
Political Studies in 1946, asked his audience: ‘if the native is exactly equal in his 
psychology and mentality to the inhabitant of a civilized country, will you please tell 
me where the colonizer fits in the colony?’38 Bonelli’s views certainly reflected the 
essence of Francoist ideology, in which the colonizer ‘should feel, at the same time, 
partly as a master and partly as creator’ and by doing so it should feel closer to God -  
the Master and Creator par excellence.39 Francoist paternalism understood that 
natives’ inferiority should be overcome by Spanish colonial agents, who in their 
civilizing mission would create a new people.40 This paternalistic ideology was the 
cornerstone of the administrative and judicial structure of the colony between 1938 
and 1959, in which Africans were legal minors under the protection of the colonial 
state and subject to tribunales de raza (native courts, literally ‘race courts’).
Contrary to Catholic rhetoric, which claimed that all men were children of God, 
paternalism was mixed with racist views. Governor-General Juan Fontan argued that 
Africans’ intelligence decreased with age.41 This became a popular belief in the 
colony, and in the mid-1940s was ‘scientifically’ confirmed by two Spanish doctors, 
who maintained that this phenomenon was due to ‘tropical diseases [which] totally 
exhaust the individual from birth, damaging his psyche as a result.’42 Negrin points 
out that racist and paternalistic views were especially dominant between 1939 and 
1949, yet it appears that racism was mostly an outcome of life in the colony.43 
Whereas the less racist idea of assimilation dominated metropolitan discourse, in the 
colony itself, more racist ideas in favour of association prevailed and argued that 
Africans’ intellectual inferiority would make assimilation of Africans to European 
culture impossible. Over time, as Negrin points out, Francoist colonizing doctrines
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became more diverse.44 This was possibly due to internal developments in the Franco 
regime, in which the younger generation, known as technocrats, started to occupy 
higher positions within the administration from 1957.
From 1958, a succession of political reforms rapidly altered the legal status of 
Spanish Guinea. That year, the colony was renamed Equatorial Province, though it 
was not until one year later that it formally stopped being a colony.45 hr July 1959, the 
Spanish Parliament passed the Bill of Organization and Judicial Structure of the 
African Provinces, by which the Spanish territory was divided in two provinces, 
Fernando Po and Rio Muni, as part of a process known as provincializacidn. The new 
law also abolished the Patronato de Indigenas and the classification of Africans into 
emcincipados and no~emancipados. From then on, all Africans were, in principle, 
granted equal rights with the rest of the Spanish population, hr its preamble, the 1959 
law said: ‘The traditional Spanish policy overseas... has made it possible for them 
[the Territories of the Gulf of Guinea] to overcome the necessary stage of evolution 
and reach a degree of development to be considered legally fully integrated within the 
Spanish community.’46
The Spanish government was not insensitive to current international processes, in 
which nationalist movements were increasingly gaining momentum and forcing 
European nations to grant independence to their colonies. These developments, plus 
pressure from the UN -  which Spain had become a member of in December 1955 — 
convinced members of the Spanish establishment that it was about time to change 
Spain’s policies regarding the Gulf of Guinea.47 This view, led by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, was part of an emerging trend within the Francoist ranks that felt it 
necessary to break with the autarchic system of the 1940s. This sector also thought 
that by granting equal rights to Africans and integrating the colonies into Spain, it
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would be possible to silence international pressure and the colony’s nationalist 
movement, while delaying Spanish Guinea’s inevitable independence and satisfying 
the demands of hardliners at home.
The reforms of the late 1950s were barely felt by the population of Spanish 
Guinea. As we shall see, native justice was maintained until independence. From 
1961 Africans were entitled to choose whether they wanted to be subject to native or 
European courts for civil matters, but, since not all natives were evolucionados 
(‘fully-developed’), they had to have the opportunity to be judged according to ‘native 
custom’.48 Economic conditions were also poor, especially in Rio Muni, forcing the 
Spanish Government to extend the 1963 Development Plan to its African territories. 
This scheme sought to prove to the international community that Spain was fully 
committed to bridging the social and economic gap between its African colonies and 
the rest of Spain. Nonetheless, voices from within Spanish Guinea and the 
international community still demanded that Spain should take the necessary steps 
towards granting total independence. By 1963, the situation was too difficult to 
maintain, hence, the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became dominant. In 
November 1963 the Parliament passed the Bill of Statutes that granted an autonomous 
status to the provinces of Rfo Muni and Fernando Po. One month later, Equatorial 
Guineans approved the bill in a referendum. From 1964 to October 1968, Equatorial 
Guinea was run by an autonomous administration -  the Spanish still refused to call it 
a government -  under the supervision of the Governor-General, who was now 
renamed comisario general (high commissioner).49 As Pelissier argues, the 
autonomous regime was designed to prepare Equatorial Guineans for independence, 
in spite of the official refusal to acknowledge this process.50 Certainly there were 
Spaniards whose views on Africans remained the same and believed that ‘the native
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Guinean is a pacific man, a total mentally retarded person, whose intelligence age 
varies between 12 and 16 year old amongst adults -  women do not go beyond 14 
years of mental age’.51 Nonetheless, the new administration, together with the 
economic reforms, made possible the greatest social and economic development since 
the arrival of the Spanish.
Paternalism for social transformation
Until 1938, limited resources and a blurred colonial policy resulted in a weak 
administration with an unclear role. White settlers were in the colony to make money 
through cocoa growing, timber, or trade. The aim of the missionaries was to 
Christianize Africans and to get rid of their ‘primitive’ customs. The colonial state, 
however, had no clear function other than representing Spanish sovereignty in the 
colony. Not surprisingly, both Spanish settlers and missionaries appeared to think that 
the administration was there to assist them. Internal divisions within different 
European sectors made it more complicated to elucidate the role of the government. It 
is documented, for example, that there were different factions within the colonial 
administration. Internal divisions also affected the Claretians. According to Barrera, 
the Claretians were divided between those in favour of focusing on economic 
exploitation and a minority supporting greater emphasis on evangelization.52 Amongst 
settlers, well-established landowners were often wary of newcomers from the 
Peninsula, as Spain was often referred to. Different expectations from the government 
generated stiff competition between colonial factions, whose interests were often 
interwoven. In many respects, competition and conflict shaped Spain’s colonial 
policy, especially between 1901 and 1938.
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Being in such a precarious situation, the colonial government found it very 
difficult to assert its authority over the different colonial sectors. To Barrera, it was 
necessary to empower the role of the Governor-General. He complained that ‘since 
1902 there has been... 20 Govemors-General in eight years, and the majority of them 
had an interim character. Can there be a colony like that? Can the position have any 
prestige? I understand not.’53 Constant change of Governors put long-term residents, 
mostly Claretian missionaries, on a higher ground, making them believe that it was 
they who were the actual authority.54 During Barrera’s long term, the administration 
acquired a series of functions that it had hitherto lacked. Indeed, much of Barrera’s 
success was due to his support from the officials in charge of the Ministry of State, 
the government branch that controlled colonial policies until 1925. From the reading 
of communications between Govemors-General and senior officers in Madrid, one 
gathers that personal relationships very much determined the support given to the 
former as well as his policies. During Barrera’s tenure, the administration was 
developed in order to represent the economic interests of the metropolis as well as the 
different Spanish sectors in the colony. When dealing with the natives, the colonial 
administration tried to unify the diversity of interests amongst Europeans, portraying 
the image that the Spanish, in particular, were one single body represented by the 
government. This, in essence, degenerated into an antagonistic relationship between 
Africans and the state throughout the Spanish domination.
The gradual development of an autonomous administration gave rise to 
confrontation with missionaries and settlers whenever they were unhappy with 
government policies. In principle, the colonial administration developed since the 
early twentieth century was conceived as a highly centralized and bureaucratic 
organization -  the system that dominated in the metropolis except for the short
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republican period. Nonetheless, centralization usually varied depending on the level 
of interest of the Spanish government, the character of the current Governor-General, 
and the available resources. On paper, the colonial government depended on each of 
the successive metropolitan branches in charge of administering the African 
possessions: the Ministry of State, the DGMC, and, after the provincialization in 
1959, the Direction General de Plazas y  Provincias Africanas (DGPPA, Head Office 
for African Towns and Provinces).55 These metropolitan bodies were supposed to 
dictate the main guidelines of colonial policy, yet, either Madrid’s lack of interest or 
the confidence of senior metropolitan officers in the Governor-General often resulted 
in the almost total delegation of decision-making to the latter. This situation left 
enough room for Governors to impose greater centralization to ensure their authority 
in the colony, as well as the necessary bureaucracy to make centralization possible.
The Governor-General as head of the colony’s administration was not only in 
charge of the different departments of the civil administration, but as a military officer 
-  usually a general -  was also responsible for the Colonial Guard, the colony’s 
military force since its creation in 190 8.56 The Governor-General was based in Santa 
Isabel on Fernando Po, from where he controlled the different territorial 
administrations in which the colony was divided. Territorial divisions evolved over 
time according to Spain’s growing control of Rio Muni, as well as the varying needs 
of the colonial administration. At the suggestion of the Governor-General in 1907, the 
colony was divided into three administrative regions.57 The first one comprised the 
island of Fernando Po, and it was under the direct administration of the Governor. The 
remaining two covered mainland Spanish Guinea and the minor islands, and they 
were under the supervision of two Sub-Governors, who were based in the regional 
capitals: Bata and Elobey.58 Each region was further divided into districts,
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corresponding with military posts, and were managed by colonial guard officers. They 
were known as jefes de puesto, whose functions amounted to government delegates. 
Like all Spanish public servants, they were appointed from Madrid.
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Although the number of districts increased over time, the basic administrative 
structure remained the same until the 1930s. As part of the modernization process of 
the republican government, one of the two sub-govemships of Rio Muni was 
eliminated, leaving only one in Bata. The Francoist administration preserved the 
essence of the previous territorial divisions; that is, the colony was divided in two 
administrative regions -  Fernando Po and Continental Guinea which were further 
divided into districts.59 After the 1938 reform, the administrador territorial (district 
officer) in Rio Muni was accountable to the Sub-Governor of Bata, who was 
subsequently accountable to the Governor.60 The structure of the territorial 
administration, except for the increase in the number of districts, was almost 
unchanged until the provincialization of 1959. The secretary general, the colony’s
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second in command, assisted the Governor-General in the supervision of the different 
administrative departments. He was also a substitute for the Governor in his absence, 
and was his advisor for administrative issues. The rest of the colonial administration 
was managed by jefes de servicio (chiefs of department) who directed the different 
administration departments. Although the chiefs of department were based in Santa 
Isabel, there were also representatives in Bata, as capital of the continental region.
Autocratic tendencies were salient during the Spanish domination. The faculties 
of the Governor-General, as a Spanish writer put it, ‘were almost unlimited’, for he 
acted as civil and military governor, having almost total control of the legislative and 
executive powers.61 Governors’ abusive behaviour was only checked by Madrid when 
Spanish people were affected. Autocratic practices were not only limited to the 
colony’s head. If anything, these tendencies were more acute amongst district officers, 
who, according to the Sub-Governor of Bata in 1939, could go as far as ‘transforming 
his district into an independent feud, without admitting any relationship with other 
[districts], and even consciously doing different things and procedures from other 
districts.’62 Given that the European population on the mainland was scarce, district 
officers dealt with no-emancipados almost without any restraint. As the embodiment 
of government at local level, the district officer was in charge of all administrative 
departments and the Colonial Guard -  which acted as a sort of police force -  in 
addition to administering justice amongst Africans. In the absence of either a native 
legal code and or a set of rules for the district officer, he could give sentences and 
enforce the law according to his own criterion.63 Wilson shows how this situation was 
widespread across colonial Africa, where the enormous ‘discretionary power’ of 
district officers ‘defined much of the reality of the imperial situation as perceived by
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his African subjects.’64 As we shall see, in Spanish Guinea only the Claretians were 
interested in controlling the autocratic power of colonial officers.
In spite of its formal modernity, Fields rightly points out that the African colonial 
state was fundamentally an archaic structure, especially when compared to the 
metropolitan or European one.65 The successive Spanish metropolitan administrations, 
however, were not particularly modern, and their shortcomings were multiplied in the 
colonies. In addition to autocracy, the close cooperation between Church and State 
and the heavy reliance on the Colonial Guard added to the archaic nature of the state 
in Spanish Guinea. Lack of means and legitimacy was very often replaced by coercion 
at the hands of the Colonial Guard. Whenever the administration could not afford to 
pay for public works or convince people about the benefits of government actions, the 
Colonial Guard would force people to work for free. In 1931, the government 
delegate in the Nsork district explained: ‘the recruitment of labourers for the works 
that have to be done on the track from Kogo to Rio Benito is practically impossible... 
It is necessary to implement extreme and violent policies’.66 The role of the Colonial 
Guard was especially notorious for the success of the prestacion personal. Since the 
moment of its creation, Spanish officers were aware of the Colonial Guard’s abuses, 
and tried to devise different formulae to prevent violence from happening, which was 
believed to be due the lack of preparation of native guards and their idiosyncrasy.67 
Under the authority of Spanish officers, Africans constituted the core of the Colonial 
Guard.
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Photograph 12: Colonial Guard
In 1932, after a few Spanish newspapers and a humanitarian society voiced the 
brutality suffered by the African population at the hands of settlers and missionaries 
in Spanish Guinea, the republican government sent an inspector to the colony to 
investigate and correct the situation.68 These denunciations placed further pressure on 
the Spanish government, which in the late 1920s had been forced to put an end to the 
migrant labour agreements with Liberia after several international newspapers 
described work conditions on Fernando Po’s plantation in terms of semi-slavery.69 
The victory of Franco’s troops terminated with all dissenting voices inside the country 
at the same time that the regime isolated itself from external criticism -  a situation 
that did not vary much until the late 1950s.
According to the 1950 census, the European population, made up mostly of 
Spaniards (91.3 per cent) was concentrated in the principal economic centres; 81 per 
cent of the island’s total European population lived in Santa Isabel, whereas 68.4 per 
cent of the mainland’s total population lived in Bata and Rio Benito (present-day
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Mbini).70 In 1950, the European population in Rio Muni only amounted to 0.95 per 
cent of the total population, while, on Fernando Po, the percentage was somewhat 
higher, 6 per cent.71 By 1966, the figures had risen slightly, since Europeans made up 
1.6 and 8.4 per cent of the total population of Rio Muni and Fernando Po 
respectively.72 Not surprisingly, Europeans living in overseas possessions formed a 
society of their own within a so-called hostile environment, surrounded by 
‘oppressive’ nature and ‘savage5 people, in which they tried to prosper. Despite 
internal differences, bonds of solidarity were developed amongst whites both in 
opposition to Africans and to the metropolis; the latter was considered to ignore the 
reality on the ground as well as settlers5 needs. A letter sent to President Azana 
quoted some of the words that the Governor-General addressed before the Agriculture 
Chamber: ‘the greatest enemy that this colony has always had is the ignorance and 
lack of will to understand us that there exist in the Peninsula’s offices.’74 The 
metropolis could be a hindrance more than anything else.75 Therefore, whatever 
happened in Spanish Guinea appeared to be kept away from Madrid’s knowledge, 
except when conflicts became too serious to be resolved from within. After 1938, the 
DGMC became more interested in supervising the colonial administration. In 1949, 
the Governor-General attempted to go beyond his legislative attribution, yet he was 
stopped by the head of the DGMC, who had to remind him of his prerogatives under 
the 1938 Justice Decree.76 Nonetheless, Governors continued to enjoy broad powers, 
because the bulk of legislation as well as the colony’s budget were drafted by the 
colonial government, which only required the often formal approval of Madrid.
It was claimed that one of the government’s most important responsibilities was 
the transformation of Africans in order for them to enjoy the level of cultural and 
material civilization of European societies. Thus, the administration, first, had to
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protect Africans, and, then, provide them with the necessary means to allow social
and economic transformation. The Spanish authorities created the Patronato de
Indigenas for this mission. Its role evolved over time to the point of assuming
increasing control of all those policies related to native affairs. Such a task was
developed in close cooperation between the Catholic mission and three governmental
departments: education, health, and agriculture. Along with ‘humanitarian’ reasons,
the social transformation of Africans was considered to be a necessary step for the
economic exploitation of the colony, because the existing family organization, linked
to the local mode of production, undermined the spread of capitalism.
Social transformation was conceived as social engineering rather than as an
internal process. In fact, as we shall see later, colonial authorities were very wary of
any process of internal transformation that might escape their watch. Therefore, the
first step to assert control over Africans was to deny their legal independence.
Although it did not start functioning until the approval of its statutes in 1928, the
creation of the Patronato de Indigenas in 1904 set the basic principle of what would
become Spain’s native policy until 1959; that is, the classification of Africans as
either emancipados or no-emancipados. According to the Spanish, African cultures
were extremely primitive, hence Africans lacked the maturity and knowledge of
European adults. As a result, it was necessary to create a body that acted as tutor in
the full sense of the word. The 1904 Royal Decree clearly illustrates the original spirit
of the Patronato de Indigenas'.
A Patronato de Indigenas will be formed with the assistance of the Spanish missions. It 
will be especially dedicated to the protection of children or natives... and workers, 
encouraging culture and moralization of the natives of the country, and their adhesion to 
Spain.77
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All Africans living in Spanish Guinea were automatically considered as no-
emancipados. Until 1928 no legal distinction between emancipados and no-
emancipados was laid out, being left to the arbitrary judgment of colonial authorities.
During that period, only the small minority of Creole plantation owners of Fernando
Po, known as Fernandinos, were granted full legal rights. The rest of the native
population of Spanish Guinea, together with immigrant labourers, were deprived of
legal personality, and, since the Patronato de Indigenas did not become effective until
the late 1920s, they were left without any legal protection during this period.
After his arrival in the colony in the early 1890s, Father Nicolas Gonzalez spent a
long time in Rio Muni, far from the European community and in close contact with
Africans. During this period he developed an understanding of local cultures, as well
as relative sympathy for Africans.78 Thus, when he was elected Vicar-General in the
late 1910s, one of his main preoccupations was to push for the regulation of the
Patronato in order to guarantee the protection of Africans from European
exploitation.79 This probably contributed to the deterioration of relations between the
head of the Catholic mission and Barrera, who repeatedly dismissed Gonzalez’s
petitions. In fact, the statutes of the Patronato could only be approved once Barrera
was no longer in office. As we saw above, this measure did not stop abuses.
Given that all Africans were automatically classified as no-emancipados, the
1928 statutes essentially explained which natives could be eligible as emancipados:
For the exercise of civil rights, with the prudent restrictions that are in practice advised 
by the security of the State and the actual interest of the population... those natives that 
clearly show, due to their state of intellectual and moral culture, to be in a position to rule 
their persons and properties by themselves.80
Until then, the Patronato had proven to be totally inefficient because, as a dependent 
branch of the Curaduria (Labour Department) its objectives were too broad and its
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functions too poorly delineated. The first steps towards the regulation of the 
Patronato de Indigenas were taken in 1926, when it was established that it could 
intervene in family affairs, and authorize all sorts of contracts involving Africans. 
Between 1927 and 1928 the Patronato became an independent body, thanks to the 
granting of more specific functions, the creation of a Junta de Patronos (executive 
board) presided over by the Vicar-General, and, finally, the approval of its statutes. 
The prominent role of missionaries reflected the paternalistic spirit of the Patronato. 
By representing Africans’ legal personality, it would be possible to prevent them from 
dealing directly with European settlers, as well as the exploitation and loss of 
properties that arise from such deals. Amongst other things, indigenas could not sign 
any form of contract, borrow or lend money, or sell their properties without the 
authorization of the Patronato. Prior to 1928, there also existed other restrictions on 
Africans. These limitations were maintained until 1959 and included the application 
of customary law instead of the European legal system, the limit to four hectares of 
land plots, segregation of public transport {indigenas could not travel in a truck’s 
cab), the requirement of a colonial officer’s authorization for the purchase of 
alcoholic beverages, arms, gunpowder, and so forth.
In reality, neither the 1928 nor the following Francoist statutes of 1938 and 1952 
guaranteed the protection of Africans. The ‘most beautiful of our colonial 
institutions’, far from being exclusively dedicated to ‘defending, helping, educating, 
and protecting’ natives, essentially regulated the exploitation of Africans by
O 1
Europeans. Indeed, regulation avoided further potential abuses, but it also put limits 
on Africans’ self-reliance and improvement.
Prior to the 1940s, the Sub-Govemor admitted that on the mainland ‘the works of 
the Patronato were nonexistent, and so were its results’,82 On Fernando Po, however,
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the situation was different because the majority of the European population was 
concentrated there, making necessary the ‘paternal protection’ of Africans -  
excluding the plantation workers -  from ambitious Europeans. It is also the belief, 
amongst Fang elders, that the Spanish, especially the missionaries, favoured the 
indigenous Bubi of Fernando Po over them.83
The Patronato was mostly funded through natives’ economic activities. Before 
the 1940s, the executive board preferred to concentrate investments on the island, 
where the Patronato dealt with labour contracts, the protection of native property, and 
the construction of schools and churches. The establishment of the republican regime 
in 1931 did not result in a more progressive approach towards native policies. The 
nature of the Patronato was maintained, and the most important change was the 
replacement of the vicar-general with the Governor-General as president of the 
Patronato in 1932.84 It was necessary to wait until the Franco administration to see a 
greater impulse in the life of this institution. The approval of the new statues in 1938 
represented the cornerstone of Spain’s social transformation policies, for it initiated a 
process of administrative modernization, which, along with a greater political and 
financial support, converted the Patronato in the institution directly in charge of all 
matters related to native affairs. Under the new statutes the Governor-General 
presided over the Junta de Patronos which was now formed by the Sub-Govemor, the 
chiefs of the Education, Health, Labour, Agriculture, and Public Treasury 
Departments, the vicar-general, the heads of the two delegations of the Patronato -  to 
the existing office of the Patronato in Santa Isabel a new one was recently added in 
Bata -  and two emancipados. According to Altozano, the presence of two Africans on 
the executive board reflected Spain’s ‘intention to gradually incoiporate the 
aborigines into the government process insofar as their degree of maturity allows it.’85
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The so-called humanitarian mission was key to the Franco administration, which, 
in the preamble of the 1938 statutes, stated that Spain’s main goal in the Gulf of 
Guinea was the ‘intellectual, material, and spiritual elevation’ of Africans.86 As part 
of the reform process, the colonial administration redefined emancipation as ‘a status 
and a right that Spain acknowledges to those colonized insofar as they prove a 
sufficient degree of culture to make unnecessary the tutelage of the Patronato.’87 In 
order to reach this status, Africans had to obtain two favourable reports from either
no (
the Education, Labour or Health Departments. Unlike the 1928 statues, under the
RQFrancoist administration the granting of emancipated status could not be removed. 
The 1938 statutes suffered several reforms until new statutes finally replaced them in 
1952. The Spanish authorities argued that acculturation was a gradual process, 
therefore it could not be expected that Africans became emancipados overnight. This 
belief led in 1952 to the creation of an intermediate status by which natives could then 
be classified as no emancipado, emancipado parcial (‘partially emancipated’) and 
emancipado total (‘fully emancipated’). As the term implies, the emancipado parcial 
could partially control his property and have limited legal independence. Although not 
explicitly mentioned, women could not reach emancipation in accordance with the 
metropolitan legislation that denied full emancipation to women during the Francoist 
period. Governor-General Bonelli believed that these series of measures would 
encourage the formation of a ‘native bourgeoisie’ in order to fill the gap ‘between the 
two societies’ coexisting in the colony.90
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Photograph 13: Since 1936 fascist values became part o f the transform ation project
Photograph 14: Children also took part in patriotic indoctrination
In accordance with the paternalistic discourse that dominated the Francoist creed, 
the State was portrayed as a paternal figure, which restricted political and economic 
liberties in order to protect the weak from the strong. As a legitimizing rhetoric it 
certainly achieved economic growth while improving social conditions, especially 
from the late 1950s, yet it faced numerous contradictions both at home, where big 
corporations were the great beneficiary, and in Spanish Guinea, where Africans never
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enjoyed the privileges of Europeans. Indeed, the situation of an emancipado total was 
far better than of the rest of Africans, who had very few chances of seeing their legal 
status being revised. Nonetheless, full citizen rights did not amount to being a ‘black 
Spaniard’, as Berman referred to emancipados.91 Heriberto Alvarez, who was in 
charge of the Education Department in the 1940s and early 1950s, admitted that, in
* 07practice, the emancipado rarely received the same treatment as Europeans did.
Together with the construction of roads, the improvement of sanitary conditions 
in Rio Muni was one of the main priorities of the colonial administration from the 
early twentieth century. If Rio Muni was to supply a labour force for Fernando Po, it 
was necessary to ensure population growth through better health conditions. Besides a 
few isolated vaccination campaigns, during the early colonial period, Spain did not do 
much to improve the situation, as Nunez de Prado admitted after a visit to Rio Muni.93 
In fact, until the 1940s, the Spanish commonly believed that the native population was 
decreasing. Sanitary factors, the increasing abuse of alcohol resulting from contact 
with Europeans, and even polygamy were blamed for this phenomenon. Since we lack 
reliable census figures prior to 1932, it is difficult to know whether the African 
population was, indeed, decreasing in Spanish Guinea.94 African informants refer to 
the rising mortality in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This 
phenomenon was also registered in neighbouring Gabon, and it appears to have been 
common in many African colonies, as it was exposed at the Missionary Congress in 
Barcelona in 1929.95 The first serious attempts to reverse the situation were made in 
the early 1940s. From then, the Health Department, with the support of the Patronato, 
initiated a series of campaigns to combat endemic diseases such as malaria, 
trypanosomiasis, yellow fever and leprosy. The latter became the symbol of Spanish 
humanitarian propaganda, following the construction of a leprosy hospital in
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Mikomeseng and the almost total eradication of this disease from Rio Muni by the 
mid 1940s. More importantly, health conditions were improved thanks to the 
construction of primary care centres in rural areas. Pelissier admits that, as a result of 
this policy funded by the Patronato, the quality of the health services in Spanish 
Guinea was amongst the best in the region.96
From early on, education became a fundamental tool to assert Spain’s 
sovereignty and transform Africans. Schools were established at military posts as part 
of the attraction policy, without pursuing any goal other than boosting loyalty to 
Spain. They taught Spanish patriotic values, in addition to encouraging certain 
sanitary and fanning habits amongst African children. Although the 1918 education 
plan made education compulsory for children -  between the age of four and twelve 
for boys, and four and eight for girls -  it never had the resources to implement this
• 07policy. In fact, it had to rely on the Claretians. In the 1920s and 1930s, missionary 
penetration into Rio Muni was followed by the foundation of reducciones (missionary 
posts dependent on a central station) and schools in rural communities under the care 
of native catechists. The quality of these schools was certainly poor, given that 
catechists themselves had not received a good education, but it was enough for 
children to receive their first insights into Spanish and Christianity. Neither 
missionaries nor colonial authorities were satisfied with the results of rural schools 
during this early stage. In 1928, the colonial administration assumed full 
responsibility over the education system and took the first serious step to organize it, 
by classifying education into rural, urban, and superior schools.98 The latter, however, 
did not become effective until 1935 with the creation of the Escuela Superior 
Indigena, in which Africans were trained to work in different fields of the colonial 
administration, such as nursing, clerkship and primary school teaching.
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The republican regime tried to give a push to native education by opening
numerous government schools yet its efforts did not suffice to change the poor state of
education in Rio Muni." It failed in asserting a greater grip over the Claretian
missionaries, for it could not replace missionaries5 work, especially with respect to
education, as the Governor-General admitted:
The meritorious task earned out by the Spanish missionaries in teaching the Spanish 
language in these possessions is unquestionable. It can be said that the knowledge of our 
language by the Pamue in the Continent is almost exclusively thanks to them.. .I0°
A 1943 report of the Education Department indicated that the total number of official
schools was 43 -  18 on Fernando Po and 25 in the rest of the colony.101 The author of
the report was aware of the disproportion in the number of schools between the two
regions, mentioning the lack of staff as a serious problem, as well as the ‘extremely
deficient5 and ‘almost nonexistent5 quality of some native teachers.102 This situation
was inconsistent with the Franco administration's so-called humanitarian mission.
Therefore, in 1943 a new education statute was approved, which, according to Negrin,
laid the basis for the improvement of native education from the late 1940s.103 Between
1949 and 1959, the number of official schools rose from 70 to 106, resulting in an
enrolment increase of 61 per cent.104 The new statute classified education in several
levels: elementary, primary, and superior schools. The former were taught by native
auxiliary-teachers, usually students who had completed primary education, whereas
primary schools were taught by either Spanish teachers or African teachers who were
graduates of the Escuela Superior. Regarding the objectives of elementary and
primary education the Education Department said:
Elementary schools have a specific mission to accomplish: to guide natives in the 
fundamental task of their future lives, such as farming and manual tasks. Primary 
[schools], where one reaches after a scrupulous selection, have as a mission to prepare
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the best qualified students either for higher education [Escuela Superior], or for being
employed in jobs of a bureaucratic, commercial, or industrial character.105
Whereas the syllabus of primary education focused on academic subjects, the 
elementary syllabus put more emphasis on ‘the teaching of Spanish, and the 
development of religious, moral, and civic and social sentiments’.106 Up to the late 
1950s, this was the type of education that the vast majority of Africans received in 
Spanish Guinea. In comparison to neighbouring colonies -  French Equatorial Africa 
and Nigeria -  the number of elementary schools was high.107 Nonetheless, Equatorial 
Guineans were, overall, poorly prepared. After the colony became a province, it was 
necessary to apply the metropolitan education system and increase the education 
budget in order to improve the level of education, for independence no longer seemed 
distant.108
Arrested economic transformation
The colonial administration had two main priorities with regards to Spanish 
Guinea’s economy. First, it had to guarantee the supply of manpower for the 
plantations of Fernando Po, Secondly, it needed to convince the metropolis that 
Spanish Guinea could be a profitable enterprise with the necessary investments. 
Known as the ‘manpower crisis’, the former obsessively preoccupied colonial 
officers and settlers alike during most of the Spanish presence in the Gulf of 
Guinea.109 hi fact, one only needs to look at the colonial archives to realize that, in 
addition to government personnel, the bulk of the documentation deals with labour 
matters. From early on, the Spanish were aware that manpower shortages were not 
only a consequence of the low population density in the colony, but also of natives’
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reluctance to work for wages. The problem was aggravated once the Fang started
cultivating cash crops from the late 1930s:
No native... wishes to get hired as a farm labourer, or within the different manual trades 
and domestic service. We also notice the same trend amongst public servants and 
colonial guards, who often ask to get their contracts terminated because they prefer to go 
to their villages and open cultivation fields, from which they obtain greater profit.110
In fact, colonial authorities, in the 1940s, changed their focus regarding the 
prestacion personal from being a form of public contribution for the construction of 
infrastructures to a mechanism to ‘create a desire amongst natives for getting 
hired.’111 Colonial measures kept failing in boosting the desire for wage employment 
amongst Guineans, thus white settlers always had to rely on foreign workers. This 
was indeed a heavy burden for the European producer, who gradually had to improve 
conditions in order to attract labourers and tackle the international pressure that, from 
the late 1920s, denounced semi-slave conditions on Fernando Po.
Photograph 15: Cocoa plantation in Fernando Po
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Until the late 1930s, the colonial economy did not obtain great support from the 
metropolis, and on several occasions settlers raised their voices in demand of more 
favourable treatment, similar to that of the French and British colonies.112 With the 
establishment of the Franco regime, protectionist policies started to be considered in 
order to boost Spanish Guinea’s economy. The colony was not only important from 
the political and ideological point of view, but it could also play a role in the 
reconstruction of the metropolitan economy, whose recovery after the civil war was 
undermined by the Second World War. Further, Spanish colonies were finally given 
a purpose to contribute to the autarchic strategy that Francoist economic thinkers 
championed as a means to reconstructing and strengthening the weak Spanish 
economy. The role of Spanish Guinea’s economy, however, was not widely 
acknowledged in the metropolis. In response to critics, Diaz de Villegas wrote an 
article in 1956 in which, after enumerating the volume of exports sent to Spain, he 
concluded that the colony produced around one and a half billion pesetas annually.113
The deep economic crisis that followed the Civil War seriously affected the 
colonial economy, especially traditional cash crops such as cocoa and coffee. In 
1942, Spanish colonial officers recognized that as a result of the economic situation 
and the metropolitan tariff imposed on these goods, the demand and, subsequently, 
the prices had gone down.114 The priority of the colonial administration was to save 
these crops, which had hitherto been the basis of the colonial economy. Therefore 
they intervened by setting minimum prices in order to achieve ‘the greatest stimulus 
for the native and a fair profit for the European trader.’115 Once Spain started 
recovering from the immediate effects of the war, coffee, and especially cocoa and 
timber consolidated their central role within the colonial economy. It was not until 
the second half of the 1940s that the Franco government imposed tariffs subsidizing
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Spanish Guinea’s coffee and cocoa production, which from that point bought at 
above world market prices.116 Indeed, favourable policies from the metropolis led to 
growth in the colonial economy, especially on Fernando Po, where plantation 
agriculture boomed in the 1950s and 1960s, but also in Rio Muni, where Africans 
became increasingly involved in cash crop production from the 1940s. Although 
Pelissier argues that economic growth in Spanish Guinea was somewhat ‘artificial’ 
because it was achieved thanks to metropolitan subsidies, it is necessary to keep in 
mind that this was a common practice within an economy in which international 
goods paid high duties in order to favour Spanish production.117 Indeed, a few 
Spaniards benefited the most, having been able to create a ‘complex development of 
monopolistic groups’ that controlled large plantations, timber exploitation, imports, 
goods distribution, and even the small financial sector in Spanish Guinea.118
The economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s did not alter greatly the structure of 
an economy that, for the most part, suffered the typical problems related to 
underdevelopment. Thus, the economy revolved around the production and 
exportation to Spain of cocoa, coffee, and timber. Such exports were capable of 
enriching Spanish settlers and investors as well as raising the average living standard 
of Africans above that of Nigeria, Cameroon, and Gabon.119 Nevertheless, the 
colonial economy could not generate enough wealth to bring running water beyond 
Santa Isabel and Bata, or to asphalt more than 160 kilometres of road across the 
whole colony, or to take the first steps towards the industrialization of Spanish 
Guinea.120
For the early period of Spanish colonization, the economy of Rio Muni was 
neglected, allowing some possible slow economic transformation without much 
interference from the state. From the trade in forest products of the 1900s and 1910s,
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the African economy gradually moved to cash crops such as cocoa and coffee. This 
process was initiated by Rio Munian migrant workers on their return from Fernando 
Po’s plantations from the mid 1920s.121 Although there are no figures regarding the 
extent of labour recruitment in Rio Muni, colonial sources suggest that the amount 
was small and certainly insufficient to cover the needs of the island’s plantations, ha 
spite of the lack of success of labour recruitment campaigns, Fang migrant workers 
played a significant role in the economic transformation of Rio Muni. Once Fernando 
Po settlers realized the potential competition from Rio Muni, they lobbied against the 
cultivation of competing cocoa on the mainland. The colonial government accepted 
this pressure and sought to encourage the substitution of cocoa farming, arguing that 
poor soils and economic cost made coffee cultivation more advisable.122 Nonetheless, 
colonial pressure had a very limited effect, and, as we shall see later, cocoa continued 
to be cultivated in Rio Muni during the whole colonial period.
Given the difficulties to apply Fernando Po’s plantation model in Rio Muni, 
Nunez de Prado argued in favour of local production on the mainland, following the 
example of the Germans in Cameron and the British in the Gold Coast,123 The 
absence of a large European settler population allowed, in the long run, the survival 
of a large African peasant class in Rio Muni, which by the time of independence had 
almost disappeared from the island. Equally, Rio Muni did not develop the 
monoculture model that made Fernando Po extremely vulnerable to world markets 
and which resulted in the almost disappearance of the agriculture sector 011 the island 
once cocoa production collapsed in the 1970s. Indeed, colonial authorities tried to 
intervene in the development that Rio Muni’s economy should follow, however its 
opposition to cocoa cultivation in Rio Muni mainly affected European settlers, for 
African competition did not seriously undermine Fernando Po’s planters and the state
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could not control these activities. Whether the nature of the colonial administration 
was interventionist, it was not until the 1940s that the Spanish authorities were able 
to take a stronger grip on the African economy in the mainland.
Photograph 16: South of the W ele logging was the main source of income
Photograph 17: Logging was mostly manual and often relied on watercourses for
transportation
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Duffy suggests that Portuguese strong interventionism ‘prevented what might 
have been the natural’ economic ‘development’ in Angola and Mozambique.124 
Something similar happened in Rio Muni from the 1940s, as Spanish authorities 
strengthened their commitment to closely guide the economic process. In mainland 
Spanish Guinea, the most important tool of state economic interventionism was the 
creation of native markets, designed for the exchange of goods between European 
traders and African producers with the veiled purpose of preventing rising prices, 
arising from competition between European traders, through the establishment of set 
prices for crops. Formerly, European traders moved freely, exchanging supplies for 
cocoa and coffee in rural areas. In 1932, the Spanish authorities argued that such 
practices encouraged the ‘indolent nature of our natives’, making necessary the 
creation of native markets in district capitals where colonial officers could supervise 
such exchanges.125 It was not until the early 1940s, however, that monthly markets 
were consolidated as the main site for economic activities in Rio Muni, as far as 
African production was concerned. Besides facilitating commercial exchanges and 
attracting goods from neighbouring colonies, it was claimed that markets would 
boost native production because they guaranteed minimum prices while preventing 
European traders from taking advantage.126 In 1945, the Administrador Territorial of 
Niefang noted that the ‘cultivated area’ was much smaller in ‘villages located far 
from markets’.127
A few European traders, however, managed to trade with Africans outside 
official markets. In 1945, the head of the Agriculture Department argued that it was 
necessary to stop illegal commercial exchanges on the grounds that these traders 
often lacked enough economic resources and their lifestyle was far from what ‘a 
white must present before the native’.128 Despite generating certain advantages for
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farmers, in some respects official markets undermined chances to further increase 
African incomes. The same colonial officer recognized that ‘within a regime of 
complete market freedom, where demand is higher than supply... goods would get 
more expensive if insolvent buyers found a way to prosper’.129 He suggested to the 
Governor-General to decrease the number of markets in Rio Muni. In so doing, 
official markets would be more distant from each other, allowing the concurrence of 
a lesser number of European traders and, hence, keeping African prices low.130 
Although the number of markets grew over time as new roads and tracks were 
opened, rising from 23 in 1943 to some 35 in the mid 1950s, government supervision 
prevented free competition from rising cash crop prices.131 Traders were not allowed 
to offer better prices to attract more producers because the government established 
fixed prices and assigned African peasants to a fixed dealer.
Spanish policies with regards to cassava cultivation are the clearest example of
how the colonial administration undermined the natural economic development of
African agriculture in Rio Muni. Cassava, as the staple food in the region, could have
contributed to a more rational and sustainable development in which African
peasants sold their production surplus instead of selling crops that were not
consumed in Guinea. In the early 1940s, several circumstances favoured the increase
in demand for cassava. Firstly, flour became scarce in Spain as a result of the war.
Secondly, Fernando Po’s labourers were mainly fed with metropolitan rice that now
needed to be replaced with cassava. Although the Spanish authorities considered
making the cultivation of cassava in villages compulsory in order to guarantee the
production of this crop, eventually, such a measure was not necessary because,
1encouraged by rising prices, Rio Muni’s farmers concentrated on this crop. Such 
was the case that in February 1942, the Sub-Governor of Bata warned that should
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cassava prices retain their current level coffee plantations and the timber industry 
would soon be left without labourers.133 One month later, the Spanish passed an 
ordinance fixing cassava prices at 0.45 pesetas per kilo, down from 1.5 pesetas per 
kilo; unsurprisingly cassava production rapidly fell.134 A similar action was taken 
with regards to palm oil, which, like cassava, is also consumed in the region. After 
peasant production of palm oil received support from the colonial administration, in 
1942 a fixed price was set because of competition between European traders raised 
prices.135
One of the myths maintained by the Spanish colonizers was that Africans were 
not subject to taxation in the colony. In 1911, Barrera demanded the imposition of a 
personal tax on natives similar to other African colonies, but such a petition was not 
approved.136 The lack of economic development and the difficulties Spain went 
through in taking control of Rio Muni probably dissuaded metropolitan officers. Two 
decades later, the Sub-Governor of Bata referred to the existence of a personal tax on 
Africans, although he complained that takings were low because of natives’ 
reluctance as well as poor organization.137 It is not clear how long the personal tax 
was effective for, but it seems likely to have fallen into disuse considering its meagre 
results. The paternalist approach of the Franco regime eventually removed any idea 
of direct taxation. As it was portrayed, Africans received several services from the 
colonial administration, such as health care and education, free of cost. From the 
colony, some Spaniards demanded that Africans should contribute to their own 
health care, for the sole support from the metropolis was insufficient.138
Despite the lack of personal tax throughout most of the period of Spanish 
colonization, however, it is untrue that Africans were not subject to taxation or that 
they did not contribute to funding the services they received. Certainly, the
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Prestacion Personal was a clear form of taxation that affected both women and men. 
When it was officially introduced in 1906, the Prestacion Personal was seen as a 
method by which all individuals should contribute to the construction of 
infrastructure of ‘general interest’, as was still the case in Spain.139 Another 
important form of contribution was generated by native courts. Africans had to pay a 
fee, which varied according to the matter that they took to native courts. The 
Governor-General received 50 per cent of total intake, which he personally allotted 
according to the ‘social needs’, and the remaining 50 per cent was assigned for the 
functioning of native courts.140 A less known form of taxation was ewonga, as it was 
known by the Fang. Women, who were virtually excluded from the colonial 
economy by the administration, periodically had to take foodstuff to the district 
capital, where African civil servants and colonial guards could purchase those goods 
below market prices.
Finally, it is worth considering the economic role of the Patronato de Indlgenas. 
Its so-called humanitarian mission would not have been possible had it not been for 
the economic activities of Africans. Since the African population was considered 
legally minor, the Patronato was in charge of supervising all economic relations 
between Europeans and no-emancipados, and, in doing so, it retained part of the 
money involved in the transaction. Employers had to pay a fee for each of their 
African employees. The Patronato also held part of African workers’ salary until 
their contracts expired, because they were considered to be unable to save -  these 
sums clearly generated interest. In Rio Muni, where very few Africans worked for 
European employers, the Patronato was mostly funded with the tax imposed on the 
purchase of native coffee.141 Although this amount was paid by the European trader, 
it is likely that the government deducted this from the fixed price set for coffee. Such
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revenues were used to pay for the improvement and construction of health centres, 
school facilities, housing for native chiefs and ‘many other works for the benefit of 
natives’.142
Photograph 18: Road construction was the most common form of prestacion personal
"Under the divine sign of the cross”
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Spain’s colonial model was out-of-date 
and clearly unsuitable for the new trends of colonialism. Throughout the nineteenth 
century, progressive sectors in Spain were aware of the archaic nature of the 
country’s social and economic structure, and believed the dominant role of the 
Church to be partly responsible for hampering development. In 1868, the Jesuit 
Order had been expelled from Fernando Po as part of the power struggle between 
liberals and conservatives, which brought the former to power during what came to 
be known as the Sexenio Revolucionario. Nevertheless, the Catholic Church 
recovered its central role, and in 1883 the Claretian order was entrusted with the
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evangelization of the Spanish possessions in the Gulf of Guinea. Although this
decision was probably determined as much by Spain’s colonial tradition in the
Americas as by the state’s lack of resources, many actually believed that the
missionaries were the best agents in dealing with the natives.
As in the New World, the Spanish stressed the so-called civilizing mission and
the evangelization by Catholic missionaries. American peoples had been portrayed as
barbaric and savage; a similar state, it was believed, to that of the inhabitants of the
Gulf of Guinea. Such a situation justified the presence of Spain, whose new mission
was to ‘civilize’ Africans. The creation of the model village of Banapa in 1894 was
certainly inspired by the reducciones indias of South America. It was necessary to
take the enlightenment of Africans beyond material progress, because Africans
required a ‘moral’ transformation:
Neither the authorities, nor the civil servant, nor the settler, nor the schoolteacher will 
ever civilize or educate a single native; they will be able to teach him a trade, a skill... 
they will introduce him to scientific knowledge, but they will not make a man of him. 
The man is made by the sentiment; the sentiment is the effect of moral education, of 
religious education, and this can only be achieved by the missionary.143
To Spanish conservatives, the Catholic missionary somehow embodied the essence of
Spanish identity -  ‘Hispanidad’ -  developed during the course of the Reconquista
against the Muslim infidel, the conquest and evangelization of the Americas, the wars
against Protestant nations in Europe, and ultimately the resistance against increasing
secular trends in Spain. Nobody was better suited than the Catholic missionary to
spread the fundamental values of Spanish culture amongst ‘natives’. The missionary
task was key, for it would make possible the necessary transformation of Africans,
which would subsequently bring material benefits for both colonizer and colonized.
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Both missionaries and colonial officers were aware of the difficulties that the 
‘moral’ transformation of Africans entailed, thus the emphasis was put on children 
and education. The Spanish missionaries would not only eliminate ‘savage customs’ 
from the Sanaga-Ogowe, but would also overcome the influence of foreign Protestant 
missions, the American Presbyterian and the English Evangelical missions, which had 
been active in the area since the mid nineteenth century.144 Nonetheless, Spanish 
missionary activities in Rio Muni were marginal during the 1900s and 1910s, being 
limited to the southern coastal section. It was not until 1919, after the French Catholic 
missionaries left Bata, that the Claretians expanded their activities to the whole 
coastal area. The interior still remained unknown for the Catholic missionaries, but, in 
1925 a series of missionary expeditions culminated in the foundation of the first 
Claretian missionary station in the heart of the Sanaga-Ogowe territory.145 Education, 
it was believed, would lay the basis for the formation of ‘Christian’ families -  the 
cornerstone of the new society. This view was not exclusive to Spain. Fabian points 
out that similar notions were also expressed in the Belgian Congo, where it was 
maintained that education ‘had to form and transform the whole person in all aspects, 
religious as well as secular.’146
In 1921, Father Ajuria asked the Government to force parents to send their 
children to school, and make an extra effort with regards to education of women, due 
to the ‘despicable condition of the weak sex amongst the Pamue tribes’.147 Emphasis 
on children and women was not only for moral reasons, it was also important insofar 
as it would allow the spread of capitalist structures across the colony. On the one 
hand, the Spanish believed that polygamy decreased the need of adult men to work for 
European employers, because they obtained enough incomes from women’s work. On 
the other, patriarchal structures tied youngsters to their home commitments, making it
186
difficult for them to leave their villages to find wage labour. A 1936 article in the 
Claretian magazine showed that, in reality, the problem had more to do with the 
specific needs of the Spanish, claiming that ‘the greatest enemies for the plantations, 
both in Fernando Po and Rio Muni, were the civilized and rich natives’ because their
14Rfarms took away workers from European plantations. The Claretians were aware of 
the importance of their work for the colonial enterprise, and time and again made 
clear their desire to cooperate in spreading the Spanish culture amongst Africans, 
even when relationships between Church and State were problematic during the 
republican period.149
Between 1886 and 1927 the Claretian order was in charge of education, the main 
purpose of which was to inculcate patriotic values, change local customs, and 
evangelize. From the late nineteenth century, the teaching of Spanish was seen as a 
priority by colonial officials. Up until then, Fernando Po had been an anglophile 
enclave, dominated by the English-speaking Creole population. Colonial authorities 
believed that the spread of Spanish as a lingua franca would eliminate foreign 
influence from the colony. In order to avoid a similar situation in Rio Muni, in 1907 
the colonial government decided to make the teaching of Spanish compulsory in 
education, even for foreign Protestant missions.150 Almost two decades later, a 
Claretian missionary explained that Spanish was a key subject in their schools, where 
they also tried to inculcate ‘love’ for Spain.151 This was not enough to consolidate 
Spanish as the dominant language in the colony, and the government had to approve 
additional measures in support of the Spanish language, hi 1926, the colonial 
government established the compulsory command of Spanish for all natives working 
in the administration, whereas all residents who required the service of the 
administration and did not speak Spanish had to pay for an interpreter.152 Seven years
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later, Governor Lluesma had to renew this measure in the light of the limited 
results.153
Photograph 19: Female labour was strongly criticized by the Spanish
Ufiatinnigenaa
Photograph 20: Embroidery was believed to be more in accordance with w om en’s roles
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The prominent role of Claretian missionaries in the colony was often a matter of 
conflict with the colonial administration. In many respects, this difficult relationship 
was a reflection of the conflict in Spain, where secular and religious sectors battled 
for the space that the State and Church should occupy within society. Barrera, for 
example, considered that Catholic missionaries’ privileges were disproportionate in 
relation to the results they obtained. He was especially unhappy with missionary 
schools, whose education he considered to be not solid enough, being soon forgotten 
by pupils.154 Similar complaints were aired with regards to evangelization, the results 
of which were said to be inflated by the practice of baptism in ‘articulo mortis ’ (at the 
point of death).155 Claretians’ reluctance to spread their mission beyond Rio Muni’s 
coastal area during the 1900s and 1910s was also an issue of concern.156 Missionaries 
rarely denied such accusations, for it was clear that their results were less than they 
had previously expected. Nonetheless, Claretians usually complained about the lack 
of support from the state. Although officially the Catholic mission was independent of 
the civil administration, its role within the colonial enterprise was acknowledged in 
the fonn of subsidies and privileges granted by the colonial state, which provided the 
bulk of the Claretian mission’s budget.157 In addition, missionaries were entitled to ten 
hectares of land free of charge in those areas where they established missionary 
stations or schools. To Barrera, missionaries tended to ignore their main goal in 
favour of more lucrative activities, claiming that they had no reason to complain about 
their lack of resources because they obtained incomes from their numerous 
businesses.158 hi 1925, he unsuccessfully asked the metropolitan government to 
modify the law regarding the concession of land for Catholic missions on the grounds 
that they took advantage of it, requesting always the best land whether or not it was 
needed to feed their pupils.159 Missionary education was also funded through the
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Patronato, which allocated money to pay for catechists, facilities and learning 
material.160
Despite the close cooperation between Church and State in the colony, clashes 
were inevitable because both institutions had different priorities as far as colonization 
was concerned. The former believed that evangelization should take priority over any 
other action. Missionaries understood the necessity of economic growth, yet they saw 
economic exploitation simply as a means to fund colonization’s most important 
objective: the evangelization of Africans.161 The colonial government, however, knew 
that little support would come from the metropolis unless they could prove that the 
colony was economically viable. Barrera tried to solve this discrepancy, explaining to 
the Claretians that:
Without stopping the spread of the Gospel, what Spain needs is to make men and 
women, but men and women with Spanish ideas... Later there will be time to make them 
Catholic, which is now impossible, because these rudimentary brains still cannot 
understand the mysteries of our Religion.162
Before the Franco era, missionaries tended to depict any criticism as anti-Catholic, 
arguing that colonial authorities, especially Governor Barrera, favoured Protestant
* 1 fi'X  *missions. Such an accusation was far from being true, since the colonial 
government was wary of Protestant missions, which being administered by foreign 
pastors, were often seen as fifth columnists. Insofar as Protestant missions made clear 
their adherence to Spanish sovereignty, the colonial government had no complaints 
against them, because they rarely interfered with matters of the administration.164
Once Spanish Guinea fell under Franco’s control in 1936, missionaries received 
unconditional support from the administration. From then on, the conflict between 
Hispanization and Evangelization was meaningless, for both concepts were put on the 
same level; by making Catholics, the missionaries were also making Spaniards. This
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support made possible an intensification of evangelization from the 1940s, which, at 
least numerically, was very impressive. According to Olangua, of a total population of 
198,663 in 1959, there were 180,000 Catholics.165 Protestant missions were not 
banned by the francoist administration, however. The 1938 General Ordinance of the 
colony established that, according to the Fuero de los Espanoles (the Francoist 
fundamental laws), all Christian denominations should be tolerated. Nonetheless, their 
proselytizing duty was certainly undermined because the ordinance only allowed the 
Catholic Church to conduct public displays.166 Religious tolerance was mostly 
effective on Fernando Po, where treaties required the respect of Nigerian workers’ 
faith. In Rio Muni, however, the Sub-Governor explained that ‘the actions developed 
by these [Protestant] missions is hindered, in order to make their expansion and their 
activities in this district difficult.’167 The control of Protestant missions was 
intensified in 1957 as a result of the proclamation of independence of the Presbyterian 
Church in Cameroon, which was feared to have implications in the development of 
political movements in Rio Muni.168 Although all these actions benefited the work of 
Claretian missionaries, outside the high number of conversions, their activities were 
not very successful in eradicating certain local beliefs such as witchcraft or 
eliminating polygamy, as we shall see in the following chapters.
The Claretians’ relative success was partly due to their strategy with regards to 
natives. Besides targeting the most disaffected and vulnerable people in local society, 
they also sought to deepen their knowledge of their cultures. This effort was 
supported by the Spanish government, which financed the publication of the 
Claretians’ dictionaries and grammars of local languages in the late 1920s. In the 
1940s, Governors Fontan and Bonelli complained that Spain’s neglect of ethnology 
was a serious mistake, because it was necessary to know natives’ ‘psyche’ and
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‘ancient customs’ in order to make colonization more effective.169 Up until the 1940s, 
only Claretian missionaries amongst the Spanish population in the Gulf of Guinea had 
paid attention to the study of African cultures.170
Indeed,-a key element in explaining Africans’ rapid acceptance of Christianity 
had to do with missionaries’ strategy of presenting themselves as the gentle side of 
colonialism. In 1928, a Claretian compared the violent methods of the colonial guard 
during the penetration of Rio Muni with those of the missionaries who ‘do not enter 
their villages as a conquered land, and are only trying to make them see the truth’.171 
Although civil authorities tried to avoid displays of European division in front of 
Africans, the Claretians frequently antagonized colonial officers in public. 
Missionaries used a different language depending on whether Africans were present 
or not. Thus, they unofficially became the native’s advocate when it came to labour 
exploitation at the hands of the administration, or the protection of native property 
against settlers’ ambitions, especially on Fernando Po.172 And yet, they could ask for 
the severest punishment should they feel confronted. In 1942, the Sub-Governor of 
Bata had to restrain a Catholic mother superior, who asked for further punishment 
against a group of colonial guards’ wives after they had been physically punished and 
their farms destroyed for confronting and, allegedly, hitting a Catholic nun.173
Despite the close relationship between the Church and Franco’s regime, conflict 
between missionaries and the administration remained constant all through the 
colonial period. As with previous administrations, clashes were often motivated by 
missionaries’ tendency to interfere in what the administration considered to be 
exclusively its jurisdiction. Undoubtedly family matters provoked most 
disagreements, for the Catholic order believed that family legislation should be the 
realm of the Church only. They were especially concerned with everything that had to
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do with marriage, especially polygamy, which, to their mind, was somehow
sanctioned by a government unable or unwilling to take a tougher position against it.
To the missionaries, district officers’ mediation in conflicts in which polygamy was
involved was a way to consent to it.174 A Francoist Governor-General expressed his
frustration in trying to ‘convince [missionaries]... that what we want is to go hand in
hand with them... as this is the most convenient thing for the colony’.175 He hoped
that they could become ‘great auxiliaries’ due to their close contact with natives and
their control over ‘catechists to report to us’ about local ‘sects’.176 In fact,
missionaries’ interference was likely to upset even the most recalcitrant of colonial
authorities. In 1941, after the Claretians sheltered a runaway wife in Ebibeyin without
the permission of the district officer and provoked a serious incident with villagers,
the Governor-General wrote:
It is not only admissible that they [the Claretians] stand in front of us, but they are not 
even in a passive attitude. If they do not listen to reason, we shall apply the Law 
vigorously, and as soon as we expel a couple of missionaries to the Peninsula you will 
see how the rest will bow to reason.177
Since the colonial administration was not willing to give up important aspects of its 
sovereignty, missionaries sought to take part in formulating colonial policies, 
especially with regards to marital issues. Polygamy, however, was never banned by 
any of the successive colonial governments, because such a measure was considered 
to be ‘anti-political’, due to the strong resistance that it would provoke amongst 
Africans. The Francoist administration sought to conciliate Claretians’ demands by 
prohibiting polygamy amongst Africans civil servants. More importantly, the 1952 
ordinance established that district officers had to be a ‘tireless cooperator in the 
evangelizing task’, avoiding any interference in the ‘ecclesiastical jurisdiction’, while 
respectfully preserving the government sphere from outside intrusion.178
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Photograph 21: Public displays of the faith served to show the 
success o f the Spanish civilizing mission
Conclusion
The Spanish colonial state, like its counterparts across Africa, was an archaic 
underdeveloped institution. Being the spin-off of the Spanish state, the colonial 
administration did share some features with its precursor, yet it never reached the 
level of institutional development and power of the metropolitan state. In front of 
Africans, however, such limitations were covered up with a high level of 
authoritarianism, which contributed to the alienation between state and individual that 
has characterized the colonial and postcolonial Equatorial Guinea. Constrained by its 
own lack of development, the internal divisions amongst colonizers, and the
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opposition of Africans, the colonial state only achieved limited results. The profits of 
economic exploitation mostly reached the European settler community and the small 
group of metropolitan investors. Although colonial policies favoured economic 
transformations amongst the African population, the system tended to undermine 
Africans’ economic initiatives for self-reliance. Yet again, the authoritarian nature of 
the colonial state dictated the rules that framed Africans’ economic behaviour and 
prevented the development of subsistence agriculture and its integration within the 
capitalist economy. With regards to social transformation, the results were even more 
discouraging. In spite of the rhetoric that surrounded the political reforms of the late 
1950s and the 1960s, colonial officers and Claretian missionaries believed that the so- 
called hispanization of the African population was rather superficial. The ideological 
nature of the Spanish colonial state and its intense use of rhetoric contributed to the 
enlargement of the gap between form and substance, in which the former took 
prominence over the latter. Indeed, greater economic development of the Africans 
could have served better the efforts for social transformation, yet this would have 
ultimately clashed with the economic ambitions of the Spanish settlers and the very 
sense of Spanish domination, as the colonial establishment was aware. Eventually, the 
colonial state, unable to deal for much longer with the debilitating conflict between 
economic exploitation and legitimacy, was forced to initiate a process of self- 
destruction that culminated in the granting of independence.
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Chapter 4
Searching for a New Tradition
For the Fang of Rio Muni, the 1930s and 1940s was a transitional period in 
which, despite numerous important changes, their society continued to be dominated 
by individuals bom long before the Spanish conquest. Fernandez points out that, after 
losing their autonomy and becoming colonial subjects, the Fang became ‘self- 
conscious about their own way of life.’1 I shall argue that, rather than triggering the 
process of self-awareness, colonial conquest deepened it. Such a development laid the 
basis of the modem Fang tradition. This chapter will examine the transition between 
the established Sanaga-Ogowe tradition and the new socio-cultural organization, 
which culminated once the younger generation took over from their fathers in the late 
1940s. Until a decade earlier, the impact of a capitalist-based economy in Rio Muni 
had remained marginal, as cash crop cultivation had been only adopted by a few Fang 
individuals in northern and coastal Rio Muni, favoured by the presence of colonial 
roads and white traders. South of the river Wele, however, commercial cultivation 
developed more slowly and access to cash was mostly limited to the timber industry. 
From the late 1930s, as a result of the post-war crisis in Spain, the demand for tropical 
goods such as cassava and palm oil grew significantly. Thanks to the push of the 
colonial authorities and the introduction of subsidized prices, coffee and cocoa spread 
throughout Rfo Muni during the 1940s. Many men, for whom agriculture production 
had been limited mostly to clearing farmland until then, now became fully engaged in 
commercial cultivation.
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As a result of the social and economic transformations of the 1930s and 1940s, 
Fang society underwent a crisis of adaptation in which the rise in individualism and 
deepening social divisions clashed with strong egalitarian tendencies. We shall see 
how, at the same time, Christianity started taking root thanks to the intense campaign 
of evangelization which, consisting in the construction of numerous reducciones 
under the management of African catechists, targeted women and children in an effort 
to dismantle the Sanaga-Ogowe belief system. Christianity, however could not cope 
with the social crisis that affected Fang society and this was reflected in an escalation 
in the perception of witchcraft activities and the subsequent renewal of old anti­
witchcraft cults, such as Ngtt, and the emergence of new ones, such as the Don 
Enrique cult. Amidst this climate, local authority was also affected by the crisis, as 
Fang leaders were unable to restore the peace in their communities. The development 
of a dual authority structure to meet the internal demands of the mvok and the external 
ones of the government was not enough to prevent the weakening of local authority. 
In fact, Fang leadership actions, during this period, were a desperate attempt to 
preserve the political autonomy of their communities and, thus, their own legitimacy. 
The crisis also provoked an intellectual response. The Fang of Rio Muni adopted the 
e ’Lat-Ayong movement and the Bwiti cult, which spread from Cameroon and Gabon 
respectively. Despite being minority movements, they had a significant impact on the 
configuration of the new tradition. Under colonial domination, the e ’Lcit-Ayong 
movement succeeded in creating a sense of common identity amongst the numerous 
Fang clans. By 1948, the process of self-awareness matured to the point that a few 
Rio Munian Fang began publicly to express their discontent with colonialism before 
an official delegation of the Spanish government to the Gulf of Guinea, in which 
many consider today as the first act of the incipient Equatorial Guinean nationalism.
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When Melan left: Christianity and witchcraft on the rise
The end of military campaigns did not bring to a halt Spain’s offensive in Rio 
Muni. From the early 1920s the Sanaga-Ogowe of the interior witnessed a different 
kind of assault in the form of Claretian missionary penetration, whose effects had 
been experienced by their coastal neighbours from the mid 1880s. In 1883, the 
Claretian order was asked to carry out the evangelization of the Spanish Territories of 
the Gulf of Guinea, and as early as 1885 they had already founded two missionary 
stations in Corisco and Cabo San Juan.2 It would not be until the foundation in 1925 
of the mission of San Francisco Javier de Nkue-Efulan -  some 100 kilometres inland 
-  that the rapid acculturation process began. The arrival of the Catholic missionaries 
into the Sanaga-Ogowe country in the 1920s could not have happened at a better time, 
because, after the series of military campaigns and the increasing labour conscription, 
the Christian message of hope found the perfect reception amongst the Sanaga- 
Ogowe. The Spanish missionaries’ slow start was soon made up with a series of 
campaigns that were aimed at evangelizing the whole Sanaga-Ogowe people. Only 
four decades after the foundation of the first missionary station in the interior, most of 
Rio Muni’s population was Catholic.3
When talking to Fang elders, one immediately perceives an air of frustration 
about the state of Fang society today. Retrospectively, many elders point to the 
banning and subsequent disappearance of Melan as the coup de grace that sealed their 
complete defeat, bringing about the subjugation and decadence of their society. 
Balandier and Fernandez argue that the ancestor cult was a key element of Sanaga- 
Ogowe society which reinforced elders’ authority while strengthening community 
ties.4 Similarly, Fang informants maintain that their ancestors’ power came from 
Melan.5 It is therefore difficult to understand why documentary sources do not refer at
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all to any strong backlash as a result of the banning of such an important cult. 
According to informants, Spain’s repressive methods prevented their fathers from 
developing any sort of active resistance, leaving them with the sole option of simply 
handing over their relics and abandoning their rituals. Nonetheless, this explanation is 
not satisfactory, since we know that societies under coercion are often capable of 
developing passive strategies in order to preserve valuable institutions. Polygamy, for 
example, was extremely resilient throughout the entire period of colonial domination 
in spite of Spain’s position against it.
Although repressive official measures and the aggressive campaign by 
missionaries did contribute to the end of the Fang ancestor cult, a careful analysis of 
sources indicates that the rapid disappearance of Melan was also connected with 
internal dynamics. Scholars and Fang people in general traditionally assume that cults 
such as Melan were long-lasting phenomena within precolonial societies. There is yet 
much that is not known about the nature and pace of social transformation in Central 
Africa before the advent of colonialism. De Craemer, Vansina and Fox argue that 
such religious movements are not a modem phenomenon, but were common in 
Central Africa prior to colonial domination.6 They claim that twentieth-century 
religious movements rarely last more than thirty years before being replaced by a
n
newer and more vital movement. The comparison between past and modern religious 
manifestations is useful insofar as it suggests that similar processes of substitution 
were likely to have taken place in the past, although data indicate that the lifetime of 
precolonial cults was significantly longer.8 In the case of Melan, it is difficult to 
establish how long this cult had been around before dying out in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Clearly, the mediating role of the ancestors, as the basic principle 
of Central African religions, predates rituals such as Melan. This ancestor cult was
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commonly practiced across the entire Sanaga-Ogowe territory, even by the Bisio or 
Osyeba, whose separation from the core group took place at a very early stage, 
corroborating that Melan was a rather old cult.9 It is reasonable to think that Melan, 
like modem religious movements, replaced a similar ancestor cult sometime before 
the series of migrations that gave birth to the different sections of the Sanaga-Ogowe.
Photograph 22: Claretian mission station in Cabo San Juan
Photograph 23: Claretian missionaries in Nkue
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According to De Craemer, Vansina and Fox, the substitution of a given religious 
movement by another in Central Africa is inevitable, as people eventually lose faith in 
the cult’s ability to ‘prevent misfortune and maximize good fortune.’10 People’s 
confidence in a particular ritual has much to do with the novelty associated with it, 
and its lifetime may be extended through constant innovation and reinterpretation.11 
While sharing the same basic principles, Melan rituals contain numerous variations 
even within the same region. The large degree of autonomy and decentralization of 
Sanaga-Ogowe societies facilitated a process of constant renewal, since each mvok- 
e'bot could introduce modifications within Melan. In spite of this, some sources 
suggest that, by the early twentieth century, Melan had already entered a process of 
decline, which was accelerated, rather than initiated, by the European conquest of Rio 
Muni and neighbouring territories.12 Tessmann, for example, mentions that during the 
celebration of a Melan ritual in the late 1900s, some men did not seem to take the 
ceremony very seriously and laughter and jeer could be heard.13 To Fernandez, 
Tessmann probably witnessed ‘rituals in decline’, yet Fernandez insists that Melan 
was still very dynamic and so-called comic images only sought to offer ‘a grace note 
and relaxation from the previous engagement with death’ of the first two days of 
rituals.14 Although contemporary Fang descriptions of Melan also portray a very 
different picture from that which Tessmann observed, an octogenarian informant 
admitted that faith in Melan was not equally shared by everybody, and he was never 
initiated because of his father’s disbelief.15 Even though Melan still enjoyed a high 
degree of dynamism at the beginning of the twentieth century, it appeared to have 
been experiencing its first symptoms of decline as a result of the acute crisis and 
instability that affected the Sanaga-Ogowe from the late nineteenth century and that
208
culminated in their subjugation at the hands of the Europeans. Such a crisis, for which
Melan did not have an effective response, would explain its rapid decline.
At first sight, one gets the impression from Fang sources that Melan was
eliminated as a result of an organized campaign led by Claretian missionaries with the
support of the Colonial Guard, This episode of Fang history is portrayed by present-
day informants as a traumatic experience, yet when asked about details of how this
campaign took place in their villages, facts are often scanty:
The power of the Fang came from Melan, that is why they banned it... This banning 
came from the Church... catechists were told to observe who had Melan ... with the 
support of the colonizers...16
Melan was extremely powerful, so, when the missionaries came, their main target was to 
eliminate Melan. I never saw it.17
Melan disappeared because of the work of the missionaries... If anybody resisted, the 
priest left and reported them to the authorities, which, then, ordered the military to arrest 
people.18
When the missionaries found out about Melan and the fact that the rite involved human 
skulls, they got furious... They said that this meant that we eat human flesh. That is how 
they decided that we should stop practicing Melan.19
Surprisingly, neither the colonial nor Claretian archives shed any light on the 
process. Only in La Guinea Espanola, it is possible to find some obscure references to 
the ancestor cult, hi a series of articles written in 1911, Father Gonzalez described 
some Sanaga-Ogowe rituals that, despite being distorted, are easily recognizable as 
elements of Melan?0 At this time, however, Spanish missionaries were not fully 
aware of the importance of this ancestor cult, which was simply depicted as African 
‘superstitions’. The expansion of missionary schools from the 1910s allowed a dual 
learning process, in which both African children and Catholic missionaries learnt 
from each other’s culture. By the early 1920s, the Claretians understood that cults
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such as Melan, by then referred to as ‘secret societies’, played a vital role in Africans’
lives, making it necessary to fight against them if evangelization was to succeed. Such
a concern was expressed in numerous articles published in La Guinea Espanola in the
1920s. A typical contribution from 1922 argued that:
These secret societies have an enormous influence in the social and religious life of 
people... and their principal objective seems to be to keep the customs of the tribes, to 
set indisputable laws, and make women, slaves and children work and obey. The leaders 
of these societies are usually political and religious chiefs... [and] what gives power to 
these societies is the terrible sanctions that they impose.21
Since I was unable to examine missionary archives in Malabo, conclusions on this 
subject must be tentative. For the most part, Melan was eradicated through the active 
role of Fang individuals, mostly catechists but also missionary school pupils and 
women. Once missionaries realized the importance of religious cults within Fang 
society, they urged new converts to abandon their beliefs if they truly wanted to find
“J OGod and avoid eternal damnation. The problem was that missionaries’ influence 
mostly reached yoimg men, women and children, neither of whom had any control 
over the ancestor cult. Melan relics, the ancestor skulls, were not simply a symbol but 
the instrument around which the village community came together to communicate 
with their forefathers, and the Claretians realized that if these symbols were 
eliminated, then the cult was doomed.23
Although missionaries commanded all Africans to give up their ‘fetishes’, they 
were able to monitor the process only through their sporadic visits to Fang villages. 
The role of Fang converts was, then, to report on all those fellow villagers who kept 
relics. Even though Fang elders leamt to distrust catechists, in most cases they were 
reported by women and children in an attempt to prove their faith to the 
missionaries.24 An informant, who attended missionary school in the mid 1930s,
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described how he participated in the removal of Melan skulls. After receiving 
information on a village where Melan relics were kept, the Catholic missionary 
gathered all students to follow him. The mere petition of the missionary was enough 
for elders to hand over their relics, which were later taken to the mission to be blessed 
and buried.25 In this account the students are described as having played a passive 
role, yet it is not that clear that this was always the case. A Fang elder explains that ‘at 
the time, the priests were like the authorities because thanks to their escort of 
youngsters they could do whatever they wanted.’26 Furthermore, the Fang were aware 
of the close relationship between the Claretians and colonial officers. To disobey the 
missionaries amounted to a challenge to the colonial government, which inevitably 
brought punitive measures. According to Fang informants, the removal of relics was 
mostly a missionary business in which colonial authorities did not intervene. 
However, when elders refused to give in to missionary pressure, the latter always 
found official support through the Colonial Guard.
There are indications that some villages abandoned Melan voluntarily, but only 
one informant openly admitted that this was the case in his village. According to him, 
this was an individual decision because each family head kept the relics of his 
ancestors. Thus, when missionaries asked his village to abandon Melan, many elders 
freely chose to hand over their relics, making unnecessary the direct intervention of 
Catholic missionaries or the Colonial Guard.27 Fang reaction to the process of 
removal of Melan relics must be considered in the light of the egalitarian and 
decentralized nature of society, in which individual elders took different positions as 
to whether or not to give up their relics freely. It is likely that the voluntary handover 
of relics was more common than is usually acknowledged, explaining to some extent 
why many informants do not have clear recollections of this episode. Considering that
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Melan is seen by many Fang elders today as the source of power of their forefathers 
and that some of them are likely to have cooperated with missionaries in the early 
stages of evangelization, it makes sense that these memories were, somehow, 
‘forgotten’.
The offensive against Melan did not begin with the expansion of Spanish 
missionaries in the 1920s, but earlier, in the 1890s, when the Gennan influence started 
to be felt in large areas of central and northern Rio Muni. There is little information 
about this, but in 1954 Larrea wrote that the Bisio reported to him that they had been 
forced to hide their ancestor skulls from the Germans who used them for decoration. 
The Claretian fight against local beliefs may have been facilitated by Gennan actions 
as well as early Presbyterian activities from their missionary station at Ebolowa, in 
southern Cameroon. The influence of German settlers and Presbyterian missionaries 
mostly affected the northern section of Rio Muni, explaining to some extent why 
some Ntuinu believe that Melan disappeared earlier in their region while the Okak, 
south of the Wele, managed to preserve it for longer.29 We know that Presbyterian 
missionaries were already present in the Muni and Gabon estuaries before 1842, but, 
in the long run, the impact of their mission was not as strong as in northern Rio Muni 
and especially southern Cameroon. From the Presbyterian mission in Ebolowa local 
converts took upon themselves the double mission of eradicating Melan and spreading 
the Christian gospel. Presbyterian activities against the ancestor cult in Rio Muni 
seemed to predate that of the Claretian missionaries by at least one decade. A Fang 
elder from Mikomeseng recounted how his family abandoned Melan before he was 
bom in the late 1910s due to the influence of the Bulu of southern Cameroon. 
According to him, Bulu converts told them that Melan was not the original religion of 
the Ntumu and it should be abandoned if they wanted to be faithful to their tradition,
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which was a main concern of the those who called themselves Ntumu-Mebum or 
genuine Ntumu. Instead, ‘the Bulu brought the religion called Amerika’, which 
undoubtedly refers to the American origin of the Presbyterian missionaries.31 Others 
refer to this religion that came from Cameroon as Jlso, probably a deformation of the 
word Jesus.32 Clearly, the persuasive skills of the Bulu converts were helped by more 
mundane circumstances. As the informant went on to explain, at the time the region 
was badly affected by a contagious skin disease called mebarct (yaws). The 
missionaries had a cure for it, but their Bulu followers only allowed non-Christians to 
be treated on condition that Melan relics were first handed over.33
By the 1920s, more than three decades of insecurity and violence had seriously 
disrupted Sanaga-Ogowe society. Elders had first been unable to put an end to the 
continuous skirmishes between local clans, and later they were driven to accept 
Spain’s sovereignty as the only answer to the endemic violence. This solution soon 
took a sour turn when the Spanish authorities imposed forced labour for the road 
construction of the 1920s. To make matters worse, since at least the 1910s the 
northern region of Rfo Muni had been affected by contagious diseases such as yaws 
and leprosy, whereas the central and southern regions had been badly hit by famine. 
The main goal of Melan was to ensure the welfare of the mvok-e ’bot, but elders could 
not obtain any positive answer fi'om the ancestors to counteract the chain of 
adversities that shook their tradition. Certainly, this crisis took a heavy toll on the 
dominant position of the elders, who in the eyes of the younger generation rapidly 
started to become replaced by the Europeans as figures of authority. As happened 
earlier with the first Bulu converts north of the Ntem — before Claretian missionaries 
even set foot in most Fang villages -  Fang youngsters educated in Catholic missions 
returned home carrying news about the new and true God.34 As a result of all these
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circumstances, Melan was in a very poor state to face the vigour and drive of 
Christianity that under the direction of the Claretians spread all over Rio Muni in the 
1930s. Melan and the remaining Sanaga-Ogowe cults were forced to retreat due to 
missionary persecution. Its once public rituals now became clandestine, a situation in 
which it could not survive, because, unlike witchcraft, Melan needed to be open and 
communal in order to benefit the whole village community. Gradually, the old 
ancestor cult of the Sanaga-Ogowe disappeared during the 1930s and 1940s as more 
and more villages fell under the influence of Claretian missionaries. By the 1950s, 
only a few Fang families still observed Melan in remotes areas of Rio Muni.35
Although some scholars argue that Central African religious movements 
disappear only when they are successfully replaced by a new but yet similar cult, the 
end of Melan did not quite follow this pattern.36 Melan was indeed replaced, not by 
another ancestor cult, but by Christianity. Indigenous cults found it extremely difficult 
to flourish under colonial rule, leaving the door open for Christianity, which was not 
only legal but also supported by the colonial establishment. However, the new order 
did not have the same impact on witchcraft beliefs. This was because the Spanish 
mostly ignored the significance of witchcraft, and repressive policies did not have the 
same effect on practices that are clandestine by definition. Paradoxically, the Spanish 
saw how witchcraft increased parallel to Fang evangelization during the 1930s and 
1940s. Christianity expanded very rapidly across Rio Muni, particularly among Fang 
youngsters and women. The skilful tactics of the ‘merciful whites’ paid off at a time 
when the Fang were still trying to recover from the trauma of the late 1920s road 
construction.
Although Melan as a public cult was widely abandoned, we cannot say the same 
about its underlying beliefs. Sanaga-Ogowe religion was solidly established in their
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tradition, but, as a pragmatic society, it was also strongly influenced by experience 
and observation. The notion of a close and protective God that interferes in human 
affairs was very difficult to accept for people who regularly had to deal with all sorts 
of adversities. Central African religions, like Christianity, considered Mebe’e as the 
Supreme Being, yet their conclusions could not be more different. While the Christian 
God Almighty cares and watches over men as the central piece of His creation, the 
African Nkom-Bot -  ‘men arranger’ -  is so great that He cannot be concerned about 
humanity’s trivial problems. Not surprisingly, Fang elders could not come to terms 
with God’s interest in a man’s business, such as the number of his wives -  the main 
obsession of Claretian missionaries with regards to African customs. A large majority 
of the people that I interviewed acknowledged that their fathers either were never 
baptized, or they did it right before dying. Informants are not very specific as to why 
so many Fang elders refused to be baptized, but Christianity’s condemnation of 
polygamy appears to have been the main reason.37 Baptism did not only imply 
renunciation of future wives, but also involved rejecting all of their current spouses 
except one.
In spite of the stance of Christian missionaries against African religious principles 
and social structures, there was not open opposition against Christianity on the side of 
Fang elders. Many of them seem to have attended church regularly, where they 
listened to the weekly sermons of the catechist and, sporadically, the missionary. 
More importantly, these men were often accompanied by their children at church.38 
Sunday services were seen as a sort of distraction from the monotonous life of the 
village, in which Protestant and Catholic competed for attracting the most followers.39 
Fernandez correctly points out that the Fang were strongly attracted by numerous 
elements of the Old Testament, especially the ‘ritual regulations’ of the book of
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Leviticus that could be identified with their ‘system of ritual prohibitions’ -  meki.40
Furthermore, the Old Testament came with a long array of attractive stories on
subjects on which the Fang had elaborated little.
The main obstacle for Christianity, however, was Fang reluctance to subscribe to
a moral doctrine emanating from a God that, in their views, had little or no business in
human affairs. As Father Gonzalez wrote in 1910, ‘all savage peoples... admit a
Supreme Being’ yet ‘they are mistaken about His providence, as they do not admit it
in ordinary events, only in exceptional and veiy important cases.’41 Two decades
later, the missionaries still struggled against the same obstacle, as the Fang continued
to ‘care very little about Him.’42 Despite Claretian success in evangelizing the Fang,
the Christian God was unable to completely replace the ancestors as the source of
morality. In 1942, the district officer of Kogo described this problem:
Despite the effort and continuous work of our missionaries, the native does not 
necessarily embrace Christianity. He apparently goes to church, gets baptized, and some 
even marry canonically, but without conviction or faith. The moment they are denied a 
second wife or they see how their desire of having descendents is not accomplished they 
move away from the Church.43
In fact, as we shall see, the regulatory role of the ancestors was destroyed without
being effectively replaced by either a religious or secular alternative. If anything,
social regulations were mostly sustained by state violence, illegitimate, to many, due
to the colonial and later dictatorial nature of the state.
To the Fang, the number of wives was one of the most evident signs of a man’s
success. Within an egalitarian society all these signs were especially significant and it
was believed that successful men had been ‘ritually arranged’ -  akomng’a - by elder
relatives usually of the maternal line. Therefore, by renouncing polygamy, the Fang
believed that they were rejecting all the good that their ancestors might have wanted
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for them, condemning themselves to a simple life of no accomplishment and falling 
into oblivion, for only successful men are remembered. The strength of this belief 
prevented many from taking the necessary steps to be baptized, even if they found 
certain elements of Christianity attractive. Most elders seemed to be baptized ‘at the 
point of death5 when polygamy was no longer important and the hope of an eternal 
life was so.44 Nevertheless, one should not inteipret the numerous cases of baptism at 
the point of death exclusively as a genuine worry about the afterlife before imminent 
death. It appears that in some cases baptism was administered without the consent of 
men in the throes of death, often causing disputes between relatives in favour and 
against the sacrament. An informant recalls how her father was baptized at the point 
of death, in spite of his sister's strong opposition.45 Similarly, Barrera, referring to the 
Claretians, reported:
They caused quite a few disruptions because of the baptism in articulo mortis, in which
they change a person’s name despite having been admitted in the hospital with a different
one, and, being in the throes of death did not realize what had been done to them 46
Most informants, particularly men, admit that, despite their fathers’ position on 
baptism, they did not object to their sons being baptized. It is not known for certain 
why fathers did not resist a decision that clearly might undermine their sons’ ability to 
many many wives and have a large family. Their passivity is likely to have been due 
to the fact that, unlike them, their sons did not have to reject any wife in order to be 
baptized. As children, the process was much more straightforward, because in the 
eyes of the missionaries they were not yet corrupted by African customs and 
institutions. Adult men, on the other hand, not only had to renounce their wives but 
also to go through a long process so they could prove to be worthy of being 
Christians. The stance of most elders’ on Christianity was characterized by a mixture
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of rejection, passivity and attraction. The acute sense of impotence that overcame the 
Fang as a result of the establishment of the colonial system determined their attitudes 
towards the religion of the Europeans during the 1930s and 1940s. Fang men realized 
that Christianity was there to stay and, for their children, that it was crucial in gaining 
access to Western education.
Adult men’s views on Christianity were much more hostile when it came to their 
daughters and wives, who, often, were only able to be baptized after their fathers had 
passed away or after divorcing their husbands. Men’s authority over their daughters 
was likely to be more effective than over their wives, because the Spanish authorities 
made divorce more accessible for African women married according to local custom, 
which could always be used as a bargaining mechanism. The actions or inactions of 
these men were generally guided by the acceptance of Spanish domination and a 
sentiment of contempt towards the ruling Europeans. They accepted their sons being 
baptized, going to school, and working for the Europeans as a means to obtaining the 
maximum benefit from an undesirable situation, yet there was no reason why Fang 
women should be involved in the ‘affairs of the colonizers’.47 The new order that 
came with the Spanish clearly undermined the existing family structure by sowing 
‘dangerous’ ideas in the minds of women about their new role within the nuclear 
Christian family. Those more hostile to the Spanish did not allow any of their 
dependents, including sons, to be baptized or to go to school48 hi a situation like this, 
very few dared to challenge the authority of the family head while he was alive, 
otherwise they would run the risk of being repudiated or, as one informant recalls 
happened to his mother after she was secretly baptized, being neglected.49
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Photograph 24: A Claretian transported by two o f his pupils
Photograph 25: Claretian baptizing Africans
Whatever the position of elders, there was little they could do against the 
Claretians’ determination to evangelize the colony. The close relationship between the 
Catholic missionaries and the colonial government proved to be vital, for it did not 
only provide the economic and political support needed but also strengthened the case
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that the missionaries were the doorway to the world of the Europeans. The Claretians 
wisely identified those sectors of society that were more receptive to the persuasive 
message of the ‘merciful white’: women, children and young men. Christianity 
offered Fang women a more central role within their communities as well as in 
villages’ religious life. Above all, missionaries provided women in traditional 
marriages with stronger rights vis-a-vis their husbands. Paradoxically, women married 
according to local custom could have more rights than those married canonically, for 
whom divorce was more difficult to obtain. Claretian missionaries often refused to 
baptize women involved in polygamous marriages, unless their husbands accepted 
keeping a single wife or they obtained a divorce. The latter was not always motivated 
by women’s desire for embracing Christianity, however women learnt to use the 
support of Claretian missionaries’ to secure divorce from unwanted husbands.50 
Missionaries also saw girls’ education as the cornerstone for their evangelization and 
acculturation. Despite the relative success of the girls school at the San Jose Mission 
in Evinayong, created in 1930 and directed by the Conceptionist Sisters, it was 
believed that many ‘more girls would attend’ if it were not ‘for the obstacle of fathers 
and mothers’ who ‘wish their daughters to remain in the greatest ignorance so they 
can remain under man’s slavery’.51 In order to reach more women, in the 1930s the 
missionary created the Sigsa, an institution designed to offer shelter mostly to young 
women in which they could leam the principles of Christian life and family before 
marrying canonically, usually to young men educated in Catholic missions. This 
institution was often a matter of conflict between Claretian missionaries and Spanish 
officers, as the former gave shelter to all women regardless of their reasons supporting 
their request for divorce. It was not uncommon that women under their protection 
were denied divorce by district officers. To the distress of the colonial
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administrations, Claretian missionaries could take, at times, drastic measures, such as 
taking women away from their villages, creating subsequent turmoil.
As Fernandez points out, evangelization was helped by the belief that Christianity 
would bring about material advancement.53 European culture and material wealth was 
clearly attractive to most Fang youngsters, but, in order to gain access to it, it was 
necessary to leam the language and culture of the colonizer, all supposedly available 
in the schools that the Claretians, and to a lesser extent the Presbyterians, opened 
across Rio Muni. So great was the desire of some children to go to school that, in 
some cases, informants reveal how they had to run away due to their fathers’ 
resistance.54 Once in school, children were unmonitored by their parents and, under 
the catechist’s influence, were easily converted to Christianity. Schooling was key in 
interrupting the transmission of the established tradition from fathers to sons, since 
children now did not spend as much time with their fathers. In contrast, the catechist 
dealt with subjects apparently more relevant in the world they had to live. The 
ancestors had very little to offer in comparison to the numerous goods with which the 
white man had been blessed by God. Fernandez correctly suggests that Christian 
missionaries, in an effort to gain followers, established a somewhat supernatural 
connection between Europeans and their material culture, a misconception the 
negative consequences of which are still felt in Equatorial Guinea today.55
During this period, youngsters were not aware that Christianity also introduced 
social concepts that did not suit local social realities and which contributed to the 
adjustment crisis of the Fang. Missionaries encouraged the nuclear family model in 
opposition to the extended family. In doing so, Christianity eroded solidarity ties 
within villages, because Christian solidarity was based on elusive concepts -  the 
universal Christian family -  difficult to grasp for the average individual. The
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ancestors, however, offered a more tangible solidarity, which, though not always 
effective, was based on a closer concept like blood ties. Looking back, it is clear that 
Christianity did not succeed in spreading the new family organization among the 
Fang, nonetheless its effects were felt in one way or another by local structures. The 
nuclear family model was seen by the Spanish as a key step for the economic 
transformation that, from the late 1930s, gathered momentum in Rio Muni. The social 
effects of this process on the hitherto egalitarian social structures were evident by the 
1940s. This was aggravated by the destruction of Fang cults designed to address all 
sorts of disruptions affecting the community. Whereas Christianity mostly focuses on 
the individual and his relationship with God, the ancestor cult, as Fernandez argues, 
emphasizes the search for the common good.56 hi addition, Christianity firmly 
believes in an individual’s responsibility, therefore local communities are not 
considered responsible and are excluded from the healing process.
The 1930s and 1940s appeared to have witnessed an unprecedented increase in 
witchcraft accusations in Rio Muni, which was probably related to the generalized 
social disruption resulting from colonial conquest, the rise of economic inequalities, 
the destruction of checks on witchcraft and the loss of local autonomy, all of which 
can be described as part of the crisis of adjustment. Certainly, it is extremely difficult, 
if not impossible, to measure any increase in witchcraft activities due to the nature of 
this phenomenon. The roots of Fang witchcraft beliefs are indeed very old, probably 
dating back to the days before the development of the Sanaga-Ogowe tradition. This 
is shown by the fact that very similar principles can be fomid amongst other peoples 
across the entire western Equatorial African region. In understanding this 
phenomenon, we must be aware that witchcraft is not so much an activity as a belief. 
The ancestors of the Fang believed in the existence of a hidden world where
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extraordinary things happened and supernatural forces could be manipulated so as to 
have an effect in the visible world. The manipulation of such forces is what is known 
in Fang as mbwo.
Anthropological literature has established a distinction between witchcraft and 
sorcery. The former would be an ‘unconscious action’ that relies ‘purely on internal 
psychic power to harm’, whereas the latter consciously makes ‘use of objects to do 
so’.57 As far as I know, there doesn’t exist such a clear-cut distinction. Although 
mbwo is usually translated as witchcraft, highlighting its negative character, the 
primary use of this term refers to the manipulation of hidden forces without adding 
any moral connotation. In the course of this manipulation, individuals can resort to 
objects, byang (remedy or medicine), in order to manipulate hidden forces more 
effectively -  ancestors’ skulls were undoubtedly the most powerful byang. As I 
pointed out in chapter 1, mbwo can be either good or evil, depending on the use that 
one makes of it. All Sanaga-Ogowe cults and healing rituals involved the use of mbwo 
or the manipulation of hidden forces for the benefit of the community. As we also 
saw, in Sanaga-Ogowe ideology, the roots of success rest on mbwo, since it was the 
ability to manipulate hidden forces that made some individuals excel over the rest and 
become well-respected leaders in their communities. Mbwo, however, could also have 
evil intents when it was used for egoistic purposes. This case was strongly feared 
because it could bring about misfortune and, ultimately, the destruction of the 
community. As Fisisy and Geschiere point out, ‘any distinction between good and 
evil, 01* between acceptable or unacceptable uses of the occult forces is relative and 
undermined by the extremely diffuse tenor of these discourses.’58 Mbwo and those 
who are able to use it have a very ambivalent character, as they are both feared and 
admired simultaneously.
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According to Bot Ba Njok, the majority of people were unable to manipulate 
hidden forces and they were considered bedzimi mam (those who ignore things or 
ignorant people). 59 A few individuals, beyem (those who know or wise men), could 
manipulate hidden forces due to their ability to see beyond.60 Beyem owe their ability 
to the possession of evu, a living being which is believed to live inside the body of 
these individuals. It is the evu that allows people to travel at night, usually in their 
sleep, into the hidden world, where they leam hidden secrets and manipulate forces. 
One’s evu can be arranged {akomng’a) by another wise man, so the person can gain 
control over it and, thus, use his ability for the good. This is what Tessmann described 
as evu-besi.61 In the case that the evu has not been arranged, evu-mbwo, due to neglect 
or extreme ambition, the individual will use his ability for his own benefit and, in so 
doing, he will harm those closest to him. It is believed that, in such cases, the evu 
must be rewarded with the life of a fellow human, who will be eaten by the nnem 
(singular of beyem). This strong belief lies behind the principle of symbolic 
anthropophagy, which led the Fang to believe that wizards eat people, and the Spanish 
to assume that anthropophagy was rampant amongst the Fang in the 1930s and 1940s.
In understanding the rise in witchcraft in the 1930s and 1940s, it is necessary to 
look back at the principle of ‘natural order’ that we saw in chapter 1. The regular 
functioning of nature and society was considered to be the natural order established 
by Mebe'e at the time of the ‘organization’ or creation. The disruption of the natural 
order was considered to be the result of evil manipulation of hidden forces by 
members of the community. This was especially so, but not exclusively, when some 
seemed to benefit in the midst of a climate of misfortune and disruption. In such 
situations, witchcraft accusations would escalate, being people accused of doing 
witchcraft in their sleep or in the forest at night. Generally speaking alleged witchcraft
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activities are intangible; that is, ceremonies in which groups of beyem secretly gather 
at night to plot against their neighbours do not take place -  at least, not in the visible 
world. People are, therefore, accused in the belief that they are committing such 
actions. Furthermore, this was reinforced by colonial repression which drove 
legitimate religious practices into clandestinity. Thus, if an elder refused to give in the 
relics of his ancestors, he was forced to keep them in hiding, where the mediation of 
the ancestors is considered to be evil because it is neither open nor communal.
One must be very careful when analysing informants’ statements on growing 
witchcraft activities, because it is a common reaction to believe that present 
circumstances are worse than those of the past. While admitting that the level of 
individualism within Fang society has expanded in the last century, colonial 
documents indicate that a rise in witchcraft accusations did take place during the 
1930s and 1940s. Usually, the Spanish authorities did not refer openly to witchcraft as 
such, rather it was preferred to use the term ‘anthropophagous sects’. From early on, 
the Spanish had been aware of Africans’ belief in witchcraft, yet they were often 
dismissed as ‘ridiculous superstitions’ or ‘repugnant rites’.62 Conditions appeared to 
have deteriorated considerably from the late 1930s, given that the Spanish authorities 
decided to take direct action in cases related with witchcraft. The situation was so 
alarming that in 1939 Sub-Governor Cabrera wrote to the Governor-General about the 
‘delicate’ issue of ‘N ’buo’ [mbwo], which was ‘very complicated due to the numerous 
cases of anthropophagy’.63 In a following letter Cabrera asked the Governor to 
authorize execution by hanging in cases of witchcraft, clarifying that while this ‘will 
be done without rushing... I consider it necessary.’64 Governor Suances, though not 
very resolutely, replied by granting permission.65
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In the first half of the 1940s, sources refer to several instances of 
‘ anthropophagous witchcraft’ that ended up in court. One of the most notorious was 
the trial of nine people from Niefang accused of taking part in the alleged murder of 
three children who were later eaten.66 From the copy of the sentence it is not clear 
whether these individuals, considered members of the ‘evu sect’, actually participated 
in witchcraft activities, or, as it seems more likely, simply exhumed the cadavers in 
order to carry out the traditional autopsy performed both in cases of suspected victims 
of witchcraft and on suspected sorcerers.67 The individuals involved in this case 
received severe sentences varying from the death penalty to long-term 
imprisonment.68 During the course of a lecture in 1944, Governor-General Bonelli 
referred to another important witchcraft case in which sixteen people were allegedly 
murdered and eaten. According to his analysis the main reason for these activities was 
that ‘the native ignores what love is.’69 The examination of different cases reveals that 
the colonial government, while trying to put an end to so-called witchcraft actions, 
never charged anybody directly for this activity, only for crimes related to it and 
contemplated in the colonial legislation, such as anthropophagy and cadaver 
exhumation. Unlike the French authorities in Cameroon, who created a special 
tribunal for witchcraft cases, the Spanish had no intention to give witchcraft official 
recognition in the eyes of the Africans.70
It is clear from the reading of colonial sources that the Spanish had enormous 
difficulties in understanding African cultures. Such a situation motivated reactions 
like that of the distressed Sub-Govemor Cabrera, who in 1939 wrote: ‘there is a 
woman who in eating has eaten even her own mother.’71 Symbolic anthropophagy 
also became real in European minds, in which lack of knowledge combined with a 
long array of prejudices, added more credibility to the vivid descriptions reported by
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Africans in court. In the defence of the Spanish officers, one has to admit that they 
were often misguided by the difficulty in translating these concepts and, above all, by 
African’s total belief in witchcraft and the ability to cause somebody’s death through 
magic. Such a deep conviction partly explains, as numerous students of this 
phenomenon have noticed, why many individuals are willing to admit responsibility 
for this kind of acts. According to Moreno, in 1946, 19 out of 73 inmates were 
imprisoned in Bata for the crime of anthropophagy.72
Today, we know that witchcraft is mostly a discourse, which often expresses 
social tensions through metaphors. In this respect, anthropophagy is fundamentally a 
metaphoric expression of ritual assassination. Fernandez, Fisiy and Geschiere’s 
studies on witchcraft amongst the Fang and their Cameroonian neighbours the Maka 
are very useful in understanding this phenomenon.73 Fernandez and Geschiere’s 
concept of witchcraft as a mechanism to express social inequalities seems to be 
corroborated by the fact that the increase in witchcraft activities amongst the Rio 
Munian Fang in the 1930s and 1940s took place at a time of fundamental economic 
transformations.74 The Fang reacted against the perceived rise in witchcraft through 
the use of old and new anti-witchcraft cults. Moreno mentions the resurgence of the 
Ngu cult in 1943 as an indicator of ‘collective reaction’ against witchcraft in the 
present-day district of Anisok.75 He argues that traditional forms of Ngu gave birth to 
other anti-witchcraft versions like the so-called Don Enrique sect, that acted in the 
Mikomeseng and Ebibeyin area in 1943, and whose members were trailed by the 
Spanish authorities after several people allegedly died during the celebration of 
rituals.76 Moreno, unfortunately, does not provide further information about this new 
cult, which is not mentioned in any of the examined colonial documentation. It is very
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likely that colonial repression limited the geographical extension and lifetime span of 
the Don Enrique cult.
To the Spanish, there was no difference between witchcraft and anti-witchcraft 
activities, which were both equally pursued; if anything the more conspicuous 
character of anti-witchcraft movements made them more vulnerable.77 By examining 
sources we realize that Spanish actions against so-called witchcraft activities, such as 
those mentioned above, were, in fact, directed against anti-witchcraft rituals. The 
repression on cults like Ngu left Fang elders, like in other Central African societies, 
powerless before the rise of individualistic tensions. Unable to deal with this 
phenomenon, witchcraft accusations no longer channelled community conflicts, but 
made them worse.
Keeping matters inside the viliage
The level of transformation within African societies as a result of colonial 
domination is a debatable and sometimes controversial subject. As we have seen, 
change was a two-way process, in which Africans actively participated, and was often 
the indirect result of European actions, since colonial administrators were not 
interested in governing all aspects of colonized societies. Local political structures 
undoubtedly became the most direct target of colonial policies. Spanish officials 
sought to exploit the colony through the transformation of the Fang and other local 
groups. Such an objective required tight political control. The Spanish authorities 
focused much of their efforts on transforming local authority structures, so they could 
become part of the wider network of colonial authority. This strategy was often 
hampered by Africans’ determination to maintain their sovereignty at a local level. 
Fang elders, however, found it very difficult to match the will and power of the
228
colonial state, which by the late 1940s had established itself as the undisputed 
authority across the Spanish colony. The Spanish authorities had aimed to strengthen 
African leadership to assist mikukuma (administrative chiefs) in their mediator role, 
but it is clear that this objective was never achieved.78 The new functions of 
administrative chiefs ended up destroying what was left of the former Fang political 
structure. If, as Foucault argues, power is ‘an action over actions’, local Fang power
70rapidly disappeared during the 1930s and 1940s. Fang leadership gradually lost the 
capacity to mobilize a population that over time became exclusively responsive to 
government orders, and mostly because of the state’s coercive apparatus. The 
mediator role of the chief clearly contradicted the Fang concept of mmnama. The 
community leader’s main responsibility was to look after the needs of his community, 
whereas the administrative chief acted as a representative of the government. Both 
functions were clearly at odds with one another, and most Fang elders struggled to 
reconcile the two institutions during this period as part of their effort to preserve Fang 
autonomy. Gradually, the figure of the mmnama as a symbol of Fang political 
autonomy retreated and by the late 1940s it had either disappeared in most villages or 
its functions were almost non-existent.
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the imposition of chieftaincies by the Spanish 
resulted in the development of a dual authority structure in Rio Muni. The Fang 
sought to integrate the newly created institution within their socio-political structure. 
However, this relationship was not always simple. By the early 1930s, Fang elders 
had understood the actual nature of Spanish domination as well as the importance of 
administrative chiefs in dealing with them. It was believed that the minnama and the 
administrative chief could coexist as long as their functions were clearly delineated. 
Thus, the chief would be in charge of dealing with the colonial government and the
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orders emanating from it, whereas the mmnama would continue regulating the 
internal affairs of the village and representing his community before other villages. 
This trend was rather common to many decentralized societies across Central Africa. 
Balandier writes that French colonial authorities were aware of this phenomenon both 
in Gabon and Congo as a factor that undermined the authority of administrative 
chiefs.80 The Spanish also observed this trend in Rio Muni.81 As Balandier argues, the 
authority of administrative chiefs was often subordinated to the minnama, yet it is not 
so clear that this relationship was always characterized by mutual hostility.82 The 
relationship between chief and community leader was very much determined by the 
former’s personality; that is to say, if the chief was particularly ambitious or had a 
strong character, relationships were likely to be more difficult. Informants tend to 
describe the relationship between the two village leaders as a cordial one, for the chief 
generally accepted the established authority in the village.83 Although this situation 
did take place, we should not consider that this was always the case -  especially as 
time went by and administrative chiefs perceived community leaders as an obstacle to 
their functions and aspirations. It is quite likely that tensions between village elders 
and administrative chiefs were more acute than it is often admitted, yet such 
memories have been re-elaborated in an effort to legitimize the growing importance of 
administrative chiefs. This is a well-known phenomenon, but it is not always easy to 
detect. At Beayop, Mikomeseng, two elders gave the same version as to how Okenve 
Mituy, the village’s first chief was chosen by Ela Mituy, the minnama. However their 
version contradicted that of two informants whose fathers were directly involved in 
the process that resulted in the minnama being stripped of his official appointment in 
favour of his more dynamic brother around 1930.84
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The development of a dual authority structure among the Fang does not imply 
that leadership was necessarily shared between two individuals. At times, this duality 
was rather complex for the same person could exercise both functions. Undoubtedly, 
this required a large degree of discernment on the part of these individuals, above all, 
if they were seriously committed to differentiating between the two positions. 
Certainly, this was an extremely difficult situation to deal with, and inevitably one of 
the functions took priority over the other, avoiding what otherwise may have turned 
into a sort of schizophrenia.
Community leadership had been traditionally based on the village’s recognition of 
an individual’s extraordinary qualities and his commitment towards the interest of the 
whole community. However, it is unlikely that such extraordinary personal qualities 
were equally possessed by all community leaders. Therefore, for those whose 
leadership was barely acknowledged, the official backing of the Spanish authorities 
was a very attractive proposition.85 It is difficult to tell the extent to which dual 
authority was in the hands of single individuals across Rio Muni’s villages, but it 
appears to have been at least as common as the division of village leadership between 
two individuals.86 Those leaders who took advantage of the Spanish to consolidate 
their leadership were left in an awkward position because their legitimacy slipped 
away from the community to the colonial government on whose approval they 
ultimately depended. In 1933, the Sub-Governor of Bata wrote that those 
administrative chiefs who continued to solve palavers against the principles of the 
Spanish ‘civilizing march’ or repeatedly failed to attend monthly meetings with 
colonial administrators would be dismissed.87
Sources do not refer to administrative chiefs openly challenging the status of the 
elders in their communities during the 1930s and 1940s. Many informants recount
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how administrative chiefs used to consult with the elders and act according to their 
advice due to their recognition within the village as well as their experience.88 For 
many of these early administrative chiefs, having been educated under the guidelines 
of the old Sanaga-Ogowe tradition, it must have been very difficult to break away 
from established structures and ignore the authority of the elders. Nonetheless, the 
process by which the administrative chief was appointed could also determine his 
relationship with the mmnama. hi 1932-1933, Spain’s commitment to redefine the 
state of native authority in Rio Muni provoked the dismissal of part of the traditional 
leaders from their official post and the appointment of new administrative chiefs. All 
over Rio Muni, district officers were ordered to assess existing chiefs, making sure 
that they had the required ‘morality’, ‘spirit of justice’, ‘intelligence’ and ‘pedigree’
o n
among their personal qualities. Spanish officers were also told to consider people’s 
approval in appointing new chiefs or confirming old ones, provided they had these 
qualities.90 New administrative chiefs, appointed after community leaders were 
removed from their administrative functions, were left in a strong position to 
challenge the influence of the established village authority that was discredited in 
public by the Spanish authorities.
Sources mention certain instances that indicated a rise in authoritarian tendencies 
among some administrative chiefs during this period. Existing check-and-balance 
mechanisms were unable to prevent the authoritarian actions of chiefs who enjoyed 
the coercive backing of the Spanish authorities. As a result, people often had no other 
option than asking the colonial government for help, as in this 1932 letter signed by 
members of the Amvom clan of Evinayong:
We have in this area a chief called Abesolo Ela who lives close to the Mission. This
chief is causing us much damage because he takes other people’s money so we report to
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HE [His Excellency] that this chief does not observe the law of the Governor, since a 
chief is a Governor’s representative to solve all existing palavers in villages... Therefore, 
we beg HE, given that we do not want him close to us, to send him far away.. ,91
Informants describe other cases in which village chiefs were feared by their fellow 
villagers, as a simple disagreement or disobedience could easily trigger off an angry 
reaction on the part of the chiefs.92 Nonetheless, it does not appear that authoritarian 
tendencies were very common among administrative chiefs in this period, because the 
presence of charismatic elders was often enough to control such tendencies, especially 
if there existed a close family relationship.93
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, colonial officers continued to complain about 
the weakness of most administrative chiefs, arguing for the need to further empower 
them, hi 1939, Sub-Governor Cabrera saw the empowerment of chiefs as the only 
way to control the African population. A few years later, the colonial administration 
considered certain policies to strengthen administrative chiefs prestige such as the 
construction of concrete houses for them by the Patronato de Indigenas.94 
Authoritarian chiefs dealt with the conflict between their strong position and the 
traditional socio-political structure through the integration of the functions of 
minnama and administrative chief. The Spanish authorities determined that chiefs 
should intervene in the resolution of conflicts within their villages, and, although 
many unofficially declined such responsibility in favour of the minnama, charismatic 
chiefs assumed this role, as it was considered the greatest responsibility and virtue of 
prestigious community leaders. The combination of Spanish backing and a good 
economic situation offered charismatic chiefs the possibility to put into practice their 
skills as “community leaders”. The adoption of cash-crop cultivation by some chiefs 
from the 1930s favoured the development of a clientelist relationship with the rest of
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the community, which ultimately allowed people to tolerate those cases of 
accumulation of power and wealth by some chiefs.95
Within resettled villages, Fang families, initially, intended to maintain their old 
organization by preserving the political autonomy of the different extended families. 
The division of village authority according to families was reflected by the 
construction of several mabdd (plural for abda, ‘palaver house’) within the same 
village, in which each extended family would solve their conflicts and their male 
members would gather. However, the Spanish authorities did not accept this situation. 
According to the colonial guidelines, unified villages had to be organized under the 
authority of a single village chief. In the early 1930s, clan chiefs, like Motuu 
M’Abege, leader of the Nzomo clan in Mikomeseng, visited the villages of their 
respective clans and explained about the obligation to choose a single administrative 
chief per village.96 In spite of this, villagers tried to maintain as much independence as 
possible within the new settlements, as in the case of Beayop, where the chief Okenve 
Mituy, according to his widow, built a fence around his compound to keep outsiders
07away. Eventually, the imposition of single village authorities eventually forced 
reluctant settlements to join their neighbours.98
The idea of a family head mediating or resolving the conflicts of a family group 
different from his was not new to the Fang. The situation created by colonial policies, 
however, was different, since a village chief now had to intervene in solving conflicts 
affecting the different families of his village as a result of outside imposition, and not 
the decision of the families involved. No doubt, this had a deep effect regarding the 
legitimacy of chiefs as arbitrators. If the chief chose to respect the traditional authority 
structure, he was less likely to attract antagonism from the village elders and families. 
Nevertheless, as the Spanish increased their intervention into Fang affairs from the
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late 1930s, and youngsters and women sought matters to be resolved according to the 
new colonial native justice system, administrative chiefs gradually increased their 
intervention in conflict resolution. This trend slowly but surely eroded the authority of 
traditional leaders and the legitimacy of administrative chiefs. As a result, the latter 
resorted to the support of the colonial authorities in increasing their executive powers 
in order to overcome the steady loss of popular recognition. Only charismatic chiefs 
were in a good position to expand their functions without necessarily eroding their 
legitimacy.
Well aware that the excessive number of chiefs contributed to the inefficiency of 
native administration, the Spanish authorities tried to reduce the number of chiefs in 
the late 1920s, coinciding with the village resettlement. It was not until 1932 that a 
more serious attempt was designed to put in order the confusing situation regarding 
chiefs. Although Spain’s reorganization of native administration shared, at least 
formally, some of the ideas of existing authority structures, it clearly differed from 
them with regards to contents. At the top of the native administrative organization was 
the jefe de tribu or clan chief in charge of looking after the affairs of his clan -  tribn 
in the colonial argot -  in each demarcation or district of Rio Muni. Given that a clan 
could be divided into multiple villages within a district, villages were under the 
immediate supervision of a jefe de poblado or village chief. The colonial government 
exceptionally could admit the appointment of two clan chiefs within a given district, if 
a clan was too large." In the past, the existence of so-called clan leaders was 
something exceptional, determined by the availability of men with the required 
qualities within a district at a given point in time. During the early stages of the 
colonial conquest, Spanish officials came across some of these characters and in the 
1930s sought to institutionalize this figure. Top Spanish officials understood that it
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was necessary to take into account ‘the feeling of the majority of natives’ in choosing
clan chiefs if they were to be effective.100 Whenever district officers found this type of
chief, Fang clans did not have much trouble in accepting the authority of appointed
clan chiefs. Nonetheless, as the Sub-Governor of Bata admitted in 1933, most chiefs
were appointed in spite of not satisfying the conditions established by the colonial
government.101 To a much greater extent than village chiefs, clan chiefs had to
struggle to combine the qualities that bestowed prestige and recognition on them with
the obligations that the colonial position entailed. Ultimately, Spanish officers
favoured loyalty over popular recognition, like in the case of Motuu m’Abege, who,
despite his great prestige amongst the Nzomo clan in Mikomeseng, was removed
from office and banished to Fernando Po in 1938 due to his constant disdain for the
Spanish authority. The anger provoked by Motuu’s actions still could be perceived in
the words of Sub-Governor Cabrera one year later:
If the chief who is asking you to come back is Matu Abegue [Motuu m ’Abege], a “great” 
Chief of Mikomeseng, it is not advisable to bring him back... He is constantly working 
against us in Mikomeseng thanks to his prestige... Together with him, it was necessary 
to impose government punishment on a few more people, but it seems almost certain that 
he is the instigator of all these troubles.102
Although the 1932 reorganization of the native administration sketched out some 
of the functions of clan chiefs, especially with regards to their involvement in ‘all 
small matters’ affecting Africans as well as the resolution of more complicated 
‘palavers’ during the monthly meetings with district officers, it was not until the 1938 
native justice reform that their functions were more clearly delineated.103 The justice 
system reform, rather than introducing innovative elements, sought to formalize the 
existing legal structure, which had hitherto been developed in an ad-hoc manner. 
Given the anarchic functioning of native justice, the new ordinances stated in its
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preamble: ‘all authorities not mentioned here, as well as official institutions and 
private individuals must refrain from solving palavers of civil or criminal 
character’.104 The biggest innovation of the new ordinance was the empowerment of 
administrative chiefs and the creation of the native tribunal, also known as tribunal de 
raza, which was divided into four tiers: the Jefe de Poblado -  village court, headed by 
a village chief; the Tribunal de Demarcacion (district court), formed by seven village 
chiefs under the supervision of the district officer; the Tribunal de Distrito (regional 
court), presided over by a judge along with two village chiefs; and, finally, the 
Tribunal Superior Indigena, presided over by an examining magistrate who was 
assisted by a public officer and an ‘emancipated native’.105
Like the bulk of colonial legislation, this ordinance was drafted in Santa Isabel, 
where most Spanish officials were not familiar with the social structure of the largest 
ethnic group in the colony, the Fang. Therefore, the original drafting is somewhat 
confusing because it mentions the nkukuma or village chief, when in reality it was the 
clan chief who intervened in the different levels of native courts.106 Since the figure of 
clan chief did not exist amongst the Bubi of Fernando Po, it was mistakenly assumed 
that village chiefs where the highest rank of Fang administrative organization. The 
clan chief, who, since the early 1940s was officially known as primer jefe (first chief), 
was in charge of visiting all the villages of his clan within his district and solving the 
cases presented by the village chief. In case he failed, he would refer the matter to the 
district court.
On paper the new native organization provided administrative chiefs with ample 
powers, for their role would be key in the resolution of judicial matters, especially on 
the first two levels of the new legal hierarchy. Nonetheless, colonial officers, 
including the Sub-Governor, shared numerous objections with regards to the original
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draft of the native justice ordinance. Convinced of the ‘evident ignorance’ of native 
chiefs, the Sub-Governor considered that giving such ample powers to them was 
incompatible with a ‘just, complete and impartial native justice’.107 Further it was 
believed that chiefs’ weakness would prevent them from carrying out their judicial
1 ORresponsibility at village level, since people would not respect their rulings. Official 
reservations did not change significantly the final draft of the native justice ordinance, 
yet the reality on the ground was that district officers earned on solving most cases by 
themselves, using first chiefs simply as advisors.
The efforts of senior colonial officers to strengthen the position of administrative 
chiefs were undermined by district officers, who not only resolved ‘palavers’ during 
the monthly court sessions but also a whole series of minor complains and disputes on 
a daily basis.109 Although the 1938 native justice ordinance established that all cases 
should be ruled according to native custom, this was not codified during the 1940s, 
despite several attempts.110 In the absence of a custom code, district officers ruled 
according to their ‘common sense’.111 District officers’ role in native justice had two 
serious negative consequences with regards to the Fang socio-political structure. On 
the one hand, the authority of chiefs was undermined, reinforcing the notion that they 
were simple intermediaries between the Spanish officer and the African population. 
On the other, the Fang justice system was totally perverted by the adversarial 
approach of colonial officers, who, in accordance with Western justice, set one side 
against the other instead of restoring harmony within the community through 
compromise. At the same time, native courts, under the authority of district officers, 
also sought to boost women’s legal rights, especially concerning family matters. As a 
result, the authority of elders could now be challenged by women who found it easier 
to divorce their husbands and reject arranged marriages.
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Growing tensions resulting from the colonial justice system added to the 
increasing frictions of village life, in which relations were made more complex after 
the policy of resettlement brought different families together. Fang administrative 
chiefs were aware that they were losing control over a society where the district 
officer became the reference of authority and social tensions where on the increase. In 
response to this situation, charismatic chiefs tried to tighten the grip over their 
communities by minimizing colonial intervention in the affairs of their villages. This 
required the exercise of fair rulings in solving all village disputes so people did not 
feel the need to carry their cases to the colonial officer. In a desperate attempt to 
preserve the autonomy of his community from the colonial state, Okenve Mituy, the 
powerful chief of Beayop, soon before dying, instructed his successor not to let any 
‘trouble5 in the village to come to the attention of Spanish officers.112
The children of Afri Kara begin their journey
The transformation of political and cultural identity across Rio Mimi is, no doubt, 
the clearest example of how this formerly decentralized society silently responded to 
the shock that followed the colonial conquest. As Fernandez argues, colonial 
domination tends to raise the level of self-awareness in most colonized societies, 
including the Fang, while generating the need to find an explanation to the newly
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created situation. People's active participation in the transformation of their cultural 
and political identity throughout the 1930s and 1940s gave birth to the Fang identity 
that we know today. From a multiple, fragmented political identity, somehow 
cemented by a loose sense of cultural identity, the Fang came to be an ethnic group 
with a solid sense of their own unity. The integration of members of the Osumu clan 
into the Bopkwen and Esakora clans to avoid the brutal reprisal of the Colonial
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Guard, mentioned in Chapter 2, does not only show how flexible identity could be, 
but also how it was possible to manipulate it in response to critical situations.
Ranger rightly argues that ethnicity, as a solid sense of identity, in Africa is a 
colonial ‘invention’ or ‘imagination’, yet we should not interpret ethnicity as the 
result of colonial policies alone, but, rather, of the combined efforts of African and 
European agents.114 For the most part, the reconstruction of Fang identity was an 
internal response to the situation created by colonialism. Certainly, it was also 
encouraged by the Spanish authorities in order to simplify the complex socio-political 
composition in Rio Muni. The colonial order put the numerous social units within a 
broader social context in which Sanaga-Ogowe speakers were identified as a sole 
entity in relation to the other communities coexisting in the colony. In colonial 
terminology, all Sanaga-Ogowe groups were classified as Pamue, in a similar fashion 
that coastal groups, today known as Ndowe, were classified as Playeros -  literally 
beach people. This process was not unique to the Spanish colony, as the Sanaga- 
Ogowe went through a similar experience in neighbouring Gabon and Cameroon, 
where the French referred to them as Pahouin.115 Europeans’ obsession with 
simplifying intricate structures, which colonial bureaucracy was unable to cope with, 
was especially evident regarding the complex African socio-political mosaic. In Rio 
Muni, the Spanish aimed at ordering this complex reality by reallocating district 
population on the basis of clan identity.116 This proved to be an impossible task since 
clans were intermixed within the territory, and very often scattered throughout several 
districts, hi addition, these colonial policies were often undermined by the decision to 
allow family groups from neighbouring colonies to settle in Rio Muni, contributing to 
the complexity of the territory.117
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Colonial policies during the 1930s and 1940s put special emphasis on clan 
structures. Settlements were reallocated according to clan composition, whereas the 
newly created figure of first chief united all clan members under the leadership of a 
single chief in each district. Perhaps the Spanish were aware of the difficulties of 
constructing new institutions on the basis of ethnicity, but it could have also well been 
that they were aware of the dangers that ethnicity entailed, as colonial authorities 
would learn from the late 1950s. Regardless of the reasons behind colonial policies, it 
is a remarkable achievement that the Fang, during this period, succeeded in 
overcoming past divisions as well as the ones encouraged, directly or indirectly, by 
colonial authorities. In fact, the Fang were able to construct a common identity on the 
basis of their diverse social composition, the ayong. The Fang clan was now used not 
as an element separating all those sharing the same language and culture, but as an 
instrument to unify all family groups under a common origin or ancestor. This 
achievement is all the most notable if we keep in mind that it was carried out across 
three colonial territories, Cameroon, Gabon and Rio Muni. The reconstruction of Fang 
or Beti identity was a form of reaction to colonialism, even rejection of it, but, above 
all, it was a form of a reaffirmation for a people undergoing humiliating colonial 
domination. As Fernandez points out, by means of protest movements the Fang 
sought to ‘revitalize themselves’ through the affirmation of their past, of a culture that 
appeared to have been belittled by the vigour and impressiveness of Western 
civilization.118
hi creating a common identity, the Fang provided themselves with an alternative 
to the cohesiveness of the Spanish and French colonial masters. Historically, Sanaga- 
Ogowe culture was characterized by its dualism. In this respect, Fernandez is right in 
suggesting that the Fang were impressed by European thought, which is why they
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tried to recreate European forms of organization in their two main protest movements, 
e ’Lat-Ayong and Bwiti. Fernandez claims that ‘it was not so much European’s wealth, 
but his knowledge of how to do things... that impressed Fang.’119 Bwiti and e ’Lat- 
Ayong were based on a hierarchical organization inspired by the Catholic Church 
hierarchy and military ranks respectively.120 The consolidation of ‘invented’ or 
‘imagined’ identities in Africa was possible thanks to its reliance on historical 
elements.121 As Ranger rightly acknowledges, all traditions and institutions are 
‘invented’ at some point in time, yet his emphasis on the artificiality of this process 
downplays the social, political and cultural realities in which it was grounded.122 hi 
the case of the Fang, we cannot know whether the construction of a pan-clan identity 
would have taken place without the establishment of colonial domination, but we 
know that, by and large, this process was successful due to the continuity between 
past and present. Fang identity was built on the basis of widely accepted old elements, 
such as blood ties, genealogy and clan identity.
The origins of the process that culminated in the development of a Fang identity 
is rooted in the e ’Lat-Ayong movement, bom in southern Cameroon, according to 
Fernandez, in the mid or late 1930s.123 This movement was based on the Sanaga- 
Ogowe concept of e ’lat-ayong. Clan division was traditionally counteracted through 
the celebration of bisulan, clan gatherings that drew together members of brother 
clans in order to discuss common matters and strengthen family ties. The instability of 
the late nineteenth century, followed by colonial domination and the establishment of 
borders dividing the Sanaga-Ogowe territory, prevented these gatherings from being 
celebrated as frequently or from taking place at all. According to a Claretian 
missionary, by the early 1920s these gatherings had lost importance in western Rio 
Muni, especially as elders’ authority was challenged by youngsters who tried to
242
impose their own topics of discussion.124 As Alexander and Balandier point out, clan 
gatherings continued to be celebrated in Cameroon, especially amongst Bulu and 
Yewondo sections where greater social stability maintained clans’ cohesion, whereas 
south of the river Ntem, in Rio Muni and Gabon, ‘solemn gatherings’ -  bisulcin -  and 
even ‘the feeling of tribal reality’ were gradually disappearing due to clan 
dispersion.125 It is not surprising, then, that the e ’Lcit-Ayong movement was bom in 
Cameroon, where colonization was more advanced. It was founded precisely by those 
who were acculturated at an earlier stage, mostly pastors and catechists.126 Faced with 
the constant reminder of their inferiority as well as the evils of their culture by 
colonial rulers, the leaders of this movement, who had been mainly trained in the 
Presbyterian mission of Ebolowa, felt compelled to assert their identity through the 
revival of their past tradition. Colonial domination was followed by a state of 
depression and, in trying to explain this situation, the e ’Lat-Ayong movement also 
sought to revitalize Fang society. Fernandez argues that genealogical history, legends 
and myths served as instruments for this movement. One should not think, however, 
that the Fang avoided any responsibility for this state of affairs. Quite the opposite: 
the leaders of the e ’Lat-Ayong, like those of Bwiti, blamed the Fang themselves for 
this situation, as it was believed to have unfolded due to the abandonment of their 
ancestors’ tradition.
In its origins the e ’Alcit Ayong did not aim at building an ethnic identity. Rather, 
its main purpose was to recover important elements of the past tradition through the 
strengthening of clan identities. The decline of clan obligations was seen to have 
debilitated Fang society, leading ultimately to the European conquest. Although 
people in present-day Equatorial Guinea are generally aware of the e ’lat-ctyong 
concept, during the course of this research it was obvious that not everybody knows
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the complete list of their brother clans. Clan ties became blurred as a result of 
migration, thus most people could only recall family ties with one or two clans within 
their region, and very few could trace any ties with groups in more distant areas.
As Fernandez points out, the e ’Lat-Ayong movement was particularly interested 
in the past as a form of reaffirmation.127 Africans had been dehumanized through the 
denial of their history, and this is precisely what the e ’Lat-Ayong sought to recover by 
resorting to the atam-ndd-e ’bot, the genealogy genre that Fang ancestors had used for 
centuries in order to be remembered and keep the past alive. Literacy now enabled the 
preservation of this knowledge while crisscrossing the multiple genealogies that the 
movement recovered across southern Cameroon, Rio Muni and northern Gabon. In so 
doing, the leaders of the movement uncovered family ties between different clans 
beyond the obvious and limited list that most people were able to recall. Thus, a given 
clan in southern Cameroon could be related to other clans as far as southern Rio Muni 
or central Gabon. It is no coincidence that most of my informants could immediately 
name one or two brother clans, while needing more time or the cooperation of fellow 
villagers to recall additional clans learnt thanks to the e ’Lat-Ayong movement. From 
southern Cameroon, members of the movement spread the information concerning 
clan ties into Rio Muni and Gabon, so the Nzomo clan could know that, besides the 
Amvom, they were also related to the Fong and Yendomo, or the Esamongon and 
Yenoo could leam of their relation with the Esamokuas, Esatuc and Esaman clans. 
The collection of genealogies brought to light the existence of common ancestors 
between clans that, having split up long ago, had forgotten their ties.
In Rio Muni the actions of the e ’Lat-Ayong movement were especially noticeable 
in the north, where the proximity of the Cameroonian border allowed regular contacts 
between people on both sides. Despite movement being restricted by colonial
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authorities, the effects of the e ’Lat-Ayong were also felt south of the Wele, albeit
more feebly than in the north. In Nkum-Esong, Evinayong, an Oyek elder told me that
they only learnt of their ties with the Yenkeng clan in the 1940s. A man who came
from Cameroon asked them that ‘why we kept marring to the Yenkeng clan, since we
are brothers’. As in many other villages, the member of the e ’Lcit-Ayong movement
resorted to his broad genealogical knowledge to prove his point, asking them:
‘How come Eva’a Nzam and Ndui Nzam are mentioned in both the Oyek and Yenkeng 
genealogies?’ He told us that these two characters are mentioned because we are the 
same thing. It is then that we realized it and began to respect the rules that tie those of 
one family.128
Although in the 1930s and 1940s most Fang elders knew, to different degrees, 
their clan genealogies, only a few were familiar with the genealogy of more than one 
clan. The e ’Lat-Ayong movement was a significant development because it provided 
the Fang with a broader perspective surpassing the narrow borders of individual clans. 
In collecting a large array of genealogies, they could not only see ties between several 
clans, but more importantly could prove two or more clans shared a common origin. 
As part of their strategy, they revived traditional gatherings in which brother clans 
could come together in order to strengthen their ties. In northern Rio Muni, these 
gatherings were relatively common during the second half of the 1940s when the 
movement was at its peak.129 South of the Wele, although it was known that 
gatherings were celebrated among the Ntumu subgroup, they seem to have been 
uncommon due to the difficulties that e ’Lat-Ayong members had in travelling 
unnoticed from Cameroon and northern Rio Muni.130 In Cameroon, colonial officers 
were less suspicious of these celebrations, but in Rio Muni they had to be organized 
without the knowledge of colonial authorities and Spanish vigilance required that they 
were celebrated clandestinely in the forest.131 Clans usually took turns to organize
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these meetings that used to gather elders of brother clans not only from Rio Muni, but 
also from Cameroon and Gabon.132
Photograph 26: The Fang from Ri'o Muni have continued meeting their neighbours in 
Cameroon across the River Ntem
Photograph 27: From Ebibeyin one can easily cross the River Kie by canoe into Gabon
Despite its affirmative ‘traditional’ character, Fang appreciation for European 
culture was reflected in these gatherings, in which the European military and colonial
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order was recreated. Thus, one informant witnessed how different groups arriving in 
her village were led by an individual who was referred to as ‘president’ and was 
earned on a chair, in the same fashion that Europeans were transported in their 
expeditions to the interior.133 Like the colonial administration, fines were given to 
those who did not participate in the arrangements necessary to host the celebrations. 
Although many individuals were involved in the preparations, only male elders were 
allowed to attend the meetings and participate in the discussions. Access to the actual 
location of the meetings was controlled through a series of checkpoints, preventing 
women and children from attending. A mixture of the past and present, e ’Lat-Ayong 
gatherings sought to maintain the old tradition through the celebration of Melan 
rituals, while creating a hierarchical order reminiscent of the European one in which 
individuals were given titles such as captain, colonel or major according to their 
responsibility.134 More than ever, the symbolic value of the ancestors skulls was vital 
in reinforcing the link to the past, which was felt to have been betrayed, as well as 
family ties weakened after numerous migrations. Fang pragmatism could not help 
noticing that their lack of centralized organization put them at a disadvantage with the 
Europeans, making necessary to adopt their models.
It was precisely the recreation of an alternative hierarchical order that 
preoccupied the Spanish authorities, who, in addition to witnessing how 
administrative chiefs were usually challenged by the African population, now feared 
that they could be replaced by leaders outside the control of the colonial government. 
Marcelo Ndong Mba, a clerk of the colonial administration who throughout his work 
developed close ties with the e ’Lat-Ayong movement and the incipient Equatorial 
Guinean nationalism during the mid 1940s and 1950s, recalled an incident in 
Ebibeyin on the occasion of an e 'Lat-Ayong meeting:
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There was a clan gathering when I was posted to Ebibeyin around 1945. The e ’Lat- 
Ayong came from Cameroon with people like Afa’a Bibo’o. These people carried out 
some sort of politics, because these gatherings were clandestine here [Rio Muni]. There 
were some who were colonels, others were captains... I remember how they said: ‘fifty 
lashes for the colonel!’... They celebrated these meetings in the forest, but a chief... 
reported them to the authorities... and they went and caught them.135
It is difficult to know what the Spanish authorities’ exact position on the e 1Lat-Ayong 
movement was. They broke up these gatherings whenever they leam about them, but 
it is not clear whether this was part of a direct plan against the e ’Lat-Ayong or a 
general policy against all clandestine rallies. According to Fernandez, the Spanish 
authorities were seriously concerned about the political implications of this 
movement. But colonial sources indicate that the Spanish were not very familiar with 
its actual nature.136 In 1949, the Sub-Governor referred to the e ’Lat-Ayong as a 
‘dance’, which according to the district officer of Rio Benito was unknown in the
i "xn •area. This document suggests that e ’Lat-Ayong was perceived as a sort of 
celebration pursued by the colonial authorities for its ‘ambiguous’ morality rather 
than its political implications.138 This was not an isolated case, as the Spanish 
authorities generally ignored the details of most African expressions. In 1949, for 
example, Pinillos wrote an article in which he warned about the dangers of Bwiti, 
which should not be simply considered as ‘one of many secret societies’. He argued 
that it was necessary to investigate the actual nature of this cult, for its ‘hierarchical 
organization’ as well as ‘euro-phobic tendencies’ could represent a serious ‘political 
danger’.139
Fernandez’s analysis of the e ’Lat-Ayong does not quite do justice to the influence 
of the movement. Certainly, it never became a mass movement or developed into a 
direct political challenge to the colonial order, but its importance went beyond its
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symbolic character.140 In its search for forgotten clan ties and for social regeneration, 
the e ’Lat-Ayong by the late 1940s had evolved into a movement working for a unified 
ethnic identity.141 Whatever its downfalls, this was no doubt the greatest legacy of the 
movement.
Following the tradition of old genealogies and migratory accounts, two 
Cameroonian Fang, Afa’a Bibo’o and Ondo Enguru, created the myth of Afri Kara, 
the common ancestor of the entire Fang or Beti people. In 1948, Ondo Enguru 
converted this legend into the book Dulu Bon be Afri Kara — The Journey of the 
Children of Afri Kara -  which helped in spreading what, over the years, has become 
the best-known account across the modem borders that separate the descendents of 
Afri Kara. Written in Bulu dialect, despite the Ntumu origin of its two co-authors, the 
legend narrates the long migration of the descendents of Afri Kara from their original 
village by the salt sea (mdng me nku), to the piercing of the adzap tree that symbolizes 
the entrance into the rainforests, to the final separation of the descendents of Afri 
Kara in different directions until their arrival into the territories where they live today. 
This fascinating book, as Mbana suggests, is, above all, an expression of Fang self- 
realization within an environment characterized by the problems that colonial 
domination posed.142 Despite its numerous symbols and alterations to suit the needs of 
the colonized Fang, the account should not be dismissed simply as an ahistorical 
tradition, for it is based on numerous historical elements recorded in old accounts, 
such as the escape from militarily superior peoples (Bivee be Bot or Red People), the 
long settlement in Odzambo ’a on the border between the savannah and the rainforest, 
the shock of entering into the unknown milieu, the crucial cultural contribution of the 
Bokuin or Pygmies, the gradual split of family groups after entering in the forest, and 
so forth.143 Inspired by genealogical stories, the book very much follows the pattern of
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Fang historical accounts in which the names of the ancestors, the villages in which 
they lived, their descendents, the separation of brothers who later become founders of 
new clans, and the origins of numerous traditions are all narrated.144 Afa’a Bibo’o and 
Ondo Enguru basically translated the concept of the ‘sewing of the clan’ present in 
most genealogies into a broader concept embracing all Fang clans and even all 
African peoples. Thus Afri Kara, whose name’s resemblance with Africa is not 
coincidental but full of symbolism, appears as the common ancestor of all Africans. 
The name Afiri t hope or future, and Kara, crab which refers to the etymological origin 
of the Portuguese term camarao, can be literally translated as the hope or future of the 
crab; that is, according to Alexandre, the Fang or Beti ‘are the future of Cameroon 
and Africa.’145 From the union between Afri Kara and one of his multiple wives, Nane 
Ngo’o Baa, seven children were bom: Fang Afiri, Oka’a Afiri, Mevu m’Afiri, Nden 
Afiri, Bula Afiri, Nge Afiri -  mother of Owono Nge -  and Ntum Afiri. The seven, 
united by their symbolic uterine origin, are the ancestors of each of the main Fang 
subgroups: Fang, Okak, Mevu-me-Nde, Bulu, Yewondo and Ntumu.146
Afri Kara was not only an attempt to strengthen a common identity through blood 
ties, but also to provide the Fang with a historical consciousness in which they were 
incorporated within the much broader historical context of humankind. Against the 
Western worldview, the Fang had Afri Kara, the father of the Fang and all African 
peoples. Like most clan genealogies that usually started with Mebe’e (God) and 
Nzama, his son and the first of a long series of human ancestors that eventually give 
origin to the founder of the clan, Afri Kara’s lineage goes far beyond. If the book is a 
‘neo-tradition’, as Mbana argues, it is mostly due to the presence of Western 
influences, especially Christian, mixed within a mostly traditional setting, and not so 
much to the fact that it is a modem creation.147 Indeed, the structure of the book is
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inspired by the Bible, whereas there is a constant preoccupation with stressing the
monotheistic character of Fang ancestral religion and how they developed other cults
to worship the Creator.148 In the Afri Kara account, the Fang and by extension all
Africans are linked to the rest of humanity by means of a common ancestor that
originated the fathers of each of the inhabited continents.
Narrated from the Ntumu perspective, the historical account does not finish with
the arrival in their present-day territory, but continues well into the colonial period.
The contact with the Europeans is accurately described as a gradual process that
culminated in the colonial conquest.149 Equally, the book narrates the imposition of
compulsory communal work, which is portrayed as the last straw in what became an
intolerable situation.150 E ’Lcit’Ayong’s view on colonialism can be read in the
conclusion of the book:
The cause of the decline of the Ntumu is their territorial dispersion... Some are located 
in Wele-Ntem (Gabon); the Governor there says that nobody can cross the river Ntem 
without authorization. Others live in the Spanish territories; the Governor there also 
prohibits crossing the river without documents. The same happens with those who live in 
Cameroon. Therefore if an intellectual or a good man lives in the Spanish territories or in 
Cameroon or in Wele-Ntem cannot have any contact with his brothers, nor try anything 
to help them... In conclusion, what has weakened the Ntumu is the compartmentalization 
of these countries.
I wish I had served under a single flag: Ah, Nane Ngo’oooo!151
In Rio Muni, the e ’Lat-Ayong movement found it difficult to extend beyond the 
Ntumu area. Nonetheless it succeeded in consolidating a Fang common identity 
across the Spanish colony, as colonialism inadvertently provided the tools for the 
spread of these ideas. Being a movement led by literate Fang, many of whom worked 
in different branches of the colonial structure, it was possible to transmit the main 
e ’Lat-Ayong notions to Fang people as they were posted all over the colony.152 The
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myth of Afri Kara was extremely attractive to all the Fang, because it provided them 
with a history as well as an inteipretation as to their present situation. Initially 
transmitted as an oral account, Dulu Bon be Afri Kara was published by the American 
Presbyterian Mission of Ebolowa in 1954, allowing it to be read in many villages. 
This in turn allowed the Fang to develop a sense of themselves beyond the narrow 
borders of the districts and colonies in which they lived. Between 1947 and 1948, the 
e ’Lat-Ayong movement reached its peak. In Mitzik, Gabon, the Pahouin Congress was 
celebrated in 1947 under the control of the French colonial government. 
Unfortunately there is not much information about this congress, but Balandier 
explains that there, numerous calls were made for the regeneration of a society in 
crisis and for Fang unity, yet the more dissenting voices of the ‘group of progressives’ 
asking for greater autonomy were eventually silenced by the majority of 
administrative chiefs. A year later in Ebolowa, Cameroon, the e ’Lat-Ayong 
movement took a step further with the creation of the Union Tribale Ntem-Kribi, 
which aimed not only at unifying all e'Lat-Ayong movements but also all Bantu 
peoples.154 Not being able to develop any similar activity in Rio Muni, the activists of 
the movement in the Spanish colony attended the rallies organized by the Ntem-Kribi 
Tribal Union which were called efula-moyong, the mixture of clans or nations.155 ‘It 
was then when we learnt that we were all brothers’, commented Ndongo Mb a.156 
Having developed the original movement into a pan-clan or even pan-ethnic political 
expression, these rallies became a space for the organization of opposition to
• 1 ^7European colonialism. As we shall see in the next chapter, however, this movement 
never consolidated itself as political alternative to colonial domination.
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Conclusion
The imposition of the colonial structure did not represent a sharp break in the 
history of the Fang, but it did unfold deep changes throughout the 1930s and 1940s. 
Fang society experienced serious instability, as it found it extremely difficult to deal 
with the pace and magnitude of such transformations. The erosion of key traditional 
institutions contrasted with the efforts of Fang elders to keep them alive. In trying to 
cope with the crisis, elders sought for reassurance in their old religious and political 
institutions. However, as these institutions weakened and proved unable to sort the 
crisis, the younger generation increasingly lost faith in the tradition of their ancestors, 
giving way to a new social and cultural organization by the end of the 1940s. 
Christianity also failed to solve the crisis, but it offered the key to a world of material 
prosperity free of the ‘superstitions’ that concerned their elders so much. The efforts 
of charismatic leaders to maintain local authority structures backfired, because, in 
their desperation, they increased the personal character of power excessively. In so 
doing, what was left of local authority came to rely mostly on charisma and not on the 
community, which had been traditionally the ultimate source of legitimacy. 
Undoubtedly, the most positive answer to the crisis was the development of a new 
political and cultural identity. The Fang identity, rather than being ‘invented’, was 
transformed on the basis of their historical heritage; hence its vigour. Thanks to their 
new identity, the Fang were better equipped to understand their position within the 
colonial environment and provide a more adequate response to the new challenges. 
Nonetheless, this process, as we shall see in the following chapters, was never smooth 
due to the lack of freedoms of the colonial and postcolonial regimes.
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Chapter 5
The Fang Find “Modernity”
The 1950s and 1960s saw how the socio-cultural organization that emerged from 
colonial rule consolidated its position in Spanish Guinea. More and more individuals 
aspired to adopt ‘modernity’ in an effort to improve their social and economic status. 
Nonetheless, in Equatorial Guinea, like in the rest of colonial Africa, modernity was 
never synonymous with the socio-cultural model that dominated European societies in 
the mid-twentieth century; not even that of backward Spain. The only modernity 
Equatorial Guineans knew was that imposed by colonial authorities; that is, a series of 
social, cultural, administrative and economic structures, which, though based on the 
metropolitan ones, were substantially modified in order to fit the needs imposed by 
colonial domination. Although traditional structures still dominated a fundamentally 
rural Fang society, colonial modernity achieved a paradigmatic character in the 1950s 
and 1960s, as it became the referential model that many aspired to reach through 
Western education, Christianity and capitalist economic activities. This chapter will 
analyse the relationship between traditional and modem structures within Fang 
society during a period in which modernity gained ground at the expense of tradition, 
becoming the dominant social and cultural reference.
The success of Catholic evangelization during this period was undoubtedly the 
main manifestation of the modernity embraced by the Fang. Colonial modernity was 
characterized by the coexistence between archaic and modem European institutions. 
In looking at this aspect of Fang society, we shall see how the massive acceptance of 
Christianity was greatly determined by the belief that Christianity was the doorway to
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modernity; in other words, to the world of the whites. Within this context, traditional 
institutions, especially political ones, were abandoned since they no longer served a 
puipose in the rapidly changing Fang society. The rise in authoritarianism amongst 
administrative chiefs exacerbated their loss of legitimacy, especially after society 
understood that it was the government and not the chief in which actual authority lay. 
‘Acculturated’ Fang soon realized that, despite embracing modernity, the colonial 
system curtailed their own ability to achieve the social and economic improvement 
that the very system claimed to offer. Although Fang self-assertion never evolved into 
a nationalist movement, it did contribute to the development of Equatorial Guinean 
nationalism. To become modern amounted to live like Europeans, which is precisely 
what nationalism sought. However, this goal was undermined by the lack of 
integration of a colonial society in which neither modernity nor tradition were 
complete socio-cultural models. This realization led to the development of the ‘double 
realm’ or compartmentalization of social and cultural structures, which resulted in the 
coexistence between Fang or traditional institutions and Spanish or modem ones. The 
development of the latter was partly undermined by racial segregation, which allowed 
minimum contact between European and African societies, and the fact that it was 
Africans themselves -  catechists, chiefs and teachers -  who transmitted modernity to 
the rest of the African population.
Christianity holds sway
The combined effects of missionary evangelization and repressive colonial 
policies on Fang society were apparent by the late 1940s. By then, old Sanaga-Ogowe 
religious cults had nearly disappeared from most of Rio Muni, remaining only in 
isolated areas. The generational change of the late 1940s and early 1950s proved that
261
the Claretians’ relentless focus on the evangelization and education of children had 
been an effective strategy. The instruction level of most people educated in 
missionary schools and reducciones was certainly poor, yet it was enough to question 
basic Fang principles, which had been formerly maintained through the use of meld or 
ritual prohibitions. Social movement within the Fang hierarchical structure was 
regulated by elders and symbolized by rituals of passage. The missionaries did not 
ignore the social functions of such rituals, but, since their goal was to undermine the 
existing social order, they clearly targeted ritual prohibitions. Christianity was 
portrayed as the key to social equality, and women and children were promised 
immunity from Fang prohibitions by means of a new passage rite, baptism. Today, 
some elders explain that ‘gluttony’ spelt the end of Fang cults, because Christian 
women and children could eat any meat, including those animals that were 
exclusively reserved to initiated individuals; that is, the ambition for enjoying the 
privileges of adult males precipitated the decadence of local cults.1 Whether we call it 
gluttony or ambition for a more promising society, it is clear that by the 1950s the 
religious role of the previous generation was almost non-existent. Younger Fang 
embraced Christianity as their religion, and, according to the Catholic faith, their 
children were usually baptized soon after being bom; no longer were questions raised 
as to what the ancestors had to say.
Although the post-war economic development in Rio Muni was modest in 
comparison to the plantation-based economy of Fernando Po, it made possible a clear 
improvement in the living standard of the African population. Undoubtedly this had a 
positive effect on the expansion of Christian beliefs, since people could experience 
firsthand the benefits of European culture of which Christianity was a fundamental 
part. The rise in witchcraft accusations that since the late 1930s affected Fang society
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appeared to have been successfully contained one decade later, as explained by a 
colonial report in 1950:
It has been observed during the last year that, in comparison with previous years, there 
has been a very significant decrease, almost total disappearance, of all those cases that 
showed native’s backwardness, especially of those of the mainland’s interior. We are 
speaking, in particular, about those cases related to criminal manifestations of their secret 
sects, whether they are autochthonous like Evu or imported like Mbueti [Bwiti], in 
connection with ritual anthropophagy. This is a clear result of the vigilant and 
educative work of the administration, on the one hand, and the spiritual one of the 
Religious Missionaries, on the other.2
From this point, there is no record in colonial documentation of major incidents
associated with witchcraft and similar practices. The social tensions linked to the
initial stages of the introduction of cocoa and coffee crops diminished as more people
benefited from these cultivations and other economic activities related to the colonial
system. By the late 1940s, the Fang were becoming to terms with the effects of such
transformations, which were no longer attributed to witchcraft practices. Success was
now explained in different terms, because, as an informant explained, once Meldn was
gone, ‘the Fang man was left only with three things to face his problems: many
children to farm and reap abundant harvest, physical strength to work hard in case one
did not have many children, and discernment to chose the right business strategy.’3
The belief in witchcraft did not disappear completely, yet its scope was diminished to
extreme cases, as people could see a cause and effect relationship between economic
prosperity and cash crop cultivation and education. The latter replaced ritual
preparation -  cikomng’a -  as the tool to guarantee children’s success in life.
In addition to the improvement in living conditions, so-called witchcraft practices
were also affected by the harsh measures adopted by the Spanish authorities during
the 1940s. Now, when people were suspected of witchcraft activities or rituals against
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such practices were earned out, this was kept in secret in order to avoid the 
intervention of the district officer. Something similar happened with the expansion of 
religious movements like Bwiti, which, after becoming a great concern for the Spanish 
authorities, came to a halt by the late 1940s.4
Contrary to colonial rhetoric, which linked Bwiti to witchcraft and 
anthropophagous sects, Bwiti was a communal religious movement, in the fashion of 
past ancestor cults, that sought to maximize the fortune of the members of the cult. 
This decentralized movement seemed to be born in the late nineteenth century around 
the Gabon Estuary, probably amongst the Mitsogo people. Fernandez in numerous 
articles and, especially, in his influential ethnological work, Bwiti, describes this 
religious movement as an adaptation of previous Central African ancestors cults, such 
as Meldn. Despite its syncretic nature, in which elements of Christianity were 
integrated especially from the 1940s, Bwiti, somehow, sought to re-establish links 
between worshipers, the ancestors and God. Bwiti was bom out of the sense of crisis 
that followed colonial conquest, and which was believed to be the result of the 
abandomnent of the ancestors.5 Unlike Meldn, Bwiti transcended family, gender and 
age boundaries, since both men and women from different clans and ethnic groups 
took part in ceremonies, and yomig men, especially since the 1940s, could play a 
leading role. This was, indeed, one of the worrying factors of this religious 
movement, in which blacks -  Africans -  were given a sense of communality in 
opposition to whites. Pinillos, for instance, refers to a Bwiti legend that claimed that 
Jesus was murdered to prevent blacks from knowing the ‘truths of the world.’6
The dynamism of all kind of African religious manifestations, such as Bwiti and 
Ngii was seriously undermined by repressive colonial measures, which included the 
use of the death penalty. Moreno and Novoa argue that after the execution of seven
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bandji (.Bwiti members) in 1948, the cult became much less visible, abandoning its 
former proselytizing approach.7 Unlike Bwiti in Gabon, no religious movement was 
created or widely spread across Rio Muni during the colonial period. Bwiti, which 
spread into the Muni Estuary at the turn of the twentieth century, was mostly limited 
to the south-western and south-central part of the territory. This is not surprising 
considering the repressive climate created by the Spanish authorities, especially 
effective within Rio Muni’s narrow borders. The existence of a religious movement 
does not only require that a community ‘accepts a new religious form but also 
transmits it to other individuals and groups’, and this was certainly difficult in a 
territory like Rio Muni, under the close scrutiny of colonial officers, missionaries and 
elements of the African population. Inadvertently, some of the Spanish strategies to 
combat Bwiti backfired, favouring, at least initially, the expansion of this cult. 
Members of Bwiti arrested in coastal areas were confined to regions of the colony 
where Bwiti was unknown. Given the proselytizing nature of Bwiti, in which non­
initiated people were allowed to attend ceremonies, local individuals could be co­
opted to becoming active members of the cult.9
Sources indicate that Spanish propaganda with regards to African religious 
manifestations was quite effective. When asked about Bwiti, informants’ views are 
very different from academic interpretations like that of Fernandez who sees in Bwiti 
a reformative and affirmative cult. Initially there were numerous misconceptions 
about Bwiti, which was purposely portrayed as an anthropophagous sect by the 
colonial government and the Catholic missionaries. This, along with most of the Fang 
population’s ignorance of the cult, contributed to the development of exceptionally 
negative views on Bwiti, particularly in regions like present-day Kie-Ntem where the 
cult never took root. Nobody can explain exactly why Bwiti was so unpopular in
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northern Rio Muni, but it appears that it was seen as a form of witchcraft, feared by 
many.10 hi becoming increasingly clandestine to protect itself from Spanish 
persecution, the mystery around Bwiti grew, raising all kind of rumours about the evil 
nature of its rituals. The ingestion of iboga, a hallucinogenic substance, for example, 
was frequently argued in many informal conversations as the main reason to reject 
Bwiti. This is certainly surprising, considering that Meldn also involved the intake of a 
hallucinogen, alan.u Whatever the reason, Bwiti members found it very difficult to 
explain that this cult was merely a religious movement and should not be feared.12 
The profound effects of this campaign are still visible today. In districts like 
Evinayong, where Bwiti flourished in the 1930s and 1940s and continuing to be 
celebrated long after, people are very reluctant to talk about the cult. Spanish 
propaganda did not only affect new cults like Bwiti but also old ones like Ngii, which, 
according to one informant, was believed to be ‘foolishness’ by many of his peers in 
the 1950s, despite the fact that their fathers still took it very seriously.13 African 
religious beliefs were either demonized or ridiculed to such an extent that most Fang 
people embraced in varying degrees some of these misconceptions.
Despite retreating in the face of Christian culture and colonial repression, local 
religious beliefs did not disappear completely, hi fact, the existence of cults like Bwiti 
and later Mibili indicate that the Fang managed to enrich their religious repertoire 
through the influence of neighbouring peoples both from inside and outside the 
Spanish colony. Nonetheless, it is clear that this period was dominated by Christian 
culture. When asked whether any other cult replaced the functions that Meldn used to 
serve in the village, most people initially give a negative answer. If anything, many 
replied that they were left only with Christianity.14 It is only after some discussion 
that informants admit that, in certain occasions, some rituals where celebrated in the
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village. Clearly, their answers denote that these rituals had a marginal character, for 
they did not have the same consideration as Meldn nor were celebrated often. 
Referring to one of these rituals, a relatively young woman explained that during the 
1960s ‘life was pretty ordinary’ and people ‘only looked after their farms, which did 
well’, thus ‘those rituals were not celebrated in the village.’15 Christianity did not 
make modem Fang less pragmatic than their ancestors, therefore religious 
celebrations remained rather scarce due to the relative material prosperity of this 
period. In contributing to this climate of perceived spiritual calm, the reduction of 
mortality resulting from economic prosperity and colonial health policies also made 
local rituals somewhat unnecessary.
Despite informants’ descriptions of rising prosperity, we should not paint too rosy 
a picture of the late colonial period. Manny people’s memories are tainted by the 
repression and hardships that followed the country’s independence, but living 
conditions were not ideal within a colonial system perceived as unjust due to the 
numerous obstacles for the improvement of the African population. In dealing with 
unjust interventions by the colonial state and other problems, the Fang resorted to 
Bowuu and Abira. These rituals are comparable to what the Fang generically call aban 
meten or blessing of the village, whose main purpose is to expel whatever evil there is 
within the community and restore the natural order. Perhaps because Bwiti never 
spread to northern Rio Muni, these rituals appeared to have been more common in 
this region than south of the river Wele. In accordance with the previous tradition, 
Bowuu and Abira involved the role of the ancestors who were asked by the elders for 
assistance to rid the village of existing difficulties. Skulls relics, however, were not 
present. There are conflicting views as to whether or not these rituals were banned by 
the authorities, yet it does not seem that the Spanish took a tough stance on them.16
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Fang religious beliefs remained alive especially in the minds of those elders most 
sceptical about the religion and culture of the Europeans. Many of them rejected 
Christianity and even refused to allow their children to be baptized and to go to 
school. Meldn relics were gone, yet, during the 1930s and 1940s, they reinvented new 
cults in which the ancestors maintained their intermediary and protective role. Bowuu 
seems to have followed an initiation pattern similar to that of Meldn, which was 
narrowly linked with the Sanaga-Ogowe So ritual. The latter took its name from the 
red antelope, so, whose meat was exclusively reserved to those men initiated in this 
ritual, and which also allowed them to participate in Meldn ceremonies.17 Informants 
do not refer to the existence of So during their lifetime, yet a few of them claim that 
Bowuu was an initiation lite that allowed men to eat red antelope.18 This information 
complements those views that describe Bowuu fundamentally as a purification ritual. 
It is difficult to know the origin of this rite but Ndongo Mba and Tessmann provide 
some clues which may shed some light on this process. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, Tessmann explained that after being initiated a neophyte received 
several tattoos or scars in the back of his neck; this mark was called wu.]9 Ndongo 
Mba confirms that these scars are called ‘bogu ' [bowuu], which is plural for wu.20 It is 
probable that due to the decline of some Sanaga-Ogowe cults, such as So and Meldn, 
and the later confiscation of Meldn relics, Fang elders recombined elements of the two 
cults into a new one, which included an initiation rite as well as the mediator role of 
the ancestors. Informants recount that during the ritual the name bowuu is called, 
which, according to them has no meaning, but whose root seems quite close to the 
verb a wu (to die) and the noun nwuu (dead person),21 Due to the absence of 
‘gruesome’ elements, such as human bones, that could attract the condemnatory
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vigilance of the Europeans, Bowuu could be practiced with relative freedom. 
Nonetheless data do not suggest that this cult spread beyond present-day Kie-Ntem.
It is not very clear, as De Craemer, Vansina and Fox suggest for Central Africa 
generally, that the exchange of ideas was expanded and intensified in Rio Muni; at 
least not during the first half of the twentieth century.22 Despite the fact that colonial 
domination facilitated contacts within Rio Muni, religious practices did not benefit 
greatly from this situation because they had to be hidden from the colonial 
establishment and its closest African allies. In his study of southern Gabon, Gray 
argues that Europeans’ disregard of the ‘supernatural’ allowed elders to remain in 
control of this part of the ‘precolonial cognitive map’, placing the ‘invisible’ realm 
‘beyond the influence of the colonial administration’.24 hi Rio Muni, however, Fang 
religious manifestations seemed to have lost their previous dynamism. This is partly 
explained by the hostile colonial environment but also by what appears to have been a 
reduction in the celebration of local rituals. As Fernandez argues, ‘systematization 
was buried in action and image’ in Central African societies; that is, the strength of 
the belief system is mostly kept through regular religious practice.25 Action, however, 
was quite scarce during this period. Despite the lack of evidence, Fernandez was 
inclined to think that soon after the contact with the Europeans ‘a decrease in the 
complexity of Fang cognitions of their own culture’ took place, which, to my mind, 
might have been caused by the reduction of religious activity just mentioned.26 This 
conclusion is inevitable if one compares modern Fang religious thought with the one 
reflected in Tessmann’s monograph of less than a century ago. Fang elders of the 
1930s and 1940s sought to transmit their knowledge to those younger men who were 
considered to have special aptitudes and who remained in the village away from 
strong European influence, yet this process was undermined by the repressive colonial
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climate. In the 1950s and 1960s, this generation started to take over, but given that 
they did not experience religious life previous to the arrival of the Europeans and their 
formation had been incomplete, they had to reinterpret new ways on the basis of less 
complex religious beliefs within an adverse climate dominated by Clnistianity.
The lack of vigour of African religious manifestations in the late colonial period 
contrasts with that of Christianity, whose popularity grew as the younger generation 
started gaining control over their society. Christianity was the religion of the 
European colonizer, but it was also the religion of a more modem and vibrant society 
in which many Africans in the Spanish colony wanted to be integrated. Within 
colonial society, one of Africans’ maximum aspirations was to reach the status of 
emancipcido, which, on paper, put them on the same cultural level with Europeans. To 
be Christian was obviously a sine qua non to reach the point of so-called cultural 
evolution required to enjoy the benefits of full citizenship. Very few became 
emancipados, for the law required a level of economic independence difficult to 
obtain for the vast majority of the African population. Nonetheless, Christianity 
allowed many to pursue and advance their careers within education and the colonial 
administration. Polygamy was strongly discouraged by the Spanish administration, 
which saw such behaviour as contrary to Christian civilization and morality. Having 
observed that many Christian Africans were still reluctant to many canonically, the 
Spanish administration decided to pay a salary bonus to those functionaries who did
27 ■ * •so. Living m accordance with Christian principles could put one in a position to be 
promoted by the Europeans, which subsequently resulted in many economic and 
social rewards. Such a lifestyle, somehow, brought Africans closer to the way of life 
of the European, and, as one infonnant acknowledges, cat that time, people who were 
married canonically had plenty of prestige’.28
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Photograph 28: Under the term “baleles”, the Spanish allowed dances that were previously part
of religious rituals
Photograph 29: “Baleles” were often encouraged as folkloric m anifestations
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Key to the success of Christianity was the speed with which it was internalized by 
the Fang, passing from being considered the religion of the colonizers to be accepted 
as a local institution. Indeed, this process was facilitated by the important role of 
Africans in the evangelization of Rio Muni. Scholars such as Fernandez often 
highlight the importance of the missionaries by placing their influence above that of 
colonial officers, yet this was very much possible thanks to the assistance of African
9 0catechists and pastors. In commemorating the centenary of the Catholic missions in 
the Gulf of Guinea in 1959, Father Olangua acknowledged that the function of the 
African catechist was ‘invaluable’ when it came to ‘forming a new Christendom’.30 
The average Fang did not learn the Christian gospel through the mouth of the 
European missionary, but through their African assistants. Despite Rio Muni’s limited 
size, the Claretians never had enough human resources to cover the territory. In 1959 
there were 53 priests, including 12 Africans, in the colony in addition to a larger 
number of brothers and sisters from several religious orders and some 325 
catechists. From central missionary stations in Nkue, Evinayong or Bata, a given 
missionary periodically visited the reducciones in villages under his supervision.32 
The frequency of missionaries’ visits was not only limited by the lack of resources but 
also by climate, since their touring was interrupted by the two annual rainy seasons 
that could make travel almost impossible in certain areas. Most informants admit that, 
although their contact with Europeans was mostly with the missionaries, they rarely 
saw them more than twice a year. Claretians’ visit to their reducciones usually 
coincided with the commemoration of the village’s patron or other similar important 
occasions. These visits could be more frequent in the case of reducciones in big 
villages where the large number of followers required the special attention of the 
missionary.33
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Photograph 30: Guinean priest celebrating mass
In many respects, Fang catechists had to play the role of priests, administering 
some sacraments such as baptism or the last rights, and celebrating religious services. 
As mentioned above, they were also responsible for initiating children into 
Christianity as well as providing spiritual guidance for the rest of their community. 
Not surprisingly, some people believe that the catechist’s role was more important 
than that of the missionary.34 When analysing the peculiarities of Catholicism in 
present-day Equatorial Guinea, one not only has to keep in mind the African cultural 
background in which Christianity developed, but also that Christianity was mostly 
interpreted and transmitted by Africans. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
absence of trained catechists forced the Claretians to resort to good students from 
their missionary schools. Initially most of these students came from coastal areas but 
as the Spanish penetration into Rio Muni progressed in the 1910s they also recruited 
pupils from the interior, especially the children of prominent leaders. The opening of 
two schools to train catechists in 1928 and 1931 did not succeed, as they had to close 
down in 1935 due to the lack of resources and support from the Republican
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government.35 These schools were never opened again and, during the remaining 
colonial period, most catechists continued to come from Claretian boarding schools.36 
Clearly, their religious training was never comparable to the one received in Catholic 
seminaries. With a rudimentary understanding of the intricate Catholic theology, Fang 
catechists became the new ‘peasant intellectuals’ having to interpret and explain the 
message to their followers. As one informant recalls, in the early stages of 
evangelization, people could refer to these catechists as a sort of prophet, for in 
religious discussions an opinion was usually preceded by the words 'Jose Menana a 
dzd net’ -  ‘Jose Menana says that’.37 In a process similar to other African peoples, the 
Fang Africanized Christianity by adding their own interpretations and rites to the 
Catholic liturgy. Fang Christianity became essentially ritualistic, with a lesser 
emphasis on Catholic moral principles.38 The Fang were equally influenced by 
Christianity, which made them more concerned with the hereafter at the same time as 
providing them with a more universal worldview.39
Many informants explain that they were mostly taught about the Christian gospel, 
without much emphasis given to ‘correcting’ Fang customs. This is somewhat 
suiprising considering that missionaries were aware that so-called pagan practices and 
beliefs remained alive in Fang villages. Only a few informants had memories about 
missionaries censuring certain customs such as the use of protective amulets, which 
were dismissed as foolishness before the impotent eyes of Fang parents who had to 
see their children dispossessed of ritual protection against misfortune.40 The issue that 
by and large continued to aggravate missionaries during the 1950s and 1960s was 
polygamy, because most Fang men, like their fathers before them, did not want to 
renounce polygamy on principle, and continued to reject canonical marriages even if 
they were monogamous.41 Since missionaries sought to maintain the picture of the
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‘merciful White’ in the eyes of Africans, they avoided being seen as ruthless and
condemnatory in their sporadic visits to Fang villages. With regards to Fang
catechists, the situation was a bit more complicated. Firstly, they came from the same
cultural background as their fellow villagers, and their Christian faith had not
succeeded in eliminating certain enduring beliefs such as the power of evu and byang.
In 1966, Perramon estimated that, despite ninety per cent of Fang were baptized, they
still believed in ‘medicina’ (byang).A1 Secondly, having to share the same village
space with other Fang Christians, it was not in their best interest to exacerbate
tensions within the community and, thus, make their life harder. In addition, Fang
catechists found it very difficult to reach the right equilibrium between the culture
they came from and the religion they followed. Bonifacio Ondo Edu, one of the most
prominent catechists and who would later serve as the President of the Autonomous
Government between 1964 and 1968, had many difficulties in explaining to his fellow
men certain aspects of Christianity:
Amulets were removed but, in exchange, they were given crosses, medals and 
scapularies.
Totemic figures were despised, but yet they were made to worship images of saints.
The marvellous doings of their wizards and warriors were mocked, but, on the other 
hand, they were told about the miracles and marvels of saints and the extraordinarily 
supernatural tales of the Bible.
They were censured for offering food and hens to the dead, while Christians honour them 
with candles and flowers... Their wizards were discredited as frauds, despite being 
considered as their legitimate intermediaries between people and spirits, having 
extraordinary powers. However, they were taught to believe in the supernatural powers of 
the Catholic priest; powers as potent as the Eucharistic consecration, the forgiveness of 
sin, salvation through baptism, protection or liberation from evil through exorcisms and 
blessings.43
Despite Christianity’s inability to eliminate completely local beliefs, by the late 
1950s it was clear that, as far as numbers were concerned, the Claretians had won
275
their battle against local cults and other Christian denominations in Rio Muni -  
180,000 Catholics and 8,000 Protestants out of a total population of 198,663 people.44 
The competition between Catholics and Protestants added further conflicts to village 
life, with their communities divided between Protestant and Catholic followers as 
leaders of both denominations sought to attract the largest number of converts as 
possible.45 In spite of Claretian complaints, this competition was clearly imbalanced 
since they had much more human and economic resources as well as enjoying official 
support. The colonial government’s concern with Protestantism was based more on 
political than on religious grounds. By the late 1940s the Spanish authorities were 
aware of growing nationalist demands in neighbouring colonies, which were usually 
voiced by educated Africans. In this respect, Protestantism was considered as a threat 
in Spanish Guinea, not only because its alliance to the colonial government was not 
clear but also because the majority of pastors were African. In response to this 
situation, in 1949 the Spanish decided to carry out an intensive survey on the situation 
of all Protestant chapels in the colony. The 1949 report included the number of 
chapels in each district, their ascription, the central mission on which they depended, 
number of followers, and so forth. The same report acknowledged that Protestant 
missions activities were undermined by district officers.46 Almost a decade later, 
Protestant activities in Rio Muni became much more worrying as the African 
population started to make more evident their dissatisfaction with a system that 
limited their social and economic improvement. Following the announcement of the 
independence of the Cameroonian Presbyterian Church in 1957, the Spanish 
authorities decided to impose censorship on all mail involving Protestant African 
pastors 47 This measure, however, did not stop the rise of nationalist demands in the 
late 1950s and 1960s. From then, social dissatisfaction was not expressed in terms of
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witchcraft accusations, nor took the form of religious movements; rather, the Western 
educated elite opted for ‘modem’ ways of political stmggle.
It is the state that matters: the decline of village autonomy
In so-called traditional societies, customs and institutions mostly survive as 
constituent elements of the broader tradition or culture in so far as they serve a 
purpose. Pre-industrialized societies can rarely afford to preserve outdated customs 
that are otherwise stored as folkloric elements in the industrialized world. By the late 
1940s, as the passage of time took its inevitable toll on charismatic elders, most Fang 
were aware that mmnarna leadership was meaningless. The death of Fang elders came 
along with the decline of the values that they struggled to preserve for several 
decades, only eventually to become part of people’s memories. The establishment of 
the native justice system in 1938 increased the colonial government’s interference in 
village affairs, putting a serious strain in the relationship between the community 
leader and the administrative chief. One decade later, it was very difficult to 
distinguish one from the other. A Fang elder explained that minnama never 
disappeared, it was simply transfoimed into what was nowadays called nkukuma, 
whose leadership is as essential for the village as ‘the soil is for men’.48
By the late 1940s, Fang society was left without the mechanisms to counteract the 
individualistic trends encouraged by all sectors of the colonial establishment. The 
younger generation of Fang chiefs did not share the same values of their predecessors. 
To them, personal ambitions came before their responsibility to their communities, a 
tendency that was accentuated during this period. The erosion of check-and-balance 
mechanisms did not necessarily mean that Fang administrative chiefs became ruling 
despots within their villages, because colonial authorities continued to be extremely
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wary of empowering local authorities to the extent that they could no longer be
controlled. The Spanish approach towards administrative chiefs was always
influenced by a mixture of racism and suspicion. In 1939, the chief Jose Menana of
Mbe, Mikomeseng, reported the intention of a group of Fang civil servants and chiefs
to hire a lawyer to defend African interests in Spain to the colonial authorities.49
Although the Sub-Govemor suggested rewarding him, the Governor-general, advised
by the Mikomeseng district officer, refused to do so:
Baena [the district officer], who knows him well, believes that it is not appropriate to 
give him a reward, because he considers that he reported the case not out of good will, 
but out of outrage for being deceived... What Baena says completely agrees with the 
Bishop’s opinion, who claims that it is very dangerous to reward natives because, vanity 
being an innate quality in them, rewards are usually counterproductive.50
Chiefs’ authoritarian tendencies were as much limited by colonial officials as by 
the African population. In neglecting their duties as community leaders, 
administrative chiefs were seen by the Fang population as simple agents of the 
colonial government. Chiefs who referred conflicts to district officers were likely to 
be seen as ‘traitors’ to the village community.51 Accordingly, people understood that 
chiefs’ ability to impose their authority was mostly limited to those cases that directly 
concerned the colonial state, such as labour and marriage. All those spheres of village 
life in which the state did not intervene gradually escaped the control of village chiefs 
during the 1950s and 1960s. This contributed to the political compartmentalization of 
Fang communities, whose integration was never completely consolidated after the 
policy of resettlements of the 1920s and 1930s. Administrative chiefs of the 1950s 
and 1960s lacked the necessary skills to be acknowledged by all extended families at 
village level. In the 1930s, Fang families tended to acknowledge the leadership of 
chiefs from different families, but by the 1950s and 1960s people found it more
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difficult to recognize village leaders outside their families. Informants explain that in 
some cases this situation led to the appointment of more than one village chief in 
order to satisfy all families involved.52 Although such measures went against colonial 
authorities’ efforts to unify native authority, it is likely that individual district officers 
approved this kind of measure so as to avoid disruptive conflicts.53
Although divisions and tensions between extended families did not become 
evident until the late 1950s, this was an outcome of the series of accumulated actions 
of administrative chiefs from the late 1940s. The newer generation of administrative 
chiefs was chosen on different grounds than the first generation. Spanish officials 
were no longer as interested in their local legitimacy. Now, their aptitude was 
measured according to their level of acculturation and loyalty to the colonial state, 
which included some command of Spanish and literacy as well as their Christian 
commitment. An informant from the Anisok district clearly remembers how amongst 
a neighbouring clan, the succession for chieftainship opposed the clan elders against a 
younger candidate, who was finally appointed by officials thanks to his command of 
Spanish, his canonical marriage, and his leadership qualities learnt during service in 
the Colonial Guard. Clan elders chose a candidate amongst themselves, arguing that 
he knew Fang customs as well as the villages and people of the district, unlike his 
younger opponent who, after working outside the district for so long, was not familiar 
with village life.54
In the past, succession was usually decided after reaching some form of 
consensus amongst village elders as to whom was best qualified to protect the interest 
of the whole community. Behind administrative chiefs’ attempt to point out their 
successor was the secret desire to retain the chieftainship within their family, 
institutionalizing the hereditary character of this post. Accordingly, the election of the
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successor was usually an individual decision that ignored the will of the rest of 
villagers. Chieftainship turned into a self-promoting institution, while village families 
generally opposed chieftainships becoming the patrimony of a sole extended family. 
Referring to the dispute over succession in Beayop, where the young Nzang Okenve 
was appointed by his father -  Okenve Mituy an informant claimed that the two 
other families refused the election of the chiefs son because his ‘family have held the 
post for too long, so they cannot continue any longer.’55 The district officer had to 
intervene to ease the tension which threatened to destabilize part of the district. The 
district officer arrested numerous people, after a crowd marched for some thirty 
kilometres to the district capital to protest against the appointment of a young 
candidate. The arrested individuals were released on condition that they all returned to 
their village, where they should follow a regulated process to elect a new village 
chief.56 Finally a member of a different family was elected as chief. Although 
informants do not usually refer to this type of incidents -  disputes over leadership are 
frowned upon -  it appears that they were more common than are often accepted. 
These cases are often hidden by village official versions, which tell of succeeding 
chiefs being pointed out by their predecessors or elected by village men. Authority 
legitimacy continues to rest on the village community, thus, in order to legitimize the 
final outcome, the official version in Beayop claims that the succeeding chief was 
pointed out by Okenve Mituy from the beginning.
Administrative chiefs’ lack of prestige was influenced by district officers’ low 
concept of them, as it was evident in the leadership dispute in Beayop. Nzang Okenve 
was advised by the district offer to withdraw from the race over the chieftainship 
because the chieftainship was ‘worthless’ and, given his education, he could have a 
more prosperous future within the colonial administration.57 This advice eventually
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proved to be right, according to one informant.58 In spite of this, it is clear that many 
individuals actively sought chieftainships. The efforts of administrative chiefs to 
consolidate their position became clear during the visit of members of the 
metropolitan government to the colony in 1948, Although the main item in the agenda 
of the official delegation was the construction of the new airport at Bata, it was 
decided to carry out a mini tour across Rio Muni in order to see the progress of the 
colonial enterprise. The tour, which was initially considered as a simple formality, 
took a different tone when the delegation arrived in Mikomeseng. The district officer, 
knowing that the delegation had scheduled to meet a group of prominent chiefs and 
hear their views, asked this group of chiefs to write a letter where they expressed their 
petitions and concerns. Most Fang chiefs saw this as an opportunity to advance their 
position and request a series of improvements in the conditions of chieftainship from 
the metropolitan government. According to Marcelo Ndongo Mba, one of the Fang 
civil servants in charge of typing the letter, the chiefs of the Mikomeseng district 
asked for a salary, for the transformation of the position into one for life and for the 
position to be hereditary.59 hi view of the fact that most chiefs were only concerned 
with their own benefit, a group of educated men and chiefs led by Enrique Nvo and 
Carmelo Nguema Ndongo -  teacher and first-chief respectively -  decided to write a 
letter denouncing the abuses of the colonial system and asking for an improvement in 
the treatment of Africans, and, more significantly, for the possibility of sending a few 
acculturated Africans to Spain in order to expose the conditions and needs of the 
African population.60 Although a few chiefs reported this move to the district officer, 
the defiant group managed to hand in their letter to the metropolitan delegation, 
including the Minister of Aviation, Gonzalez Gallarza, Franco’s Undersecretary, 
Carrero Blanco, and the Director-General for Morocco and the Colonies, Diaz de
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Villegas. The colonial authorities, embarrassed by an incident that exposed Africans’ 
dissatisfaction with the colonial administration, reacted by punishing those involved 
in the plot. Those arrested were tortured and banished to Annobon, from where a few 
of them, including Marcelo Ndongo Mba, managed to escape.61
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Photograph 31: M arcelo Ndongo M ba in his office of Nkue
The 1948 incident announced the emergence of open dissatisfaction amongst 
certain sectors of the African population, which would develop into a nationalist 
movement by the mid-1950s. The incident also revealed that administrative chiefs 
would be an obstacle for the aspirations of the nationalist movement. Village 
leadership had clearly moved away from the principles of precolonial ideology and no 
longer aimed at representing the interest of the community. Furthermore, 
administrative chiefs, despite barely obtaining anything from the colonial 
administration, were very attached to their chieftainship and feared district officers. 
Being afraid of losing their posts, they were unable to represent the grievances of their
282
fellow villagers. Instead, they mostly limited their functions to referring judicial 
matters to the district officer, witness his resolutions and receive his orders. As a 
result, families were increasingly reluctant to refer their cases to the village chief or 
even to be represented by him. In the absence of the regulatory role of elders’ 
councils, village life became susceptible to administrative chiefs’ arbitrariness and 
partiality, which eventually exacerbated divisions and tensions within communities.
Although colonial chiefs enjoyed a specially privileged position, in many cases 
they were no different from the rest of the population. They also had to take part in 
the much-hated compulsory communal work, given that only emancipados, Africans 
working directly for the administration, migrant labourers and foreign Africans were 
exempt from it.62 In fact, the colonial government was aware of the precarious 
situation of most chiefs, whose situation deteriorated when they lost control over the 
hiring of villagers by European companies in the late 1930s. A colonial report pointed 
out that it was advisable to pay a salary to administrative chiefs, in order to avoid their 
interest in fomenting ‘palavers’ within their communities, since this was their only 
source of income. In spite of this, chiefs continued not receiving a salary during the 
colonial period.63 Only a small number of administrative chiefs could act as members 
of the district tribunal, so most chiefs lived thanks to their fanning activities. Given 
that administrative chiefs did not obtain much from the colonial administration, some 
used their authority to take advantage of their fellow villagers, especially in relation to 
two types of issues, women and personal disputes. According to colonial authorities, 
women filing for divorce should remain under the custody of the chief until the case 
was finally heard by the district officer. Nonetheless, chiefs could delay unnecessarily 
the referral of the case before the colonial authorities, so as to use women’s labour in
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their farms as well as other personal favours. With regards to administrative chiefs
conduct in divorce cases, an elder explained people’s stance:
Those cases took place, yet, at that time, this was not considered to he an abuse but 
something normal that we had to respect. It was assumed that during the process of 
divorce a woman had to stay in the nkukuma's compound. It is only later that people 
realized this was abusive,64
Other sources refer to cases in which clan chiefs used their position to undermine 
fellow clan members in case of personal clashes. Thus, there were cases in which 
people could be accused before the colonial authorities or they could be denied a 
positive report necessary to hire farm workers.65 An informant described how he was 
arrested and brutalized by the Colonial Guard after being accused by the chief of his 
clan in 1951. When asked about the type of accusations launched against him, he 
answered that he was simply arrested without being told why or without being able to 
defend himself; on top of that, he had to pay the colonial guards to compensate them 
for the ‘trip’, as was customary.66 Although abuses at the hands of chiefs appear to 
have been relatively limited during the 1950s and 1960s, it is difficult to measure the 
actual extent of the problem because even now people are reluctant to speak out.67
As in most African colonies, the nationalist movement in Equatorial Guinea 
developed an antagonistic relationship with local chiefs, who were seen, from the 
nationalist ranks, as agents of the colonial administration. This is not to say that the 
nationalist movement completely bypassed rural communities. Urban development 
was practically non-existent in Rio Muni, being limited to Bata and, to a lesser extent, 
Rio Benito, Ebibeyin and Mikomeseng, where commercial activities had a more solid 
basis. Educated elites, therefore, kept very strong links with the rural communities 
where they came from. Enrique Nvo, who along another emancipado, Acacio Mehe, 
was the most prominent nationalist leader in Rio Muni during the 1950s, developed
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most of his activities from his home-village of Mbe, Mikomeseng. As we shall later, 
the two leaders died in strange circumstances at the end of the decade, but, before 
their deaths, they tried to gather support from respected elders. The clash between 
nationalists and administrative chiefs was a logical consequence. The latter owned 
their privileged position, however limited it was, to the fact that they acted as 
government representatives. They claimed to be the legitimate heirs of precolonial 
Sanaga-Ogowe community leaders, thus their authority was based on tradition and 
age. The younger and educated generation, however, had problems in coming to terms 
with administrative chiefs authority, as they despised their lack of education and 
considered themselves to be better qualified to lead. If there was any hope as to the 
future of so-called traditional authority, this was sealed after the legalization of 
political parties by the Spanish government in 1963. From then on, African leadership 
came into play within the broader national arena, and so-called traditional authorities 
were ruled out as an alternative in taking meaningful decisions. Informants usually 
agree that village authority is no longer respected, and a few point out the arrival of 
politics as the moment in which this took place.68 At the same time, politics 
exacerbated divisions within communities, putting village and clan chiefs in a more 
precarious situation. In realizing that their role would be even smaller within an 
administration controlled by African politicians, many administrative chiefs chose to 
oppose the idea of independence.
The Fang complete their journey
The development of a common Fang identity did not result in the formation of a 
nationalist movement capable of claiming a nation state for the Fang people across the 
three colonial borders that separated them, as the leaders of the e ’Lat-Ayong would
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have desired. Following the foundation of the Kribi-Ntem Tribal Union in Cameroon 
in 1948, its activities gradually diminished during the 1950s and by the end of the 
decade the movement had virtually ceased to exist, hi Rio Muni, the movement 
always remained dependent on Cameroonian leadership, hence its actions were 
seriously affected by the political developments north of the border as well as Spain’s 
suspicion towards what was increasingly seen as foreign interference. Undoubtedly, 
the development of formal political parties in Cameroon had a negative effect on the 
fate of the e ’Lat-Ayong movement. Mbana recounts how a former member of the 
movement in Cameroon told him that ‘the political parties that fought for 
independence in Fang countries were utilized by colonial governments against Fang 
nationalism, since their goals were set within the border limits of the new states 
created by colonial powers.’69 The 1948 incident in Mikomeseng showed the 
existence of an incipient cooperation between early nationalist leaders, such as 
Enrique Nvo, and charismatic elders. To the educated elite, elders’ influence in their 
communities was key, for it went beyond that of administrative chiefs, who, as we 
have seen, were constantly caught between government and village loyalty. However, 
the younger generation of nationalist leaders, who started to emerge from 1959, 
developed a more antagonistic relationship with rural leadership. For as long as 
political activism was banned in Spanish Guinea, politicians, acting from exile mostly 
in Cameroon and Gabon, maintained closer contacts with charismatic elders in order 
to spread their messages. Once political activities were legalized at the end of 1963, 
political leaders gradually distanced themselves from their traditional counterparts. 
The latter were seen as competitors by a political class that enjoyed little or no 
influence within rural areas. Amongst the different political parties that saw the light 
in Rio Muni since 1959, only Idea Popular de Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE, Popular Idea
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of Equatorial Guinea) embraced Fang nationalism while pushing for a future union 
with Cameroon. As we shall see later, this option lost momentum throughout the 
1960s due to Spain’s opposition as well as regional divisions amongst Fang political 
leaders.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the investigation of this period of Equatorial 
Guinea’s history is constrained by the limited access to relevant documents in Spain 
and in Guinea. Amongst the available documentation, for example, there is no explicit 
mention to e ’Lat-Ayong as a protest movement. Nonetheless, informants acknowledge 
that in the 1950s, hardly any clan rallies were celebrated in northern Rio Muni.70 
Given that the movement continued to be active in southern Cameroon, at the same 
time that the number of refugees from Rio Muni grew throughout the 1950s, it is clear 
that the Spanish authorities increased the level of repression against protest activities. 
One year after the 1948 nationalist manifestation in Mikomeseng, the colonial 
government made enquiries on the spread of e ’Lat-Ayong across Rio Muni, in spite of 
not knowing its actual details, being simply defined as a ‘dance’.71 Less than a month 
earlier, in October 1949, the Sub-Governor had sent the newly appointed Governor, 
Faustino Ruiz Gonzalez, a complete report on the situation of Protestant missions in 
the colony.72 This should not be interpreted as an attempt to limit the religious 
influence of Protestantism, which was minimal according to the report, but as part of a 
strategy to stop the political threat of the so-called ‘Protestant plot’ which according 
to the authorities was behind the growing unrest.73 Not surprisingly, the Spanish 
authorities were more concerned than ever about ‘hindering’ the ‘activities and 
influence’ of Protestant missions in the region.74 The fact that most of these missions 
in Rio Muni were controlled by African pastors, especially those in Kie-Ntem where 
opposition activities were more conspicuous, added to Spanish concerns.75
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According to Donato Ndongo, the 1948 incident in Mikomeseng triggered the 
dismissal of Governor-General Bonelli and the subsequent appointment of Ruiz 
Gonzalez, whose long term in office coincided with growing nationalist activities in 
the colony. The activities were confronted by growing repression on the part of Ruiz 
Gonzalez’s administration.76 While the increase in repressive measures undermined 
the activities of the e'Lat-Ayong movement in Rio Muni, it also encouraged growing 
nationalist sentiments amongst educated Africans. Such is the case of Ndongo 
Miyone, a Fang and future nationalist leader from Mbini, who was brutalized by the 
police and expelled from the Banapa Seminary on Fernando Po in 1951 after a strike 
that simply demanded an improvement of the seminary’s education and living 
conditions.77
E ’Lat-Ayong’s decreasing influence in northern Rio Muni during the 1950s was 
not only the result of repressive Spanish measures. The movement was bom in 
response to the crisis of adaptation that followed colonial conquest. By the 1950s, 
Fang society had come to terms with certain elements of the colonial order as the 
Fang readjusted their socio-economic structures, at the same time that younger 
individuals, who did not know any other reality outside colonialism, started taking up 
positions of influence in society. The old values around which e ’Lat-Ayong sought to 
revitalize and unify Fang society, such as clan solidarity and elder authority, were less 
appealing for the younger generation. Given the colonial ‘pax’ imposed since the 
1920s and relative economic prosperity of the 1950s, the clan no longer seived as the 
protective mechanism of the past. In addition, increasing individualism resulting from 
the economic growth of the 1950s did not favour the strong communitarian principles 
behind the e ’Lat-Ayong movement, now that individuals’ fate had become less 
dependent on their communities.
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The emergence of political parties from the late 1950s, which contributed to the 
break of solidarity links and growing polarization within Fang society, did not 
originate from so-called tribal divisions, but from the administrative partitions 
established by colonialism. 78 This became clear during the autonomy period (1964- 
1968), when Macias Nguema turned into the candidate for the Fang of the interior 
(present-day Kie-Ntem and Wele-Nzas), Ondo Edu the candidate of the central region 
(present-day Centro-Sur), and Ndongo Miyone that of the coastal area (present-day 
Litoral). The origin of these divisions is unclear but it appears that, along with the 
usual distrust derived from geographic separation, it was also related to Spanish racial 
stereotypes that confronted the ‘savages’ from the interior versus the ‘civilized’ from 
the coast.79 Referring to the Kombe group, de Veciana wrote in 1956:
They were, along with the Benga, the first in having contact with the European culture.
They have a clear intellectual superiority in relation to other natives of our colony, and it
is no coincidence that the posts in the administration, education or trade, which have been
80assigned to natives, are mostly in their hands.
The formation of unified ethnic identities in colonial Africa did not require, in 
each case, the emergence of regeneration movements such as e ’Lat-Ayong. While 
fomenting internal divisions, colonial domination also contributed to the development 
of self-awareness by opposing a given people, now conscious of their similarities, 
against the remaining groups coexisting in the colony. A 1919 article in La Guinea 
Espanola illustrates how the Bubi, amongst whom there historically existed a clear 
division between those of the north and south of Fernando Po, started to refer 
themselves as Bubi because everybody else did, and in order to distinguish 
themselves from the outsiders.81 This common phenomenon was also observed 
amongst the Fang, who, according to Panyela, ‘felt Fang’ within the heterogeneous 
social context of Fernando Po, whereas in Rio Muni their identity was still dominated
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by the clan.82 In this respect, the uniqueness of the e ’Lat-Ayong movement’s 
contribution was not the formation of a common identity, but the active participation 
of the Fang in the development of their own identity. It provided the Fang with the 
necessary agency to elaborate an ethnic consciousness mostly determined by their 
historical dynamics and not only by foreign intervention. In so doing, the Fang 
surpassed the boundaries established by colonial powers, as their identity 
encompasses three different countries.
The name in itself is a symbol of self-determination, for the Fang refused to 
accept the foreign name, Pamue, forcing all sectors in the Spanish colony to 
eventually accept the local name, Fang. Nowadays, most Fang believe that this is the 
name that their forefathers always used to refer to themselves. In the process of 
developing an ethnic identity, the Fang adopted a common name in order to 
distinguish themselves from other social groups. The hitherto loose sense of identity 
was now made relevant, because colonialism created a multicultural reality that 
required greater interaction between the peoples living within colonial boundaries. 
Thus, in Rio Muni and Gabon they called themselves Be fang, whereas in Cameroon 
they named themselves Bed. E \Lat-Ayong and its influential spin-off, Dulu Bon be 
Afri Kara, despite being an affirmation movement, never promoted the use of a single 
term, hi fact, the title, The Journey o f the Children o f Afri Kara, is very significant, 
since in Fang one’s identity is expressed as “son o f ’. For example, a Fang man will be 
referred as mon fang  (son of the Fang). Ondo Enguru and Afa’a Bibo’o consciously or 
unconsciously overlooked this difficult matter and only referred to the numerous clans 
sharing a common language and culture across Cameroon, Gabon and Rio Muni as 
bon be Afri Kara, the children of Afri Kara.
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The question which is yet to be answered is how the term Fang came to be 
generally accepted by all sections of the Sanaga-Ogowe in Rio Muni and Gabon, 
whereas in Cameroon it never took root. North of the river Ntem the presence of the 
Fang-Fang was unknown, therefore it is not surprising that people could not identify 
themselves with the term Fang. In Rio Muni, on the other hand, this was a familiar 
term since the Fang-Fang inhabit sections of the east and centre of the territory. 
During the course of my fieldwork the complexity of this matter became clear, as it 
was very difficult to explain the actual nature of those questions that enquired of the 
origin of the term Fang. The sense of identity based on common language and culture, 
though loose, did predate the arrival of the Europeans, therefore, most people assume 
that Fang has been their name since time immemorial, being impossible to pinpoint a 
moment in time in which this name started to be used. Modern Fang identity was built 
upon the basis of continuity between past and present, hence, from the inside, there is 
no difference between their identity and that of their forefathers.83 Only after some 
discussion, a few elders from northern Rio Muni admitted that Fang was not always 
the name that they applied to themselves or their language, but Ntumu.M In fact, one 
of the informants kept constantly referring to the Ntumu instead of the Fang during 
the interview, and, when questioned about it, he replied that the term Fang ‘was 
promoted by the Spanish’ in order to ‘identify’ all those who say lma dzo na> or speak 
the Fang language.85
Father Soler refers to several legends that in the mid 1940s circulated across Rio 
Muni explaining how the name Fang was adopted to identified the entire ethnic group 
because such was the name of Afri Kara and Nane Ngo’o Baa’s first-born.86 A decade 
later, the name seemed to have been widely accepted and it was regularly used by 
Fang intellectuals when writing about their culture in La Guinea Espanola,87 This
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magazine, in which individuals linked to the e ’Lat-Ayong movement -  like Marcelo 
Ndongo Mba -  collaborated, played an influential role because, although the 
circulation of the Claretian magazine was rather limited amongst rural Africans, it 
was easily accessible to African civil servants and students based in Bata and Santa 
Isabel. For these individuals, displaced from their family environment, such readings 
gave them the opportunity to learn about themselves and develop a sense of identity 
beyond their family or clan boundaries. An elder in Ebibeyin explained that it was not 
until he moved to Bata to study that he was referred to as Fang for the first time.88 
Given that many of these educated Fang continued to keep close links with their home 
villages and were posted in different destinations as civil servants, the term Fang 
rapidly spread throughout Rio Muni. Furthermore, Mbana sees the appeal of the term 
Fang in its double etymological origin: fdm , man or male, on the one hand, and 
infang, genuine or authentic person, on the other.89
The construction of Fang identity affected all elements related to their past, 
including subgroup ascription. Having an extremely fluid character, subgroup identity 
never had much importance other than indicating the regional and dialect 
characteristics of those clans living within the same geographical space. As a result of 
the process of simplification that affected colonized society, the various Fang dialectal 
sections of Rio Muni were reduced to only two. The Spanish were aware of the 
regional and dialect differences amongst the Fang and, as early as 1919, they already 
mentioned the existence of two main Fang branches, although it would not be until 
1927 that this classification became more influential following the publication of the 
Fang-Okak catechism in 1927.90 By the 1940s, the colonial government’s 
acknowledgement gave official character to the emerging classification of the Fang. 
Thus, subgroup identity was transformed, as it was fixed by means of clear-cut
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definitions such as that of Governor Bonelli in 1944: ‘In Guinea the Pamue are 
divided in two large groups: the Ntumu and the Okak, practically separated by the 
river Benito [Wele], being the Ntumu to the north and the Okak to the south of the 
river.’91 In reality, the Fang were neither divided into these two groups alone, nor was 
the border between them clearly delineated by the river Wele. Ntumu clans could be 
found south of the Wele in so-called Okak territory and vice versa.
Photograph 32: River W ele
In addition, some educated Fang were also interested in simplifying their social 
reality as part of their effort to construct a comprehensible and explanatory past. Thus, 
Dulu Bon be Afri Kara, which in the 1950s and 1960s gained the status of a semi­
official account of Fang history, reduces to seven the number of Fang subgroups for 
the entire Fang-Beti territory, the descendents of the seven children of Afri Kara.92 
According to this account, the children of Ntumu Afiri marched their way to the sea 
along the left bank of the river Ntem, whereas the children of Okak Afiri followed the 
left bank of the Wele. Except for the Bisio, who were considered altogether a different 
ethnic group by the Spanish, the remaining Fang dialectal sections in Rio Muni
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followed a process of integration within the Okak and Ntumu ranks depending on 
their geographic location. Due to the historical fluidity of subgroup identity, the 
process of integration ran rather smooth. Nowadays, Equatorial Guinean Fangs have 
no memories whatsoever of a Fang subgroup -  Fang-Fang in modem anthropology -  
ever existing. Not even amongst those clans from central and eastern Rio Muni 
considered historically Fang-Fang, such as Bekpwen, Esangi, Osumu, Okas, or 
Esawong, does there exist any such memory of their Fang-Fang origin. Indeed, many 
informants in this area held some doubts as to their subgroup identity, but, in trying to 
resolve certain contradictions, the majority went as far as to say that perhaps they 
were originally Ntumu, without even contemplating the possibility of a Fang-Fang 
origin.93 Only a Bekpwen elder from Nfulu-Ayong, Evinayong, surprisingly admitted 
that: ‘I am Fang, I’m neither Ntumu nor Okak.’94
Selective memories have always characterized traditional societies, before and 
after the arrival of the Europeans, because the fluidity and character of these societies 
require the continuous legitimization of the present through the past. In the case of the 
Fang-Fang subgroup, their elimination from historical memory in Rio Muni appears 
to have been a necessary step to solve the conflict that the adoption of the name of 
their subgroup by the entire ethnic group posed, and also the outcome of educated 
Fang’s desire to simplify their social reality. So-called historical truths are rarely 
questioned, but if they are, a Fang elder may answer that all Fang subgroups received 
the name of one of the children of Afri Kara, Fang Afiri, because he was the eldest 
and more important due to his great offspring, or because he never had any children 
and so his name would not be lost.95 The Fang managed to create a unified identity in 
times of adversity, within a colonial setting where the rules were not theirs. In so 
doing, they regained a sense of dignity lost after the colonial conquest. Unfortunately,
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they also lost part of their historical heritage. The Ntumu in northern Rio Muni, under 
the influence of the e ’Lat-Ayong movement, led the construction of Fang identity in 
Equatorial Guinea while losing their genealogical knowledge. Having focused their 
attention on the spread of a new historical past characterized by its literate character, 
Afri Kara, they neglected oral tradition and the transmission of their genealogies. 
South of the Wele, the majority of Okak informants can at least name ten ancestors, 
whereas, in the north, most people cannot go beyond their great-grandfathers.
The double realm: between tradition and modernity
The heterogeneous nature of colonial society was rationalized through the 
development of the ‘double realm’, a concept by which the Fang of Rio Muni 
classified each element of their reality according to what was perceived as either Fang 
— traditional -  01* Mitdngdn -  modem -  cultural origin. Both realms maintained a 
parallel yet complementary relationship, for, although mutual influence was denied on 
principle, individuals were able to resort to either realm according to the conditions 
and needs. Fernandez, who defines this situation in terms of cultural dualism, believes 
that this was the result of a process of ‘acculturation’ that gave rise to ‘cultural 
dilemmas’ and made ‘choice’ more difficult,96 The development of a double realm 
concept was, above all, a reflection of the poor level of integration within colonized 
society. Thus, depending on the situation, Fang culture was more relevant than the 
European one and vice versa, giving individuals a grater scope to resolve situations 
that could be contemplated by one realm but not the other. The effects of witchcraft, 
for example, ware resolved according to Fang tradition, whereas, in choosing a career, 
individuals resorted to the modem realm. To the Fang, the coexistence of both 
cultural realms was, therefore, necessary.
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Syncretism in colonial Africa was the result of a double process of acculturation 
by which both African and European cultures influenced one another. Although the 
concept of a double realm or dualism suggests the idea that both cultures maintained 
an independent existence, in reality there was a mutual interaction between the 
African and European realms. In theory, this phenomenon is denied, as a clear-cut 
division between both cultures was established in most people’s minds. It is only after 
some reflection that people tend to admit such a possibility. The new tradition that the 
Fang developed since colonial conquest was clearly affected by the culture of the 
colonizers, in the same way that European culture was reinterpreted by Africans 
before being adopted. Two representative developments of the new tradition, such as 
the e ’Lat-Ayong movement and Bwiti, show distinctive European influences, 
especially with regards to their hierarchical organization. Customary law, which is 
believed to be a continuation from the precolonial society, was also transformed, 
becoming more rigid and losing part of its compromising character as a result of the 
legal interpretations of Spanish officers. Christianity, as we saw, turned into a more 
ritualistic religion in which its moral code became less relevant. Given that 
individuals maintained a permanent dialogue between both cultures, moving back and 
forth, the two realms influenced one another and continue to be reinterpreted 
constantly.
Modernity is usually distinguished from tradition on the basis of rationality; that 
is, the organization of modem societies mostly responds to a rational logic, whereas in 
traditional societies it generally responds to the logic of a semi-sacred past.97 In fact, 
rationality plays an important role in all types of cultures, but, while in modem 
societies rationality is observed as the main source of legitimacy, in traditional 
societies the past is considered to be the key legitimizing principle.98 All societies are
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heterogeneous, as they develop multiple answers to a given situation. In modem 
societies, traditional elements do not disappear completely, yet their presence 
gradually shrinks as modernity gains ground and leaves an increasingly marginal 
space to tradition. In colonial Africa, the transition to modernity did not quite follow 
the same path. Indeed, the Fang of Rio Muni increasingly adopted modem institutions 
and, by the 1950s and 1960s, colonial modernity had become the referential culture 
pushing tradition into a secondary position. However, since tradition and modernity 
were perceived as different social realities, traditional institutions could find shelter 
within the traditional realm without necessarily disappearing. The survival of a 
traditional realm made it possible that, whenever European culture was unsatisfactory, 
the Fang could recreate old traditions as well as import new ones, which, despite not 
being Fang, could easily fit into Fang culture due to their traditional character. Bwiti, 
for example, was originally a religious cult of the Mitsogo of central Gabon, but is 
considered as local amongst those Fang who practice it.
In his study of the Gabonese Fang, Balandier was aware of the existence of the 
double realm. To him, this was due to a strategy of hiding the ‘authentic social reality 
behind official appearances’."  Although this could have been the case initially, the 
persistence of two cultural realities had more to do with the nature of colonialism and 
its lack of legitimacy. In Rio Muni, the Fang tried to conceal their community leaders 
from the Spanish authorities, but, as we saw, legitimate traditional institutions found it 
very difficult to survive within a climate of clandestinity. As Balandier argues, ‘semi­
secrecy’ led to a decrease in the necessary ‘dynamism’ of society.100 The 
consolidation of two different realms was mostly the result of Spanish policies, which, 
from the onset sought to divide colonial society in two. On the one hand, the modem 
sector was the space for the European and the tiny minority of African emancipados.
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The traditional sector, on the other, took in the remaining African population. This 
social organization was consolidated through the establishment of two separate legal 
systems, one for Europeans and emancipados and another for Africans. In spite of the 
rhetoric, the Spanish government was never fully committed to transforming Fang 
society, and chose not to make use of the law as a means to accelerate social 
transformation. The lack of legitimacy as well as the fear of resistance drove the 
Spanish authorities to acknowledge local institutions, such as customary marriage and 
polygamy, while Catholic missionaries encouraged canonical marriage and 
monogamy.101 Undoubtedly, the lack of consensus amongst European colonizers did 
not contribute to the development of a more homogeneous society. After the 1959 
change in status from colony to Spanish province put an end to the legal distinction 
between emancipados and no-emancipados, yet the majority of the African 
population continued to be subject to customary law. The new justice system of 1961 
left the door open for Africans to decide whether they wanted to be subject to the 
native court or the ordinary court for civil matters.102 It was argued that this temporary 
measure was necessary, especially in Rio Muni, due to the large number of ‘non- 
fully-developed individuals of inferior culture.’103
The existence of two distinctive social sectors and its manifestation through two 
cultural realms drove the Fang to assume that people’s actions could respond to either 
realm. Thus, it was believed that there was a ‘Fang way’ and a ‘European way’ of 
doing things. Although this conception mostly responded to a racial division, it was 
not so much based on race as on culture. Africans could sporadically act as Europeans 
or, like in the case of emancipados and other acculturated individuals, do so regularly. 
In theory, this conception also admits the possibility of Europeans acting as Africans, 
but, in reality, colonial authorities made sure that Europeans always presented
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themselves in front of Africans according to a certain standard.104 Unlike Portugal, 
Spain kept a strict control on European settler migration into its Central African 
colony, so as to prevent the inflow of a large number of poor and uneducated settlers 
from undermining the white race stereotype built up by colonial authorities. Spanish 
legitimacy, claimed to be based on its so-called cultural superiority, meant that all 
efforts had to be made to maintain the status quo. To the Fang, superstitions or poor 
housing were considered to be part of the Fang realm; little did they know about the 
figures of saints being carried in procession through Spanish villages when hit by a 
severe drought, or about the slums growing around Spain’s main urban areas in the 
1950s and 1960s. A Fang informant still remembered the shock when, for the first 
time, he saw white men ‘working with their hands’ during a visit to Spain in 1963.105
In many respects, the clear-cut division between Fang and European ways was 
based on misconceptions originating from an artificial colonial reality, that portrayed 
fake stereotypes on both cultures. Racial segregation was a key instrument in 
guaranteeing this order, as it prevented the interaction between African and European 
cultures while regulating contact between them. For the average Fang, contact with 
European culture took place within a controlled, limited and partial environment. Not 
surprisingly, European civilization tended to be mystified by many Fang in the 1950s 
and 1960s. After the legal end of racial segregation, Africans tried to gain access to 
formerly segregated spaces -  despite Europeans’ resistance -  not so much as a desire 
to interact with Europeans, but mostly as a sign of rebellion and as an opportunity to 
live like Europeans or actual people. A Fang elder, for example, explained that 
emancipados, having the same rights as Europeans, could ‘live like human beings’.106
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Photograph 33: Colonial life offered Europeans a com pletely different lifestyle
from that of the metropolis
In understanding the influence of European culture on the Fang, we must keep in 
mind that, for the most part, direct contact between the Fang and the European was 
rather sporadic. As a result of the limitations of the Spanish administration, the 
number of colonial officers and missionaries was relatively low. In addition, the small 
number of European settlers in Rio Muni was mostly concentrated in the coastal area. 
Most informants point out that district officers rarely visited their villages, and it was 
only during the course of an official tour or a game expedition that they could be seen 
in villages. Only administrative chiefs had more frequent contact with district officers 
during the course of the monthly sessions of the native tribunal, especially in the case 
of clan chiefs whose attendance was compulsory so as to allow district officers 
transmitting the series of government orders. Within rural communities, most adult 
men’s communication with Europeans was limited to their trade partners, as cash crop 
producers sold their crops to an assigned European trader, from whom they also 
purchased different goods. This could sometimes evolve into a friendly relationship, 
but it was mostly characterized by mistrust between the African farmer and the 
European trader, each of them trying to obtain the maximum profit.107 The low level 
of urbanization in Spanish Guinea did not allow a larger development of the modem
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economic sector nor greater interaction between the African and the European cultural
realms. In the early 1960s, Bata, the largest town in Rio Muni, had a population of
some 9,000 people out of a total population of some 183,000.108
No doubt, for the vast majority of the Fang population, the Catholic missionary
was the most familiar face of European culture, as they visited Fang villages for one
week once or twice a year. Nonetheless, these sporadic visits do not change the fact
that contact between the Fang and the Spanish was infrequent. This raises serious
doubts as to the level and quality of Fang acculturation or what the Spanish called the
‘civilizing mission’. Understandably, this situation contributed to the cultural
misunderstanding and mystification that was referred to above. As we saw with the
evangelization of Rio Muni, African catechists were in charge of spreading the
Christian gospel amongst the rest of the population. It was also the African chief who
transmitted the government’s orders, the African teacher who taught the colonial
curriculum, and the African soldiers of the Colonial Guard who physically punished.
Cultural contact suffered from the problems related to the cultural gap between
communicators and transmitters, as well as from the fact that the Spanish were only
interested in transmitting a partial message that excluded basic information. Gradually
some Fang became aware of this situation, which would influence their actions
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. This problem was not exclusive of Spanish Guinea,
as Fernandez heard from a Gabonese Fang elder:
When have we not been disappointed in the European? We have always had the highest 
hopes in him but he has not taught us to make the simplest thing he knows-a match! He 
always comes among us full of promises but in the end he turns away from us and 
deceives us!109
As in most colonial societies, the culture of the colonizers in Rio Muni became 
paradigmatic. European culture amounted to political and economic power, and, more
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importantly, quality of life. By the 1950s and 1960s, large sectors of Fang society 
embraced different aspects of European culture, aspiring to live like Europeans. 
Amongst the least acculturated Fang, Western education and the capitalist economy 
were seen as an opportunity to improve their living conditions. To the most 
acculturated Fang, political struggle became, from the late 1950s, an instrument for 
socio-economic improvement. During this period, the modern realm, by and large, 
grew at the expense of the traditional one. Most parents were now willing to send 
their children, including daughters, to school. The expansion of Western education 
came hand in hand with the decline of traditional education, which was no longer 
relevant.110 In spite of the increase in the education budget during the 1950s, this did 
not solve all needs, especially with regards to the quality of teaching.111 After all the 
efforts of the 1950s, the 1962 report of the Commission for the Economic 
Development of the Equatorial Region acknowledged that ‘female education leaves 
much to be desired’ and ‘there exists an imbalance regarding secondary education’ in 
Rio Muni.112 Mainstream education was not enough, by itself, to bridge the cultural 
gap between the African on the one hand and the European and acculturated 
population on the other. The opening of a boarding school by the La Salle Brothers 
allowed a small group of students from the mainland to receive an instruction similar 
to the average metropolitan school. From this select group of students came the 
intellectual elite of Rio Muni that in the late 1960s and 1970s had the opportunity to 
study in Spanish universities. However, it was too little for the vast majority of the 
population who had to make do with poor teaching, facilities and resources, and too 
late for the poorly trained political leaders who led the independence process in the 
1960s.
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So we can live like whites: the end of colonial rule
In the minds of Spanish officials, there always existed the fear that socio­
economic development could pose a serious challenge to their authority. Since the late 
1940s, these fears started to become more real due an emergent protest movement in 
Spanish Guinea and, above all, to the dynamics spreading throughout the entire 
continent. By the mid 1950s, Spain’s concerns were confirmed, as nationalism grew 
stronger in Africa and started to take shape in Rio Muni and Fernando Po. As Alicia 
Campos argues, the transformations in the status of Equatorial Guinea between 1958 
and 1968 responded very much to international pressure as well as internal 
circumstances in Spain, yet these steps would not have taken place had it not been for 
the development of a nationalist movement in Equatorial Guinea from the early 
1950s.113 In 1957, an article written for the Spanish weekly magazine Blanco y  Negro 
was stopped from being published by the Spanish censors due to several remarks that 
indicated the emergence of a nationalist sentiment in Rio Muni, especially amongst 
the Fang. With regards to the situation in the colony, the author claimed: ‘Rio Muni... 
is slipping through our fingers. It is a matter of time. We can no longer do anything! I 
wish we could retreat to Fernando Po wisely!’114 The incipient nationalist movement 
in Rio Muni was particularly intense in the north, where there was a stronger tradition 
of protest since the late 1930s and where the e ’Lat-Ayong movement had been 
especially active. Not surprisingly, the article pointed out that the union of Rio Muni’s 
Fang with ‘their brothers’ of Cameroon was unavoidable.115
Although the authorities publicly denied the existence of an emerging nationalist 
movement in Spanish Guinea, all indications seemed to point in the different 
direction. The provincialization of the Spanish colony in July 1959 did not stop 
nationalists’ discontent. In October 1959 the Sub-Governor asked for reinforcements
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in order to prevent ‘the activity of the anti-Spanish movement’, which was 
‘notoriously and gradually on the rise’.116 A few months earlier, a force of the 
Guardia Civil had been sent to Rio Muni and Fernando Po to support the Guardia 
Territorial (the former Colonial Guard) in the policing of the increasingly difficult 
political situation. From the Government General, it was believed that this should 
suffice to contain the nationalist movement in Rio Muni, and they refused to attend 
the Sub-Govemor’s request.117 Sources seem to suggest that Spanish officers were 
resigned to losing Rio Muni and focused all their efforts on Fernando Po, where its 
economic interests were much greater. On the island, for example, Spain was 
seriously concerned about the possibility of a Nigerian invasion.118 There are no 
details about the nature of this threat, other than ‘credible sources’, but this fear was 
grounded in the large number of Nigerian workers on the island as well as the 
numerous complains about labour conditions appeared in Nigerian newspapers.119 So 
great were Spanish concerns that, in 1962, a military base was built on Fernando Po in 
order to host a quick intervention military unit. Troops, however, were never 
deployed due to the political situation in Spanish Guinea and its possible impact on 
international opinion.120
Little is known about the actual development of nationalism in Equatorial Guinea, 
and, indeed, much more research needs to be done. From the existing literature one 
gets a rather blurred picture of Equatorial Guinean nationalism that does not go 
beyond a few names of political leaders, acronyms and their main political guidelines. 
If anything, one comes across contrasting information as to the chain of events that 
resulted in the formation of each of the main nationalist parties. As we saw, neither 
e ’Lat-Ayong nor Bwiti directly challenged the colonial order. By the late 1940s, e ’Lat- 
Ayong seemed to be moving towards a more confrontational approach, yet this
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development was hampered by the internal limitations of the movement as well as the 
emergence of a more conventional political line of action.
In Rio Muni, the origins of the future nationalist movement can be traced back to 
the late 1930s. Behind the incident that triggered the banishment of the chief of the 
Nzomo clan, Motuu m’Abege, to Fernando Po in 1938, laid the growing 
dissatisfaction of sectors of the African population, especially traditional leaders and 
colonial civil servants, with the failed promises of the Spanish regarding African’s 
socio-economic improvement. According to colonial sources, in 1938, a group of 
colonial civil servants, led by the emancipcido teacher Enrique Nvo and inspired by 
Motuu m’Abege and other traditional leaders, tried to raise fluids to hire a Spanish 
attorney, who could defend their interest in the metropolis, in the belief that the 
Spanish settlers and officers planned to take their land plots.121 Colonial sources do 
not explain the origin of what they refer to as simple ‘nonsense’, but it appears that 
such rumours were based on the ambiguous character of native property and the fact 
that the 1938 Native Justice Statute neither clarified nor guaranteed Africans’ 
property rights. Generally, Africans’ property over land was not seriously threatened 
in most of Rio Muni, but, on Fernando Po and Rio Muni’s coastal region, where the 
presence of European settlers was more noticeable, this was a genuine concern.122 In 
this respect, it is worth noting that, amongst the African civil servants involved in the 
raising of funds in Mikomeseng, there was a Bubi civil servant, Matias Remi Hoko.123 
In response to these activities, the Spanish authorities not only banished Motuu 
m ’Abege but also expelled the implicated Africans from the colonial service, 
including Enrique Nvo, who happened to be Motuu’s nephew.124 Sources do not refer 
to similar activities until the famous incident of 1948 in Mikomeseng, in which 
Enrique Nvo also took part.
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From the early 1950s, protest activities took a turn towards a nationalist approach 
that started to challenge the colonial order. In Rio Muni, Enrique Nvo and Acacio 
Mene, became the main leaders of the incipient nationalist movement. The latter was 
a Fang emancipado fanner from Kogo, who somehow symbolized the success of 
Spain’s ‘civilizing’ mission, since, in addition to his economic success, he was known 
for his deep Catholic beliefs. Acacio Mene, however, was not all that sympathetic 
towards Spain and, according to Donato Ndongo, from 1950 he became the leader of 
the Movimiento Nacional de Liberation de Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE, 
Equatorial Guinea National Liberation Movement), a party that was founded with the 
purpose of ‘raising awareness about the abuses of the [colonial] system.’125 Thanks to 
his emancipado status, he was able to move freely across the colony with the excuse 
of recruiting labourers for his plantation, establishing contact with other African 
figures, such as Enrique Nvo, as early as 1951.126 These links were soon spread to 
Fernando Po, where both Enrique Nvo and Acacio Mene were able to secretly meet 
other nationalist leaders, such as Luis Maho Sicacha (a Bubi attorney) and Gustavo 
Watson Bueco (a Fernandino doctor). The first significant outcome of Equatorial 
Guinean nationalism was the sending of a report to the U.N., refuting Spain’s claims 
about the provincial status of its African territories, denouncing the series of abuses 
that took place in the colony, and demanding the colony’s independence.
Between 1958 and 1959, a series of repressive measures against nationalist 
activists convinced Spain that order had been restored. Although Fernandino and 
Bubi nationalists were also involved in the nationalist movement, repressive measures 
were mostly directed against activists from Rio Muni. The assassination of the two 
main Fang nationalist leaders, Enrique Nvo and Acacio Mene, was followed by the 
arrest of other nationalist activists, who, according to testimonies received by Donato
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Ndongo, were brutally tortured by the Spanish authorities.127 As a result of this, most
nationalist activists went into exile, including Ndong Miyone, who acted as
representative of MONALIGE in Gabon. The majority of the population, who had
hitherto been unaware of the development of a clandestine nationalist movement in
the country, was then alerted about its existence by the series of repressive measures.
From exile in the now independent Cameroon and Gabon, the nationalist movement
became more active in the early 1960s, as different activists moved clandestinely into
Rio Muni where they kept secret reunions with community leaders. Ndongo explains
that, as a result of its clandestinity, the nationalist movement adopted a mythical
1character in rural areas. Some report that they heard about nationalist claims 
through Tetters that fell from the sky’; political pamphlets were planted in villages at 
night without people’s knowledge.129 Nonetheless, the majority of the population, 
especially women, had little or no infonnation about the nationalist movement and its 
claims for independence.130
The two oldest parties, MONALIGE and IPGE appeared to be founded in the 
1950s under the influence of Acacio Mene and Enrique Nvo respectively. The two 
parties had a multiethnic composition as they were made up by Fang, Ndowe, Bubi 
and Fernandino or Creole members. IPGE and MONALIGE were somehow depicted 
as leftist parties by the colonial authorities, although they appeared to have had a 
poorly defined ideology beyond the demand for independence. As in the case of many 
liberation movements in Africa, Equatorial Guinea’s nationalism was seriously 
hampered by factionalism which prevented the development of a unified 
movement.131 Most of the parties bom in the 1960s were splinters of the two original 
political formations. This should not be a surprise, as the small nationalist movement 
was in the hands of a limited group of individuals who had either a privileged
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economic position or a formal education. As time went by and the prospect of actual
* 1 T9political power became more evident, divisions arise amongst nationalist leaders.
When asked about the impact of the 1959 provincialization on daily life, people’s 
answers tend to be contradictory. Some claim that there was improvement because 
compulsory communal work disappeared; others argue that little changed since the 
Spanish were still in power; most are unable to elaborate 011 their answers and provide 
examples as to how things changed.133 For the most part, it appears that very few 
things changed, since racial discrimination, abuse of power and repression continued 
during this period. For the majority of the population, there was barely any 
improvement in their living conditions. The relatively high living standard in 
Fernando Po and Rio Muni did not hide the fact that there existed, especially on the 
mainland, a sharp imbalance in the income levels between the European and the 
African population, and that infrastructure and economic investments needed to be 
increased if the provinces were to be competitive against their neighbouring countries 
that were then undergoing ‘ambitious economic development plans’.134 In fact, 
nationalist leaders were aware that the provincialization was used as decoy by the 
Spanish authorities, and were convinced that political struggle should continue until 
the country’s independence was won. Although Africans had been given the same 
rights as the rest of the Spanish population, most people kept seeing the Spanish as 
oppressors and, hence, sympathized with the demands of the nationalist leaders. This 
was, according to some informants, a general sentiment shared by most villagers 
except administrative chiefs.135 It was believed that Africans’ advancement could only 
be achieved once Africans themselves took control of political power.
By 1963, it was impossible to maintain the farce created by the provincialization 
of Rio Muni and Fernando Po. Spain drafted a bill to grant an autonomous
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administration to Equatorial Guinea that would serve as a transitional arrangement 
during which African leaders would be able, for the first time, to play a direct role in 
government. Most informants do not have detailed recollections about the Autonomy 
Bill referendum. In fact, many were' not aware what the Autonomy amounted for. 
Nevertheless, the Bill of Statutes was passed by referendum on 15 December 1963 
within a confusing climate in which many people were not even sure what ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ meant.136 Spanish officers were seriously concerned that the bill would not be 
passed in Rio Muni, where pro-independence sentiments were stronger, leaving them 
with no room to manoeuvre and with the only option of having to grant immediate 
independence to a population with no government experience whatsoever. The 
referendum was finally approved thanks to the affirmative vote of the majority of the 
population in Rio Muni. But the outcome of the referendum showed the first signs of 
what would become some of the main political problems for the future independent 
country: poor information, men casting their wives’ votes, and a clear political split 
between Rio Muni and Fernando Po, where the majority wanted to maintain the 
existing status quo and voted against the Autonomy Bill.137
During the autonomous period (1964-1968), Equatorial Guinea was at its most 
prosperous moment due to the Economic Development Plan, which led to the 
improvement in economic and social conditions. Ondo Edu, the former catechist and 
founder, while in exile in Gabon, of the moderate and short-lived Union Popular de 
Liberation de la Guinea Ecuatorial (Popular Union for the Liberation of Equatorial 
Guinea), and Macias Nguema, the former colonial civil servant, emerged as the two 
strongest political leaders of Rio Muni, and by extension, of Equatorial Guinea.
The two leaders competed for the leadership of the Autonomous Government. 
Due to Spanish support, Ondo Edu was chosen as President of the Autonomous
309
Government Council and leader of the recently created pro-Spanish party Movimiento 
de Union Nacional de Guinea Ecuatorial (MUNGE, Equatorial Guinea National Unity 
Movement), whereas Macias Nguema was left with the public works portfolio. A 
metropolitan officer sent to Equatorial Guinea wrote to the DGPPA Director General, 
advising him to appoint Bonifacio Ondo Edu as president, ‘who, at the moment and 
except surprise, seems to be a serious, formal and very religious person and who has a 
great influence in Rio Muni’.138 Indeed, Ondo Edu was very respected south of the 
Wele due to his personality and the fact that he was born in Evinayong, but, in 
addition to his deep Catholic beliefs and sympathy for Spain, one could not see any 
other merits to support him as leader of the Government Council. Members of the 
different existing political parties and ethnic groups were represented in the 
Government and the Assembly. It is a general belief in Equatorial Guinea that 
tensions between Fernando Po and Rio Muni were fuelled by the Spanish colonial 
administration, which promoted the fear that the Fang majority would eventually take 
control over the island. Although the Spanish government, led by the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry, wanted a future unified country, Spanish colonial interests hoped that the 
rift between the island and the mainland population would degenerate in the split of 
the two regions, leaving the island under the strong influence of Spain. Spanish 
interests on Fernando Po were disrupted by the quick intervention of the more radical 
nationalist sector. In January 1966, the MONALIGE members represented in the 
Autonomous Government -  Macias Nguema, Rafael Nsue Nchama and Antonio Nang 
Ondo -  submitted a motion to start negotiations towards the independence of 
Equatorial Guinea.139 Less than three years later, on 12 October 1968, independence 
was proclaimed.
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Conclusion
The Fang interpreted that Spanish political and economic power was based on 
their cultural superiority or, rather, the inferiority of the Fang culture. Amongst the 
Fang, as in most colonized societies, community leaders stopped being the most 
influential members of their society in favour of teachers, clerks, colonial guards, 
catechists, priests and other acculturated individuals. Understandably, modernity 
became paradigmatic as the social and cultural model that guaranteed social 
advancement, while tradition was relegated to a marginal position, in the belief that 
traditional institutions had to be abandoned if social and economic improvement was 
to be achieved. Nonetheless, the Fang, who only had a limited understanding of a 
system they were never fully exposed to, were not aware that colonial modernity was 
not a completed socio-cultural system. Under colonial domination, the African 
population came to know a distorted version of European modernity that did require 
the existence of traditional institutions. Christianity, though massively embraced, 
could not address all spiritual needs, especially Fang concern with the relationship 
between man and evil. The district officer, despite being an element of the colonial 
administration, tended to resolve judicial conflicts in a personal manner, as a sort of 
‘big man’. Fang social structures were simplified, facilitating the development of a 
Fang common identity. However, this never transformed into Fang nationalism, 
because, to the acculturated Fang, colonial modernity required a ‘modem’ response. 
Fang desire to enjoy the benefits of modernity were channelled through their 
contribution to the Equatorial-Guinean nationalist movement. In accordance with 
colonial modernity, nationalism also suffered from the series of dysfunctions that 
emerged especially after 1968.
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Chapter 6
The New Tradition Takes over, 1968-1979
In 1968, Equatorial Guinea’s independence from Spain was received by many of
its people with great optimism. Although European observers, including Spanish
officials, were less optimistic about the prospects of the new Central African country,
very few could foresee the series of events that soon after independence triggered off
a process which, by 1979, had virtually wiped out any trace of a ‘modem’ social,
political and economic system. At the end of colonial domination, modernization had
not been consolidated in Equatorial Guinea, but Spanish rule had succeeded in
spreading a series of modem structures throughout the country and, more importantly,
in making colonial modernity the referential socio-cultural model. At the height of the
African decolonisation process, however, Fernandez warned:
No one has ever supposed that political independence in Africa has meant independence 
from European culture. Much less has it meant independence for the Africans themselves 
from the ‘dysfunctional’ and ‘primitive’ elements that linger on their age old 
civilizations.1
In Equatorial Guinea, such warning soon proved to be correct. The collapse of the 
existing political and economic structures indicated the relevance of the ‘double 
realm’; that is, the compartmentalization of reality into the Fang or ‘traditional’ realm 
and the Spanish or ‘modem’ one. President Nguema, an acculturated Fang, was not 
unaware of this conception and, from 1969, he became convinced that Africans’ 
distinctive culture responded to rather different principles from the European one. His 
regime portrayed the idea that European culture was inappropriate for the now 
sovereign nation. La tradition, as the culture of the ancestors, became the alternative
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to modernity, which, since this period, was rapidly relegated to the increasingly 
formal role that it plays in Equatorial Guinean society today. This process, by which 
colonial modernity gave way to the new Fang tradition as the socio-cultural paradigm 
between 1968 and 1979, will be examined in this chapter.
The new tradition, like modernity before, did not gain ground as a result of a 
natural social process; rather, it was encouraged by the Macias Nguema’s regime in 
an effort to preserve power. As we shall see, Equatorial Guineans’ actual 
independence lasted less than five months, before they lost the autonomy that they 
needed to face the challenges that independence was to bring. In the immediate 
aftermath of independence, very few in Equatorial Guinea believed in the tradition as 
the socio-cultural reference for the independent country. In fact, the ruling elite 
aspired to preserve the political and economic structures left by the Spanish. In 
understanding the so-called process of Africanization or retraditionalization that 
Equatorial Guinea underwent in the 1970s, I shall pay special attention to the 1969 
political and economic crisis that triggered off the collapse of the country’s modern 
structures and its subsequent replacement by traditional ones. As a result, the Fang 
tradition was gradually applied to the political and social organization of the whole 
country, within a climate of extreme coercion that undermined the process. Finally, 
we shall see how the failure of Christianity, now besieged by the Macias Nguema’s 
regime, in offering an effective response to the generalized deterioration of living 
conditions led to the rampant expansion of witchcraft beliefs within Equatorial 
Guinean society.
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The short-lived independence
The Autonomy period was dominated by growing internal divisions that 
highlighted the lack of social and economic integration in Equatorial Guinea. Such 
tensions were aggravated by the absence of a civil society and a mature political class. 
During the two rounds of the constitutional conference between October 1967 and 
June 1968, it became clear that the differences and tensions between Fernando Po and 
Rio Muni would be the main obstacle to national integration. The Bubi and Creole 
leaders from the island were especially wary of the Fang majority on the mainland, 
with whom they competed for political power. Encouraged by the imminent 
withdrawal of Spain, an emergent Bubi nationalism demanded a separate state for 
Fernando Po while maintaining close ties with Spain. This demand, however, could 
not overcome the strong opposition against partition from the United Nations, the 
Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Rio Muni’s nationalist leadership. In 
exchange for giving up its separatist claims, the island was given a ‘disproportionate 
political weight and representation’ in the constitution.2 The opposition of the Bubi 
and Creole minorities did not prevent the approval of the constitution in a referendum 
in August 1968. The new constitution did not bring an end to internal conflicts; rather 
they were exacerbated as presidential elections approached. Thanks to the 
demographic weight of the Fang population, more than 85 per cent of the Equatorial 
Guinean total, three Fang leaders, Ondo Edu, Macias Nguema and Ndongo Miyone, 
emerged as the main contenders for political power.3 The electoral dispute revolved 
around the level of association that Equatorial Guinea should keep with Spain. The 
results of the first electoral round, in which no candidate obtained the necessary 
majority support, polarized the dispute even more, as Ondo Edu, in favour of a close
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association between the two countries, and Macias Nguema, in favour of cutting ties
with the metropolis, emerged as the two strongest contenders.
MADUD, SABADO 21 DE SEPTIEMME'Dff
«ATANAM O
MANANA, ELECCIONES EN GUINEA ECUATORIAL
M a n a n a  o l o q i r a  e l  p u e b l o  g u i n c a n o  s u  p r i m e r  p r e s id e n l e .  B o n if a c io  O n d o  E d u . 
F r a n c i s c o  M a c ia s  y  A t a n a s io  N d o n g o  s o n  I r e s  p e r s o n a l i d a d e s  d e s t a c a d a s ,  c o n  m e -  
r i t o s  p a r a  o c u p a r  l a  p r c s i d e n c i a  d e  l a  R e p u b l i c a .  E l p r o c e s o  c o n s t i t u c i o n a l  d e  
G u i n e a  E c u a l o r i a l  l l e g a r a  a  s u  c u l m i n a c io n  c l  d i a  12 d e  o c t u b r e  c o n  l a  p r o c la -  
m a c io n  d e  l a  i n d e p e n d e n c i a .
Photograph 34: Front page of the Spanish newspaper ABC  with the photos 
of the three main candidates
The build-up to the final round of the presidential elections distorted the actual 
purpose of the voting, which was transformed into a contest between the so-called 
‘total independence’ coalition, led by Macias Nguema, and the ‘associated 
independence’ faction, headed by Ondo Edu.4 In fact, the constitution only 
contemplated one formula for the country’s independence, granting complete
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sovereignty to the Equatorial Guineans regardless of the cooperation agreements 
signed by the two countries. Given the moderate position of Ondo Edu, who was 
supported by the Spanish, the group led by Macias Nguema chose to radicalise its 
discourse in order to gain popular support. Macias Nguema capitalized on the abuses 
of the colonial period and portrayed Ondo Edu as a pro-Spanish candidate who would 
allow Spain to maintain a dominant position in Equatorial Guinea. Ondo Edu argued 
that Equatorial Guinea should keep a close relationship with Spain, since the country 
was not ready to rule its destiny without the input of the expatriate community. To 
many of the voters in the 1968 elections, the debate was reduced to the simple 
question of whether or not the ‘whites’ should leave the country. In the end, the more 
radical option won the elections, thanks partly to Macias Nguema’s charisma, his 
capacity to connect with the ordinary Fang voter, and his ability to gain the support 
from those candidates who lost the first electoral round, including Bosio Dioco, leader 
of the Bubi political party on Fernando Po, Union Bubi. Today, very few Guineans 
are willing to admit their support for Macias Nguema in 1968.
Bom in the Mongomo district in the early 1920s, Macias Nguema’s instruction 
was limited to elementary and primary education, being unable to pass the exam that 
gave access to the Escuela Superior, the highest education level for non-emancipated 
Africans at the time.5 He spent most of his career as clerk within different 
departments of the colonial administration and later as translator in Mongomo. He 
became prominent after being elected mayor of Mongomo in 1962, and, later, 
member of the Autonomous Government Council, where he served as Infrastructure 
Minister between 1964 and 1968. His short political experience eventually proved to 
be insufficient to deal with the enormous difficulties of ruling a country, where most 
of the political class aspired to obtain his post and where the national economy was
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closely dependent on the very same people he antagonized in order to win the 
elections.
Many present-day informants describe the time immediately after independence 
as a period of great improvement in their living conditions. However, this is seen to 
have lasted only around two years, before things changed for the worse.6 The extent to 
which the economic situation actually did improve is unclear, but it appears that 
optimistic expectations at the time affected people’s perceptions. The atmosphere of 
generalized optimism that characterized the months leading to and following 
independence was, indeed, very brief. As early as 5 March 1969, less than five 
months after the proclamation of independence, things started to change dramatically 
in Equatorial Guinea. ‘The true independence’, as Mitogo argues, ‘only lasted 145 
days’, before Equatorial Guineans lost their recently gained sovereignty at the hands 
of an autocratic regime.7 The drastic turn of events was triggered off by a failed coup 
d’etat on 5 March 1969, led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ndongo Miyone, and 
allegedly sponsored by Spain. As a result, Macias Nguema, now obsessed with losing 
power and Spanish interference, transformed his government into a ruthlessly 
repressive regime and made anti-Spanish sentiment his ideological cornerstone.
Repression and harassment affected all sectors of Equatorial Guinean society, 
including most members of the original cabinet and Parliament and the expatriate 
community, whose role was key in the running of the economy. According to Decalo, 
by the end of his brutal regime, Macias Nguema had eliminated 32 ministers -  10 of 
which formed part of his original 12-member cabinet -  two thirds of the original 
National Assembly and some 37 senior officers of the security and civil services.8 
Alaimed by the deterioration of the situation, in March 1969 the Spanish authorities 
advised its population to leave the country.9 Decalo claims that, in the month after the
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failed coup, 92 per cent of the Spanish community left Equatorial Guinea.10 Deprived 
of Spanish capital and commercial organization, the country’s economy rapidly 
collapsed. During the next decade, economic development effectively came to a halt, 
contributing to the deterioration of social and political conditions in a country where 
violence and coercion became the order of the day. Independence did not only reveal 
the country’s over-dependency, but also the absence of a fully committed political 
class. Despite nationalist promises of social and economic equality, post­
independence developments indicate that political leaders wanted, above all, simply to 
take over the position left by the Spanish. On the one hand, Ondo Edu and Ndongo 
Miyone did not accept the electoral results, undermining the country’s fragile 
stability. On the other, Macias Nguema drove the country into total chaos in his effort 
to keep political power by any means.
The Political Crisis
Amongst those individuals who lived during the period of Spanish domination, 
there exists a general sentiment of disappointment with independence. Much was 
expected from it, and nobody could imagine the sufferings that this period would 
bring about. Optimism soon gave way to the pessimism that still today affects a 
society with little or no hope for the future. When asked about Macias Nguema’s rule, 
except for the short initial period, it is almost impossible to obtain any positive 
recollection. By and large, most informants camiot hide their disappointment and 
distress regarding this episode.11 Some people go as far as to say that ‘total 
independence has killed us’, or to argue that if they were asked again today, ‘most 
people would choose the whites to come back’.12 The series of elections that took 
place throughout the 1960s -  the autonomy and constitution referenda and the
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presidential elections -  leave little doubt as to Equatorial Guineans’ mind regarding 
Spanish colonialism. Thus one can get an idea about what this people went through 
between 1968 and 1979 in order to change their mind so drastically. Many desired 
independence as an opportunity to get rid of the Spanish masters, who were thought to 
curtail the chances of the improvement of African society. Today, many of the 1968 
voters cannot help but wondering what would have happened had Ondo Edu won the 
elections. To some extent, people’s disappointment appears to be mixed with some 
degree of sadness, for in reality many voted for Macias Nguema, the first and only 
time Equatorial Guineans had the chance to choose their ruler freely.
Perhaps the Equatorial Guinean were caught off guard by the developments that 
followed the granting of independence, yet a careful look at the social and economic 
conditions in Equatorial Guinea at that time reveals that the aftermath of 
independence was somewhat predictable. Bayart points out that ‘authoritarianism’ and 
‘extreme centralization’ were predictable in Africa due to the weaknesses that the 
postcolonial state had inherited from its colonial predecessor.13 Equatorial Guineans 
themselves admit what today seems as an overstatement; that is, the country was 
simply not ready for the challenge of independence. The Spanish Territories of the 
Gulf of Guinea were rushed towards self-determination as a result of a combination of 
factors such as the UN pressure to put an end to colonial domination, certain Spanish 
political and economic sectors’ will to withdraw from Equatorial Guinea, and the 
ambition of a small number of Equatorial Guinean politicians to take over the 
economic and political control of the country.14 Between 1945 and 1960, Britain and 
France paved the way to independence through the creation of political institutions in 
which Africans could increasingly take part in and gain political experience. In the 
case of Equatorial Guinea, this experience was limited to the four years of the
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autonomy period. Certainly, the former Spanish colony is not the only case where the 
postcolony failed. However, except for the former Portuguese and Belgian colonies, 
Angola, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo, other African countries 
took longer before experiencing serious crisis that undermined the survival of the 
‘modem’ state. Along with the absence of sustained social and economic 
development, a problem that affected many African countries, Equatorial Guinea had 
to deal with the shortage of experience and qualification of its political leaders. 
During the election of the eight members that would form the Autonomous 
Government Council in 1964, a Spanish official wrote that ‘they [Guinean politicians] 
are now becoming aware that they do not have much to choose and even those picked 
are far from being well-qualified’.15
Whereas in most African countries independence leaders moved from democratic 
convictions to dictatorial practices once they felt their position threatened, in 
Equatorial Guinea politicians did not quite follow this journey. What is often 
underestimated is the influence that metropolitan regimes had in the formation of the 
political class and their different ideologies across Africa. In the French and British 
colonies, for example, nationalist leaders often studied in the metropolis where they 
could get political inspiration from the democratic principles and institutions that they 
were denied back home. At least initially, African nationalists rarely devised 
alternative political models; rather they were mostly inspired by their respective 
metropolitan systems. In Equatorial Guinea, however, the government model was not 
a democratic one but that of General Franco, and there is no doubt about its influence 
over Ondo Edu first and Macias Nguema later. In the final round of the 1968 
elections, the choice was limited between two candidates with little or no democratic 
convictions and with very poor intellectual instruction. Previously, the best-qualified
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candidate, Ndongo Miyone, who had a seminary education and had been in contact 
with different African nationalist movements during his time in exile, failed to gain 
enough support, partly because he was unknown to the majority of the electorate. 
Ondo Edu’s anti-democratic principles were clearly expressed during the course of a 
speech in 1964:
There existed an unknown country whose inhabitants lived within an upset and despaired 
atmosphere, deprive of their complete freedom of action.. .You must know that political 
parties are dangerous. I believe that each country’s custom must be its actual political 
party. Why should we look for or imitate those countries that have parties for destruction 
when we are all united?... As long as I am the President, I will ask you to be patient... 
Be quiet because your moment will come... You look crazy, you look like a rabble who 
want to take over the Autonomous Government... We are now going to organize the 
Government and you must listen to the Government Council because the people no 
longer has a voice.16
Previous to his election as president of Equatorial Guinea, one cannot find such 
explicit anti-democratic statements in Macias Nguema’s discourse. Nonetheless his 
proclaimed admiration for General Franco, expressed during the declaration of 
independence, was undoubtedly a bad omen.17 In a later speech, on 3 November 1968, 
President Nguema stated that he and his government ‘having been educated by Spain 
will follow the policy of thirty years of peace of Generalisimo Franco.’18 In fact, this 
was a rather conciliatory discourse for somebody who had been characterized 
previously by his vitriolic declarations against both Spain and other nationalist 
leaders. In addition to maintaining the economic partnership with the Spanish and 
proclaiming the national and non-partisan character of his government, Equatorial 
Guinea’s new President reasserted his lack of concern about any coup d’etat against 
his administration.19 The latter is a clear example of Macias Nguema’s contradictory 
personality, which characterized his rule until he was ousted in August 1979. At the
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same time that President Nguema was giving his speech, the Spanish ambassador 
reported to his superiors about the detention of Ondo Edu’s followers due to an 
‘unsubstantiated’ fear of activities against the government.20 A few days later the 
Spanish ambassador described the situation in the following terms: ‘the kind and 
harmless personality of Bonifacio Ondo [Edu] has become a nightmare for the 
inexperienced and fearful rulers of this country.’21
In the light of these events, Ondo Edu escaped to Gabon, where he believed he 
would be safe. The Equatorial Guinean government convinced the Gabonese 
authorities to hand him over, however, and a few weeks later, in January 1969, the 
former President of the autonomous government died in prison as a result of torture -  
in spite of an agreement with the Gabonese government to treat him ‘humanely’ 22 
The detention and murder of Ondo Edu only a month after independence clearly 
showed the character of those in charge of ruling the country. The problem was not 
limited to Macias Nguema only, but, as indicated in the correspondence of the 
Spanish ambassador, several members of the administration were involved in the 
repression against Ondo Edu and his followers, especially the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Ndongo Miyone. Although not visible to the majority of Equatorial Guineans, 
in Evinayong and Akurenam, Ondo Edu’s stronghold, some sectors of the population 
were already suffering the Government’s repression.23 It is the belief of the people of 
this region that Macias Nguema never forgave the tnkooi (gazelle), as Ondo Edu’s 
supporters were known, and his repressive policies were especially hard in these 
districts.24 Other than Spain’s traditional support for Ondo Edu, it is not clear where 
the fear of potential activities against the Equatorial Guinean government came from. 
Some internal sources suggests that President Nguema was not fully involved in the 
repression against Ondo Edu, and his murder in prison was received with surprise and
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concern by the President.25 Spanish documents indicate that Ndongo Miyone was, at 
least, the visible head and one of the main instigators behind the repression against 
Ondo Edu. Whatever the case, Macias Nguema was clearly unqualified to run the 
country and, overcome by circumstances, his policies became very much a desperate 
attempt to control a situation that was going out of hands as early as 1969.
As soon as Macias Nguema became president, he sought to reconcile with the 
Spanish and held out his hand to the expatriate business community. Nonetheless, the 
damage had been done and the Spanish settlers, somewhat misled by their diplomats, 
were wary of the Equatorial Guinean President. Restricted access to the Spanish 
documentation for this period does not allow the confirmation of information from 
Equatorial Guinea suggesting that the Spanish, led by the ambassador, sought to 
undermine the Macias Nguema government. According to Equatorial Guinean 
sources, civil servants stopped being paid from October 1968 and when the 
government took direct action to find out the reasons for the delay in the payments, 
they realized that there was no money in the government’s accounts of the Banco 
Exterior de Espana (BEE), the only operative bank in the country.26 Furthermore, 
Bolekia claims that all BEE accounts were empty after all Spanish businessmen 
withdrew their funds. According to him, by December 1968 there were no more than 
2,000 pesetas in all the BEE branches in the country.27
The minder and repression of Ondo Edu and his followers as well as the 
complicated economic situation created a climate of growing tension and instability in 
the country. The government banned political meetings and increasingly directed its 
attacks against the Spanish and everything that was identified with them, including 
the Catholic Church. The early months of 1969 were characterized by the escalation 
of tensions between the Equatorial Guinean government and the group of Spanish
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diplomats, top officials and military personnel that remained in the country as part of 
the transition agreements signed before independence in order to guarantee the 
functioning of the administration and security of the country. Such hostility 
culminated in the so-called ‘incident of the flags’ on 25 February 1969. This 
originally minor incident blew up out of proportion as a result of the accumulated 
tensions and, above all, the lack of ability of Macias Nguema and the Spanish 
Ambassador Duran-Loriga to address the conflict. Frustrated by his inability to deal 
with the country’s difficulties, President Nguema organized a public rally during 
which he demanded that all Spanish flags be lowered from Spanish buildings in Bata. 
The refusal of the Spanish Consul, backed by the Ambassador, to comply was 
perceived as affront to Equatorial Guinea’s independence. This gave way to a series 
of street protests by uncontrolled groups of youngsters against Spain and the Spanish 
presence, which culminated in the death of a Spanish citizen.29 In order to sort out the 
conflict between the two countries, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ndongo Miyone 
and the Ambassador to the UN Satumino Ibongo travelled to Madrid. Two days after 
their return, on 5 March 1969, they led a failed coup d’etat against President Nguema 
in Bata. The Spanish have always denied their involvement in the coup, but in 
Equatorial Guinea it is a common belief that the Spanish were behind the plot.
Most Equatorial Guineans consider the 1969 coup attempt as a turning point in 
the history of the country and the beginning of what Decalo calls ‘Nguema’s reign of 
terror’. The events that followed have made people forget that the first signs of 
Macias Nguema’s repressive tactics appeared less than a month after gaining 
independence. Today, many blame Ndongo Miyone and Franco’s government for 
Equatorial Guinea’s decade of terror, in the belief that perhaps Macias would never 
have become so brutal had it not been for the failed coup. Initially, Macias Nguema’s
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reaction was directed against those related with the supposed instigators of the 
rebellion, that is, the members of Ndongo Miyone and Ibongo’s parties, MONALIGE 
and Union Bubi respectively. Many of those arrested died in prison as a result of 
torture, and those who survived imprisonment and harsh punishments were later 
expelled from their jobs.31 Although the President’s counter-attack was initially 
localized with regards to the Equatorial Guinean population, the entire Spanish 
community became the target of the government. Ndongo Miyone’s public 
confession, before dying in prison, about Spanish participation in the plot became the 
official version in Equatorial Guinea, despite the fact that he had clearly been 
tortured.32 Sources do not indicate that the Spanish were physically attacked in the 
aftermath of the failed coup, yet the Spanish ambassador asked the Spanish 
community to evacuate the country, fearing that rhetoric might give way to action. 
The latter never happened and although some of the nine hundred Spaniards that 
remained in the country by 1971 complained about government harassment, they 
never suffered the harsh repression that was inflicted on many Equatorial Guineans.33 
No doubt, Macias Nguema contributed to the mass departure of the expatriate 
community, for he clumsily victimized all the Spanish for the faults of a small and 
localized group of people. The so-called Spanish neo-colonialism became the 
obsession and alibi of the regime. Cornered by the subsequent stagnation of the 
economy, Macias Nguema started a series of measures that paved the way for the 
highly autocratic regime that dominated the country during the 1970s. In November 
1969, one could read in the newspaper Potopoto the first manifestations praising the 
ruler in the totalitarian fashion that characterized the following decade:
The truth is making its way; the system has triumphed.
MACIAS, MACIAS, MACIAS, PRESIDENT.
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Oh, venerated loved son of Equatorial Guinea.
Oh, great saviour of Equatorial Guinea, your wisdom has transformed many things 
miraculously.
You seem to have been sent by God for our salvation.
We were still in darkness, but your rays gave us the light...
Oh, great thinker, great contemporary wise man, oh humble man destined to come to us 
from the bottom of the darkness to redeem us, poor oppressed people that suffered in 
sadness and misery, we show you our great gratitude.34
Macias Nguema, like many of the first generation of African leaders in the 
postcolonial period, did not possess a coherent plan for government. The rhetoric and 
actions of the nationalists were dominated by the blinding goal of independence. Once 
in power, the Equatorial Guinean president simply aspired to take over political 
control of the former colonial administration. The basic structure of the country 
should remain the same but without the abuses and injustices of the previous period. 
This was seen to be easily accomplished, since Africans themselves would now be in 
charge of the administration. The reality was, however, that since the late 1960s most 
African countries entered a process of disintegration, which scholars have described 
as the Africanization of the state.35 This concept appears to imply that African 
countries inherited a totally modem state, which increasingly lost its modem 
characteristics in favour of so-called traditional or African elements. In this respect, 
Macias Nguema was not a traditionalist; if anything, he became one. As we saw in his 
first speeches, he had a ‘modem’ conception of the state as an instrument that should 
serve the interests of the whole of Equatorial Guinean society. African rulers, 
however, were unaware that the system they inherited was not a modem one, but an 
old-fashioned organization that worked thanks to the existence of a coercive 
apparatus, the colonial state, and an unequal economic structure, the colonial 
economy. Both the colonial state and colonial economy were interdependent and
332
required the support of the metropolitan bureaucratic machinery as well as the 
financial assistance of European private investors.
Photograph 35: President Nguema at the steps o f the Presidential Palace
The initial conciliatory tone of Macias Nguema suggests that he realized the 
extent to which the country depended on the human and financial resources of Spain. 
Certain Spanish political and economic sectors, however, sought to take advantage of 
this circumstance in order to maintain de facto control over the young country. The 
inevitable clash between President Nguema and the Spanish left Equatorial Guinea 
without the necessary resources, as Spanish businessmen and officials abandoned the 
country. Under these circumstances, Macias Nguema began to take resolute steps 
towards instituting a dictatorial regime. Authoritarianism should not be typified 
exclusively as characteristic of the process of Africanization of the state, since its 
presence dates back to the early days of colonial domination. The Spanish, once the 
colonial state was consolidated, were able to reduce the level of authoritarianism and 
autocracy. Nonetheless, they never disappeared completely as the colony continued to
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be run under the almost absolutist power of the Governor-General and his district 
officers and the permanent threat and use of the Colonial Guard. Deprived of 
‘sophisticated’ mechanisms to make the administration work, it should not come as a 
surprise that African leaders resorted to increasingly brutal means which turned the 
existing totalitarian-styled administrations into weak but yet omnipresent 
organizations from which they could benefit while hampering the development of 
internal dynamics in African societies that might jeopardize their position.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the deterioration of the social, political and 
economic conditions in Africa led to the adoption of autocratic systems, which, in 
varying degrees, were heavily dependent on the use of violence for their survival. In 
Equatorial Guinea, the dictatorial system that developed throughout the 1970s and 
which laid the bases for the successive authoritarian regime was first defined as 
‘nguemism’ by Ela Nchama.36 Scholars and observers agree that nepotism was the 
main characteristic of this system.37 With regards to this subject, Bolekia explains that 
Nguemism is a ‘pseudo-philosophy that consists in considering Equatorial Guinea as 
a private matter of Macias Nguema and his family.’38 According to this analysis, the 
state was appropriated by Macias and his family, who then had to develop a system of 
arbitrary terror in which human rights and freedoms were completely denied in order 
to guarantee their power. In this respect, the infamous Juventud en Marcha con 
Macias (Macias’ Youth Movement) became a key tool, since they terrorized entire 
communities, exercising a greater power than many government officials.39 The 
patrimonialization of the state by a family is, in essence, what we can understand as 
the Africanization of the state, because, although the personalization of the state 
institutions is not exclusive to Africa, in Equatorial Guinea and other African 
countries this process took place on the basis of kinship ideology. The use of kinship
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ideology in postcolonial Africa is, according to Ekeh, a corruption of the ideology 
developed in the past, because, applied in a modem context of intense multi-ethnic 
interaction, it becomes socially unacceptable.40 Such use is derogatorily defined as 
‘tribalism’ 41 To Ekeh, the lack of development of the state inherited by African rulers 
has been a major factor in the strengthening of kinship ideology or tribalism, as 
individuals from all social categories could not rely on state institutions for their 
security and welfare.42 In Equatorial Guinea, tribalism was encouraged from the top, 
since Macias Nguema, not trusting state institutions, increasingly resorted to kinship 
alliances to maintain his power. Thus the formation of what Liniger-Goumaz calls a 
‘nepo-republic’ 43
After the 1969 coup attempt, Macias Nguema got rid of his multiparty cabinet and 
surrounded himself with members of his Esangi clan, including Obiang Nguema, the 
current ruler of Equatorial Guinea, who helped him to eliminate numerous politicians 
and cadres considered as a potential threat.44 The departure of Spanish officials and 
businessmen along with the murder, imprisonment and exile of the local cadres 
brought the economy and government to a halt by 1971.45 Civil servants could spend 
up to five months without pay, hospitals and health centres lacked essential 
medicines, and teachers had to do without textbooks.46 People from all over the 
country were mobilized to keep commercial crops afloat without economic 
compensation. As the situation in the country deteriorated, the lack of legitimacy and 
fear of the Macias Nguema’s regime rose. As a result, in 1971 he abolished numerous 
articles of the 1968 constitution. A year later he proclaimed himself president for life, 
and in 1973 he passed a new constitution that gave him full control over the 
executive, legislative and judicial powers. The entire life of the country became 
politicized around the single party, Partido Unico Nacional de Trabaj adores (PUNT,
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Workers’ Single National Party), which based its ideology on the adoration of the 
egomaniac and histrionic personality of its leader as well as a vague mixture of 
socialism and nationalism.47
The so-called authenticity was used, above all, as a weak excuse to hide the 
failures and abuses of Macias Nguema and his relatives. Thus, the political system 
imposed by the Equatorial Guinean ruler was justified as an attempt to follow African 
traditional ways. People were told, for example, that genuine Africans eat cassava 
rather than bread in order to cover the lack of flour in the country. However, the 
development of this Mobutu-styled rhetoric, which was often mixed with Communist 
discourse, did not seem to have been directly influenced by the Congolese dictator. 
Macias Nguema was not an African nationalist, but an Equatorial Guinean one, and 
resented foreign African influences. After establishing cooperation agreements with 
the communist bloc, for example, his government allowed people to wear Maoist 
suits, whereas African garments from neighbouring countries were banned. Children, 
civil servants and the whole society in general were mobilized to undergoing militia- 
styled instruction and attend rallies of support for Macias Nguema, in which people 
had to chant slogans such as ‘Toclo con Macias y  Nada sin Macias' (‘Everything with 
Macias and Nothing without Macias’). The fragility of the system could not stand 
criticism; hence any complaint was interpreted as treason and was harshly punished. It 
is estimated that, by the end of Macias Nguema’s regime, one third of the population 
had been driven into exile.48
The economic breakdown
It is often argued that at the time of independence Equatorial Guinea was in a
better economic position than neighbouring countries. This statement tends to stress
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President Nguema’s disastrous management that led the country from a relatively 
prosperous economy to be considered amongst the poorest nations in Africa only a 
decade after gaining independence. In explaining developments in Equatorial Guinea 
between 1968 and 1979, scholars such as Liniger-Goumaz, Decaio and Mitogo tend to 
focus their attention on Macias Nguema’s complicated personality, questioning his 
mental state by using terms such as psychosis and inferiority complex when 
describing his chaotic and brutal policies.49 Indeed, many in Equatorial Guinea 
consider today that Macias Nguema was mentally unfit to serve as president. 
Nonetheless, these observations often neglect economic conditions as a major factor 
in the deterioration of the country. Whether the economy suffered as a result of 
President Nguema’s mistakes, the President’s policies were also affected by pressing 
economic circumstances beyond his control. In fact, it is somewhat misleading to 
affirm that Equatorial Guinea was in a better economic position than its neighbours in 
1968.
In 1962, a Spanish official report revealed that ‘the average living standard’ in 
Equatorial Guinea was ‘higher’ than in ‘Nigeria, Cameroon and Gabon’, yet warned 
that the development plans these countries were carrying out ‘would dangerously 
bring their living standards closer’, affecting ‘the economic and political mechanism’ 
in Equatorial Guinea.50 Having an economic system that relied on cheap migrant 
labour for the production and export of cocoa, coffee and timber, the rise in the living 
standard in the neighbouring countries would deprive Equatorial Guinea of its cheap 
labour supply. Further, an increase in production in these countries would also bring 
world-market prices down, making Equatorial Guinean subsidized goods uneconomic 
in the Spanish market. The report went on to say that ‘Fernando Po and Rio Muni’ 
were ‘poor provinces’, and, therefore, they could not develop ‘without representing a
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burden to the Treasury’ like the rest of the poor Spanish provinces did.51 Indeed, the 
Spanish colony, as Pelissier points out, had the highest export earnings per capita in 
Africa in 1960, but this was mostly due to the Fernando Po plantations and Rio 
Muni’s timber exploitation controlled by Spanish settlers and companies.52 The 
production of the myriad of small African farms dedicated to the growing of coffee 
and cocoa was very limited due to their lack of capital and rudimentary techniques.53 
The fanning companies, despite their high capitalization, were over-dependent on 
cheap migrant labour, since they had barely invested in the mechanization of 
production.54 To de Cossio, ‘the coexistence’ of the African and European farming 
production made ‘returns to be minimum’ as the productivity of the best farms could 
not compensate for that of the poorest ones.55 Furthermore, the apparent success of 
the colonial economy was very much based on the system of subsidies, which allowed 
farms to ‘withstand the cost pressure’ -  30 pesetas per kilogram for coffee and 10 
pesetas for cocoa.56
The Spanish authorities were not unaware of these problems. They knew about 
the fragility of an economy highly dependent on monoculture, at a time when cocoa 
and coffee prices were falling in world markets, and with almost non-existent 
industrial activity.57 Although the 1963 development plan sought to readdress these 
problems, including the poor infrastructure and education levels, so as to prepare 
Equatorial Guinea for independence, it achieved limited results due to the short time 
span as well as the obstacles posed by Spanish interests in the region. As the 1962 
report and de Cossio point out, Equatorial Guinea’s economy was based on large 
monopolistic Spanish companies that controlled all financial and commercial 
activities. This oligopoly, along with the Presidential Office and colonial officials, 
opposed the granting of independence and, once they realized there was no way back,
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they pushed for the separation of Fernando Po, where they aimed at maintaining the 
same economic relation with Spain. In short, this alliance tended to boycott the efforts 
that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which through the development plan tried to 
transform Equatorial Guinea’s dependent economy.
In 1966, in an article that defended the economic relationship between Equatorial 
Guinea and Spain, a Spanish author argued that ‘Equatorial Guinea’s economy will 
not be able to survive without being integrated in the broader economy of Spain.’58 
Considering that Spain guaranteed a market and higher prices, this statement was not 
far from being true. Nonetheless, there were economic and political sectors that were 
willing to disengage from what was considered to be a burdensome relationship for 
the Spanish economy. To them, the well-being of a marginal group could no longer 
dictate Spain’s policies at the expense of the country’s broader economic interests and 
its international relations. A 1967 official report argued about the convenience of 
breaking the existing economic relationship, because Spain not only paid prices above 
the international market for Equatorial Guinean goods, but this relationship also cost 
the Spanish Treasury some 16 million US dollars to compensate for the colony’s 
foreign trade deficit and the purchase of pound sterling to pay for the migrant 
workers’ salaries.59 In spite of the differences between the two groups, represented by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidential Office, they both agreed on the 
need to provide financial and technical support to the new country.
The study of Equatorial Guinea’s economy after 1968 is a challenging task due to 
the absence of reliable statistics.60 When analysing previous information, however, 
one needs to be careful to avoid being misled by data that the Spanish often utilized in 
a propagandists fashion. Decalo, for instance, relies on this information to say that 
Equatorial Guinea’s per capita income and gross national product was similar to that
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of Ivory Coast in 1968.61 Unlike the case of Ivory Coast whose agriculture sector 
relied on local producers, one of the most serious problems of the Equatorial Guinean 
economy, according to the 1962 report, was the extremely unequal income 
distribution between the African producers and European settlers as well as the 
internal tensions resulting from it.62 The developments that followed the aftermath of 
independence were to a large extent determined by the accumulated tensions between 
the Equatorial Guinean politicians and civil servants and the affluent European 
population. As we saw above, President Nguema, immediately after securing power, 
sought to appease the expatriate community and restore their confidence, in an effort 
to undo the damage caused by his radical anti-Spanish campaign. In his speech before 
a majority Fang audience on Fernando Po, Macias Nguema asked Equatorial 
Guineans to forget about past colonial errors, at the same time that he demanded 
Europeans to leave aside former discriminatory behaviours.63 Conscious of the 
economic importance of the European community, he asked not to ‘offend the white 
man, who is here to help us.’64
The Spanish community was not willing to forget the ‘arrogance’ of a former 
African clerk who, taking advantage of the changing political situation, dared to speak 
of the white man as an equal. From the beginning, the Spanish business community, 
in alliance with the Presidential Office in Madrid, tried to boycott the policies of a 
government whose fragility and dependence was obvious to everybody. Despite the 
fact that Spanish government undertook to pay for the salaries of the Equatorial 
Guinea’s administration until the end of 1969, all wages stopped being paid as early 
as October 1968. It is clear that, by not paying civil servants’ salaries, they expected 
that Macias Nguemas’ weak government would fall as a result of mounting 
dissatisfaction. The fact that European businessmen also withdrew their funds from
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local accounts shows that both businessmen and members of Franco’s government
took part in the design of this strategy.
On 12 October 1968, during the ceremony of independence, a message from
General Franco to President Macias Nguema was read:
I am very pleased to express to you my warmest congratulations and assure you that the 
Spanish Government will provide firm support to the new and dear nation, which Your 
Excellency is going to lead, with the intention of cooperating in its development and 
growing prosperity.65
Far from getting Spain’s support, the Equatorial Guinean Government suffered a 
series of destabilizing policies that targeted the country’s weakest point, its economy. 
Yet the Spanish underestimated Macias Nguema’s charisma and Equatorial Guineans’ 
antagonistic feelings towards the foimer colonial master. People’s dissatisfaction 
instead turned against the Spanish who were perceived to be interfering in the matters 
of Equatorial Guinea as if they were still in charge. The Spanish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs sought to sooth the tense relations between the two countries through the 
signature of a comprehensive cooperation agreement in May 1969, which covered 
commercial, financial, education and transport areas. The agreement did not seem to 
be fully implemented due to the inability of Macias Nguema’s administration to meet 
the obligations and the lack of cooperation of the Presidential Office, whose support 
was key for the implementation of the agreement after having been in charge of the 
colonial administration for the last few decades.66 In 1971, after the signature of 
another cooperation agreement to ‘normalize relations with Equatorial Guinea’, the 
Foreign Affairs Minister had to remind Vice-president Carrero Blanco, in charge of 
Presidential Office, about ‘the importance of this matter, given that, if  our economic 
cooperation is delayed or defectively implemented, we shall enter... a new period of 
crisis with Equatorial Guinea’.67
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The sudden departure of the Spanish community had catastrophic effects for the 
Equatorial Guinean economy. It is very likely that the country’s economy would have 
fallen apart as a result of the ending of colonial commercial privileges, the fall in cash 
crops prices and the 1973 oil crisis, as happened all over Africa, yet the collapse 
would not have been as sudden had it not been for Spanish flight. Spanish settlers and 
companies who owned large cocoa plantations on Fernando Po and timber 
exploitations in Rio Muni, which produced the bulk of the country’s GDP, left 
without making any arrangements to guarantee the continuation of production.68 As 
early as 1969, cocoa production suffered a major setback as a result of the instability 
related to the attempted coup, moving from 37,000 tons of cocoa the previous year to 
28,000 tons.69 Although the conditions of the 1969 cooperation agreement guaranteed 
the purchase of some 20,000 tons of cocoa by Spain, they could not compete with 
those of the colonial period.70 The new agreement, in addition to not absorbing the 
total production, paid for cocoa in accordance with international market prices.71 The 
profits of the plantation based economy of Fernando Po decreased significantly in 
spite of previous reports warning about the inability of this sector to survive without 
the subsidies that since the mid 1940s had contributed to economic growth. Without 
this extra profit, the necessary commercial infrastructure and the backing of the 
Spanish business’ capital, production fell dramatically in the subsequent years. 
Timber exploitation, which required a substantial capital base, could not continue 
once the Spanish left, as the government did not have enough financial resources.72 
Only coffee, mostly grown by small local farmers in Rio Muni, did not suffer such a 
drastic collapse. In the end, however, it followed the same pattern as the other 
production sectors, partly, because farmers, being formerly accustomed to heavily
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subsidized prices, no longer found the necessary economic incentive in the market 
after 1969.73
Beyond the impact on cocoa plantations and timber exploitation, the Spanish 
departure had a significant effect on the entire commercial system. The Equatorial 
Guinean economy was articulated through a widespread network that connected 
producers, distributors and a small group of monopolistic companies in charge of 
exporting Equatorial Guinea’s production and importing the bulk of the goods 
consumed in the region. Despite the economic preponderance of the large commercial 
companies, the commercial network depended on the numerous small Spanish traders 
scattered throughout the country, who linked African farmers to the large commercial 
companies. The flight of the Spanish deprived Equatorial Guinea of three important 
pillars: the farming and timber companies, the small trader network, and the 
monopolistic companies that connected the country’s economy to the international 
market. The production of African farmers was severely damaged by the breakdown 
of the commercial network for, in the absence of their commercial partners, they now 
found it almost impossible to sell their harvest.74
Trusting government promises and not having other economic option to obtain 
cash, most farmers continued growing commercial crops. By 1971, only those in 
border regions still grew these crops since they had the option to smuggle their 
harvest into Cameroon or Gabon to be sold.75 Those far from the border chose not to 
waste their time and effort in return for nothing. Macias Nguema’s administration 
tried to ameliorate the situation through the creation of a government office, INFOGE, 
which bought farmers’ production. This solution soon failed because INFOGE did not 
have the necessary fluids to pay farmers for their harvests. People were promised to 
be paid as soon as the coffee and cocoa was sold to Spain. However, due to a
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combination of the government’s inability and corruption generated by the deep 
economic crisis, fanners were rarely paid.76 Fanners stopped growing cash crops, 
income sources disappeared, unsupplied shops closed down, and money flow was 
almost non-existent; the country, for the most part, moved towards a subsistence 
economy.
In response to the economic crisis, most rural communities resorted to subsistence 
agriculture. Despite being marginalized by the administration and capitalist sectors, 
subsistence farming had played a key role in the colonial economy. Now, due to the 
collapse of the modem economic system, it regained its central role in ensuring the 
survival of the Equatorial Guinean population. Subsistence agriculture, however, did 
not meet the needs of an administration that relied on exports to generate the funds 
that kept the state machinery running as well as the elite’s living standard. For the 
government, the only viable alternative was to take control of Fernando Po’s 
abandoned plantations. The situation did not improve as the government expected, 
and under its management cocoa plantations were unable to regain previous 
production levels. In addition to the lack of expertise and old age of the trees, the 
prices obtained for the cocoa harvest were not enough to cover productions costs. The 
decrease in profits made it increasingly difficult to pay for the Nigerian labour force. 
The latter’s dissatisfaction was addressed by the Equatorial Guinean government 
through the use of violence and coercion, which, far from improving the situation, 
made matters worse. In November 1972, the use of repressive measures against a 
group of migrant workers protesting against their labour conditions caused the death 
of some fifty Nigerians at the hands of the Equatorial Guinean police during a
• 77demonstration. Coercion as a means to address the economic difficulties created a 
vicious circle in which Nigerians’ productivity diminished, profits and salaries
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became increasingly meagre, and the government made greater use of violence to deal 
with the situation. Given the series of abuses committed against the Nigerian 
labourers, their government decided to evacuate its citizens in 1975. Such a measure 
left the island’s plantations without its labour force, and Macias Nguema reacted by 
signing a Presidential Decree that ‘established that all citizens over fifteen years of 
age had to provide manual work in the government’s plantations and mines.’78 
According to Buale, the following year some 25,000 people were recruited to work on 
the island’s plantations without pay, in exchange for a small food ration that barely 
covered the needs of the worker but not his family.79 In addition to the forced 
recruitment of workers for Fernando Po’s plantations, known as bob a (literally, bag), 
abandoned private coffee and cocoa farms in Rio Muni had been nationalized. There 
the government forced the population to carry out free communal work, like in the old 
prestcicion days, in an effort to reactivate production which stopped due to the lack of
R0economic incentives.
Equatorial Guinea’s underdeveloped civil society was unable by itself to replace 
the vacuum left by the Spanish in 1969. The government, which totally depended on 
the modem economic sector, tried to play the role the Spanish had done before in 
order to keep the system alive. Nonetheless, changing economic conditions and 
insufficient cadres made it an impossible task. Being completely overcome by the 
circumstances, it resorted to violence in the belief that it would work as it did during 
the early days of the colonial domination. Although coercion was a key instrument of 
the colonial system, the Spanish did not rely on it exclusively but also on 
bureaucratic, financial and human resources.
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Photograph 36: Since the collapse of commercial agriculture women have become
the pillar of rural economies.
The collapse of the colonial economic system affected the entire Equatorial 
Guinean population, whose living standard fell dramatically. People could not buy 
basic goods such as salt, soap, kerosene, clothes or medicines.81 Many were forced to
make trousers out of sacks and use almost forgotten methods to make their own salt
82 •and soap. The signature of cooperation agreements with China and other countries 
of the communist bloc by 1972 improved the situation initially, as the country 
received basic goods that were sold in state shops known as estatales. The 
government, in accordance with the communist principles of its new allies, banned all 
private economic activities after declaring all capitalists to be subversive.83 Beyond 
the communist rhetoric, the ban on private economic activities hid the government’s 
wish to profit from all economic activities in the country. By banning most private 
initiatives, it undermined the regular functioning of the economy and people’s ability 
to deal with the precarious situation. Thus, for example, an informant explains how he 
was arrested, along with his brothers, for buying coffee and cocoa from local
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producers that was later sold in Cameroon.84 Freedom of movement was virtually 
non-existent, as people required government credentials to move from one district to 
another, and numerous checkpoints were established along the roads.85 According to 
an informant, the climate of terror and distrust prevented many individuals from 
sneaking through forest paths for fear of being reported by someone else.86 People 
often resorted to the sale of game meat, staple food, malamba (fermented sugarcane
• * 87juice) or handmade soap to get some money. The government, however, eventually 
banned the production of malamba and soap and established a myriad of checkpoints 
that control all kind of activities throughout the country,88 By the late 1970s, the 
economy was almost paralysed as a result of the firm control on private economic 
activities and the failure of most government initiatives due to corruption and 
mismanagement.
Bi ne bon be’fang: we are Fang
By 1968, Equatorial Guinean society appeared to have come to terms with 
colonial modernity, and people were, to varying degrees, familiar with some of its 
elements. Very few questioned modernity as the system that should organize the 
country’s social and economic structures. Some nationalists argued about the need to 
include some local elements within the so-called modem system, but, no doubt, the 
great challenge to the new government was how to consolidate the process of 
modernization. In a speech in November 1968, President Macias Nguema talked 
about his commitment to act as the leader of all Equatorial Guineans regardless of 
their ethnic origin and to maintaining the basic economic structure in good partnership 
with the Spanish community in order to develop the country.89 Nonetheless, the 
fragility of modem political and economic institutions became evident as soon as
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Equatorial Guinea suffered its first serious crisis in March 1969. From then on, the 
regime turned its back on modernity, as Macias Nguema, like many contemporary 
African leaders, moved somewhat inadvertently towards tradition in his ‘search for 
authority.’90 Modernity stopped being sponsored from the government ranks; instead, 
tradition gained strength and, slowly but surely, replaced modernity as the referential 
social model. The adoption of ‘tradition’, as the African alternative, did not mean an 
explicit rejection of the administrative and economic structures brought by 
colonialism, because nobody could envision an autochthonous alternative to run the 
country. Fang compartmentalization of reality, the double realm, led the regime to 
believe that the tradition could rule Equatorial Guineans’ social behaviour, especially 
family life and religious beliefs, whereas modernity would regulate the country’s 
administration and economy. Nobody seemed to be aware that, once the tradition was 
accepted as the social and cultural paradigm by the ruling elite, its influence would 
transcend social life, giving way to the so-called process of Africanization or 
retraditionalization of social, political and economic structures in Equatorial Guinea.
Similar social and political developments, taking place throughout most of Africa 
since the 1970s, have been often inteipreted as an indicator that European culture was 
not deeply rooted amongst the African population. According to European observers, 
by the 1960s Spanish culture had a strong hold amongst young individuals while the 
so-called traditional system was still strong amongst older generations.91 Indeed, it is 
difficult to assess the level of acculturation within a given society, as one can be 
misled by external factors. At the time of independence, acculturation was especially 
strong amongst two groups of Equatorial Guineans, the generation bom after 1945 
and especially those adults in the administration and business sectors in close contact 
with the Europeans. Often these individuals had to leave their rural communities in
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order to purse their careers or continue their education. In the process, however, they 
felt out of touch with village traditional social organization and adopted Spanish 
culture as their social reference. Acculturation is rarely a straightforward process as it 
usually results in the formation of contradictory mentalities. In Equatorial Guinea, 
such contradictions started to emerge as soon as the country’s independence was 
imminent. It was precisely within the acculturated sectors, which, by and large, 
benefited the most from the colonial system and accepted European culture, where 
nationalism took a stronger hold and more intense anti-Spanish sentiments developed. 
Spain had expected that acculturation would strengthen the identification between 
Africans and Spaniards but it had the opposite effect, as a Spanish official reported in 
1963:
We must assess the position of the [Equatorial] Guinean youth, especially, those who
have reached a higher level of education or an independent economic position. They are
92not only in favour of independence, but they are also anti-white racists.
In Equatorial Guinea, the process of retraditionalization did not take place as a 
result of a well-designed strategy. As Vansina argues, ‘the transition to independence’ 
in Africa took place ‘without the guidance of a basic new common tradition’.93 In 
many respects, this process was very much the undesired effect of Macias Nguema’s 
failed attempt to consolidate the modem system in the country. As shown above, a 
combination of personal inability and systemic fragility led the country to the collapse 
of colonial administrative and economic structures. The moment Equatorial Guinea 
suffered its first serious crisis, the country was unable to recover. From then on, each 
desperate attempt on President Nguema’s side to address the political and economic 
crisis resulted in a greater erosion of modernity. The individuals who led the top- 
down traditionalization process in Equatorial Guinea did not have a close relationship
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with the new tradition. For the most part, they had neither the intellectual capacity nor 
the traditional knowledge necessary to direct a viable process of traditionalization, in 
which the country’s organization and institutions responded to the existing traditional 
socio-cultural structures. In theory, the traditionalization of society would pose an 
immediate problem, such as what tradition is to be followed within the multi-ethnic 
context of most African countries. In Equatorial Guinea, where more than 80 per cent 
of the country’s population was Fang, including Macias Nguema, the regime 
mechanically imposed the ‘Fangization’ of Equatorial Guinean society; that is, the 
application of their own interpretation of the Fang tradition on a multi-ethnic social 
reality. Fang language, for instance, was declared the national language and 
compulsory to all Equatorial Guinean nationals.94 Although there was no 
premeditated campaign to develop Fang nationalism, not surprisingly, a loose sense of 
hegemony developed amongst the Fang since the early 1970s, which led to mistake 
Fang culture for Equatorial-Guinean culture. The national model that President 
Nguema defended during a speech in 1968 was abandoned, because, within a climate 
of growing political fragility and loss of legitimacy, multi-ethnicity came to be 
considered as divisive and dangerous.
Many scholars now emphasize the numerous similarities between the colonial and 
postcolonial periods, given that colonial ‘dynamics have continued to shape 
postcolonial society.’95 Thus, the process of traditionalization was also overshadowed 
by authoritarianism and the divide between rulers and subjects that characterized the 
colonial period. Given that the main goal of Nguema’s regime was to maintain the 
power structure inherited from the Spanish, it is not surprising that this process was 
dominated by the denial of plurality and the extreme use of coercion. Unlike the 
Sanaga-Ogowe tradition, during the post-independence period political leaders chose
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to ignore pluralism in order to create what Houtondji defines as the ‘unanimist 
illusion’.96 Within a climate of political fragility and growing illegitimacy, the only 
valid view in Equatorial Guinea became that of the government, which could only 
count on violence to guarantee this state of affairs. Alternative opinions were depicted 
as subversive or simply as contrary to African culture. Nowadays, under the successor 
regime of Obiang Nguema, criticism continues to be rejected and unconventional 
views are usually labelled as ntdngdn, a term that can have derogative connotations 
especially if its directed against a black individual.
As hard as it is to define Macias Nguema’s political thought, many in Equatorial 
Guinea consider that, if anything, this was characterized by a fierce nationalism.97 
Macias Nguema’s nationalist feelings, like the rest of Equatorial Guinean nationalists, 
mostly consisted in a radical rejection of the Spanish legacy. As a result, all those 
Equatorial Guineans who were identified with the former metropolis or its culture 
were repressed by the regime, especially Western-educated individuals. Seeking to 
eradicate potential competition, President Nguema chose to vilify this sector, by 
confronting them with the non-educated majority. According to President Nguema 
‘education and intellectuals’ were the ‘greatest problem facing Africa today’ because 
‘they are polluting our climate with foreign culture’.98 Decalo claims that Macias 
Nguema went as far as banning the use of the word ‘intellectual’ and, by 1979, ‘not a 
single university graduate remained in the country.’99 In rejecting Spanish culture, the 
regime also attacked monogamy, which was considered as a foreign institution, and 
encouraged polygamy, that seemed to rise since this period.100 As Lonsdale points 
out, ‘the social impudence of women in the colonial era roused many men to redefine 
“tribal” norms to secure a degree of female subordination for which there was often 
little precedent.’101 As early as 1969, district tribunals, now controlled by African
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men, chose to ignore Spanish and Catholic laws when resolving both canonical and
« • 109non-canomcal marriages.
Like colonial modernization, postcolonial traditionalization was hampered by the 
oppressive climate imposed by the government of Macias Nguema, which denied 
people’s autonomy. However, unlike the colonial project, Macias Nguema’s regime 
did not allow any safety valve. Ranger rightly points out that the colonial state was 
less omnipresent than its successor.103 Having a more efficient organization, the 
colonial administration did not require to depredate all economic activities or to 
control all social actions.
Macias Nguema gained power through an alliance with other political factions, 
which were later integrated within his cabinet and the country’s administration. The 
1969 coup attempt exposed the fragility of this alliance and of Nguema’s position. 
State institutions did not only fail to provide the necessary support for political power, 
but more distressingly the uprising originated from within these institutions. Fearful 
of losing power and incapable of devising a better solution, Macias Nguema chose to 
appoint personal allies to the state apparatus. In a society like Equatorial Guinea, 
characterized by the lack of qualified cadres, President Nguema did not have much to 
choose amongst his personal allies, and, rapidly, state institutions lost their 
institutional character as they moved from a people-in-institution model to an 
institution-in-people one.104 Those in charge of the state apparatus were aware that 
they owed their position to the President’s trust and not their qualification, 
exacerbating the personal character of the administration. A measure, which initially 
had intended to preserve the existing political order, ended up destroying it, because 
the administration became an inefficient machine with a totally distorted purpose. 
Macias Nguema laid the basis of a personal system, but he lacked the material and
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ideological resources to reward his allies.105 The underlying principles of state 
institutions stopped being served in order to serve the interests of those in charge of 
the administration. As early as 1971, Macias Nguema was aware of his failure in 
reasserting political control. The state, in the hands of dubious personal allies, 
became, then, a threatening organization that had to be dismantled. The series of 
constitutional reforms transformed the state into Macias Nguema5 s ‘personal 
fiefdonT, and, thus, became a void reality.106
The political crisis originating from the 1969 coup exposed the lack of national 
integration in the country, as social, regional and ethnic tensions came to the surface. 
Macias Nguema was clearly influenced by such tensions and interpreted the coup 
mostly on regional and ethnic grounds. Therefore, the coup was not simply the result 
of the political ambition of MONALIGE, Union Bubi and certain sectors of the 
Spanish community; rather, to Macias Nguema, the coup revealed the disloyalty of 
certain sections of Equatorial Guinean society. Rio Muni’s coastal areas, where 
MONALIGE had its stronghold, Fernando Po, where Union Bubi originated from, 
and the European community in general were victimized for the actions of a small 
group of individuals. In turn, the President looked for alliances from within those 
Fang regions that supported him during the 1968 elections, present-day Wele-Nzas 
and Kie-Ntem. For that purpose, he recovered the previous radical language that he 
successfully used during the presidential campaign, but now, in addition to targeting 
the former colonial master, he picked on minority groups -  Bubi and Ndowe -  and 
coastal Fangs. These social sectors were replaced in state institutions with individuals 
from the president’s traditional strongholds. Such measures opened the way to 
tribalism, which, in the 1970s, became a growing trend affecting the entire Equatorial 
Guinean society. Tribalism, being such a deeply pervasive pseudo-ideology,
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eventually tainted both oppressors and victims. The latter reacted by blaming the 
‘Ntumu tribe’, as all the Fang of the interior of Rio Muni were wrongly referred, for 
the chaos and suffering affecting the country, in spite of the fact that all social sectors 
were victim of the abuses and brutality of the regime. The so-called Ntumu were not 
only accused for the country’s problems but also described as a ‘primitive race that 
has barely coexisted for fifty years with the whites’.107
By sponsoring the traditionalization of Equatorial Guinean society, Nguemism 
has been able to direct this process in the most convenient way to the interest of the 
ruling elite. During the 1970s, village and clan based political institutions were clearly 
undermined by the government’s policies, as they were seen to pose a threat to its 
authority. More than ever, administrative chiefs acted as government agents for the 
control of rural communities across the country. In the 1960s an administrative reform 
created the village council, an institution that joined several neighbouring villages, 
regardless of their clan identity, under the same administration. The villagers chose 
the council members as well as its president. Macias Nguema replaced the village 
council for the comite de bases, which represented the ruling party, PUNT, in the 
village, instead of the village population. On principle, people had the right to choose 
the members and president of the committee, all of which had to be sympathizers of 
the PUNT, but, in reality, they were handpicked by government delegates or the party 
itself. Under Nguemism the only legitimacy originated from the President, thus no 
other loyalties were tolerated. Fear and terror as a tool for social control affected 
chiefs and villagers alike, contributing to the spreading of a climate of mutual 
accusations and distrust that eroded local political institutions. Hardcore supporters of 
the regime were rewarded in exchange for reporting on their fellow villagers and, in
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doing so, they could be appointed as presidents of village committees and enjoy 
certain privileges, such as access to scarce goods.108
Photograph 37: Although the abaa is no longer a political forum, it is still the main
space for socialization for men
Whatever legitimacy was left after colonial rule, it completely disappeared during 
the 1970s, destroying any sense of local authority. In the end, loyalty to the regime 
was not expressed to obtain any reward but, above all, to avoid being punished by the 
government. As in the worst days of the colonial conquest, villages could be 
indiscriminately burnt down in retaliation for challenging the government’s authority. 
In Evinayong, for instance, following the murder of a soldier in 1975, Macias 
Nguema arbitrarily ordered the torching of several villages on the Evinayong-Kogo 
road to prevent so-called rebel elements from finding shelter in the future and, thus, 
setting an example to dissuade potential rebellions.109 Despite the level of coercion 
diminished after the ousting of Macias Nguema, local authority has been unable to
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recover any sort of legitimacy as it still acts as the government’s primary instrument 
for social control,110 Rural communities continued to be alienated and, thus, they 
remain ‘uncaptured’ by the state and on the margins of the official system.111
The development of a clientelist system within the higher ranks of the 
administration during the 1970s spread all over the Equatorial Guinean society, yet it 
was somewhat limited by a political regime that did not favour the development of a 
closer clientelist relationship. The climate of physical and legal insecurity made 
possible the emergence of ‘big men’; that is, politically well-connected individuals 
who could offer some level of protection to ordinary citizens against generalized 
abuses. Rural communities witnessed how government delegates, whose functions 
were officially similar to those of former district officers, acted as powerful 
individuals. Unlike colonial officers, government delegates knew the local language 
and culture, which allowed them to exercise greater control while establishing an 
incipient clientelist network in their districts. In addition, government delegates 
visited villages much more often than their colonial predecessors.112 Considering the 
total abuse of human rights that dominated the country during this period, for villagers 
it was important to offer their loyalty and adulation as a means to gain the sympathy 
of government delegates and other government top officials, and, thus, avoid severe 
punishment or the looting of their scarce resources. Since this period, power relations 
were characterized by an extreme display of submission in order to disguise the lack 
of legitimacy of the powerful.
Black man only does witchcraft
Given that Macias Nguema’s regime destroyed anything that got in its way or was 
likely to be threatening, Christianity was soon targeted by the government. From the
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mid 1960s, the most radical elements of Equatorial Guinean nationalism had single 
out the Catholic Church as the main symbol of the much-hated ‘imported’ culture, 
despite Catholicism appearing to be strongly consolidated within Equatorial Guinean 
society.113 Local religious beliefs were not directly sponsored by the regime, yet they 
benefited from the government’s rhetoric in favour of local culture. The Claretians, 
despite being regularly harassed from the early 1970s, managed, for some time, to 
persuade the government that they posed no threat to the regime.114 Indeed the 
Catholic Church had to pay a high price to subsist within an increasingly hostile 
enviromnent. Decalo points out how priests were forced to spread government slogans 
such as ‘there is no other God than Macias’ or ‘God created Equatorial Guinea thanks 
to Papa Macias’.115 Between November 1974 and April 1975, all sorts of religious 
meetings and the use of Christian names were banned at the same time that 
Christianity was declared to have an alien nature.116 Eventually, in May 1978, 
Equatorial Guinea was officially declared an atheistic state.117 For the most part, 
religious manifestations survived within an intimate family realm, but, in some cases, 
larger communities could continue to practice regular masses thanks to the support of 
government officials with a greater faith than fear.118
In 1967, Bishop Nze Abuy had expressed his concern about a situation that led 
nationalist parties to deny the Church’s representation in the future legislative 
assembly.119 The loss of a privilege, which the Church enjoyed in Spain, came along 
with messages that served to ‘encourage and spread the hate for religion, as well as 
lies, smears, criticisms and disdain against God’s ministers,’120 By singling out the 
Catholic Church, nationalists were implicitly expressing acceptance for the existing 
administrative and economic structure, while explicitly rejecting the Church’s 
influence within a society that never came to terms with its ruling on moral and
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family affairs. In this respect, Nze Abuy was right in arguing that Christianity did not 
have deep roots in Equatorial Guinea.121 Nonetheless, this had much to do with the 
own nature of the Catholic Church, which never paid much attention to the pressing 
problems of Africans, such as witchcraft. As a Guinean priest explained to me, the 
greatest difficulty that the Church faces in Africa today is to deal with the problem of 
‘evil’, for which Catholicism does not offer an adequate response other than in the 
afterlife. In 1980, the Archbishop of Bamenda (Cameroon) drew attention to what he 
called Africans’ ‘double-life’.122 By compartmentalizing reality, to Africans, 
Christianity became perfectly compatible with local beliefs. The latter became 
especially relevant after independence, as the decline of social and economic 
conditions increased Equatorial Guineans concern with evil or witchcraft.
The deterioration of living conditions in Equatorial Guinea rapidly found its 
social expression in the revival of witchcraft beliefs. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
such beliefs appeared to be dying out, yet they only became less conspicuous within a 
context of economic prosperity that did not favour the development of those internal 
tensions usually expressed through witchcraft beliefs. Equally important, government 
repression contributed to maintaining the low profile of witchcraft during this stage. 
The reduction of Spanish repression during the autonomy period resulted in the 
gradual growth of witchcraft expressions. In 1967, Bishop Nze Abuy warned about 
the ‘reappearance of certain pagan practices’, such as sorcery, witchcraft or magical 
remedies, in Equatorial Guinea.123 Unlike the Spanish administration, most African 
political and religious leaders did not bear, and still do not, the same reservations 
regarding the existence of witchcraft. In fact, it would not be too adventurous to claim 
that many of them believed, to a varying extent, in it.
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It is difficult to decipher the role that witchcraft beliefs actually play in African 
societies, but there is no question that, in Equatorial Guinea, these beliefs resurfaced 
at a time of a great social and economic turmoil. Scholars have often interpreted 
witchcraft as an expression of social dissatisfaction as well as a mechanism to channel 
internal tensions resulting from inequality. In looking at witchcraft in postcolonial 
Cameroon, Rowlands and Warmer emphasize the political character of a phenomenon 
that seeks to express popular dissent with the autocratic state.124 Although referring to 
religious movements, Rangers sheds some doubts about this approach with regards to 
these sorts of phenomena, which, to him, must be interpreted as ‘responses to cultural 
and psychological tensions and not as expressions of political antagonisms.’125 The 
case of Equatorial Guinea during the 1970s shows that, witchcraft is, above all, a 
cultural and psychological response to social tensions, which are ultimately originated 
from a political situation. Macias Nguema’s policies, like that of his successor, were 
clearly related to the problems that Equatorial Guinean society experienced since 
independence and which, for lack of a more appropriate mechanism, were articulated 
through a witchcraft discourse. Referring to the repression of Macias Nguema’s 
government, an informant explained how, after the 1969 coup attempt, ‘Macias 
started doing witchcraft and eating people’.126
As Fernandez rightly points out, in modern African societies, witchcraft 
accusations, rather than channelling internal tensions, have exacerbated them.127 The 
reason for this has to do with changes in African societies and, in particular, in 
witchcraft beliefs since colonial conquest. In the past, magic in Equatorial African had 
an ambivalent nature, as it could be used by charismatic leaders for the benefit of the 
whole community as well as by ‘selfish’ individuals for their own benefit. In this 
context, social inequalities behind internal tensions could be addressed through
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witchcraft accusations against those who did not redistribute their gains in their 
communities, hi postcolonial Guinea, like Fisiy and Geschiere have noticed in 
Cameroon, witchcraft is used both by the weak and the powerful, which has limited 
the levelling role of witchcraft accusations, hi the 1970s, ordinary Fang individuals 
resorted to witchcraft accusations to express their frustration with the dreadful social 
and economic conditions, hoping, perhaps, that such accusation could have an impact 
on those responsible for the situation. The powerful, especially President Macias 
Nguema, manipulated witchcraft beliefs in order to convince Equatorial Guineans of 
his supernatural power and, hence, discourage potential threats. During the 1970s, 
many in Equatorial Guinea were convinced about President Nguema’s use of 
witchcraft as well as his cannibalistic habits. As Decalo suggests, Macias Nguema, 
being feared for his magic, turned witchcraft into a pillar of his eleven-year-long ‘rule 
of terror’.128
No doubt, the absence of past anti-witchcraft institutions undermined the capacity 
of witchcraft accusations to serve as tool to channel social tensions, which, now, 
could not be dealt accordingly. After the destruction of these institutions in the mid 
1940s, people were often left with the only option of resorting to district officers in 
the hope of obtaining some protection. Although the Spanish did not believe in 
witchcraft, they did take a tough stance whenever these accusations were launched, 
especially in the 1940s. After independence, however, government officials lacked 
any sort of legitimacy to deal with this situation, since they were often suspected of 
witchcraft themselves. Given that the sympathizers of the regime were often behind 
much of the indiscriminate violence and abuses of this period, accusations were rarely 
launched. Therefore, during the 1970s, witchcraft did not appear to serve so much as a 
levelling instrument, but rather as an expression of social dissatisfaction and
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frustration. In fact, despite Bishop Nze Abuy warning about the revival of movements 
such as Bwiti in 1967, religious movements were generally held back during the 
1970s. Informants from Evinayong, one of the areas where Bwiti had been 
traditionally more active, confirm that, during Macias Nguema’s rule, this cult 
suffered greater repression than ever. It appears that President Nguema, somehow 
wanted to repress all those supernatural activities which might threaten him. Decalo 
claims that Macias Nguema did not only accumulate a large array of skulls, but also 
‘tapped all other clan sorcerers of their powers, “concentrating” their magic in his
1 90own hands. In this respect, the end of his extremely coercive regime had two 
immediate consequences. On the one hand, there has been a significant increase in 
religious movements in the last twenty-five years. On the other, witchcraft 
accusations have skyrocketed, partly, as a result of the absence of legitimate anti- 
witchcraft institutions that seek to restore social harmony instead of making economic 
profit.
One of the factors that contributed to the revival of witchcraft beliefs during 
Macias Nguema’s rule was the significant increase in mortality as a result of 
repression and the decline in living conditions. The limited number of qualified 
doctors and nurses were unable to deal with the deteriorating health situation because 
they did not have basic medicines or the necessary equipment, as an informant 
working at the Mikomeseng health centre at the time explained.130 Not finding an 
appropriate response in modem medicine, people increasingly looked at the Fang 
tradition for answers. An informant explains how in the last four decades there has 
been a proliferation of illnesses of unknown origin, a factor that is clearly related with 
the collapse of health services and the contempt for scientific knowledge that 
followed independence.131 In the past, witchcraft was the explanation for inexplicable
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tragedies, especially premature death. The new Fang tradition, however, has neither
the complexity nor the expertise of the Sanaga-Ogowe, which was much more
efficient in dealing with social and natural adversities. As a result, witchcraft has
become since the 1970s the common explanation to any tragedy or incident, however
minor this might be, as Fang elder explains:
Nowadays people talk about witchcraft much more. To the Fang of the past, witchcraft 
was a hidden secret that was not publicly discussed... You could not call anybody a 
wizard. Today, for instance, if you have a minor argument with somebody, he will call 
you wizard as if it were an insult. Any incident is said to be caused by witchcraft.
The loss of Sanaga-Ogowe knowledge has been especially relevant with regards
to traditional medicine. The Fang ngengan or healer, who traditionally relied on his
knowledge of medicinal plants, has assumed in the last few decades the functions of
the ndende’e or diviner.133 This seems to have its origin in a modern anti-witchcraft
movement, which, according to Fernandez, originated in Gabon in the late 1950s,
only to die out a few years later.134 Although the ndende’e movement disappeared, it
had a significant impact on Fang society, as so-called diviners of all kinds have
mushroomed since independence. Divination became identified with healing, thus
providing with a livelihood to numerous individuals who, despite their ignorance of
traditional medicine, were more than willing to see witchcraft actions behind any kind
of affliction. Modern mingengdn (plural for ngengan) have not been aware of their
social responsibility in restoring family or social harmony. In making witchcraft a
trivial phenomenon, witchcraft has contributed to the ‘instrumentalization of
disorder’, since it exacerbates distrust and prevents the development of social
institutions outside the margins of the state.
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Conclusion
Equatorial Guinea became a paradigmatic case in Africa, where the transition 
from colony to postcolony turned out to be an enormous challenge for most countries, 
showing that modem democratic states can rarely succeed within an environment 
characterized by poor socio-economic development. During great part of the colonial 
period, the Spanish authorities sought to consolidate certain social, political and 
economic structures in Equatorial Guinea, but independence revealed the fragile 
foundations of colonial modernity. The new tradition, despite its secondary role 
during the colonial period, proved to be much more deeply rooted in Equatorial 
Guinean society. The absence of a mature nationalist movement prevented a more 
accurate analysis of the country’s social, political and economic conditions, as well as 
the articulation of an ideology that could realistically serve as framework for the 
organization of the new country. In view of the collapse of modem structures, Macias 
Nguema resorted to tradition, which was now sequestered, and sponsored a restricted 
version of tradition so as to serve the needs of the regime. In so doing, he developed a 
totalitarian-styled regime that sought to control every aspect of Equatorial Guinean 
society. Paranoid about losing power, Macias Nguema was increasingly forced to 
reduce his circle of allies. Initially, he looked for shelter amongst the Fang, soon later 
his Esangi clan, and, after 1975, he retreated to his home village from where he ruled 
over a country that in effect no longer existed.
Within a system dominated by chaos and repression, the state was left in the 
hands of individuals, who, in their search for resources, end up appropriating each and 
every one of the state institutions. Through the use of extreme coercion, Macias 
Nguema and his cronies developed a completely arbitrary system that allowed them to 
exploit the scanty resources left in the country. By 1979, the regime was completely
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exhausted and, once the inner circle had used up all the resources and could no longer 
benefit from the system, the decision to remove Macias Nguema was taken. He was 
replaced by his nephew and close collaborator, Obiang Nguema, one of the instigators 
behind the August 1979 coup. Once in power, Obiang Nguema was able to correct the 
errors of his uncle in order to transform Nguemism into a more efficient authoritarian 
and patrimonial system, at the same time that he consolidated the process of 
retraditionalization of Equatorial Guinean society.
Photograph 38: The Catholic faith has recovered part o f its former dynamism
Photograph 39: Family blessings are a key element of funeral celebrations
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Photograph 40: The Sanaga-Ogowe Ndongo Mba ritual is today a form  of entertainment
Photograph 41: The M vet continues to entertain Fang villagers across Rio Muni
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Conclusion
Deep changes have taken place in Equatorial Guinea but few are aware, for that is 
indeed the nature of tradition. If one inquires, elders will admit that matters were not 
always run the way they are in the village, that the ngengan never used to be a simple 
diviner, or that, in fact, Fang was not always our identity. The younger generation 
ignores these things. They do not even question such matters, since they rightly 
believe that their tradition has always been the Fang tradition. Thus, Fang identity, the 
clan chief, the diviner healer, the monetary bridewealth, witchcraft as cause of any 
incident, government officials ‘arbitrating’ justice, economic power equally 
proportional to political power, the non-questioning of authority: they are all the Fang 
tradition. The new tradition, which resulted from the establishment of the series of 
political, administrative and economic structures that followed the Spanish conquest 
of Rio Muni in the first quarter of the twentieth century, is a clear example of 
continuity in African history, as it was developed on the basis of the old Sanaga- 
Ogowe tradition. The strength of the tradition rests, though not exclusively, on the 
belief that Fang traditional structures have been handed over generation after 
generation since time immemorial, since the times of Afri Kara, the ancestor of those 
who say ma dzo na -  the Fang people.
The loss of autonomy by the Sanaga-Ogowe was the highest price of colonial 
conquest. Until the 1920s, political communities lay within the narrow borders of the 
mvok-e’bot, which provided its members with protection without limiting their 
independence. The strength of egalitarian tendencies had allowed village communities 
to keep personal ambitions in check. Since the second half of the nineteenth century, 
the expansion of European trade throughout the region brought about a series of social
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and economic changes that resulted in growing instability. These transformations, 
however, took place within a context in which Sanaga-Ogowe communities were still 
in command, being able to carry out the necessary adjustments. The gradual 
accumulation of economic and political power in the hands of a few individuals was 
somehow counteracted by the combination of egalitarian tendencies and geographic 
mobility. Emergent leaders faced numerous difficulties due to the constant flow of 
village communities towards the coast, whose competition tended to reduce their 
power, at the same time as making it extremely hard to maintain large family groups 
under the control of a single leader. Certainly we should not overestimate the scale of 
European trade in the area, which, for the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, did not cause major changes with regards to social and political structures. 
Gradual concentration of political and economic power during this period was far 
from being institutionalized.
European contact per se did not mean a sharp break in the history of the Sanaga- 
Ogowe, in spite of the transfonnations and instability resulting from it since the mid 
nineteenth century. Colonial conquest, however, had much more dramatic 
consequences in the history of the Sanaga-Ogowe as it removed communities5 
sovereignty and subsequently damaged their ability to deal with the series of 
transfonnations and instability that characterized the immediate precolonial period. In 
this respect, there is little doubt that the Spanish conquest of Rio Muni inten’upted the 
internal transformation process that was begun in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. From then on communities’ responses would be curbed by the limits imposed 
by the state, a completely new institution in the history of the region and whose power 
found no match in local institutions. Ever since, people’s actions and decisions have 
been, in many respects, a reaction to the series of policies imposed from the
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government ranks. With the establishment of the state, Sanaga-Ogowe communities 
lost one of its most cherished values, the autonomy that had shaped its social features 
for some five centuries and had allowed the expansion of their tradition across a large 
area of western Equatorial Africa. Deprived of their autonomy, village communities 
were unable to face the challenges posed by the colonial state, which now targeted 
key principles of their social, political and cultural organization.
Autonomy, nonetheless, was such a strong value within Sanaga-Ogowe society 
that its influence has somehow survived until today. In fact, the development of the 
new tradition is a reflection of people’s efforts to maintain or regain their autonomy. 
Both in the colony and in the postcolony, the state has remained as an illegitimate 
entity from which Equatorial Guinean society sees no representation. It is difficult to 
determine to what extent the state’s illegitimacy is related to bad government -  
meaning that working for the benefit of a small social minority -  or the pervasiveness 
of autonomy as a cultural and political principle. Throughout the twentieth century 
and up until today, Equatorial Guineans have waged a silent battle against the state, 
which sought to remove people’s agency while imposing its unilateral policies. Thus, 
the colonial state tried to transform Africans in order to create a ‘Hispanized’ social 
model. Africans, on the other hand, tried to retain their agency by creating their own 
answers to the conditions imposed by colonial modernity. Whatever the final 
objective of the Spanish and the Fang was, the reality is that neither of them quite 
succeeded due to the clash of wills. The new tradition and the colonial modernity are 
in fact the outcome of such clash, as both were motivated and limited by each other’s 
actions.
The existence of two socio-cultural models is perhaps the greatest failure of the 
colonial modernizing project. The nature of colonial domination lies behind the lack
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of integration that characterizes Equatorial Guinean society today. The colonial state 
was above all the political tool for the economic benefit of a small sector of society. 
In maintaining such an illegitimate situation, it was required to impose a particular set 
of social, political and economic structures -  the colonial model -  while seeking to 
transform -  modernize -  African society in an effort to legitimize foreign domination. 
Modernization, however, was in conflict with economic exploitation, as it would 
ultimately bring Africans to the level of ‘civilization’ that justified European rule over 
the African population. For this purpose, the Spanish authorities, like the rest of their 
counterparts across the continent, devised an incomplete form of modernization -  
colonial modernity -  that would allow the controlled transformation of Africans. This 
peculiar model of social organization, however, required the existence of ‘traditional’ 
structures so as to fill the gaps left by colonial modernity. Despite Equatorial 
Guineans having learnt to coexist with both social models, it seems evident that the 
effects of such coexistence are more negative than positive, as tradition and modernity 
keep hampering one another.
The development of new traditional socio-cultural structures did not result in the 
formation of a functional society in the fashion of its predecessor. The Sanaga-Ogowe 
organization, despite not being ideal, could at least respond effectively to most of the 
challenges that village communities faced on a day to day level. Fang society, 
however, found numerous limits to the development of adequate responses, as they 
had to fit within the limits imposed by the state. The clearest consequence of this has 
been the poor development of authority structures within modem Fang society. Most 
rural communities lack the necessary leadership to address all sorts of ordinary 
problems that the state chooses to ignore and which would be easily solved at local 
level had the necessary political structures be in place. The mere construction of a
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rudimentary bridge to cross a stream separating a village from farmland may pose a 
serious difficulty in many villages across Equatorial Guinea. Under these 
circumstances, Fang society has increasingly relied on state institutions to mediate in 
all kind of matters, from witchcraft, to marital conflicts, to debt disputes, and so forth.
Photograph 42: One o f the m ultiple watercourses that crisscross Rio Muni
As pervasive as the colonial state was, it left some room for manoeuvre. This 
allowed some forms of political organization outside the official sphere, such as those 
behind the e'Lat-Ayong movement in the 1930s and 1940s and the incipient 
nationalist movement of the 1950s. Certainly, the development of party-styled politics 
in the 1960s and especially the arrival of independence had a much more negative 
effect on Fang political structures than many might have anticipated. As Macias 
Nguema’s government lost its legitimacy, and helped by its intimate knowledge of 
traditional political organizations in rural areas, pressure was increased on all sorts of 
social associations. Although, under Obiang Nguema’s regime, religious 
manifestations have been allowed to flourish, the pattern remains very much the same 
for other forms of association, which tend to be considered highly suspicious. A
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traditional reluctance to develop organizations outside family limits combined with a 
climate of fear and repression has clearly undermined the ability of the Equatorial 
Guinean society to create the necessary level of association that modernity requires. 
One should not underestimate the role of fear alone as a political instrument in 
countries with underdeveloped civil societies like Equatorial Guinea.
Independence did not only show how superficial the Spanish modernizing project 
was, but more importantly that modernity, the colonial modernity that Africans came 
to know, was in no way viable within an independent nation. At the time of 
independence, Equatorial Guineans were not aware of this, and sought to perpetuate 
most of the basic structures left by the Spanish. Very soon, they realized that 
modernity was falling to pieces in the absence of the colonial masters. Macias 
Nguema had neither the human nor material resources to keep the system alive, but 
also he was an African himself trying to govern a system designed for foreign 
domination and exploitation on the basis of European cultural superiority. Under these 
circumstances and in the light of growing illegitimacy, it was necessary to find an 
alternative social and cultural model. Macias Nguema’s regime resorted to the new 
tradition which was now sequestered to serve the interest of an autocratic regime. In 
doing so, traditional structures have been deeply undermined, as they have been 
manipulated from the state in order to legitimize and strengthen its position.
Today, the loss of Fang autonomy is more obvious than ever, as the ruling elite 
dictate the direction of traditional structures. Nonetheless, no one should suppose that 
the process of retraditionalization that Equatorial Guinea has experienced since 1968 
has meant the total eradication of modernity. At an ideological level, colonial 
modernity legitimizes the existence of modem structures such as the state or even the 
national boundaries, and, at a material level, it provides the instruments to perpetuate
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another form of ‘colonial’ government, that of a ruling elite over the majority of 
Equatorial Guineans. Very few seem to accept traditional structures as a viable 
alternative; rather, the new tradition is a contingency solution in times of crisis. For 
traditional structures to actually become effective and come to terms with the needs of 
a modem nation state, Equatorial Guinean society requires a much greater level of 
representation than it enjoys today. Historically speaking, the new tradition is a rather 
recent phenomenon with a very long way to go before evolving into the sort of socio­
cultural model that is needed. As long as the state keeps acting as an illegitimate 
coercive apparatus, we cannot claim that the process of retraditionalization that we 
witness today is Africans’ genuine response to the crisis of modernity.
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